Half-breed Traders
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
This page intentionally left blank 
CANADA
and the
METIS,
1869-1885
D. N. Sprague
with a foreword by Thomas R. Berger
Wilfrid Laurier University Press
This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social
Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sci-
ences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Sprague, D. N. (Douglas Neil), 1944-
Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-88920-958-8 (bound) ISBN 0-88920-964-2 (pbk.)
1. Metis - Manitoba - History.* 2. Metis - Manitoba -
Government relations.* 3. Red River Settlement -
History. I. Title.
FC3372.9.M4S69 1988 971.27'02 C88-093344-5
F1063.S69 1988
Copyright © 198 8
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY PRESS
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5
88 89 90 91 4 3 2 1
Cover design by Vijen Vijendren
Map 2 drawn by Victor Lytwyn
Printed in Canada
Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885 has been produced from a manuscript supplied
in electronic form by the author.
No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system, translated or repro-
duced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche, or any other
means, without written permission from the publisher.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations vi
Foreword vii
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xi
1. Historiographical Introduction 1
2. Acquiring Canada's First Colony 19
3. Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 33
4. Negotiating with Delegates from the North West 55
5. Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 67
6. "Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 89
7. Amending the Manitoba Act 109
8. Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 129
9. Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 141
10. Confronting Riel and Completing the CPR 157
Conclusion 179
Note on Sources and Method 185
Selected Bibliography 189
Index 197
v
List of Illustrations
Photographs
Frontispiece: Half-breed Traders i
Sir John A. Macdonald, Nov. 1883 xii
H.Y. Hind, ca. 1869 18
William McDougall, 1867 32
N.J. Ritchot, ca. 1870 54
Alexander Morris, 1875 66
Survey Party, ca. 1875 87
Gilbert McMicken, 1880 88
Archbishop Tache, ca. 1870 108
Joseph Royal, ca. 1880 128
George Stephen, ca. 1885 140
Lawrence Clarke, ca. 1880 156
Louis Riel, ca. 1880 178
Maps
Map 1. The Red River Settlement and the
First Dominion Surveys 38
Map 2. Conflicting Claims to the Colony of St. Laurent 159
vi
Foreword
The story of the Metis is one of the epics of Canadian history: the rise on
the Prairies of a new nation of mixed blood ancestry, the emergence of a
distinct culture, the formation in 1869-70 of the provisional government to
defend their homeland, their dispersal. Yet in our own time the Metis have
re-entered Canada's history, seeking to discover their own past, and to find
a place for themselves in Canadian life.
The crucial year for the Metis was 1870. In that year Canada acquired
the Red River Settlement, the provisional government of Louis Riel fled,
and the dispersal of the Metis began. But it was in that same year that the
Manitoba Act was passed by Canada's Parliament, and confirmed the fol-
lowing year by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, to ensure that the
Metis would receive title to the river lots they occupied on the Red and
Assiniboine and land for future generations. These were solemn promises
made to the M6tis by the Government of Canada—promises which were
not kept.
In this book, Professor D.N. Sprague tells why the Metis did not
receive the land that was supposed to be theirs under the Manitoba Act.
John A. Macdonald and his Conservatives and Alexander Mackenzie and
the Liberals did not honour the promises in the Manitoba Act. The Cana-
dian Parliament passed a series of laws designed to undermine the rights
the Metis had under the Manitoba Act. These laws prepared the way for
settlers who moved westward to Manitoba from Ontario to acquire control
of the provincial legislature. They, in turn, enacted a series of measures to
ensure that the land allotted to the Metis would soon find its way into the
hands of settlers entering the province from the East. Professor Sprague
offers many examples of the methods used, such as legislation justifying
the sale of land allotted to Metis children without any of the safeguards
ordinarily required in connection with transactions with infants. Then there
were powers of attorney, tax sales — any number of stratagems could be
used, and were—to see that the land intended for the Metis and their fami-
lies 'went to others. All branches of the government participated. It is a
shameful tale, but one that must be told. It offers the explanation for the
fact that today the Metis, once dominant at Red River, indeed the
vii
viii Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
guardians of the community there, should now find themselves strangers in
their own land.
In 1982, the Canadian Parliament belatedly recognized the Metis as
one of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. It remains, to us, now that we
know how they lost their land, to see that they get the land-base they were
promised.
Thomas R. Berger
April 1987
Preface
The author's central purpose is to explain how the Red River Settlement,
one of the most persistent
1
 populations of North America from 1820 to
1869, dispersed almost entirely in the 1870s and failed to secure a new
homeland by migration to the Canadian North West in the early 1880s.
While students of other migrations are certain that push factors are as
important as pulls in any mass exodus, in the case of the Red River Metis,
the dispersal is usually attributed to some fatal flaw in the Metis character
rather than to external pressures arising after 1870. The present study is an
inquiry into the discouragements, formal and informal, that forced most of
the Red River Metis from Manitoba to Saskatchewan and culminated in the
rebellion of 1885.
Informal discouragements included intimidation of the original popu-
lation by hundreds, then thousands of ultra-Protestants from Ontario who
intended to establish new homes for themselves and to become a new
majority transforming the Quebec of the West into a new Ontario. Newco-
mers appropriated Metis land and made the old settlers feel like strangers in
a new land.
The Metis might have mounted an effective defence against such
informal pressure had they not faced overwhelming formal discouragement
from the acts of a colonial establishment created by the Government of
Canada. Ottawa witheld self-government from Manitoba until a preferred
1. The evidence for the remarkable persistence of the Red River Settlement is census data
compiled by the Hudson's Bay Company before 1849 in comparison with the figures
reported in the first Canadian enumeration of the district renamed Manitoba in 1870.
See D.N. Sprague and R.P. Frye, The Genealogy of the First Metis Nation (Winnipeg,
1983). Most of the families included in the earlier enumeration were included in the
first census by Canada twenty years later. (The typical rate of persistence elsewhere in
North America in the mid-nineteenth century was around thirty per cent for ten-year
intervals). See David Gagan, Hopeful Travellers: Families, Land, and Social Change
in Mid-Victorian Peel County, Canada West (Toronto, 1981), pp. 6, 95.
ix
x Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
majority was established. Facilitating the process were numerous Orders in
Council and Statutes of Canada, which shifted the administration of
insecure land titles from a legislature of the old settlers to a federal depart-
ment whose primary mission was guaranteeing the security of the newco-
mers.
Since the formal process of discouragement was the more irresistable
one, the operations of the Canadian bureaucreacy are the main focus of the
study. The important evidence is communication between officials in the
field and policy-makers in Ottawa. The highest level of consideration was
frequently the office of the Prime Minister, occasionally operating indepen-
dently of Cabinet or Parliament. And since Sir John A. Macdonald was the
individual who occupied the prime ministerial position for eleven of the
years between 1869 and 1885, his decisions are central to the story of for-
mal discouragement. Yet Macdonald was only one of many unsympathetic
actors in the drama. Given the pressure from the informal side, opportuni-
ties for accommodation of the Metis were easily missed by all operators of
the apparatus of formal control. Whether such moments passed by mere
carelessness or by deliberate inaction cannot be known with certainty in
every instance, but one overall conclusion is inescapably obvious: the
Government of Canada conceded a legal framework for the permanence of
the Red River Settlement as a province in response to force in 1870, and
subsequently presided over the dissolution of the terms of the Manitoba Act
with approximately the same regret as would be exhibited by an unwilling
victim escaping from a sales contract negotiated under duress.
Acknowledgements
Research support was provided by the Manitoba Metis Federation, the
Canadian Department of Secretary of State (Canadian Studies Directorate),
and the University of Manitoba Research Board. In the preparation of the
manuscript, helpful criticism came from sceptical colleagues: Professor
Thomas Flanagan at the University of Calgary, Dr. Philippe Mailhot at the
Saint-Boniface Museum, Professor J.E. Rea at the University of Manitoba,
and Professor Irene Spry of the University of Ottawa.
xi
Sir John A. Macdonald, Nov. 1883
(Public Archives of Canada [C5332])
"... forgery of medical evidence... uncontrolled terror in early
Manitoba ... mock diplomacy in 1869-70. Certain nasty bits had been
uncovered by establishment historians since 1936."
xii
Chapter 1
Historiographical Introduction
"Rebellions" of native peoples disturbed Canadian history in 1869 and
again in 1885. Neither encounter involved a massive number of "rebels,"
and both tended to be identified with a single person. In the first "Riel
rebellion," Louis Riel probably had no more than 700 active adherents. In
the second, the number of Metis taking up arms was less than 400. Not
surprisingly, neither event was significant by the number of casualties.
Only a few people died in the first instance; about fifty were killed on each
side in the second conflict with Canada. Still, few historians would quarrel
with the assertion that the Red River Resistance of 1869-70 and the North
West Rebellion of 1885 had profound significance for the country as a
whole because Canadians have debated heatedly and persistently the rights
and wrongs of the roles played by the various participants for more than a
century.
In the first frankly polemical accounts,
1
 the most salient theme was the
struggle of "civilization" against "barbarism" because the rebels in each
case were the "natives" of a newly acquired country. An aggressive but
compassionate New Dominion had defeated "semi-savage" obstacles to
progress. And since the defeat of the Metis represented a conquest of per-
sons whose language was French and religion was Roman Catholicism, the
victory was a triumph for English-Protestant ascendancy at the same time.
But so long as the French-Catholic minority in the rest of the country was
not similarly vanquished, it would be impossible to achieve a "Canadian"
consensus on the larger significance of the two "Riel Rebellions." Several
traditions of hagiography and demonology posed conflicting claims to the
larger truth.
In addition to the government-vindication tradition suggested above
(the story with the New Dominion of Canada in the role of hero, the part of
arch-villain played by "Dictator" Riel, and the Roman Catholic mis-
sionaries to the Metis falling somewhere in between), there was a French-
1. See George Bryce, A Short History of the Canadian People (London, 1887) or R.G.
MacBeth, Making the Canadian West (Toronto, 1905).
1
2 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Canadian version articulated by spokesmen for Canada's largest minority.
2
Here the tendency was to glorify saintly bishops and missionaries for their
heroic struggle to "civilize" the Metis and to resist the tide of Orange-
Protestant fanaticism emanating from Ontario. In the pro-French polemical
tradition, Riel was a demented leader of a flawed but pitiable people. Louis
Riel and the "semi-civilized" Metis ranked between the heroic clergy, on
the one hand, and the anti-Catholic fanatics in and out of government, on
the other hand.
Clearly, the government-vindication and the clerical-beatification
polemics did not serve the national pride of the Metis who believed that
they had followed neither dictator nor madman. Their version of events —
largely a matter of oral tradition—passed from generation to generation in
a number of different stories, occasionally surfacing in written petitions,
then finally appearing as a comprehensive history published in 1935.
3
 The
official "history of the Metis Nation" depicted Riel as visionary and mar-
tyr. Neither insane nor dictatorial, he operated with foresight and con-
sensus. The clergy were well meaning but cowardly; ultimately their
cowardice turned them into betrayers of the cause and prime speculators in
Metis land. Still, the clerical sin of cowardice paled beside the treachery of
strangers who plotted the destruction of Riel and his people through the
power of the state.
Sifting a more comprehensive truth from the competing polemical
traditions became the challenge to academic historians in the twentieth cen-
tury. To George Stanley, what was needed was to establish the good faith
of each set of principal actors. His Birth of Western Canada (first published
in 1936)
4
 adopted a tragic stance. While praising the New Dominion for its
zealous expansionism (a sign of "nationalism" and "aggressive civiliza-
tion," both worthy attributes for Stanley), he still expressed sympathy for
the frustrations of the clergy and the tragic losses of the Indians and the
Metis. The tragedy was their "doom" as a people.
The natives had to fail. They were "primitive peoples" standing
against the march of "civilization" (p. 88). At the minimum, they had to be
pushed aside to make way for newcomers. The Metis plan to resist Canada
in 1869 was absurd. Still, they did not deserve hatred for the attempt. Their
one contemptible action in 1869-70 was the "cruel act of bloodshed" in
2. See DP. Benoit, Vie de Monseigneur Tache, archeveque de Saint-Boniface, 2 vols.
(Montreal, 1904); and A.G. Morice, History of the Catholic Church in Western
Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1910).
3. A.H. de Tremaudan, Histoire de la Nation Metisse dans I Quest canadien (Montreal,
1935). In English translation (by Elizabeth Maguet), the work is Hold High Your
Heads (Winnipeg, 1982).
4. The place of publication was London, England. A generation later a Canadian firm
acquired the copyright and reprinted the work in a resurrected but unrevised edition
(Toronto, 1961).
Historiographical Introduction 3
the matter of Thomas Scott's execution for counter-insurgency. "The
charges brought against Scott... were hardly offences that demanded the
death penalty" (pp. 105-106). And even if Scott did deserve "a form of
punishment used only as a last resort in civilized communities," his execu-
tion was politically inexpedient. The Metis invited terrible reprisals. Up to
March 4, 1870 their resistance had been peaceful, "almost bloodless, but
this regrettable event aroused those latent racial and religious passions
which have been so deplorable a feature of Canadian history, and left bitter
memories that were not soon forgotten" (p. 106).
Stanley's evidence that Canada might have forgiven the Metis for
non-violent rebellion was that the Government of Canada continued to fol-
low a process of conciliation through the passage of the Manitoba Act in
May; the fatal error of the Scott matter meant that the government had to
turn a blind eye to the violence of newcomers entering the new province
thirsting for the blood of Scott's murderers. And since the key people of the
provisional government had to be denied amnesty for the same reason, no
Metis person could lead the government of Manitoba in the first critical
years of the province's history.
"Sullen, suspicious and estranged from their [new] white neighbours
and by the actions of the Canadians and the non-promulgation of the
amnesty, almost immediately many metis began to look for new homes"
(p. 179). Ineffectively led in their homeland, they sought a land of second
chance west and north on the Saskatchewan River. Unfortunately, they
soon discovered that their status as "first settlers in the North West Terri-
tories" did not exempt them from the provisions of the Dominion Lands
Act (p. 251). Stanley believed Canada was wrong to have disregarded their
new claims. "The attempt to impose an unfamiliar, and to the metis, unsa-
tisfactory system of survey, and thus deprive them of their river-frontages
and destroy their village community life, invited armed resistance" (p.
255).
No one could be surprised by the displaced Manitobans' retrieval of
Louis Riel from exile in 1884. Nor surprised that he, in his turn, decided to
follow the "tactics which he had employed in 1869 and 1870" (p. 314). He
formed a second provisional government even though the clergy advised
against such a move and condemned him for it. Their reaction was too
strong, in Stanley's view. "Riel had no intention of fighting the Dominion
with arms; it had not been necessary in 1869; it would not be necessary in
1885." Canada would be shocked into a negotiated settlement as before.
"But instead of commissioners came troops" (p. 314).
Stanley did not hesitate to proclaim the "justice of the metis case" (p.
251). Canada's disregard of the Saskatchewan land question was clear.
"The case against the Government is conclusive" (p. 261). Canada was
guilty of "ministerial incompetence, parliamentary indifference, and
administrative delay" (p. 244). Officials had committed "serious
4 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
blunders" (pp. 260-61) even though Canadian native policy in general was
well intentioned, exhibiting "honesty, justice, and good faith"; Canada
caused "no wars of extermination or compulsory migrations" (p. 214). In
suppressing the rebellion of 1885, Canada's troops did little burning, loot-
ing, property damage, or killing. And "reason and conciliation ultimately
prevailed" (p. 407).
Such was the first attempt at balanced interpretation. Stanley's curious
mix of shallow praise and weak condemnation suggested that his Birth of
Western Canada was merely the beginning of the larger task of mediation.
The work attracted little attention in Canada at the time of publication in
1936. Reviewers tended to pass his conclusions with little criticism and less
praise.
5
 No one challenged his tortuous sequence: the Metis were deter-
mined to win a secure land base and political control over their homeland
in 1869-70, showed no interest in land or politics in Manitoba in the 1870s,
then became remarkably interested and determined again in Saskatchewan
in 1884-85. Stanley attributed the erratic course of events to a certain petu-
lance likely to be encountered in all primitive peoples who "felt that the
country was theirs" (pp. 48-49).
The concept of primitivism disturbed a young W.L. Morton, as evi-
denced in an article (published in 1937) on the development of Red River
institutional structures.
6
 Without citing Stanley by name, Morton still
presented a sharply contrasting analysis. He agreed that the Red River Set-
tlement had become more and more "Indian" by intermarriage from 1820
to 1870, just as he readily conceded that most people in the Red River Set-
tlement were more involved in freighting and the production of plains pro-
visions than with full-time field agriculture. The contrast emerged in
Morton's insistence that the settlement's striking backwardness was in
government institutions because the Hudson's Bay Company had imposed
a "seigniorial despotism" on the colony. The HBC-appointed council was
"mild, often benevolent" but in no sense accountable to the residents of
the parishes, not until 1869 (pp. 95-96). Then parish representatives united,
perhaps not as a single unit (as one English-speaking member of the provi-
sional government asserted) but "the degree of unity was sufficient to give
good ground for Riel's attempt to form a united front and present terms to
Canada" (p. 98).
What the rebels had done was not entirely well done. The Scott matter
5. In Stanley's view, The Birth of Western Canada (London, 1936) was "largely
ignored" at the time of first publication. See his remarkably personal account of the
development of the historiography before and since 1936 in his "Last Word on Louis
Riel — the Man of Several Faces," in F. Laurie Barron and James B. Waldram, eds.,
1885 and After: Native Society in Transition, (Regina, 1986), pp. 3-22.
6. "The Red River Parish," in R.C. Lodge, ed., Manitoba Essays, (Toronto, 1937), pp.
92-105.
Historiographical Introduction 5
in particular was a "fatal blunder" but overall they had acted with "dig-
nity" and true to the "old, proud claim of the Metis to be a 'new nation'
[they had] mustered a militia and created representative institutions" (pp.
99, 102). When Canada admitted the Red River Settlement to Confedera-
tion as Manitoba, "the Dominion recognized rather than created" (p. 105).
The question remained: if Manitobans were a well-rooted national people
determined to defend their homeland from invasion by what Stanley had
called an "almost foreign country" (pp. 48-49), why then was the dispersal
of population so sudden and complete after winning a charter for national
survival in the Manitoba Act?
Morton kept working on the problem and eventually found all that he
cared to know in a two-volume monograph on "the Canadian half-breed"
written in Paris by a French ethnographer during the Nazi occupation.
7
According to Marcel Giraud, the Metis were a "mixed-blood" people inca-
pable of responding to their own best interests. Well-intentioned agents of
civilization had tried to educate and mould them to greater competence but
had failed. The Metis rejection of proper educational and moral instruction
resulted in their decline, ruin, and extinction as a people.
Giraud saw nothing dignified or reasonable in their "nation" claim;
he saw only vanity and violence. Defiance of Canada invited reprisal; the
murder of Scott invited murders in revenge. The proof of Metis inferiority
was their inability to fight an effective defence. "The attacks, the violent
acts of every kind that were now directed against the Metis ... aggravated
the inherent weaknesses of their nature, of their upbringing and their
antecedents, and precipitated the disintegration of their group" (p. 374).
The reign of terror that began, paradoxically, with the arrival of troops sent
to guarantee an orderly beginning for the new province continued with the
arrival of new settlers because Ontarians, "grouped around their Orange
Lodge, could commit the worst excesses with impunity" (p. 377). Yet
Giraud refused to connect such violence to a larger pattern of denial of
rights. Any injustices by the Government of Canada were "unintended"
(pp. 381-382). The root cause of the dispersal was the fatal inferiority of the
Metis themselves.
According to Giraud, the principal activities of freighting and the pro-
duction of plains provisions for the Hudson's Bay Company were "distrac-
tions" rather than "occupations"; they were reflections of origin rather
than rational adaptations likely to give way to new responses in subsequent
historical development. Metis reluctance to take up full-time farming was
proof that they were "incapable of understanding any plan of life other
7. Marcel Giraud, Le Metis canadien: son role dans I'histoire des provinces de I'Quest, 1
vols. (Paris, 1945). The work is now available in English: The Metis in the Canadian
West, translated by George Woodcock, 2 vols. (Edmonton, 1986). Page citations
follow the Woodcock translation, vol. 2.
6 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
than nomadism." The few Metis who pretended to be farmers showed they
were "incapable of caring for them in a sensible manner" (p. 388). They
rapidly ran into debt and many sold their land to clergy hoping to "substi-
tute for these unambitious individuals a race whose qualities were in no
way inferior to those of the immigrants of English or Germanic language"
(p. 390). It was no surprise to Giraud that the same cycle of agitation and
violence followed the exodus to Saskatchewan and ' 'aggravated the causes
of the decay from which this people was suffering" (p. 452).
For the Manitoba historian learning to react against the word ' 'primi-
tive" as an interpretive category, the discovery of Marcel Giraud must have
been disturbing. What W.L. Morton should have pointed out in his review
of "the Canadian half-breed"
8
 in 1950 was that Giraud appeared to have
done pioneering research in vast arrays of new material without learning to
see beyond the literal to the functional meaning of written testimony, a
weakness that was particularly evident in Giraud's use of missionary chron-
icles and clerical correspondence. Here, for example, was Giraud using
Bishop Grandin of Saskatchewan to paint a gloomy prediction of Metis
failure for Archbishop Tache of Manitoba: "It will be just the same
here—neither worse nor better as at St Boniface. Our poor Metis will leave
their lands to strangers and withdraw as far as they can withdraw. They are
a people without energy on whom one cannot count" (p. 430). Instead of
interpreting the letter as an indication of pedagogical frustration, Giraud
cited Grandin's words for their literal meaning. He did not read the mis-
sionary bias. The same point missed Morton's notice.
' 'Giraud presents the Metis four square, in all his vivacity, colour and
historical significance, depicts the first beginnings of the mixed race, its
swift rise to 'national' consciousness, its half century of coherent life, and
demonstrates the inevitability and pathos of its doom" (pp. 61-62). Thus
Morton abandoned his previous celebration of the "autocthonous" people
settled in their neat little "white washed houses clustered on the points and
bays of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers."
9
 Following Giraud, Morton
began to think of the Metis as the misfits of the West, distracted from true
civilization by hunting and voyaging, activities that "bound them ineluct-
ably to nomadism and to barbarism." Their riverfront habitations were just
"rude log cabins," places for keeping their "few possessions, carts, horses,
perhaps a few cattle. There they cultivated rudely their potato patches, and
tiny fields of grain. But the hunt, the trapline, the 'free' fur trade, drew
them seasonally away" (p. 65). They clung stubbornly to their "primitive
barbarism" and followed the "easier course" away from field agriculture
8. In The Beaver (September 1950), pp. 3-7; reprinted in A.B. McKillop, ed., Contexts of
Canada's Past: Selected Essays of W.L. Morton (Toronto, 1980), pp. 61-68. Page
citations follow the McKillop edition.
9. Morton, "Red River Parish," p. 89.
Historiographical Introduction 1
to the end of the wandering life, defeat, and the scaffold at Regina (pp. 62-
63). If the Metis were victimized, they were willing victims, defeated
finally by their own defects of character. ' 'It was their tragedy that the ins-
tability and violence of Riel, reflecting the inherent instability and ready
violence of his own uncertain people, ruined his achievement and destroyed
his nation" (p. 67).
Six years later Morton was still endorsing Giraud's "magnificent
study" but managed to cling to a fragment of his earlier denial of Red
River primitivism. His history of the Red River "resistance,"
10
 published
in 1956 (and his general history of Manitoba
11
 which appeared one year
later), suggested that the nomadic Metis rebelled in 1869 not because they
resisted learning the ways of a settled agricultural existence — not from an
irrational defence of their alleged primitivism—but because they preferred
instruction by French-speaking, Roman Catholic newcomers. "What the
Metis chiefly feared in 1869 was not the entrance of the agricultural frontier
of Ontario into Red River—and they would have welcomed that of
Quebec — but the sudden influx of immigrants of English speech and Pro-
testant faith" (p. 2). Riel recognized that "their evolution away from
nomadism was incomplete" and feared that his people would be
overwhelmed by the "inrush of British Canadian land-seekers from Ontario
before the metis had finally abandoned the wandering life of hunters and
tripmen and settled down as farmers in the parishes of the Red and Assini-
boine" (p. 5). They strove to protect the stake of each individual to his rude
private plot by protecting the French-Catholic character of the group as a
whole.
It was the second more ambitious goal that brought them into conflict
with Canada. Morton believed that "the Canadian government was entirely
ready to grant the normal rights of British subjects to all civilized individu-
als in the North-West, without respect to race. But it had no idea that it was
dealing with a corporate entity, a 'nation' by sentiment and by their own
claim" (p. 3). And since the demand for "corporate rights" was consider-
ably more than Canada was prepared to concede, the government naturally
resisted. Included in the description of Canada's counter-resistance was
Morton's disclosure that Donald A. Smith (the ranking Canadian officer of
the Hudson's Bay Company recruited by the government in Montreal to
travel to Red River in December 1869) accepted a mission of subversion
more than conciliation: "the general purpose of his activities was clearly to
create an anti-Riel party amongst the English and metis by the use of the
influence of the Hudson's Bay Company, and by bribes" (p. 89). Morton
10. The term "resistance" appeared as Morton's own new label in his book-length editor's
introduction to Alexander Begg's Red River Journal and Other Papers Relative to the
Red River Resistance of 1869-70 (Toronto, 1956).
11. Manitoba: A History (Toronto, 1957).
8 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
did not suggest that such a step disqualified the good faith expressed in the
documents that Smith carried to conceal the covert mission. Morton's criti-
cism was that the "game" was "tortuous and difficult," too much for one
person to "play against the wary and entrenched Kiel" (p. 84).
The "design" failed in its principal objective, and that failure led to
the abortive counter-insurgency that culminated in Thomas Scott's death in
March 1870. Morton suggested that the killing of Scott was "difficult to
explain" because another counter-insurgent had been similarly tried and
condemned but set free. William Gaddy had been captured, imprisoned,
court-martialled, and ordered executed, then he disappeared. "The rumour
was subsequently put about that he had been shot; but actually he had been
led by a firing party away from the fort, and at the last moment released and
told to leave the country" (p. 103). Morton was puzzled by the different
conclusion of the Scott case. In Morton's speculation, Thomas Scott was
the object of exceptional treatment because of the extraordinary hatred he
and his guards shared for one another. He had to be executed or they would
have killed him without the sanction of the provisional government. "The
execution of Scott was preferable to his murder" (p. 115). The ceremoni-
ous shooting saved the illusion of orderly process, but the alternate form of
killing Scott was still a fatal error. Before March 4, 1870 "all might have
ended peacefully." After the execution, revenge became a necessary
feature of any settlement acceptable to Ontario.
Morton's new version of the story raised a question concerning the
Manitoba Act: if the Scott matter determined a vengeful outcome, why did
Canada go on with the impression of conciliation, including the concession
of the Manitoba Act in May? Here Morton explained that Prime Minister
Macdonald was desperate for British participation in a military expedition
to impose order, but the Colonial Office was "emphatic" that the Canadi-
ans first had to negotiate a settlement acceptable to the "Roman Catholic
settlers." Without elaborating the point in detail, Morton asserted that the
delegates from Red River "bargained hard" and if they had known "the
pressure the Canadian representatives were under from the Colonial office
to effect a settlement, would have bargained harder" (p. 135).
Morton's finding that Canada made large concessions to win British
military aid and the disclosure that the Smith mission was an exercise in
subversion as much as in diplomacy might have led some investigators to
search for other signs of duplicity in the pacification of the Metis, espe-
cially in accounting for the massive exodus after 1870. But Giraud had
given Morton all the reason he needed: the Metis were incurable nomads
incapable of accepting agriculture. It was not necessary to ask if the land-
promise provisions of the Manitoba Act had been broken along with the
assurance of an amnesty. Curiously, though, Morton did present evidence
that the government made no effort to control even its own ' 'expedition of
Historiographical Introduction 9
peace." To the officers and other ranks, "it was an expedition to avenge
the murder of Scott."
12
 The violence that followed (the general disorder
Giraud had called a "reign of terror") Morton might have labeled the
bleeding Kansas phase of Manitoba history. He recognized that the early
expansion of Ontarians was more than a quest for individual plots by land-
hungry pioneers. Homesteaders demanded neighbours like themselves.
"Whoever possessed the soil would give the new province their language,
faith and laws."
13
 So they deliberately took up land that was already occu-
pied, as well as apparently vacant tracts, and were sustained in such tres-
passes by the Government of Canada. Morton did not inquire if the support
of interlopers had been promised in advance, if the Ontario bias was part of
a deliberate strategy to assure Ontario's advantage in the race to determine
whether Manitoba would remain a second Quebec. Morton asserted that
Canada had done its best to move "with all possible speed to quiet fears
and to ensure that the land rush would be peaceful and orderly."
14
 In
Morton's view, there were no serious blunders or intentional injustices in
the administration of the Manitoba Act.
Morton's uncritical stance was taken one step further by Donald
Creighton. His award-winning two-volume biography of Sir John A. Mac-
donald, which amounted to a general history of Canada, was published
almost simultaneously with Morton's work on Manitoba. The nominal
focus of the second volume
15
 was Macdonald's prime ministerial career
from 1867 to 1891, but the author's larger purpose was telling the story of
the national government as personified in the country's founder and proto-
type leader. With such heroic scope, a few thousand Metis might have
escaped the notice of another historian, but Creighton devoted several
chapters to Macdonald's interaction with Riel and offered a thorough rein-
terpretation in the process.
In Creighton's rendition of the first episode, the story was of a rebel-
lion by "half-breed rioters." Another country might have responded with
force and asked questions later. Canada had to "behave in as patient and
conciliatory a fashion as possible." Smith's was a straightforward
diplomatic mission; and, when diplomacy failed, Riel gave "one final proof
of the fact that military power was the one solid and constant basis of his
provisional government" (p. 59). He murdered Thomas Scott. Still Canada
persisted in the quest for a negotiated settlement because, from one side,
Macdonald had to respond to pressure from the British, and, from another
more immediate source, powerful pressure for a negotiated settlement came
12. Morton, Manitoba, p. 143.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
14. Ibid.
15. John A. Macdonald; vol. 2, The Old Chieftain (Toronto, 1955).
10 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
from the important French-Canadian wing of Macdonald's own party. The
normally "docile troop" of French-Canadian Conservative supporters were
bound to reject any settlement that did not satisfy the "fanatical" priest
Riel had sent to Ottawa as his principal negotiator (pp. 62-63). Conse-
quently, when Father Ritchot insisted upon "absurdly premature" provin-
cial status for the Red River Settlement and held out for similarly unreason-
able promises with respect to land, language, and schools, his will was
done — but as a matter of expediency, for the sake of peace, rather than to
strike a blueprint for the future.
Creighton's hostile rendition of the Metis and his unusually sym-
pathetic depiction of Canada's duplicitous response to their demands
became even more pronounced in his version of the second rebellion. But
since Creighton worked from the perspective of Macdonald's full range of
problems, the discussion of Canada's reaction to Metis demands acquired a
reality absent from previous accounts. Creighton showed that the nuisance
of Riel was tied to the leading preoccupation of the government in 1884-85.
"The prime purpose of Canada was to achieve a separate political
existence on the North American Continent." That was to be realized by
the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), whose "prime
function" was "to help in the building of the national economy and the
national society which alone would make this ambition possible of achieve-
ment" (pp. 301-302).
A first effort to launch the railway had failed in 1873. A new begin-
ning came in 1881 with Canada linking its fortunes to George Stephen,
"perhaps the greatest creative genius in the whole history of Canadian
finance" (p. 305). But Stephen could not work miracles. Canada had to
subsidize the project enormously. Initial grants were "simply the first and
most impressive pledges of a partnership which grew tighter and more
inextricable with the passage of time" (p. 303). In 1883 and again in 1884
additional aid was demanded and provided. The later rescue "very nearly
doubled the subsidy" (p. 376) and taxed Macdonald's powers of persuasion
to his limit. Since the second subsidy was "out of all reason and all pre-
cedent" (p. 366), Macdonald called on his old friend and cofounder of
Canada, Charles Tupper, then on diplomatic service in England. With
Tupper temporarily seconded to Ottawa, Macdonald accomplished the
great work of saving the railway in February 1884. Then, at the end of the
stormy session, Macdonald sought a well-deserved rest at his summer home
by the sea. Unfortunately, Macdonald's "summer holidays were no longer
real holidays." He sought escape in June, but in July and August the "visi-
tors and mails kept continually arriving. Besides, he wanted them to
arrive" (pp. 383-384).
Thus Macdonald learned the disturbing news that "the evil genius of
the Red River Rebellion" had returned to the North West in July of 1884
(p. 383). Trouble was brewing. The claims of the Manitoba "half breeds
Historiographical Introduction 11
and the other squatters" had been settled years before in Manitoba (p. 246),
but having thrown away their opportunities to speculators, they enjoyed a
brief "spree," drifted west, and renewed the demand for land and cash. As
before, they were calling themselves the Metis nation and claiming recog-
nition on that account. "In the settlement process they were a nation of
squatters. Macdonald knew, as any lawyer knew, that squatters were notori-
ously suspicious, impatient, and stubborn people, and that the settlement of
their ill-defined claims was probably the most exasperating and difficult
problem that could confront a land-granting department" (p. 369). Their
complaints were without much substance, of course. "Yet this did not
mean that Macdonald considered the matter closed. The half-breed claims
could be settled...." Even Riel might be transformed into a loyal client.
"The whole issue was a proper subject for compromise" (p. 387).
Then, while still on holiday in August, Macdonald learned the more
dreadful truth that Stephen was "far from through his difficulties" (p. 383).
The president of the railway began to make "disquieting hints" in August
and September that the "enormous aid" voted in February "would not be
enough to secure the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway" (p.
389). In the new crisis, Stephen sought British private assistance and per-
suaded Macdonald to accompany him on the mission to Baring Brothers in
Britain. The leisurely crossing gave Stephen ample opportunity to reveal
"the deepest urgency of the Canadian Pacific's necessities" (p. 394). Once
in London, Macdonald "began another set of equally lengthy discussions
on the same subject with Tupper. Tupper emphatically agreed with him that
a final effort to save the railway must be made" (pp. 396-397). The ques-
tion was one of strategy: "How was he to convince his followers — his
own Cabinet—that government aid to the Canadian Pacific was necessary
once again?" (p. 396). Creighton found nothing to indicate that either
veteran foresaw a suitable combination of enabling circumstances. Not
even Macdonald saw a way out of the problem of making additional sub-
sidy politically palatable. He "literally had not the faintest idea. But he had
given his word to Stephen" (p. 397).
In the meantime the western crisis had reached new, more dangerous
proportions. On the eve of Macdonald's departure with Stephen, "just
before he left Ottawa," the Prime Minister had received what Creighton
called a "most disquieting" report from Saskatchewan (p. 394). The Metis
wanted more than their little plots, more even than some token cash in
recognition of their imaginary share of Indian title. They were demanding
both and two million acres of additional land and a royalty for themselves
and the Indians to be paid in perpetuity on all future western development.
For himself, Riel claimed a special personal indemnity in compensation for
alleged past injuries. Later, with Macdonald and Stephen back in Canada,
and the Metis demands still unmet, a more moderately worded petition
arrived in December and came before Cabinet as one of the first items
12 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
of business in the new year. ' 'It was at this point, when the government
expected negotiations and was prepared to make real concessions, that a
most disquieting piece of news arrived from the north-west" (p. 413).
Government agents had just learned that Riel would bring the entire protest
to an abrupt and peaceful conclusion if a certain price were met. "My name
is Riel and I want material," were his actual words, they said. "To Mac-
donald, it was a shattering revelation. It made the whole agitation seem a
malevolent sham" (p. 414).
Of course Canada could not give in to blackmail. Nor was Macdonald
frightened by the risk of standing on principle in the matter. ' 'Deep in the
final privacy of his being, he refused to believe that a single half-breed
megalomaniac could destroy the west as a homeland for British Americans
or that the track which was to bind Canada together would be permitted to
fail for a few million dollars" (p. 415). Then the unexpected happened.
Before informing Riel that the government would never stoop to bri-
bery, Canada took the precaution of informing the Metis that they might
take their claims to a special commission which would hear "half-breed
claims" in the spring. Wounded by his private disappointment, Riel sought
revenge. He persuaded his deluded followers that no one's claim was safe
and led everyone who called him leader into rebellion. At that point,
according to Creighton, Macdonald stopped wondering what was going to
happen, and started acting to make the best of a worsening situation which
now included the financial collapse of the CPR. The two emergencies had
developed separately yet coincidentally, and ' 'together they might destroy
him and his Canada." They had to be resolvdd separately, but they could be
"played off against each other. And in that possibility did not there still lie
a real hope? He could use the railway to defend the west. He could use the
west to justify the railway" (p. 417).
And so he did. But in the discovery of the dramatic linkage of the rail-
way to the rebellion, a scholar more critical than Creighton might have
sought an earlier date for the connection. If the evidence established that
Macdonald had linked the one with the other (perhaps as early as his first
learning of the new difficulties facing the CPR late in August of 1884),
such an investigator would necessarily have sought some intentional provo-
cation in the superficial conciliation of January 1885. And if the evidence
suggested that the government was playing a duplicitous game in 1884-85,
as well as in 1869-70, the issue of Canadian good faith overall would come
into a new perspective. In one form or another, the presumption of
benevolence that was such a conspicuous anomaly of the historiography
since Stanley's first attempt to balance the three polemical traditions in
1936 would finally have faced a direct challenge.
First one needed to question the fullness of Creighton's answer. Mor-
ton did not. He repeated Creighton's version in a history of Canada
Historiographical Introduction 13
published in 1963.
16
 Nor did Stanley challenge Creighton in a new biogra-
phy of Riel which appeared in the same year.
17
 The author of The Birth of
Western Canada continued to sympathize with the tragic fate of the Metis
leader and his people, but still did not question the presumption of govern-
ment good faith. In the next decade, another historian sympathetic to the
Metis, Lewis H. Thomas, published an eccentric study of Kiel's treason
trial and called Kiel's execution a "judicial murder."
18
 Otherwise the story
of Metis-government relations as told by Canadian academics remained as
Morton and Creighton had left the subject in the 1950s.
Feeling poorly served by establishment scholars, Metis people began
to address the issues for themselves and refined their earlier polemical trad-
ition for current consumption.
19
 Only Quebec's new found anti-clericalism
and heightened indifference to anything beyond the borders of the
quebecois homeland prevented a revival of the intermediate polemic glori-
fying the clergy. Since academic historians tend to think they are above
"advocacy history," the government-vindication tradition embellished by
Morton and Creighton reigned as the objective truth of the early
16. The full title was The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times
(Toronto, 1963).
17. The title was simply Louis Riel (Toronto, 1963).
18. "A Judicial Murder — The Trial of Louis Riel," in Howard Palmer, ed., The
Settlement of the West (Calgary, 1977).
19. Howard Adams, Prison of Grass (Toronto, 1975) is perhaps the best example of the
genre. Other similar works followed from the patronage of the Gabriel Dumont
Institute, an educational arm of the Association of Metis and Non-status Indians of
Saskatchewan. They supported Martin Schulman's and Don McLean's development of
Creighton's link of the railway to the North West Rebellion into a full-blown
provocation thesis. See McLean and Schulman, appearing first as "Lawrence Clarke:
Architect of Revolt," Canadian Journal of Native Studies 3 (1983), pp. 57-68. Mclean
later published the same argument in more elaborate form as 1885: Metis Rebellion or
Government Conspiracy? (Winnipeg, 1985). Peripheral to the same trend dating from
the late 1970s was the work of D.N. Sprague, which was supported by the Manitoba
Metis Federation, examining the administration of the land promises of the Manitoba
Act. His "The Manitoba Land Question, 1878-1882" (Journal of Canadian Studies 15
[1980], pp. 74-84) and "Government Lawlessness in the Administration of Manitoba
Land Claims, 1876-1887" (Manitoba Law Journal 10 [1980], pp. 415-441) received
more favourable consideration by academic historians. Adams and McLean were
called "tendentious" (Stanley, "Last Word," p. 13; and Thomas Flanagan, "Louis
Riel: A Review Essay," Journal of Canadian Studies 21 [1986], pp. 157-164), while
Sprague's argument was considered scholarly if not fully proven (Thomas Flanagan,
Riel and the Rebellion 1885 Reconsidered [Saskatoon, 1983], p. 26; and Gerald
Friesen, The Canadian Prairies [Toronto, 1984], pp. 197-199). Several historians
departing from (yet consistent with) Sprague in their own original research are Gerhard
Ens, "Metis Lands in Manitoba, 1870-1887," Manitoba History 5 (1983), pp. 2-11;
Diane Payment, Batoche, 1870-1910 (Saint-Boniface, 1983); and Nicole St-Onge,
"The Dissolution of a Metis Community: Pointe a Grouette, 1860-1885," Studies in
Political Economy 18 (1985), pp. 149-172.
14 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
1980s. Then a scholarly reconsideration of the issues attracted attention in
1984.
The author of an intellectual biography of Riel and Deputy Editor of
the Riel Papers, Thomas Flanagan, announced that there were serious flaws
in the "conventional-account" of Canada-Metis relations.
20
 Ironically, the
"reigning orthodoxy" Flanagan attacked was "Stanley's version": the one
work of an academic historian writing in English that concluded there were
"serious unresolved grievances" driving the Metis to rebellion "after legal
means of action had failed" in 1885 (p. viii). Flanagan asserted that "all
subsequent historians" had drawn on Stanley's work. Flanagan appeared to
ignore the progression of scholarship away from Stanley, and how his own
contribution was completely conventional in that regard.
Flanagan took the story one step beyond Creighton. His ' 'reconsidera-
tion" focused exclusively on the Metis in 1885. The crisis in the West did
not appear in relation to the crisis with the railway. Nor did the rebellion of
1884-85 relate to the resistance of 1869-70. Flanagan denied that there
were any direct links between the first action and the second except in the
mind of Louis Riel, who considered the Manitoba Act and the promised
amnesty a kind of treaty that left the Metis free to "remove themselves"
from Confederation if the bargain were "broken in either of its branches"
(p. 83). To Flanagan, no such provision existed in law. Consequently, there
could be no legal basis for framing a provisional government a second time
even if the promises of 1870 had been disregarded in the 1870s.
Dismissing Riel's rationale as a legal argument, Flanagan did not pur-
sue its basis in fact. A sketch of the "government's performance in Mani-
toba" convinced him that the administration of the Manitoba Act had "left
much to be desired." But, following Morton after Giraud, Thomas
Flanagan thought that "the great migration had more to do with social pres-
sure exerted by the white immigrants and the retreat of the buffalo ..." (p.
26).
As migrants to Saskatchewan, the Metis did come into conflict with
government officials. They had to, because they took up land as they
pleased in "outright defiance of regulations" (p. 27). No wonder the
government was reluctant to consider their claims. Officials were powerless
to bend rules for Metis "squatters." They had to treat them "exactly the
same as all other settlers according to legislation and settled policy" (p.
51). And officials treated them well. Flanagan reported that the Department
of the Interior had conducted a case-by-case survey in 1884 to determine
the precise nature of each claim, what part of the land could be granted as
homestead (after the performance of adequate settlement duties), and what
20. Flanagan, Riel and the Rebellion 1885 Reconsidered. Flanagan's earlier work on Riel
was Louis "David" Riel: "Prophet of the New World" (Toronto, 1979).
Historiographical Introduction 15
part was open for purchase because of its position in the rectangular survey.
Then in 1885 the Metis received written notification of the results — before
the rebellion. "Between 26 February and 7 March, a letter was sent to each
of the claimants stating the terms on which he could make entry" (p. 47).
Flanagan admitted that he was unable to find copies of the letters or other
evidence to confirm his assertion that a "reasonable compromise" had set-
tled the river-lot question before the rebellion began (p. 15). But he was
positive that "no Metis were forced off their chosen lands" (p. 49).
Another argument developed by assumption and poorly supported
assertion accompanied Flanagan's version of government reaction to the
other principal Metis demand: cash compensation for extinguishing their
share of Indian title. Flanagan believed that the formation of a "half breed
claims commission" announced by telegram on 4 February should have
ended agitation on the aboriginal title demand. His explanation for the con-
tinuation of protest echoed Creighton's assertion that Riel made concilia-
tion look like provocation (p. 76). "The cryptic telegram, of which he
made himself the interpreter, became evidence of the government's refusal
to deal with the Metis—the exact opposite of its intended meaning" (p.
71). According to Flanagan, Riel had been plotting rebellion "almost from
the beginning":
Riel saw in the grievances of the Metis an opportunity to implement his
theory that the Manitoba 'treaty' had been broken; that the Metis were the
real owners of the North-West; that they could renegotiate entry into Con-
federation; that they must receive a seventh of the value of the land of the
North-West as compensation for letting others live there; and they could
seek an independent political destiny if these terms were not met. Colla-
borating with white agitators like Jackson who were chiefly interested in
provincial status and responsible government, he embarked upon a complex
and deliberately deceptive strategy of making successively more radical
demands. A Bill of Rights amounting to a Declaration of Independence was
envisioned almost from the beginning. Finally, when Riel realized there was
an unbridgeable gap between himself and Jackson, he determined to go it
alone, as he had in 1869. The Metis would take the lead, rise in arms, and
carry the English half-breeds and white settlers with them. (pp. 99-100)
Canada had no choice but to deal firmly with the rebel leader after res-
toring order, but the government did overstep the limits of propriety in
resorting to "forgery" of certain medical evidence to hasten Kiel's hang-
ing. According to Flanagan, "This is the one episode in the North West
Rebellion in which the government may be accused, not of delays or mis-
taken judgment, but of bad faith" (p. 145). The rest was excusable. Any
other errors were honest mistakes, "not part of a calculated campaign to
destroy the Metis or deprive them of their rights" (p. 146).
No academic historian had echoed the official history more faithfully.
No one had come closer to providing a complete echo of the "statement of
16 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
leading facts" prepared for the Governor General by the Department of the
Interior in April 1885. The key elements of the interpretation were govern-
ment fairness, on the one hand, and Metis intransigence (misled by Riel),
on the other. In the official history, Canada was a helpless victim:
The real causes of the agitation have... been beyond the control of the
Government. As already pointed out, the half-breeds have asked for nothing
reasonable at the hands of the Government which has not been granted to
them; and there is indeed no instance in history where the standard of revolt
has been raised, and blood been shed, so entirely without justification or
provocation.
21
The development of the historiography from Stanley, through Morton,
Giraud, Creighton, and Flanagan would seem to indicate that each fresh
version of history is not necessarily closer to full comprehension. On the
other hand, if Flanagan's account (so similar to the official government ver-
sion) were ultimately verified, the more important lesson could be that there
is no vision more clear than the sight of the eye-witness. And yet the
official history Flanagan embraced did not include his evidence of govern-
ment forgery of medical evidence for the sake of expediting Kiel's execu-
tion; nor did it draw Creighton's link of the crisis in the West to that of the
East for the sake of the railway, or present either Giraud's documentation
of uncontrolled terror in early Manitoba or Morton's story of mock
diplomacy in 1869-70. Certain nasty bits had been uncovered by establish-
ment historians since 1936. Are there other indications of duplicity? The
question is still open. The question is important because it pertains to the
logic of using minimal assumptions in explanation.
The central issue concerns the adoption of government good faith as a
working assumption. Reformulators of the conventional account have
found suggestions of bad faith, and still assumed that the latest discovery is
an exceptional deviation from an overall pattern of benevolent accommoda-
tion. For developers of the government-vindication tradition the central
problem has been Metis abandonment of opportunities in Manitoba and
their blundering into a more perilous confrontation a second time in
Saskatchewan. The presumption of government benevolence always calls
for supporting assumptions about the Metis: "primitivism" with Stanley,
or the assumption of incurable Metis "nomadism" by Giraud and Morton.
21. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Sir John A. Macdonald Papers, MG 26 A, Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 42338-42348, A.M. Burgess, Deputy Minister of the Interior, to
Sir David L. Macpherson, Minister of the Interior. Ranagan came close to admitting
that the intent of his book was to turn the historiographical clock back to the
government's version of events. A review of his own and other recent work asserted
that an "attentive reader will see behind Stanley's analysis the oratory of Edward
Blake," the leader of the Liberal Opposition in 1885. Flanagan considered his own
book "something of a return to the views of the Conservative government of 1885"
("Louis Riel: Review Essay," p. 158.)
Historiographical Introduction 17
For Creighton and Flanagan, a tertiary presumption has been the political
immorality of Kiel and the incredible gullibility of his followers. Surely,
the more reasonable starting point is suspending both sets of assumptions
and asking what is logically the first question: Were the opportunities the
Metis allegedly ignored in Manitoba genuine? Or did dispossession precede
migration? If the evidence suggests that migration was a rational response
to an intolerable situation, the migration would be explicable without
resorting to assumptions of Metis non-adaptability. Then, with resettlement
in Saskatchewan, the question that would require fewer assumptions than
Flanagan's or Creighton's is whether the gestures of alleged conciliation in
January and February of 1885 were objectively provocative. Is there evi-
dence of deliberate provocation? If the provocations are not explicable
accidents, what could Canada hope to gain by provoking Riel into forming
a second provisional government? All such questions suggest that a path of
fewer assumptions is possible—and appropriate—for a genuine recon-
sideration of the evidence.
H.Y.Hind,ca. 1869
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"By depicting the Red River Settlement as a parody of proper colonization,
Hind was telling his Canadian readers that the real development of the
North West was yet to begin."
18
Chapter 2
Acquiring Canada's First Colony
Until the mid-1850s there was little talk of the land west of Lake Superior
in Upper Canada. Canadians already had an agricultural frontier in the
south-central region of present-day Ontario. Then, abruptly in 1854, the last
' 'wild land'' suitable for farming went up for auction in Bruce County. The
leading newspaper of Toronto, George Brown's Globe, reported that an
important milestone had just been passed. An era had ended. Canada
needed "new worlds to conquer."
1
The Canadian desire for a new agricultural frontier in the 1850s was
stimulated by prosperity as much as by fear of confinement. Excellent
wheat crops and record prices for grain in Britain (because of the Crimean
War of 1854-56) encouraged farmers to sell every surplus bushel and to put
every available acre into production.
2
 Another incentive for land acquisi-
tion was to meet the demands of the next generation. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the "motive power of the family farm was the farm family" —
especially sons. Young men legitimately hoped for "future compensation
commensurate with their contribution to the economy of the family. .. ."
3
Recognizing that there were foreseeable limits to farm consolidation
within the old boundaries of Canada, self-appointed promoters of expan-
sion joined the Globe in the late 1850s to advertise an unfamiliar West, far
away and considerably to the north of the agricultural heartland then in pro-
duction. What made the new North West all the more attractive to Canadi-
ans in the 1850s was the apparent ease of its acquisition because the Ameri-
cans had conceded for the moment that the Indian territory west of Lake
Superior, north of the forty-ninth parallel, was a protectorate of Britain and
the British had delegated all ruling authority in the region to the Hudson's
Bay Company (HBC). Periodically, however, the company's trade rights
came up for renewal. One such occasion was in 1859. In anticipation of the
1. Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of
the West, 1856-1900 (Toronto, 1980), p. 44.
2. John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in
Quebec and Ontario until 1870 (Toronto, 1980), p. 20.
3. Gagan, Hopeful Travellers, p. 44.
19
20 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
event, the British government decided to strike a parliamentary committee
to review the expediency of continuing the status quo or revoking HBC jur-
isdiction as a first step towards a more vigorous promotion of agricultural
settlement on the prairies. Hearings began in 1857.
4
One settlement did already have a well-established foothold in the
southeast corner of HBC territory in the District of Assiniboia. According
to a company census (taken in the spring of 1856), more than 1,000 fami-
lies were situated on riverfront homesteads along the Red and Assiniboine
rivers at the location of present-day Winnipeg.
5
 The Red River Settlement
was agricultural and settled in the sense that people had built houses and
stables, kept gardens and livestock, raised a little grain, fished and cut
wood, and put up hay for their horses and cattle in winter. But almost no
one in the colony attempted to make a living solely from cash-crop agricul-
ture. Nor did many people cover their occupancy of the land with the paper
mysteries of "location tickets," "patents," or "transfers" which were
such a marked feature of the settlement of Upper Canada from its earliest
beginnings. The one "owner" of land in the Red River Settlement was the
Hudson's Bay Company.
6
 In that, and in many other respects, the colony
was a kind of fur-trade company town more than a community of indepen-
dent land owners determined to make money in the usual ways of land
speculation and agricultural production. Indeed, almost every adult male at
Red River in 1850 had some kind of tie to the HBC—selling the company
his labour or selling some semi-finished commodity generated from local
resources. Moreover, what a person sold to the company in the 1850s
depended in large part on his father's relationship to the firm. That social
distinction reflected a crucial ethnic division that was rooted deeply in the
history of the fur trade, and explains settlement at Red River from the
outset.
Before 1820, two companies competed for the fur resources of the
region. In addition to the London-based HBC there was the Montreal-based
North West Company. The Canadian challenger was able to compete with
the older firm through its attachment to a population of canadiens who had
ventured west, intermarried with native people, and remained in the terri-
tories as "freemen" after the expiration of their contracts.
7
 Their metis
4. W.L. Morton gives a good general discussion in "The Northwest and Canada, 1857-
1859," in his The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-1873
(Toronto, 1964), pp. 21-40.
5. An abstract of the 1856 census is printed in the appendix of H.Y. Hind, Narrative of
the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition of 1857 and of the Assiniboine and
Saskatchewan Exploring Expeditions of 1858 (London, 1860), II, pp. 403-404.
6. For a qualification of the generalization, see Archer Martin, The Hudson s Bay
Company's Land Tenures and the Occupation of Assiniboia by Lord Selkirk's Settlers
with a List of Grantees Under the Earl and the Company (London, 1898).
7. The standard history of the HBC's Canadian rivals is M.W. Campbell, The North West
Company (Toronto, 1957).
Acquiring Canada's First Colony 21
(mixed blood) progeny were scattered all through the Great Lakes region.
But as the pressure of advancing settlement in Wisconsin and Minnesota
forced them ever further west and north, large numbers of Metis migrated
towards present-day Pembina, North Dakota, in the early 1800s. The
Nor'westers encouraged them to produce plains provisions, mainly pemmi-
can (a preparation of dried buffalo meat, fat, and berries) on which voy-
ageurs could subsist for months while en route to the fur-trade posts. Thus,
an important key to the North West Company's challenge to the HBC was
its ability to provision its trade from the hinterland itself. The Nor'westers
thirty-six-foot canoes carried trade goods, not food, from Montreal. Since
the Metis were an integral part of the Nor'westers success, employees were
not discouraged from remaining in the North West after the expiration of
their own terms of service.
No such encouragement was given to Hudson's Bay Company
employees even if they had taken native women as spousal companions.
9
But in 1821, after a decade of ferocious competition, the North West Com-
pany merged with the HBC and the older organization reversed its policy of
insisting on the repatriation of employees after retirement. At the same
time, the restoration of monopoly conditions enabled the company to
streamline its operations and eliminate almost one-third of the old labour
force. Of the 700 employees let go in 1821,
10
 many—perhaps most—had
developed attachments to native women. They and their children (the
"native English"
11
) were encouraged to retire to a small experimental
colony promoted earlier by a Scottish peer with HBC sanction at the forks
of the Red and Assiniboine rivers. From 1811 to 1816, Thomas Douglas,
the Fifth Earl of Selkirk, had persuaded hundreds of poor Scot and Scot-
Irish farmers to start afresh in his northern Garden of Eden. All but a hand-
ful had given up the attempt by 1821. After that date, those who remained
were joined by the unemployed fur traders who decided not to abandon
their native families and took up the company's offer of free rent at Red
River.
12
 A few years later, the Metis pemmican producers just over the
8. See Jacqueline Peterson, "Prelude to Red River: A Social Portrait of the Great lakes
Metis," Ethnohistory25 (1978), pp. 41-67.
9. See Jennifer Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian
Country (Vancouver, 1980).
10. Philip Goldring, "Papers on the Labour System of the Hudson's Bay Company," in
Parks Canada, Manuscript Report Series, no. 362, pp. 32-33.
11. "Native" is the term that was normally used to describe the part-Indian population of
Red River in the census reports of the 1830s and 1840s. "Native English" is a term
that Canadians used in polite correspondence to distinguish the "English half breeds"
from the French Metis. See, for example, G.T. Denison, Reminiscences of the Red
River Rebellion of 1869 (Toronto, 1873), or PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 78093-78103, A.G. Archibald to John A. Macdonald, 20
December 1871.
12. About fifteen per cent of the unemployed fur traders took up the company's offer. See
Sprague and Frye, The Genealogy of the First Metis Nation, p. 15.
22 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
international boundary at Pembina received a similar invitation (to keep
them from trading with Americans and to secure their labour since the com-
pany that took shape by the late 1820s consumed more than sixty tons of
pemmican per year).
13
Generally, the pemmican producers of Red River in the 1850s were
the children of the people who provisioned the HBC in the 1830s. Their
population had more than doubled. They had more houses, stables, lives-
tock, and acres under cultivation. Some had begun to work as freighters by
cart or by boat, but the basic employment of the Metis in the 1850s was still
as semi-independent producers of plains provisions. The other part-Indian
population, the native English, had grown at a similar rate in demographic
terms. They too had enlarged their number of river-front homesteads, and
by the 1850s some were almost self-sufficient farmers who worked but lit-
tle for the company. But most were still quite dependent on the HBC for
their main income and tended to work at higher status jobs than the Metis,
jobs best symbolized by the clerical-managerial position of "Apprentice
Postmaster," created for native sons of former HBC officers.
14
The question that preoccupied Canadians and the British in the mid-
1850s was whether the limited agricultural development at Red River was
to be explained by some inherent flaw in the people or by the climate and
soil of the region. To that end, both governments sponsored expeditions of
exploration in 1857 and both came to substantially the same conclusion —
that the Red and Saskatchewan drainage basins had vast agricultural poten-
tial. The British group under Captain John Palliser focused its report on the
"capabilities" of the country — the flora and fauna supported at present
and in the foreseeable future. Palliser had little to say about previous ven-
tures in settlement.
15
 The Canadian group, led by H.Y. Hind, showed
keener awareness of past and present human habitation of the North West
because the Canadians were concerned as much about the question of own-
ership of the soil as about the discovery of a "fertile belt" capable of sus-
taining farms. Consequently, in the Hind report there was a lengthy exami-
nation of land use in the Red River Settlement.
Hind recited the colony's historical beginnings, observed that Lord
Selkirk's venture had not prospered, and said that since there were "few
accessions" of other newcomers from "distant countries" the settlement
13. Arthur Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers, and
Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto, 1974), pp.
208-209.
14. Carol M. Judd, "Native Labour and Social Stratification in the Hudson's Bay Northern
Department, 1770-1870," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 17 (1980),
p. 312.
15. Irene Spry, ed., An Account of John Palliser's British North American Exploring
Expedition, 1857-1860 (Toronto, 1963).
Acquiring Canada's First Colony 23
had fallen into the hands of "half breeds," a fatal flaw for the proper
development of the colony, according to Hind. He thought the "diminution
of European settlers" brought the colony ever "nearer to the savage wild-
ness of Indian life." To be sure, the "neat whitewashed houses" along the
river did give the appearance of an island of European civility in a sea of
prairie wilderness — but only from a distance. On closer inspection, Hind
said all was in disarray, "slovenly" and "careless."
16
On the farm of Pierre Gladieux, for example, Hind found a cattle yard
with horses and poultry roaming among swine and cows. In the stable,
where Hind expected to see more signs of livestock, he found only a "neat,
light, four wheeled carriage." But worst of all, from Hind's perspective,
Gladieux was about to go off on a buffalo hunt in September before looking
after his harvest of peas, wheat, and hay and an immense tree that lay in
front of his house ready for cutting into firewood. Gladieux was a "half
breed." Like others of his race, the man was "naturally improvident, and
perhaps indolent," Hind said, "they prefer the wild life of the prairies to
the tamer duties of a settled home."
17
By depicting the Red River Settlement as a parody of proper coloniza-
tion, Hind was telling his Canadian readers that the real development of the
North West was yet to begin. The whole land was virgin country; the whole
region was a new world to conquer. The Metis had no prior claim, "no
paper or document of any kind to show that they held possession" of the
river lots they occupied.
18
 Those places were only their resting grounds
between hunting excursions. Every "15th of June they start for their sum-
mer hunt of the buffalo" which was taking them ever greater distances
away from Red River. Hind seemed to think that in time they might aban-
don the colony altogether. If not, should they have to be "thrust on one
side" by a tide of incoming settlers, he recommended great care in the
enterprise since "their full appreciation and enjoyment of a home in the
prairie wilds during the winter and summer, would render them a very for-
midable enemy... ."
19
One thing was certain: it was the "destiny" of the North West to
become a wealthy and prosperous region once it passed to "an energetic
and civilized race, able to improve its vast capabilities and appreciate its
on
marvellous beauties." The same theme was echoed almost immediately
by Hind's readers and admirers. A young Canadian lawyer named Alex-
ander Morris quoted Hind at every turn, and warned that the region could
16. Hind, Narrative of the Red River Expedition, I, pp. 148,222-223.
17. Ibid., pp. 164-165,179.
18. Ibid., p. 190.
19. Ibid., pp. 180-181.
20. Ibid., p. 134.
24 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
not remain "unoccupied" for long: "if we do not proceed to settle it the
Americans will...." To launch "Nova Britannia" on the prairies, Morris
urged immediate annexation to the ' 'jurisdiction of Canada with power...
to colonize the territory."
21
The British and even the Hudson's Bay Company were not opposed to
such a proposition. Edward Ellice of the HBC said glibly that "nothing is
as easy as to acquire it. For a million sterling, they may buy .. . the whole
territory north of forty-nine between Canada and the Rocky Mountains."
22
Nor did the British government see any difficulty in Canada's acquiring the
North West. The problem for the Colonial Office was learning what Canada
wanted. On the one hand, Canada claimed to be the true proprietors of the
territory already (by virtue of inheritance from Quebec). On the other hand,
one of the leading politicians of the United Province of Canada, John A.
Macdonald, claimed that responsibilities of ownership were too burden-
some in 1858 because "we would have no proper means of supervision
over it—people would rush into it who from want of restraint would grow
up into anything but a creditable population."
23
 The result was that when
the parliamentary committee reported its hearings there was no recommen-
dation for annexation to Canada. An opportunity for expansion was missed
in the late 1850s.
Macdonald and other leaders of the Government of Canada resisted
expansion in the 1850s for reasons that were political and constitutional, as
much as administrative or financial. The terms of union of Upper and
Lower Canada in 1840 gave each section equal representation in Parlia-
ment. The 450,000 people in Upper Canada did not object until the 1850s
when their population began to outnumber Lower Canada's — by more
than 60,000 people, according to the census of 1851.
24
 That disclosure gave
rise to a cry for legislative redistribution or "rep by pop." The political
problem for John A. Macdonald and his colleagues in the Government of
Canada was that the concession of representation proportional to population
was certain to upset the balance that kept Macdonald's group in power. By
1858, a recipe of appealing to the loyalism of Conservatives in Upper
Canada and the conservatism of canadiens in Lower Canada usually
enabled his coalition of "Liberal-Conservatives" to return as the dominant
group in Parliament.
Macdonald's frustration at the end of the 1850s stemmed from
21. Alexander Morris, Nova Britannia; or, Our New Canadian Dominion Foreshadowed,
Being a Series of Lectures, Speeches, and Addresses (Toronto, 1884), p. 25.
22. D.G. Creighton, Sir John A. Macdonald; vol. 1, The Young Politician (Toronto, 1956),
p. 244.
23. Ibid., p. 286.
24. J.M.S. Careless, ed., Colonists and Canadiens, 1760-1867 (Toronto, 1971), pp. 205,
240.
Acquiring Canada's First Colony 25
flagging support in Upper Canada as he seemed incapable of promoting the
expansionist agenda promoted by Brown's Globe. If Canada annexed the
North West and a horde of Protestant humanity rushed into the region from
the adjacent English-speaking section of Canada, the cry for "rep by pop"
would become even more irresistible in the fragile union. Another possibil-
ity was that open access to the North West would take thousands of young
people from Canada West, "draining away our youth and strength,"
perhaps putting the predominantly Protestant part of the province back in a
minority position and making Upper Canada vulnerable to a demand for
"rep by pop" from Lower Canada. For both political reasons, Macdonald
was "quite willing, personally, to leave that whole country a wilderness for
the next half century." He did realize, however, that "if Englishmen did
not go there, Yankees will." To prevent American annexation in the
interim, Macdonald hoped that the British would administer the North West
as a crown colony beginning in the 1860s.
25
By 1865, however, a new incentive for expansion was arousing the
interest of Upper Canada even more irresistably. The boom that had made
people land hungry earlier had collapsed, and agricultural hard times prod-
ded farmers to seek escape as a matter of survival.
26
 Intensive production
of one crop had led to soil exhaustion, and that made cereals vulnerable to
disease and parasites such as rust and the wheat fly. Production plummeted.
At the end of the 1850s an average Upper Canadian farm had produced 135
bushels of wheat for market every year; a decade later, the number fell to a
mere 60 bushels per farm.
27
 Consequently, the farmers faced a real crisis.
"The problem was one of too many people competing for too few
resources at a time when the wellsprings of the farm economy ... were
beginning to dry up."
28
 Some farmers shifted from wheat to barley produc-
tion to serve the rapidly growing market for beer-making in the State of
Wisconsin. Many more redoubled their demand for opening the North
West.
Since Upper Canada's new expansionist urge could not be resisted,
and since it could not find an outlet within the existing constitutional
arrangement, momentum developed in the early 1860s for an enlargement
of the union which was moving ever closer to political deadlock. The
separation of Upper and Lower Canada into the two provinces of Ontario
and Quebec to look after "local" concerns and their recombination with
the rest of British North America to pursue great "national" objects was
25. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 8, pp. 8-11, Macdonald to Edward Watkin,
27 March 1865.
26. McCallum, Unequal Beginnings, p. 22.
27. Ibid.
28. Gagan, Hopeful Travellers, p. 71.
26 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
the panacea for the economic doldrums that one Ontario Member of Parlia-
OO
ment described as a "general gloom" hanging "like a pall on the land.'
Since Macdonald was committed to continuing his political career, he
appeared at the forefront of the drive to create the new union and never lost
control of his majority in the process. When the Parliament of the new
Dominion met for the first time on November 8, 1867, John A. Macdonald
was still Premier and newly eager to pursue expansionist goals. Before a
month had passed, the government had resolutions before the House to
annex the North West.
William McDougall, a long-time proponent of western annexation and
the new Minister of Public Works, introduced the government's expansion-
ist policy on December 4, 1867, saying that the time was long overdue for
adding the great new land to Canada so that "the whole expanse from the
Atlantic to the Pacific would be peopled with a race the same as our-
selves."
30
 The only objections to the declaration of intent by Ontario
Members of Parliament concerned the justice of the Hudson's Bay
Company's demand for compensation as a precondition for annexation. But
George Cartier, Macdonald's Quebec lieutenant, hinted that the whole terri-
tory might be acquired for the "paltry sum of five or six million dollars."
31
That prompted a Maritimer to shift the debate to a different principle. He
wondered if the people who already lived in the North West had been con-
sulted. Since Nova Scotians had been more or less conscripted into the
Canadians' federation, he wanted to know if the new targets for merger
were "willing to come into the Union, or were they to be dragged in
against their will also."
32
When Sir John A. Macdonald (he received a knighthood for his suc-
cess with the confederation scheme) finally spoke on the North West
acquisition resolutions two days after the debate began, he ignored both cri-
ticisms. Macdonald took for granted that the HBC had to be consulted, but
the wishes of the natives could be ignored because they were "incapable of
the management of their own affairs." The necessary consultation was to
talk to the HBC and "arrange with the Imperial Government... for powers
enabling the Parliament of the Dominion to provide a constitution which
might be amended as necessary hereafter, to adapt it to the growing
requirements of the new country."
33
 Two old opponents in the Province of
29. David Gagan, "Land, Population, and Social Change: The 'Critical Years' in Rural
Canada West," Canadian Historical Review 59 (1978), p. 293.
30. Library of Parliament Scrapbook, Parliamentary Debates Reported by the Ottawa
Times and the Toronto Globe and Mail, 4 December 1867, p. 64. Hereafter cited as
Scrapbook Debates. The Official Parliamentary Debates did not become available until
1875 (Olga B. Bishop, Canadian Official Publications [Toronto, 1981], pp. 87-88).
31. Ibid., p. 65.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 6 December 1867, p. 73.
Acquiring Canada's First Colony 27
Canada, Edward Blake and David Mills, suggested that it would be prefer-
able for the Colonial Office to transform the HBC territory into a crown
colony under British rule, with the North West coming into Confederation
later with "the same rights of local self-government, free from federal con-
trol, as is already enjoyed by the provinces of this Dominion."
34
 Mills
thought that it would be inappropriate for Canada, in some respects still a
colony itself, to have colonies of its own. Maritimers and some Quebeckers
agreed.
In the end, however, it was the imperialism of Ontario—the power
that had done so much to prompt Confederation in the first place — that
carried the debate. Thus, Alexander Mackenzie, Member of Parliament for
a depressed Ontario riding, stated that he was "prepared to do all in his
power to assist in the acquisition and opening up of the North Western ter-
ritory," even though he was the leader of Macdonald's opposition in all
other respects.
3
 Other Ontario expansionists reminded the House again and
again that "we have no longer those vast tracts of fertile land" that gave
rise to earlier prosperity. And William McDougall closed the debate by
reminding Ontario Members of Parliament to "stand fast by the views
which they had so constantly expressed, and which the people of Upper
Canada endorsed."
36
 They needed little prodding. Resolutions to acquire
Canada's first colony passed on December 6, 1867, without division. Since
Confederation was just five months old (and anything but well cemented),
Joseph Howe, another disgruntled Maritimer, found the vote for "coloniza-
tion and conquest and other grand ideas" mildly ridiculous.
37
Given the overall enthusiasm and the haste with which the new Mac-
donald government pressed for parliamentary authorization to annex the
North West, it might have been expected that he and his colleagues would
have moved immediately on the project in 1868. But other matters, particu-
larly a robust separatist movement led by Joseph Howe in Nova Scotia, pre-
cluded action anywhere but on the domestic front. The "Repealers" (so-
called because they sought repeal of the British North America Act) were
eventually neutralized by promises of "better terms" in the union and
better offices for leading separatists (Joseph Howe, for example, became
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and Secretary of State for the Pro-
vinces, the two ministries that were likely to be the most involved in the
North West as well as in dominion-provincial relations).
38
 Only after
Macdonald's personal diplomacy settled a pacification scheme on Nova
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 4 December 1867, p. 70.
36. Ibid., 6 December 1867, p. 74.
37. Ibid., p. 76
38. See Kenneth G. Pryke, Nova Scotia and Confederation (Toronto, 1979).
28 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Scotia in the autumn of 1868 did a delegation consisting of the outspoken
William McDougall and the more business-minded George Carrier go off
to London to seek a bargain with the HBC.
Negotiating through British intermediaries, the Canadian delegates
succeeded at the end of the first week of March 1869 in bringing the com-
pany to an arrangement that was likely to be acceptable to Canada. They
promised to deposit 300,000 pounds sterling in guaranteed bonds in a Lon-
don bank, to recognize a number of tax and territorial concessions (includ-
ing the company's retention of one-twentieth of all the land suitable for
agriculture). Then, for its part, the HBC would surrender all proprietary
claims to the Crown, and the British sovereign would proclaim the Govern-
ment of Canada the new colonial power in the North West.
39
 But before the
actual transfer, it was necessary for the Canadian Parliament to ratify the
terms and conditions of the sale and to establish a policy for administering
the colonization of the soon-to-be acquired territory.
When William McDougall introduced the transfer arrangement on
May 28, boasting that Canada was "on the eve of securing the grand object
for which our government was formed in 1864,"
40
 no one disputed his
claim. There was general consensus that annexation of the West was the
principal goal of the Confederation movement that developed in Upper
Canada in the three years before 1867. Even the chief spokesman for the
opposition, Alexander Mackenzie, "gave credit to the delegates for their
efforts in London." He quibbled that the reserve of one-twentieth was
overly generous and asked why the government "had not brought down the
measure they intended to introduce for the future government of the terri-
tory." But Mackenzie expressed "hearty support" for the arrangement "as
a whole."
41
 Consequently, on May 31, Parliament adopted an address
"praying for the annexation of the North West," again, without division or
debate.
Four days later, Sir John A. Macdonald introduced the bill to provide
for the territory's colonization. The matter was complicated, however, by
Canada's own colonial status. Constitutionally, Canada had no power to
acquire and administer a colonial empire of its own. Section 146 of the
British North America Act
42
 did convey ' 'power to admit Newfoundland,
etc. into the Union," but the implication of the clause was as Mills had
stated earlier—additions to Confederation were to enter as provinces.
Macdonald's way around the constitutional problem was to frame the
39. See Canadian Sessional Papers (1869), no. 25.
40. Scrapbook Debates, 28 May 1869, p. 80.
41. Ibid.
42. The name of Canada's constitution was changed in 1982 to the Constitution Act
(1867).
Acquiring Canada's First Colony 29
legislation with the implication that Canada was only taking a short interim
step towards admitting another partner into Confederation. The bill pro-
vided that the region was to be temporarily run by a governor and council
appointed in Ottawa. To be sure, the territorial viceroy was to make what-
ever "Laws, Institutions, and Ordinances" he saw fit, without any accoun-
tability to the inhabitants. But Macdonald assured the House of Commons
that the "act would only remain in force until the end of the next session."
He insisted that within one year the authoritarian "provisional" regime
would be remodeled into "a more permanent government." Still, he did
not promise that the arrangement to be created in a year or so would be a
province or even elective in its institutions.
43
Some members of the House were uneasy about the lack of detail con-
cerning the "mature plan" that was contemplated. No public revelation
was forthcoming from Sir John A. Macdonald on June 4 or at any time
later. On June 18, during consideration of supplementary budget estimates,
Luther Holton noticed that $1.5 million — a sum equivalent to about one-
twentieth of the entire national revenue of the day—appeared rather crypti-
cally under the "North West" account. What for? he asked. McDougall
muttered that the need to improve communication with the territory called
for expenditure, but Holton was dissatisfied with the answer. The next day
he pressed more firmly and Macdonald attempted an explanation. He indi-
cated that the government's intention was to establish immigration agents
in Ireland and Scotland for recruiting newcomers for the North West. Anti-
cipating a flood of immigrants, Canada needed a wagon-water route from
the head of navigation on Lake Superior to the Red River Settlement.
McDougall added that the money would also support a detailed survey of
the land the settlers were likely to find most suitable for agriculture on their
arrival. But neither he nor Macdonald said a word to reveal the shape of the
"mature plan" for realizing the provincial status of the North West—not
then, or the next day when the bill came up for second and final readings.
44
One reason the measure passed with so little discussion is that Mac-
donald had waited until nearly the last day of a hectic session before reveal-
ing the barest hint of his government's colonial policy. Only as the House
was anxiously expecting a recess did he bring his territorial government bill
up for consideration. The assurance that nothing permanent was being
enacted made it plain that Parliament would have occasion to go over the
matter with more deliberate consideration in the near future. It remained to
be seen what Macdonald envisioned for the long term.
Macdonald's private correspondence suggests that he intended to
"keep it a crown colony" of Canada for considerably longer than the
43. Scrapbook Debates, 4 June 1869, p. 107.
44. Ibid., 18-19 June 1869, pp. 144-146.
30 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
temporary government scheme implied. Only after significant portions of
the "fertile belt" in the Red and Saskatchewan drainage basins were well
colonized would he consider taking all or part of the region into Confedera-
tion on a footing that would be more or less the same as that of the four ori-
ginal provinces.
45
 In the meantime, the policy was to "grope quietly
along," he said to one correspondent.
46
 He was even more blunt with
another. To J. Y. Bown, an Ontario Member of Parliament (and brother of a
Canadian already at Red River), the Prime Minister said the game was to
establish calm with the "wild people" of Red River by unspecified yet
"considerable management" until enough newcomers like Bown's brother
had moved west.
47
 He predicted rather optimistically that the first wave of
new settlers could accomplish the informal work of establishing Canadian
sovereignty. "In another year," he wrote, "the present residents will be
altogether swamped by the influx of strangers who will go in with the idea
of becoming industrious & peaceable settlers." Macdonald added, "I am
more apprehensive about the Indian difficulty than anything else."
48
 Ironi-
cally, just as he was writing that Metis resistance to the transformation of
the West would be relatively insignificant, the "present residents" of the
Red River Settlement had already taken effective action to derail
Macdonald's hope for an easy transition from HBC to Canadian rule.
45. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 15, pp. 289-291, Macdonald to J.Y. Bown,
9 February 1871. Bown had written Macdonald on February 4 complaining about
certain actions of Governor Archibald. Macdonald replied that Canada had no power to
control Archibald's every move, and added: "If the original intention of keeping it a
Crown Colony, to be governed by instructions from Ottawa, had been carried out, we
would of course have been responsible for his actions...."
46. Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 955-956, Macdonald to R.G. Haliburton, 9 July 1869.
47. Ibid., vol. 13, p. 237, Macdonald to J.Y. Bown, 14 October 1869.
48. Ibid.
This page intentionally left blank 
William McDougall, 1867
(Public Archives of Canada [C8362])
"McDougall acted in accordance with his understanding of the
instructions he had in hand, rather than in accordance with the changed
plans in the mail from Ottawa."
32
Chapter 3
Asserting Canadian Authority
Over Assiniboia
When the Canadian Prime Minister assured his private correspondents that
the Red River Metis were likely to be "swamped" by newcomers, he prob-
ably envisioned settlers taking over land that the Metis occupied without
title from the Hudson's Bay Company as well as homesteading on virgin
soil. That was implied in the ' 'Draft Order in Council for Uniting .. . the
North-Western Territory to the Dominion of Canada." Only one clause
addressed the land tenure of old settlers. Article 10 assured those who could
document their tenure by reference to the company's Land Register that
they had nothing to fear from the transfer: "All titles to land up to the 8th
March 1869 conferred by the company are to be confirmed."
1
 There was
no provision for the cases that H.Y. Hind had reported were the most typi-
cal. There was no security for persons whose only proof of possession was
their occupancy of the land.
In Canadian tradition, settlers without title were "squatters." To be
sure, the practice was to treat such persons liberally if their "squatting"
was on unsold Crown land and if the trespassers' occupancy was followed
by significant improvements — development that met or exceeded the set-
tlement duties expected of the official recipients of "free" land.
2
Apparently, Macdonald saw no reason to make different allowances for the
Metis "squatters" in the North West.
The government's first concern was to know the location and extent of
"titles conferred by the Company" so that suitable land from the rest of the
territory might be set aside for the first wave of newcomers expected to
l.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 40208, "Draft Order in
Council for Uniting Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory to the Dominion
of Canada."
2. Recipients of free land in Upper Canadian experience were military veterans expected
to perform settlement duties before receiving Crown patents. The settlers receiving free
grants that were not conditional on settlement and improvement were the pre-1789
Loyalists. See George C. Patterson, Land Settlement in Upper Canada (Toronto, 1920),
pp. 21-32, 78-80, and 171.
33
34 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
emigrate from Ontario perhaps as early as the autumn of 1869. To that end,
a team of land surveyors was sent to Red River in July. The leader of the
group, John Stoughton Dennis (a lieutenant-colonel of militia), arrived in
mid-August; the rest of his crew followed in time to begin work early in
September.
3
Before the surveys began, Dennis called on the HBC official who
presided over the territory within a fifty-mile radius of Fort Garry, the
Governor of the District of Assiniboia, William Mactavish. He told Dennis
that Red River was not the same community Hind had visited ten years ear-
lier. Dennis did know that the colony faced hard times because of drought
and grasshoppers. The company had been collecting charitable donations in
Canada and England for relief of the third of the population who faced star-
vation because of the failure of their crops, the hunt, and even the fishery.
Indeed, the Government of Canada had contributed aid in the form of a
public works project when forty (mainly local) men were put to work
improving the cart road between Fort Garry and Lake of the Woods in the
summer of 1868.
4
 What was news to Dennis was the Governor's assertion
that the natives were a hunting people rooted in the soil. Mactavish said
that "as soon as the survey commences, the half breeds and Indians will
come forward and assert their right to the land, and possibly stop work till
their claim is satisfied."
5
On August 21, Dennis reported the disturbing news to the Minister of
Public Works, William McDougall, saying, "a considerable degree of irri-
tation exists among the native population in view of surveys and settle-
ments being made without the Indian title having been first
extinguished...." He warned that the "question must be regarded as the
very greatest importance" and added that the "French half breeds ... have
gone so far as to threaten violence should surveys be attempted to be
made."
6
McDougall's repetition of the story that the Metis might become
violent prompted Macdonald to provide armed support for his own nom-
inee to replace Mactavish and to send his governor-designate to the North
West almost immediately. Macdonald's man, none other than McDougall
himself, left Ottawa in the last week of September—even before a new
appointee could succeed him in the Public Works portfolio. Moreover, he
departed in the company of a "large party" with several cases of rifles for
equipping a police force to be recruited from the local population.
7
3. A.C. Roberts, "The Surveys in the Red River Settlement in 1869," The Canadian
Surveyor (1970), pp. 238-239.
4. George Stanley, Louis Riel (Toronto, 1963), p. 50.
5. Ibid., p. 57.
6. Roberts, "Surveys," p. 240.
7. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 237, Macdonald to J.Y. Bown, 14
October 1869. Macdonald later claimed that he knew nothing about the trouble over
the surveys, "for it was only after McDougall had left Ottawa that he learned that
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 35
The plan was for McDougall and his entourage to travel by train as far
as possible; then, upon reaching the end of steel at St Cloud, Minnesota, the
Canadians were to follow the Crow Wing trail by ox cart and arrive at the
border well before the transfer was to occur on December 1. In the mean-
time, Dennis and his surveyors were to confirm the boundaries of the Old
Settlement Belt and to launch new surveys only on the periphery of the old.
What Macdonald did not realize is that the Metis were prepared to
resist the slightest new incursion of strangers from Canada. Since the 1850s
they had been witnessing the arrival of some of Canada's most acquisitive
adventurers, exemplified best by John Christian Schultz, who arrived in
1861 to practise medicine.
8
 However, it soon became apparent that the
self-made Dr. Schultz was a speculator whose major ambition was corner-
ing the land market in anticipation of the migration of pioneers from his
native Ontario. In 1864, Schultz took over the Nor'-wester, Red River's first
newspaper, and used its pages to trumpet the need for the colony's libera-
tion from the tyranny of the HBC. Preferring the adversary they already
knew, the Metis emerged as the company's staunchest supporters. The
Council of Assiniboia was not an authority they revered, but the existing
government could be tolerated because in most respects it was powerless,
and therefore irrelevant to their real concerns.
9
 In an opposite yet similar
twist, as soon as Schultz learned that the transfer was imminent, he
sloughed off his earlier liberalism and declared that authoritarian govern-
ment under Canada was entirely proper until the colony was better prepared
for elective institutions.
In 1868 other Canadians as offensive to the Metis as Schultz came in
to supervise the Dawson Road work. Charles Mair, for one, was a youthful
poet who knew nothing about roadbuilding or its administration, but he did
crave adventure and persuaded his friend, the Minister of Public Works, to
give him the position of paymaster on the road project. Inevitably, Mair
made the acquaintance of Schultz and just as predictably Dr. Schultz
became the supplier of the provisions with which Mair paid the Metis crew.
At the same time, Mair was writing letters to Ontario newspapers extolling
the quality of the land that was free for the taking and not concealing his
belief in the innate inferiority of persons of part-Indian ancestry. When he
Colonel Dennis had observed this discontent on the part of the half breeds in the
preceding summer, and had reported it to his chief, who apparently thought so little of
the circumstance that he did not mention it to his colleagues." See Joseph Pope,
Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald, 2 vols. (Ottawa, 1894), II, p.
51.
8. G.F. Reynolds, "The Man Who Created the Corner of Portage and Main," Historical
and Scientific Society of Manitoba, Transactions (1970), p. 8.
9. See Lionel Dorge, "The M6tis and Canadien Councillors of Assiniboia," Beaver 305
(1974), 1:12-19,2:39-45,3:51-58.
36 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
insulted the native wife of one of the settlement's most prominent persons,
she struck back with an "overhauling" that included a slap in the face and
several smacks with her riding whip.
10
The rumour that people like Schultz and Mair were poised on Red
River's doorstep by the thousands frightened as much as it angered all sec-
tors of the native population. The Metis of one particular parish organized
early in July to take direct and effective action to defend their land from
interlopers. With the help — indeed, the prompting — of their priest, Father
N.J. Ritchot, the people of St Norbert created patrols under two captains,
Baptiste Tourond and Jean Baptiste Lepine.
11
With Tourond and Lepine making certain throughout the summer of
1869 that "no stranger should establish himself on the lands" fronting on
the Red and Assinibone rivers, it was evident to anyone who cared to notice
that the Metis had in fact taken the first step towards creating a government.
Since there were no other police already on the scene, it was equally evi-
dent that the Metis cavalry was likely to determine the shape of the order
that was to succeed the HBC. If Tourond and Lepine were typical of the
men who were going to emerge in the commanding roles, the leaders of the
Metis shared a definite profile: they were in their forties, had canadien
fathers, headed large families in their own generation, and had direct
experience in the old economy of pemmican production as well as the
newer livelihoods of freighting supplies for the HBC and subsistence farm-
ing. At the same time, Tourond and Lepine were both farmers without land
grants. The land they "owned" they held by peaceable possession; their
names did not appear in the HBC Land Register.
12
Under the circumstances, it was predictable that older Metis with more
lucrative ties to the company would attempt to head off the upstarts. In
Ritchot's parish of St Norbert, the company's man was William Dease. He
had an appointment on the Council of Assiniboia and was the registered
owner of several large tracts of land.
13
 As he moved to assert what he
regarded as a more legitimate claim to leadership, Dease was joined by a
group of similarly well-situated Metis from other parishes at the end of
July.
14
 They called a mass meeting to take place at Fort Garry on the 29th,
and at the appointed hour, Dease told his compatriots that he and his
10. See I.E. Rea, "Bannatyne, A.G.B.," Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 11, pp.
44-47.
11. Stanley, Kiel, pp. 55-56.
12. See the data on the Lepine and Tourond families in Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of
the First Metis Nation, household numbers 2923 and 4705.
13. Ibid., household number 1059.
14. According to Stanley, the associates of Dease were Pascal Breland, Joseph Genthon,
and William Hallet (Kiel, p. 56). See household numbers 508, 1927, and 2101 in
Sprague and Frye, Genealogy.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 37
associates were the authentic leaders and true defenders of Metis society.
Dease asserted that the nub of the entire matter was the 300,000 pounds to
be paid by Canada to the HBC. Since the actual owners of the soil were the
natives, the Metis should demand money from the company, rather than
resisting Canada and the surveys.
A challenger to Dease who emerged as the leading spokesman for the
Metis position, distinct from the company and the Canadian expansionists,
was a young protege of Ritchot willing to act on Ritchot's view that Dease
and his friends were only posturing—were willing tools of Schultz, divert-
ing attention from the real danger which was land loss. Ritchot's man was
no hunter or farmer or even a resident of the colony for the last ten years,
having only recently returned to his parents' home at Red River after a
decade's absence for the pursuit of an education in Montreal.
16
 But the
young man had learned the art of speaking well. Indeed, he must have rem-
inded those who heard him of his recently deceased father, who had mobil-
ized the Metis twenty years earlier to resist the HBC in a trade matter that
seemed of similar importance then. In 1849 they had followed one Louis
Riel for freedom of trade; in the autumn of 1869 they would turn to Louis
Riel the younger to get security for their land.
17
Unfortunately for Colonel Dennis, Ritchot's parish was the one his
crew had skirted even as they moved peripherally along the colony's
western boundary. Their intention was to run an imaginary line perpendicu-
lar to the border with the United States about ten miles west of the Red
River all the way from the boundary to the Assiniboine River (see Map 1).
From the government's standpoint, the "Winnipeg meridian" could cause
no offense, and at first no counter measures followed. But in the first week
of October, a crew started to mark off sections in an easterly direction
towards the Red River just south of the Assiniboine. On October 9 Dennis
reported that all was still well; his men were "making good progress" and
"nearly as far as the Red River." They were still outside the two-mile limit
delineated by the Hudson's Bay Company in its survey of the mid-1830s.
What he did not appreciate fully is that everyone in the colony observed a
four-mile limit: an inner two miles of cleared and wooded land from which
people took their fuel, crops, and building timber, and an outer two miles
left in prairie sod as hay land. On October 11, the surveyors reached what
they called the southern boundary of Section 6, Township 7, Range II, east
of the Winnipeg meridian when the old settlers of the area ordered a halt
15. Stanley, Riel, pp. 56-57.
16. Ibid., pp. 18-34.
17. A standard account of the free-trade crisis appears in W.L. Morton, Manitoba: History
of a Province (Toronto, 1957), p. 87. A work that shows that the company managed the
matter to its own advantage is J.S. Galbraith, The Little Emperor: Governor Simpson of
the Hudson's Bay Company (Toronto, 1976).
15
38 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Map 1:
The Red River Settlement and the First Dominion Surveys
Source: PAC, National Map Collection, H12/740/Red River
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 39
because they said the crew was trespassing on the hay land of Edouard
Marion.
18
 Marion and sixteen of his neighbours ordered them off the land.
Among the sixteen was Baptiste Tourond, the captain of the patrol in the
area, but Louis Kiel did the talking. He spoke English. A.C. Webb, the sur-
vey crew leader, asked Riel to give him each man's name, jotted the infor-
mation into his field notes, and vacated the scene without further trouble.
The reaction of Colonel Dennis was less calm than that of Webb.
Dennis went to the nominal authorities and demanded strong measures to
punish those who interfered with his surveys.
19
 Subsequently, they did ask
for an explanation of events. Once again, Riel spoke for his neighbours. He
asserted simply yet firmly that Canada "had no right to make surveys...
without the express permission of the people of the Settlement."
20
How, though, were the "people of the settlement" to express such
permission? No representative assembly existed under company auspices.
The nearest approximation to an elected government was the apparatus that
came into existence each spring to govern the hundreds of families who
still participated in the buffalo hunt, travelling as one or two expeditions
southwest to the location of the herds. Within each were groups of families
that formed particular teams. Each chose a captain. The captains chose their
principal leader and he presided over the council of captains, the body that
set regulations and met each day to handle offenders against the
community's laws. The captains of the hunt were true representatives of the
people; their council was a genuine though extra-legal government.
21
 Even
after the hunt declined in economic importance, its political organization
had a social significance that continued.
The traditional organization of the hunt gave the Metis a political
structure with which to resist the surveys. The new importance of farming
22
gave them their motive. As the protest broadened, each group of concerned
families selected its captain. They met in St Norbert as the council of the
whole people, declared on October 16 that they were the National Commit-
tee of the Metis, and chose a president, John Bruce. Since the expected
struggle was to be a contest of speechmakers, the committee elected a
secretary, Louis Riel.
23
18. Not Andre Nault, as is usually reported, for example, in Stanley, Riel, p. 59. See
Roberts, "Surveys," p. 244.
19. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 482, Macdonald to William
McDougall, 20 November 1869.
20. Stanley, Riel, p. 59.
21. For a vivid description of the political organization of the hunt, see Joseph Kinsey
Howard, The Strange Empire of Louis Riel (New York, 1952), pp. 257-262.
22. See Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of the First Metis Nation, pp. 16-24, for the changes
in the relative importance of hunting, freighting, and farming to the Metis between
1830 and 1870.
23. Stanley, Riel, p. 61.
40 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Soon disturbing news convinced the National Committee that the
resistance to Canada might become an armed conflict as well as a war of
words. On October 20, Metis witnesses to McDougall's arrival at St Cloud
came home to report that they had seen several cases of the latest repeating
rifles in the Canadians' baggage. Anticipating that McDougall's entourage
would reach the border near the end of the month, the committee's next
move was to take steps to prevent the governor from entering the territory
with his load of carbines.
24
Father Ritchot may have advised Riel that the best way to prevent
trouble was to keep McDougall out of the settlement — away from Schultz
and the other Canadians. The National Committee agreed. On October 21,
they authorized barring the road to the United States, and drafted the
famous dispatch to the governor-designate: "The National Committee of
the Metis of Red River orders William McDougall not to enter the Territory
of the North West without special permission of the above-mentioned com-
mittee."
25
The note reached McDougall as he was about to enter Rupert's Land,
after having reached the border on October 30. Three days later he contin-
ued as far as the Hudson's Bay Company post just to the north of the line,
and was met by a company of Metis cavalry escorting McDougall's
advance man, Captain D.R. Cameron, out of Assiniboia. Their commander,
Ambroise Lepine,
26
 then ordered McDougall off the land, and escorted the
whole group back to the boundary on November 2. Pointing to the ground
in front of his horse, Lepine said, "You must not return beyond this
line."
27
Confident that time was on his side—that he was soon to be joined by
Canadians already in the settlement or with a force sent overland by
Macdonald—McDougall embarked upon a period of waiting, expecting
that all obstacles would vanish in time for his triumphal entry on the
transfer date of December I.
28
In the meantime, the Metis National Committee took steps to consoli-
date its power. Its troops took Fort Garry in a bloodless coup on November
2, then devised means to recruit at least passive support from the rest of the
population. The committee invited the native English of the Protestant par-
ishes to elect twelve representatives to join an equal number of Metis depu-
ties elected from the Catholic districts, and suggested November 16 was not
24. Ibid., p. 62.
25. Ibid.
26. The brother of Baptiste Lepine. See Sprague and Frye, Genealogy, household number
2920.
27. Stanley, Riel, p. 65.
28. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40751-40758, McDougall to
Macdonald, 31 October 1869.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 41
too soon for a first meeting to "consider the present political state of the
country, and to adopt such measures as may be deemed best for the future
welfare of the same." Elections followed and Protestants met Catholics on
the appointed day.
29
November 16 was also the approximate time of Macdonald's first
learning of the interruption of the surveys and the subsequent barring of
McDougall from the settlement.
30
 His sources of information were Ameri-
can newspapers forwarded to Ottawa, not dispatches from the governor-
designate. Then, about November 20, Macdonald received McDougall's
first report. Evidently the Metis feared exclusion from the " 'law' (meaning
the Council), that the half breeds would be all driven back from the River
& their land given to others, etc., etc." In the long term, the solution was to
"call for volunteers from Canada to settle the country with a good Rifle
among the implements of husbandry in each case." That would prevent a
recurrence of the annoyance of such crises. For the moment, though,
McDougall said, "I am not frightened & don't believe the insurrection will
last a week "
31
Macdonald agreed in his reply of November 20 that McDougall's trou-
ble was only "some little opposition" and that everything might proceed
according to plan. Canada would not send a military force even though
many of the Ontario volunteers were prepared to go to the North West
through the United States disguised as settlers. For the moment, Macdonald
thought that the most appropriate response was judicious use of patronage
and sending influential French-Canadians to the scene.
It occurs to me that you should ascertain from Governor McTavish to name
the two leading half-breeds in the Territory, and inform them at once that
you will take them into your council. This man Riel, who appears to be a
moving spirit, is a clever fellow, and you should endeavour to retain him as
an officer in your future police. If you do this promptly it will be a most
convincing proof that you are not going to leave the half-breeds out of the
Law.
32
The good-will ambassadors to be sent from Quebec were a priest with
missionary experience in the West, Father J.-B. Thibault, and a French-
Canadian militia officer, Colonel Charles de Salaberry. Their assignment
was to convince the Metis that all "stories as to the intentions of Canada to
deprive them of their lands & to govern .. . without any reference to the
residents" were totally untrue.
33
29. Stanley, Riel, p. 68.
30. Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 43.
31. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40752, 40754, McDougall to
Macdonald, 31 October 1869.
32. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 481, Macdonald to McDougall, 20 November 1869.
33. Ibid., p. 515, Macdonald to Rose, 23 November 1869.
42 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Macdonald concluded the letter with a warning that McDougall should
avoid the temptation of blasting his way into the colony. ' The point you
must never forget," Macdonald stressed, "is that you are approaching a
foreign country under the government of the Hudson's Bay Company....
You cannot force your way in.... ' '
3 4
Evidently content that all would be resolved in the West, Macdonald
sought confirmation that everything was still moving smoothly on the Lon-
don end. The Prime Minister used the recently completed trans-Atlantic
cable on November 22 to telegraph Canada's financial agent, John Rose,
asking whether the money had been "paid over." At the same time, the
telegram reported that McDougall had been stopped by an "armed Force of
half breeds" and the insurgents had appointed a "provisional committee or
Government."
35
Although Macdonald may have intended nothing more by his question
than literally to ask if the sale had been completed, the prompting sparked
an idea in the clever imagination of Rose who subsequently launched a
series of letters and telegrams urging delay of the transfer until peaceable
possession could be assured. On November 25 he observed: "It is one thing
to have to evict troublesome tenants" after a change of landlords. That
Canada had anticipated from the beginning. Under the unexpected present
circumstances, Rose observed, "we do not yet have the entry of the door."
Why "pay for an estate if we can't get possession?"
36
 The next day, a
telegram from Rose to Macdonald was even more blunt: "Government and
Company urging surrender [meaning payment]. Shall I claim delay? If so
let Governor [General] cable ... immediate."
37
The advantage of delay was obvious — all responsibility for defeating
the insurgents would fall to the HBC and the British. Canada could avoid
the expense and humiliation that was certain if the suppression of the "half
breeds" proved more complicated than McDougall or Macdonald ima-
gined. Indeed, Sir John A. Macdonald himself should have appreciated as
much as soon as he first learned of the disturbance from newspaper
accounts in mid-November. He responded rather dimly, at first, because a
crushing burden of personal financial troubles and family sorrow had
pushed him into nearly continual drunkenness in the autumn of 1869. As
the public crisis first broke he was not on top of developments. Later, as the
trouble at Red River began to overshadow his own private tribulations, he
became more clear-sighted. He saw that Rose was right. November 26 was
34. Ibid., p. 481, Macdonald to McDougall, 20 November 1869.
35. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, p. 40224, Macdonald telegram to John Rose, 22
November 1869.
36. Ibid., p. 40241, Rose to Macdonald, 25 November 1869.
37. Ibid., p. 40249, Rose telegram to Macdonald, 26 November 1869.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 43
not too late to stall the British.
38
 However, the same cable that informed the
Colonial Office of Canada's refusal to accept the transfer, "unless quiet
possession can be given," asserted too confidently that "Macdougall will
remain near frontier waiting favourable opportunity for peaceable
ingress."
39
McDougall was waiting at Pembina—still expecting to become
Governor on December 1, and Macdonald's letter of November 20 author-
ized him to take control of the territory by any means short of force. With
the refusal to accept the transfer communicated to the British on November
26, it was imperative that McDougall receive new instructions before
December 1. Macdonald did not write on the 26th, but he did send a
dispatch the next day telling the expectant governor to stay where he was
and to forego proclaiming his authority: "You ought not to swear that you
will perform duties that you are, by the action of the Insurgents, prevented
from performing.' '
40
If Macdonald wanted the message to reach McDougall in time, he
would have had to send the information by telegram as far as Fort Aber-
crombie (south of Pembina on the Red River), and to have had it carried the
rest of the way by riders on fast horses. (Macdonald had learned on
November 25 that the best ordinary mail connections required at least
twelve days by railway and ox cart.) Consequently, when the Prime Min-
ister chose to send his important dispatch of November 27 by ordinary
mail, he had to know that the letter could not arrive at Pembina in time to
make a difference on December 1 and he admitted as much the same day
when he wrote another cabinet colleague that he feared the worst—not
because his man on the spot had defective instructions, but because
McDougall was too "high handed" to "do the right thing."
42
On December 1 McDougall acted in accordance with his understand-
ing of the instructions he had in hand, rather than in accordance with the
38. Creighton acknowledges that Macdonald's chronic drinking became acute in the
autumn of 1869 (Old Chieftain, p. 41). Still, he asserts it was Macdonald's "quick
lawyer's eye" (p. 47) which spotted the no-payment-without-peaceable-possession
remedy. Creighton ignores the week-long pause before Macdonald's telegram of the
26th, and he ignores the telegram of Rose that finally prodded Macdonald into action.
Creighton tells the story as follows: "John Rose... had written a little complacently
[that everything was ready for the transfer].... But he could be stopped. Canada could
refuse to accept the transfer until peace was restored.... It was the one neat quick way
out. And Macdonald determined to take it" (p. 48).
39. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40255-40256, draft telegram
from Governor General to Lord Granville, 26 November 1869.
40. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 614, Macdonald to McDougall, 27 November 1869.
41. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, p. 40830, H.P. Dwight telegram to Macdonald, 25
November 1869.
42. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 585, Macdonald to George Cartier, 27 November 1869.
44 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
changed plans that were in the mail from Ottawa. In the small hours of the
morning, McDougall crossed the border and shouted the proclamation of
his gubernatorial power into the frosty silence of the darkened prairie. For
the benefit of the live audience, printed copies of the proclamation went up
all over the Red River Settlement later in the day. Ironically, the proclama-
tion of the transfer had a tonic effect on the council of delegates that had
been lost in pointless wrangling since first meeting on November 16.
43
McDougall's assertion that the transfer was an accomplished fact, like
it or not, prompted a proposal from Riel: "If Mr. McDougall is really our
Governor today, our chances are better than ever. He has no more to do
than prove to us his desire to treat us well. If he guarantees our rights, I am
one of those who will go to him in order to escort him as far as the seat of
his government."
44
 On that point all parties agreed—depending upon what
was meant by "our rights." Riel then proposed a short recess to prepare a
draft list. The others agreed to wait and see.
Two hours later Riel tabled a fifteen-point document which the princi-
pal spokesman for the native English, James Ross, accepted in substance.
Riel proposed nothing more than an elected government (with exclusive
power over all matters "local to the Territory"), equal status for the French
and English languages, and secure land tenure for everyone (not just
registered freeholders). According to the wording of the land-rights article,
Canada had to guarantee "all privileges, customs and usages existing at the
time of the transfer..." (which was broader than the confirmation of titles
that Macdonald contemplated in the Draft Order in Council governing the
transfer). On the land-rights issue it appeared that the native English and
the Metis were united. The snag that developed was over the status of the
extra-legal government then in existence. Riel's party demanded the power
to deny McDougall entry until he recognized their rights. Ross objected
that such a proviso had no meaning unless the council of delegates was the
legal government of the colony; only the Queen of England could make
them the government of Assiniboia. To declare otherwise would be an act
of rebellion.
45
Thus the council broke up on December 1. It infuriated Riel to have
agreed on their rights and failed on a procedure for enforcing them. He held
the native English entirely to blame and condemned them for cowardice.
"Go, return peacefully to your farms! Stay in the arms of your wives,"
Riel shouted. "But watch us act. We are going ahead to work and obtain
the guarantee of our rights and yours."
46
43. Stanley, Riel, p. 68-72.
44. Ibid., p. 73.
45. Ibid., p. 74.
46. Ibid.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 45
The immediate result of the apparent, irreparable division between the
two native populations of Red River was an opportunity for the Canadian
party to assert its own dominance despite its numbers. In 1869 there were
about 6,000 Metis, 4,000 native English, and less than 1,000 Canadians in
Assiniboia.
47
 Of course, the Canadians were confident that they would
achieve the dominant position in the North West eventually. The question
that concerned them on December 1 was whether the defeat of Riel would
occur immediately, with local resources, or later with outside help. One
measure of the impatience of the Canadians is that they chose to make a
bold move immediately, on their own. Schultz and Mair persuaded
McDougall to commission Dennis as the "Lieutenant and Conservator of
the Peace" to recruit an army of sympathizers from the native English.
48
But Mair and Schultz made two fatal miscalculations. They overestimated
both the competence of Colonel Dennis as a general and the willingness of
the English "half breeds" to fight the French in open war.
49
As soon as Riel learned of the plot he moved against the most likely
sources of trouble which were the stores and saloons in the little village of
Winnipeg. When a group of about fifty Canadians and their sympathizers
barricaded themselves in Schultz's store and prepared for a siege on
December 7, the Metis broke the plot on the same day by rolling some artil-
lery from the fort up to Schultz's door and daring them not to surrender. In
a moment the Metis gained entry, then marched Schultz and his co-
conspirators to jail in Fort Garry.
50
 As soon as Dennis learned of his col-
leagues' capture, he too gave up the fight, in his case, by fleeing overland to
Minnesota. As he trekked through the snow on foot, he must have burned
with anger and ached with hope for some future opportunity to avenge his
disgrace.
51
McDougall, for his part, became another embittered actor once he
learned of Macdonald's amended instructions too late to avoid the embar-
rassment of his premature proclamation of the transfer. After making one
47. According to the census of Manitoba taken one year later (after a considerable influx
of newcomers), the balance of population was 1,611 "whites"; 5,696 "French
Metis"; and 4,082 "English Metis." Canadian Sessional Papers, no. 20 (1871), p. 91.
48. Ibid, pp. 74-75.
49. A contrary view, one that argues that the two native populations were "implacable
enemies," is expressed by Frits Pannekoek, "The Rev. Griffiths Owen Corbett and the
Red River Civil War of 1869-70," Canadian Historical Review 57 (1976), pp. 133-
149. But Pannekoek admits that the native English were still not willing to become the
completely compliant tools of the Canadians and they were too divided among one
another to define and fight for their own independent objectives.
50. Stanley, Riel, pp. 75-76.
51. See the accusations of Joseph Royal, PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 88884-88890, Royal to Macdonald, 2 November 1880; and the
denial by Dennis, pp. 88880-88883,10 November 1880.
46 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
final attempt to impress Kiel with the futility of continuing the "insurrec-
tion," he left for Ottawa with Dennis in late December. Later, Macdonald
complained that McDougall had made "the greatest possible mess of
everything."
52
The Prime Minister might have judged McDougall less harshly if the
would-be governor had not launched a public campaign of personal vindi-
cation in the new year.
53
 Macdonald would not admit that he shared any of
the blame for mishandling the matter. At the same time, he feared that pub-
lic agitation might spoil a second ambassadorial mission he had set in
motion early in December.
The ambassador following Thibault and de Salaberry was Donald A.
Smith, the highest ranking Hudson's Bay Company officer in North Amer-
ica. But the role the Prime Minister assigned to Smith was more daring than
the assignment given to the others. The task Macdonald proposed (and
Smith accepted) was for the official to go to Red River "as a sort of com-
missioner [but actually]... to make arrangements for the dispersion of the
Insurgents, and the dissolution of their committee."
54
On the same day Smith left for the West, Macdonald sent a letter to
McDougall informing him of Smith's mission in unmistakable terms. "It is
hoped here," he said, "that while Mssrs. Thibault & de Salaberry are act-
ing upon the French half-breeds, Mr. Smith will be able to strengthen,
encourage and organize the English & Scotch half breeds & the whites who
are loyal to Canada, so pray sit down with the gentlemen & lay out a plan
of operations."
55
 Ignorant that the scheme had already failed with
McDougall using Dennis, the Prime Minister cheerily instructed his man at
Pembina to work with Smith in devising "a plan by which he might quietly
& without observation, organize a body of Scotch & English to take posses-
sion of Fort Garry "
56
First Thibault and de Salaberry (then Smith in his turn) discovered that
McDougall had already acted and failed in their assigned mission. Worse,
Thibault became a convert to the Metis cause soon after his arrival in the
settlement in late December,
57
 and Smith failed in the undercover aspect of
his assignment. Later, Macdonald confided to Rose that he thought Smith
was "incapacitated from usefulness by the most wretched physical
52. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 13, p. 812, Macdonald to H.C. Langevin, 28 December 1869.
53. "McDougall is very sore about his fiasco... tries to put blame upon everybody
else Without reading the documents you really could not understand the extremity
of the folly he displayed in the west." Ibid., p. 966, Macdonald to Rose, 26 January
1870.
54. Ibid., p. 648, Macdonald to Rose, 5 December 1869.
55. Ibid., p. 713, Macdonald to McDougall, 12 December 1869.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 85.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 47
cowardice." It seemed he had chosen the wrong man: "our selection of
him was rather unfortunate."
58
Closer to the reality of the situation, Smith was afraid of provoking the
Metis by seeming to be too friendly with the native English, and he did not
get very far in bribing Riel. Instead, he persuaded the people in the settle-
ment that Canada recognized they were a distinct political community and
intended to respect their rights as a condition for their joining Confedera-
tion. In other words, the cover assignment became the whole mission. By
fulfilling only the throw-away part of his task, Smith made a dramatic con-
tribution to the increasingly complicated embarrassment of Macdonald's
government.
Rather than defeating the insurgents by covert action,
59
 Smith made
promises that went beyond his instructions. Moreover, the whole commun-
ity of Red River heard Donald A. Smith tell the people that they had abso-
lutely nothing to fear from Canada. In a mass meeting that took place in the
court yard of Fort Garry on January 19, 1870 (and continued the next day),
they heard Canada's ambassador elaborate what he understood to be the
government's intentions. By the time the performance was over, nothing
remained but to set forth the conditions for the people's own terms of
transfer. Riel closed the meeting by playing with the Canadian sneer that
the people were "half breeds": "We claim no half rights .. . but all the
rights we are entitled to. Those rights will be set forth by our representa-
tives, and what is more, Gentlemen, we will get them."
60
The method was to elect a larger council, a convention of forty
delegates to enumerate the people's concerns, and to send a deputation to
Ottawa to obtain appropriate recognition of their bill of rights. The first
step, the election, was completed at once, in time for an initial meeting of
the convention on January 26. Then, rather than debating the list of rights
the Riel party had prepared on December 1, the convention struck a sub-
committee to prepare a new non-partisan list. Six people accepted the
appointment. Since the group consisted of a divided trio of Metis, and three
English-speaking "half breeds" who were sceptical about the wisdom of
resisting the transfer too openly, there was a real danger that the six people
involved would soon become lost in personal bickering and disagreement.
58. The disappointment in Smith was expressed by Charles Tupper writing to Macdonald
from Pembina, 30 December (ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41003-41004), then
elaborated in private conversation once Tupper returned to Ottawa, and finally
repeated by Macdonald himself to Rose on 21 January (ibid., Letter Book, vol. 13, p.
931).
59. In mid-February Macdonald still hoped that Smith might "cause to be removed quietly
and without observation some material portions of the machinery of your steamer at
Fort Garry, otherwise, it might be employed in bringing supplies in the spring to the
Insurgent camp" (ibid., pp. 1056-1057, Macdonald to Smith, 16 February 1870).
60. Stanley, Riel, p. 91.
48 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Somewhat surprisingly, they reported within three days that they had
agreed to a text that was remarkably similar to Kiel's
After debating and approving the revised list, the members of the
entire convention then demanded specific assurances from Smith that the
government in Ottawa would be likely to concede the demands that were
emerging as the consensus of the diverse groups of native people at Red
River. They handed the ambassador the document at 11:00 a.m. on Febru-
ary 7 and told Smith that he was expected to appear before the convention
at 1:00 p.m. with his reply. They wanted simple answers—yes or no to
each article. Smith reported later that he could give the delegates most of
the assurances they wanted, but he refused to reply with a simple yes to
each demand. Articles 6 and 15, for example, called for autonomy that
amounted to provincial status — elective territorial institutions and parlia-
mentary representation. Both would be "fully and liberally considered,"
said Smith. Two other articles called for bilingual proceedings in the leg-
islature and the courts. Bilingualism would be "unquestionably... pro-
vided for," Smith promised. Still other articles (8, 14, 16, and 17) reflected
the universal anxiety that the existing population would lose proprietorial
control of its homeland. Here Smith asserted that "property held by
residents in peaceable possession will be secured." He saw no problem
with article 16 either: "That all properties, rights and privileges, as hitherto
enjoyed by us, be respected and the recognition and arrangement of local
customs, usages and privileges, be made under the control of the Local
Legislature." In fact, the only article that received an answer as indefinite
as maybe was the demand for a broad franchise because Smith was uncer-
tain that the lack of a property qualification and the inclusion of Indians
would be acceptable to Canada.
61
Encouraged that their principal concerns were certain to be accommo-
dated, the convention concluded the next day that there was good reason for
accepting Macdonald's invitation to send a deputation to Ottawa. To give
such a negotiating team a more official standing (as well as to provide con-
tinuity in the transition of power), Riel urged the convention of forty to
transform itself into the provisional government of the territory. ' The Pro-
visional Government is an actual fact," he said. "Why not recognize
it? ... It has accomplished some good. Help it do more." Since the logic of
Riel's proposal was nearly irrefutable, the convention agreed that the same
committee that drafted the list of rights should produce a draft constitution.
When that work passed on February 10, Louis Riel emerged as President,
James Ross accepted the office of Chief Justice, and other notables
representing every faction but the Canadian party filled the remaining
offices.
62
61. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41335-41350, D.A. Smith to
Joseph Howe, 12 April 1870.
62. Stanley, Riel, p. 98.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 49
From Sir John A. Macdonald's standpoint, the worst set of cir-
cumstances imaginable had developed. The "wild people" of the settle-
ment had created an extra-legal authority that went unchallenged by the
HBC, and the population he had counted on to "seize Fort Garry and hold
it against all comers" had not risen. Instead, they had joined the insurgents
and pressured Smith into a role that Macdonald specifically repudiated in a
private letter to his friend John Rose.
63
 When Macdonald learned at the end
of February that Smith had given firm promises and de facto recognition to
the provisional government, he became convinced that nothing short of war
was likely to get the "half breeds" out of Fort Garry.
64
The difficulty with Smith's promises was that Macdonald was reluc-
tant to venture beyond two concessions. The Prime Minister had written
Smith that there was "no objection to two-thirds of the Council being
selected from among the Residents." But the council he envisioned was
still an advisory body in a territorial government. The other concession,
elective institutions, would follow as "soon as the Territory is in a positon
to bear the burden and assume the responsibilities."
65
 Clearly, neither point
represented a significant departure from his original plan for territorial
administration. In that sense, both positions reflected a rather intransigent
attitude towards the Metis and their demands. Similarly, Macdonald refused
to move from his original position on the land question. He still held that
the only residents with unqualified security were persons whose "tides"
were conferred by the HBC. The rest were to be accommodated by "a very
liberal land policy as to the future settlement of the country." Settlers
without titles would have to prove compliance with yet-to-be-specified set-
tlement duties. The Prime Minister refused to consider pre-emptive land
rights for persons whose only claim was occupancy by itself. Macdonald
did express confidence that the "propositions adopted at the Red River
conference are, most of them, reasonable enough, and can easily be
disposed of with the delegates," but he harboured grave misgivings about
what would happen when the delegates returned home with their
63. Macdonald was certain that "conciliatory propositions would be rejected by our
Parliament." PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol 13, p. 933, Macdonald to
Rose, 21 January 1870; see also ibid., vol. 13, pp. 24-28, Macdonald to Rose, 23
February 1870.
64. The same displeasure would appear to explain the government's reluctance to thank
Smith for his services; "it was not until February 22, 1872, nearly two years after his
services were rendered, that Mr. Smith received any official recognition of what he had
done. He was then thanked in a lengthy letter by the Governor-General in Council."
Deckles Willson, Lord Strathcona: The Story of His Life (London, 1902), p. 90.
65. Ibid., vol. 13, p. 848, Macdonald to Smith, 3 January 1870.
66. Ibid., p. 850.
50 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
"inadmissible" demands not granted. Macdonald had "no great confidence
in his [Riel's] ratifying any arrangement made here with the delegates."
67
Consequently, the Prime Minister made new efforts to prepare a military
expedition for departure in the spring.
In making his military preparations, Macdonald recognized that a
force of British regular troops would be more effective than the Canadian
militia. In the first place, the "half breeds" were more likely to be intimi-
dated by the imperial power of Britain. And secondly, the presence of an
imperial force would discourage Americans from thinking that Canada was
alone and powerless to assert sovereignty over the North West.
68
 The prob-
lem was getting them into Assiniboia: "once there they can easily... be
replaced by a Canadian Force."
69
Macdonald's Cabinet colleagues approved the scheme. The difficulty
was with the British. They feared that intimidating the natives would anger
the Americans.
70
 Consequently, the colonial office held back, even after
events at Red River took a new — and bloody—turn following the failure
of a second plot by the Canadian party to seize Fort Garry in mid-February.
The most troublesome character in the second episode was, of course, Tho-
mas Scott,
71
 back in jail on February 18 and engaged in nearly endless
taunting of his guards, a kind of harrassment that reached a critical point on
February 28. To Scott's surprise, they entered his cell, dragged him outside,
and started to beat the man senseless. Others intervened in time and saved
his life.
Instead of changing the guard or muzzling the prisoner to prevent his
murder, President Riel struck a special tribunal to try Scott for his most
recent "treason" against the provisional government. On March 3 a major-
ity of the members of the military- style court martial voted for the death
penalty and informed Scott that he should prepare himself for death by
firing squad the next day. The condemned man called them a "pack of
cowards" and boasted they would not dare to kill him. He was correct to a
point, but new evidence suggests that the tribunal did intend to give him the
scare of a lifetime.
72
The next day, Thomas Scott was taken from his cell and placed in
front of a squad of marksmen looking like executioners, but the captain of
the guard is said to have loaded their guns in preparation for the event with
"powder and wad" only. Unfortunately for Scott (and Riel), an
67. Ibid., vol. 14, p. 49, Macdonald to Rose, 11 March 1870.
68. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40423-40433, Minute of Council, 4 February
1870.
69. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 14, p. 48, Macdonald to Rose, 11 March 1870.
70. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, p. 40458, Rose to Macdonald, 22 February 1870.
71. Stanley,Riel, p. 111.
72. Irene Spry, ed., "The Memories of George William Sanderson," Canadian Ethnic
Studies 17 (1985), pp. 115-134.
Asserting Canadian Authority Over Assiniboia 51
uncontrollable Irish nationalist adventurer in the crowd of onlookers
refused to be satisfied with a mock execution. William O'Donoghue wanted
the Orangeman dead. Consequently, according to George Sanderson, on the
command to fire, O'Donoghue's revolver discharged at the same time the
firing squad shot its harmless blanks, and Scott fell dying in the snow. Then
Francois Guillemette stepped forward and delivered the coup de grace.
73
The possibility that the killing of Thomas Scott was a kind of accident
(or at least a murder for which William O'Donoghue was more directly
responsible than the provisional government) did not appear in American
newspapers when the story reached St Paul, Minnesota, several days later.
74
Nor did Ontario newspapers reveal the fuller truth then or later. Their news
was that a pure flower of Ontario youth had been savagely murdered by a
"half breed papist rabble," and the issue changed from a matter of frus-
trated expansion into a question of the status of Protestants and Catholics in
Canada. After March of 1870, any accommodation of the Metis had to be
denounced in Ontario as the appeasement of Catholic murderers and any
failure to accommodate the French-Catholic Metis would be interpreted as
"Protestant fanaticism" in Quebec. From March of 1870, all Canadians —
Quebeckers as well as the others — would agree with Macdonald that some
kind of armed force was needed, if only to protect the Metis from vengeful
Orangemen.
As Macdonald continued his effort to bring the British into the Cana-
dian consensus, his problem was their continuing anxiety about offending
the Americans. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, stipulated that Bri-
tain would not participate in an expedition unless and until "reasonable
terms" were granted to the "Roman Catholic settlers."
76
 Macdonald held
out for his own terms. As late as April 9 he was still insisting that he would
only receive the delegates.
77
 Just as firm in his position, Granville wanted
to know the "result of negotiations" before he would commit his country
to military assistance.
78
 Fearing that the results of the negotiations were
73. Stanley, Kiel, p. 161.
74. Nor did this version of events come through in any account of the execution written by
Riel. His position was that the provisional government had a duty to punish Scott for
his "treachery." Thus, Riel freely admitted a role played by himself in the "tribunal,"
and he never denied that the court had committed the "culprit" to death. At no time
did Riel suggest that the event of March 4 was intended as a mock execution. He never
attempted to shift responsibility to O'Donoghue. But just before Riel's own execution,
the last time anyone asked him about the matter, Riel did say that Scott's execution had
been "mismanaged," unfortunately without explaining how. See George Stanley, ed.,
The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, 5 vols. (Edmonton, 1985), I, p. 310,421; and V,
p. 110,583.
75. A.I. Silver, The French Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900 (Toronto, 1982),
pp. 75-82.
76. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 40471, Lord Granville
telegram to Governor General, Sir John Young, 5 March 1870.
77. Ibid., p. 40584, Macdonald to Governor General, 9 April 1870.
78. Ibid., p. 40583, Granville telegram to Governor General, 9 April 1870.
52 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
likely to be rejected by Riel, Macdonald despaired. He feared that there had
to be some kind of "conquest," while the British wanted an assurance that
there would be no war. That was the bind. ' 'Lord Granville says .. . that if
we accept the country, England will send troops, but.. . he says the troops
are not to be used to force the people to unite with Canada, in other words
to be of no use."
79
The nub of the problem was Macdonald's unwillingness to grant the
necessary concessions and his recognition that it was politically impossible
for him to do so after Scott's "barbarous murder."
80
 His assurance to the
British that he wanted troops only as a "friendly garrison" (not as a "hos-
tile force") was transparent to the Colonial Office whose own experience in
such matters was broad enough to recognize that peaceful military occupa-
tion was impossible without substantial concessions in advance.
On April 23 the British made a final offer. They would contribute a
force and the troops could advance using all the firepower at their disposal,
but only to enforce a mutually acceptable settlement. In the cryptic
language of the telegram: "Canadian Gov't to accept decision of H.M's
Gov't on disputed points of Settler's Bill of Rights."
81
Thus the double-bind tightened: negotiations would have to be
genuine or the armed force would be entirely Canadian; if the force were
nothing but militia, the fighting was likely to be intense. In the event of a
Canadian war against the "half breeds," the insurgents were certain to seek
American aid, and there were numerous indications that the United States
was not likely to turn its back on an opportunity to assert its own influence
over the North West. Such an outcome could be avoided by seeming to
comply with the insurgents' demands, in preparation for real subordination
of the "half breeds" and reconciliation with Ontario in time for the next
election (constitutionally as far distant as the autumn of 1872). Macdonald
saw his best remaining chance, and he took it.
79. Ibid., p. 40585, Macdonald to Governor General, 10 April 1870.
80. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 14, pp. 131-132, Macdonald to Carnarvon, 14 April 1870.
81. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40593-49594, Granville telegram to Governor
General, 23 April 1870.
This page intentionally left blank 
N.J. Ritchot, ca. 1870
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"The appointment of Ritchot was the nearest that Riel could come to
participating in the negotiations himself."
54
Chapter 4
Negotiating with Delegates from
the North West
A three-person delegation from the North West arrived in Ottawa on April
11, 1870, ready to begin negotiations. To Macdonald's horror, two of the
committee members were brought before an Ottawa magistrate on charges
of complicity in the "premeditated murder" of Thomas Scott within forty-
eight hours of their arrival. Nothing could have impugned his previous
assurances of a kind reception more thoroughly and disrupted the settle-
ment he envisioned more emphatically because negotiation in apparent
good faith was a prerequisite for securing the military assistance the British
were reluctant to concede in early April.
Macdonald had agreed that someone would give the delegates a kind
reception in Ottawa. Telegraphic messages between the Governor General
and the Colonial Office do not indicate who was to speak for Canada, or the
scope of the possible concessions. The messages did imply that the Prime
Minister did not contemplate meeting the representatives himself. Nor did
he foresee the approval of extravagant concessions from anyone else. Mac-
donald believed that he already had an understanding with Bishop Tache",
and he thought Tache was "satisfied with the terms accorded to himself
and his church."
1
The Prime Minister does not seem to have expected much more to
develop from the meetings with the delegates. Still, he did not intend to
treat them harshly. Macdonald's horror at the arrests on April 13 arose from
his fear that the event would give the British new cause to question his pre-
viously asserted good faith. A week later, with criminal charges still pend-
ing and Canada apparently doing nothing to frustrate the proceedings,
Granville cabled for an explanation. "Did Canadian gov't authorize arrests
of delegates?" he asked. "Full information desired by telegraph," he
demanded.
2
 A few hours later, the official Canadian answer flashed back
over the wire. "Canadian gov't did not authorize arrest of delegates. A
1. PAC, Records of the Governor General's Office, Records of the Governor General, RG
7 G 13, vol. 3, Sir John Young telegram to Lord Granville, 11 April 1870.
2. Ibid., Granville telegram to Young, 18 April 1870.
55
56 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
brother of deceased Scott laid information on oath against two of the three
as accessories before the fact." To make the assertion all the more credible,
the same message revealed the "secret" that Macdonald was assuming full
responsibility for the cost of the delegates' legal defence.
3
The British were reassured but a question remained about the flexibil-
ity of Canada in responding to the North West representatives once they
laid their terms before the government. That particle of remaining doubt is
probably what prompted Granville to send the telegram of April 23 in
which he asserted that if Canada persisted in the request for British military
aid, the Colonial Office would reserve the right to decide what was reason-
able and unreasonable in the settlers' demands.
The threat of British intervention was followed by a termination of
criminal proceedings and a decision of the Prime Minister to become
involved in the negotiations directly. According to the journal
4
 kept by the
most important of Kiel's negotiators, Father N.-J. Ritchot,
5
 the first "audi-
ence" that Saturday ran from 11 a.m. until late afternoon and was "pretty
well confined to asking questions or requests for information."
6
 The tone
of the questions, and the repeated assurances that Canada intended to
accommodate all the delegates' suggestions, pleased Ritchot immensely.
He and the others went away believing that a good settlement would result.
The following Monday morning the discussions resumed with the
Prime Minister still playing a leading role on the Canadian side.
Encouraged by the previous meeting, the delegates stated their demands
boldly. They said that they expected ambassadorial status for themselves
and a general welcome for the population, with Canada taking the territory
as a new province in Confederation. Another facet of the demanded wel-
come was a general amnesty for all occurrences before the transfer. Ritchot
stressed that such a pardon was the indispensable starting point, it was the
"sine qua non of any settlement."
7
 Subsequently, when Macdonald
seemed only to resist the concession of provincial status, Ritchot thought
that the Prime Minister was conceding the amnesty point and wished to
move on.
Macdonald insisted that the North West territory could not become a
3. Ibid., Young cypher telegram to Granville, 18 April 1870.
4. Reproduced in W.L. Morton, ed., Manitoba: The Birth of a Province (Winnipeg,
1965), pp. 132-160.
5. The two other delegates were Alfred H. Scott (a Winnipeg bartender) and Judge John
Black ("Recorder of Rupert's Land," the principal law officer of the Red River
Settlement). The appointment of Ritchot was the nearest that Riel could come to
participating in the negotiations himself. See Stanley, Riel, p. 123-124; and Philippe R.
Mailhot, "Ritchot's Resistance: Abbe Noel Joseph Ritchot and the Creation and
Transformation of Manitoba," (Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Manitoba,
1986).
6. Stanley, Riel, p. 136.
7. Ibid., p. 138.
Negotiating with Delegates from the North West 57
province without a period of preparation, perhaps as brief as twelve
months. For several hours they haggled—with Macdonald agreeing to
shorter and shorter periods of preparation until he finally conceded that pro-
vincial status might be granted at once, at least to the District of Assiniboia.
Overnight Ritchot must have decided that the amnesty question
demanded similarly explicit resolution because he brought the subject up
again the next day, on April 26. Macdonald hesitated, saying, "the affair
was not within their competence."
8
 According to Ritchot, he did agree that
a general amnesty was a prerequisite to a peaceful transfer, and assured
Ritchot that Canada would "undertake to get the matter settled" by advis-
ing the Governor General to seek a guarantee of safety from prosecution
from the Queen before, and as a condition of, her transfer of authority from
the Hudson's Bay Company. Ritchot and the others were at first sceptical
that such a procedure would serve, then felt reassured, and finally agreed
that the amnesty could be treated separately so long as it was settled.
By the time of the fourth meeting on Wednesday, April 27, the Cana-
dian negotiators were ready to respond with a draft of a settlement that
covered the matters acknowledged to be within the power of Canada. The
document was proposed as a series of legislative amendments to the tem-
porary government act of the previous session of Parliament and was
acceptable to the delegates in most respects. They approved what was pro-
vided for self-government and on cultural matters, but rejected the treat-
ment of the land question because a clause vested control of all lands in the
Dominion. Ritchot insisted that the new province should have the same
power over natural resources as the others. When Macdonald and Cartier
insisted that Canada had committed itself to considerable expenditure to
buy out the interest of the HBC, and looked forward to even greater poten-
tial costs in the extinguishment of Indian title, they claimed full
justification for controlling at least the vacant land as Dominion territory.
Ritchot's reply was to resurrect the demand that William Dease had pro-
moted at Red River the previous summer—the idea that persons of part-
Indian ancestry should claim a share of the compensation paid to Indians in
recognition of their inherited part of the aboriginal title.
At first Cartier and Macdonald resisted the idea that the Metis and
native English might have aboriginal rights at the same time that they
claimed rights as settlers. According to Ritchot, they replied that "the
settlers of the North West.. . having obtained a form of government fitting
for civilized men ought not to claim also the privileges granted to Indi-
ans."
9
 But Ritchot insisted that dual status was the only equitable way to
resolve the impasse on the land control issue.
Ultimately, Cartier and Macdonald both appeared to agree. They said
that the native people at Red River could have self-government and
8. Ibid., p. 139.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
58 Canada and the Mttis, 1869-1885
homesteads (the rights of "civilized men") and still claim a share of the
aboriginal title ("the privileges granted to Indians"). The only sticking
point after April 27 seemed to be the amount of land that was the appropri-
ate compensation. Ritchot insisted that each person of part-Indian ancestry
ought to have a right to select a tract equivalent to 200 acres for himself
and each member of his family. Macdonald and Cartier held out for consid-
erably less.
With apparently only the quantity of land still in dispute, the Canadian
negotiators put their understanding of the agreement on general principles
into a draft of a bill that Macdonald proposed to lay before Parliament
within the week. When confronted with the text on Thursday, April 28,
Ritchot observed that the Indian title clause was unsatisfactory not only for
the amount of land to be granted, but also for the lack of a specific mode of
distribution and form of tenure of the grants. Ritchot wanted to continue the
discussions until both matters were resolved. Macdonald, however, had
become "indisposed," and Cartier attempted to continue the negotiations
by himself on Friday and Saturday. Finally, on Monday, May 2, Macdonald
rejoined the group and the two sides came to an understanding. Ritchot was
jubilant:
We continued to claim 1,500,000 acres and we agreed on the mode of dis-
tribution as follows, that is to say: The land will be chosen throughout the
province ... in several different lots in various places, if it is judged to be
proper by the local legislature which ought itself to distribute these parcels
to heads of families in proportion to the number of children existing at the
time of the distribution; that these lands should then be distributed among
the children by their parents or guardians, always under the supervision of
the above mentioned local legislature which could pass laws to ensure the
continuance of these lands in the half breed families.
10
Macdonald's own notes corroborate what Ritchot recorded. In the
Prime Minister's version, the text of the clause was:
That in order to compensate the claims of the half breed population as
partly inheriting the Indian rights, there shall be placed at the disposal of the
local legislature one million and a half acres of land to be selected any-
where in the territory of the Province of Manitoba, by the said legislature, in
separate or joint lots, having regard to the usages and customs of the coun-
try, out of all the lands not now possessed, to be distributed as soon as prac-
ticable amongst the different heads of half breed families according to the
number of children of both sexes then existing in each family under such
legislative enactments which may be found advisable to secure the
transmission and holding of the said lands amongst the half breed
families — To extinguish Indian claims.
11
With an agreement apparently sealed, the next step was to get the
10. Ibid., p. 143.
11. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40641-40642.
Negotiating with Delegates from the North West 59
matter through Parliament. Later in the day, Macdonald introduced the
House to the general terms of the bill.
12
 He indicated that the territorial
government act of the previous session was to be amended, setting aside a
small portion of the North West, giving it provincial status and a form of
government "subject to alteration by the People" if at any time later they
believed the mix of institutions no longer suited their circumstances.
13
Macdonald explained that a large influx of newcomers was expected within
the year. For that reason, it was necessary to quiet the fears of the present
population with certain guarantees that their land was assured. With regard
to the newcomers, a police force was being dispatched with British assis-
tance. Consequently, orderly immigration and future development was
assured.
Initially the Opposition did not quarrel with the details of the proposal.
On May 2, no one disputed, for example, the official bilingualism or public
support to denominational schools that was provided. What the Opposition
attacked was the more fundamental principle of negotiating with "rebels,"
granting them provincial status, and encumbering the territory with land
promises that seemed to impede the rapid settlement that was anticipated.
More particularly, the dual status accorded to the native people struck the
leader of the Opposition, Alexander Mackenzie, as especially bizarre. He
said that he could not understand how "half breeds" might receive land as
settlers and also come forward claiming land as Indians. In Mackenzie's
view, the "half breeds were either Indians or not."
14
Cartier answered that they did not propose to give the "half breeds"
an "Indian reserve." The land granted in recognition of their share of
Indian tide was to be given "to heads of families to settle their children."
Macdonald indicated that the British had already set such a precedent with
their policy of giving Loyalists land "for purposes of settlement of their
children." In the present instance, the only difference was that there was
vastly more land available in the expanse of the territory that was not
affected by the settlement of "half breed" claims at Red River.
15
Macdonald's problem was that the Opposition reacted to the jarring
inconsistency between the Prime Minister's assertion that the terms of the
settlement were temporary provisions, bound to be adjusted by the new
12. Most of the debate for that evening and on subsequent days appears in Morton's The
Birth of a Province as "Extracts from the Debates on the Manitoba Bill, May 2-May 9,
1870," pp. 161-227.
13. The verbatim text of Macdonald's remarks concerning the temporary nature of the
constitutional provisions of the settlement was as follows: "All these clauses and
stipulations are, of course, subject to alteration by the people themselves, except so far
as they relate to the appointment of the Lieut.-Governor, which of course, rests upon
the same authority as in the other Provinces of the Dominion. In all other respects they
may alter their Constitutions as they please" (ibid., p. 167). The "same authority" to
which Macdonald referred was his understanding of section 92 (1) of the BNA Act.
14. Ibid., p. 172.
15. Ibid., p. 176,199.
60 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
population about to pour into the territory in the summer, and the implica-
tion of the land clauses that the population already there was fixed for the
present and the next generation in their own little province. Consequently,
the land clauses had to be altered.
The revised text still promised land for the children but eliminated all
reference to the timing and method of the distribution, as well as any
suggestion of trusteeship to be observed by the provincial legislature. The
new text promised 1.4 million acres "towards extinguishment of the Indian
Title .. . of the half breed residents" on terms, and conditions, in a process
and at a time that was largely unspecified except to say that a distribution
was to be made by the Lieutenant Governor
under regulations to be from time to time made by the Governor General in
Council,... in such parts of the Province as he may deem expedient,...
and divide the same among the children of the half breed heads of families
residing in the province at the time of the said transfer to Canada and the
same shall be granted to the said children respectively, in such mode and on
such conditions as to settlement and otherwise, as the Governor General in
Council may from time to time determine.
16
Similarly, the security of the parents' claims became less definite. The
words agreed to earlier were to "change peaceable occupancy to title,"
protecting persons on granted or ungranted land, both within and beyond
the limits of the old HBC survey.
17
 The new text was less sweeping, and
the intent of "quieting ... titles, and assuring to the settlers .. . the peace-
able possession of the lands now held by them" was obscured in a tangle of
sub-clauses emphasizing a hierarchy of uncertain tenures that may or may
not have covered every case with the same security that was assured on
May2.
18
When Ritchot discovered how completely and abruptly Macdonald
had retreated from the terms that were agreed to on Monday morning—
how the agreement had become "very much modified" by May 4—he
aroused his colleagues to demand reinstatement of what had been previ-
ously conceded. Ritchot's account of what followed appears in the journal
entry of May 5:
We saw Sir George and Sir John; we complained to them. They declared
that in practice it amounted to the same thing. For us they promised that
they would give us by Order in Council, before departure, assurance of the
carrying out of our verbal understandings; but that for the present it would
be impossible to get the Bill passed if one changed its form... ,
19
16. Statutes of Canada (1870), Chapter 33: An Act to amend and continue the Act 32 and
33 Victoria, chapter 3; and to establish and provide for the Government of the Province
of Manitoba, section 31.
17. Ritchot's journal, in Morton, Birth of a Province, p. 140-141; and PAC, Macdonald
Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40605-40610.
18. Statutes of Canada (1870), Chapter 3, section 32.
Negotiating with Delegates from the North West 61
The broken agreement of May 2 was then covered by fresh assurances,
an understanding that some of the settlement would appear in the statute,
and the rest would be covered by Orders in Council consistent with the ori-
ginal terms. Since the delegates appreciated that the circumstances called
for devious handling of the Opposition, they agreed to go along with what
Macdonald proposed.
Then all matters moved swiftly towards a conclusion between May 5
and May 10. The Governor General reported to the Colonial Office that a
settlement satisfactory to the delegates was in a form that was likely to pass
Parliament, and requested permission to order the troops to Red River.
20
On May 6, Granville replied, "Yes, the troops may proceed." Then the
House of Commons went through a final two days of debate, and passed the
bill at midnight on May 10. The delegates did not receive the Orders in
Council they were promised, but before leaving Ottawa, Ritchot did obtain
a letter from Cartier promising that all the tenures outlined in section 32
would receive the same consideration: "so soon as the Government can
grant the necessary titles, no payment shall be required from any persons
...." Equally encouraging was a postscript adding:
I have, moreover, the high honour of assuring you, not so much on my part
as on that of my colleagues, that regarding the subject of the 1,400,000
acres of land reserved by the 31st Section of the Manitoba Act for the
benefit of half breed families, the regulations which ought to be established
from time to time by the Governor General in council concerning this
reserve, will be of a nature for recognizing the desires of the half breed
residents, and for guaranteeing, in a manner that is at once efficient and just,
the division of this expanse of land among the children of the heads of half
breed families living in the province of Manitoba, at the time of the transfer
to Canada.
21
Only one legislative loose end remained. Two members of the Opposi-
tion, Alexander Mackenzie and David Mills, had challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Manitoba Act because it granted representation in the Sen-
ate that did not appear to be contemplated by section 147 of the British
North America Act.
22
 They had suggested that a "state of tutelage" for the
territory would give time to clarify the representation issue as well as a
period to settle the country with persons who were already familiar with
British-style government. Macdonald had replied that no one could know
whether the bill was unconstitutional until its final provisions were set.
19. Ritchot's journal, p. 147.
20. PAC, RG 7 G 13, vol. 3, John Young to Lord Granville, 3 May 1870; ibid., 5 May
1870.
21. Journals of the House of Commons of Canada, VIII (1874), "Appendix 6: Report of
the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in the North West Territory in
1869-70," p. 74, Cartier to Ritchot and Scott, 23 May 1870. The postscript of the same
letter also appears in PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 230,
file 167.
22. On May 4, see debates in Morton, Birth of a Province, pp. 207,211.
62 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Then, "Imperial Confirmation" could be obtained in due course if British
sanction were needed.
Six months later Macdonald decided that confirming legislation was
indeed desirable, first, to clarify Canada's power to provide parliamentary
representation for new provinces and, secondly, in anticipation of the future
of Manitoba, to establish a power for adjusting Manitoba's boundaries once
it was certain that the province was not developing into a "new Quebec."
Macdonald anticipated that newcomers to the little "postage stamp" pro-
vince would soon outnumber the "half breed" population so completely it
would be expedient to enlarge the boundaries of the minuscule province to
a more respectable size.
23
With both purposes in mind, Macdonald wrote a brief letter to the
Governor General on December 29, including the text of the legislation he
contemplated.
24
 On January 3, the Queen's representative dutifully for-
warded the letter to Britain.
25
 A week after the Colonial Office received
Young's dispatch, Lord Kimberley (the new Colonial Secretary) was ready
to comply with the Canadian request, even to the point of adding a power
that Macdonald had not mentioned. A similar recent appeal from the
government of New Zealand had asked for authority to make new counties
out of old. It may have seemed sensible to Kimberley that Canada would
someday wish to merge some of Quebec into Ontario, or amalgamate the
Maritimes into a wider union, just as the national legislature would cer-
tainly find it expedient to create or dissolve provincial entities in the North
West territory from time to time. Consequently, he attached the New Zea-
land power to the Canadian proposal, giving Canada authority to "with-
draw part of the territory of any province and legislate therefore."
26
 Since
the provisions of his draft legislation were "not in exact conformity" with
Macdonald's draft, Kimberley decided to delay passage "until Sir J. Mac-
donald ... shall have seen it."
27
23. A curious letter from R.G. Haliburton of Nova Scotia warned Macdonald that even the
Maritime provinces would react violently "If... the attempt is made to make
Manitoba anything else than an English province having English laws and the English
language " Making the Manitoba Act permanent would provoke "a storm that will
sweep everything before it." Haliburton indicated that he "found the public generally
give you credit for wishing to do what is right in this matter; & it may strengthen your
hands to know that in carrying out your views, you will be borne out by the public
sentiment of the country." PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp.
156724-156735, Haliburton to Macdonald, 7 October 1870.
24. Ibid, Transcripts, vol. 583, Macdonald to Sir John Young, 29 December 1870. The text
of the amendment as originally proposed is printed in D.N. Sprague, "The Manitoba
Land Question, 1870-1882," Journal of Canadian Studies 15 (1980), p. 84.
25. PAC, Colonial Office Papers, MG 11, C042/696, pp. 2-4, Young to Lord Kimberley, 3
January 1871 (received 19 January 1871).
26. Ibid., pp. 14-15, draft text of BNA Act of 1871, [January, 1871].
27. Ibid., pp. 6-7, marginal note on "Minute Paper" initialled by Kimberley, [January,
1871].
Negotiating with Delegates from the North West 63
The text that left England on January 26 arrived in Macdonald's hands
in mid-February. Evidently, the Prime Minister was somewhat startled by
the broadened power, and feared the political repercussions of its
passage — the criticism that was bound to arise from those who would
claim that Canada wished to meddle with the political geography of the ori-
ginal provinces in Confederation. As a result, Macdonald jettisoned the
Kimberley amendment, and, in his own redraft, he added a clause indicat-
ing his faith in the future population of the North West by making the
federal power to create constitutions for new provinces a one-time only
proposition.
28
 Macdonald's new draft explicitly disowned all federal
responsibility for Manitoba's constitution, and stipulated a similar immun-
ity for any other new province receiving a constitution by Dominion sta-
tute. Then, as Macdonald was about to depart to Washington, D.C., on
diplomatic business, he handed the matter to Cartier on February 26,
instructing him that the latest draft should be the one "sent home to Eng-
land to be passed by the Parliament there." Macdonald stressed that the
covering letter from the Governor General to Kimberley must "point out
that all the provinces of the Dominion should hold the same status that the
four [sic] Provinces now composing the Dominion ... hold."
29
Cartier did as he was told. The new draft giving Parliament a once-
only power to enact constitutions for new provinces went to Sir John
Young, and he dutifully forwarded the package to the Colonial Office on
March 2.
30
 Then the Canadian House of Commons entered the process as
Cartier sought parliamentary approval for the/air accompli.
The House condemned the government on March 27 for its failure to
consult the elected representatives of the people of Canada before propos-
ing changes to the national constitution.
31
 On April 8, a frustrated Governor
General telegraphed the Colonial Office to halt the legislative process there
until the Canadian legislators settled on their preferred text.
32
In the course of the subsequent parliamentary debate, there were no
dramatic changes suggested.
33
 Still, the debate did shed light on the
members' views of what they had done previously in ratifying Macdonald's
settlement of the Red River crisis. David Mills stated that "the Manitoba
Act was passed... to meet the peculiar circumstances which prevailed in
the province at the time, and to enable the Government to restore peace
there." Mills suggested that Macdonald's assurance that it was a
28. Ibid., C042/697, pp. 28-31.
29. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 15, pp. 378-379, Macdonald to Cartier, 26
February 1871.
30. PAC, Colonial Office Papers, MG 11, CO42/697, pp. 18-28.
31. Ibid., pp. 270-282, clippings from debates reported in Ottawa Times.
32. PAC, RG 7 G 13, vol. 4, telegram, Young to Kimberley, 8 April 1871.
33. PAC, MG 11, CO42/697, p. 533, text of Canadian draft adopted by Joint Resolution of
Parliament.
64 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
"temporary measure to be replaced by a better matured Act at some subse-
quent time" was essential to the bill's passage.
34
 Turning to the draft of the
bill then before the House, Mills observed that the act for Manitoba would
become "unalterable" unless the provincial legislature wanted it changed.
Yet the majority of the Canadian Parliament thought, like Macdonald, that
the future population of Manitoba could be trusted to secure what was
needed.
35
 As a result, the draft resolutions did pass on April 12, and the
British responded as requested in June.
36
 With that which was "tem-
porary" under the authority of Canada then unalterable, except by the leg-
islature of Manitoba,
37
 it became more important than ever to make certain
that the "Riel party" and its sympathizers were displaced from all posi-
tions of real political power in the fledgling "half breed" province of Man-
itoba.
34. Extract of Parliamentary debate in ibid., pp. 278-280.
35. Macdonald had recently calmed one of his more outspoken critics of the Manitoba Act
thus: "The granting of responsible government was, in my opinion, premature, but it is
the best form of government for the new settlers who will go there in schools this next
season. They will ere long be able to exercise their influence as electors, and mould the
Institutions according to their own ideas." PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol.
15, pp. 289-291, Macdonald to J.Y. Bown, 9 February 1871.
36. Statutes of Great Britain (1871), Chapter 28: An Act respecting the establishment of
Provinces in the Dominion of Canada.
37. The impact of the BNA Act (1871) on the scope of provincial power became a matter
of judicial interpretation much later. It is important to note that in the nineteenth
century politicians seem to have interpreted section 92 (1) of the BNA Act much more
broadly than the twentieth century Supreme Court of Canada. When the newcomers
first began to act as Macdonald expected in the mid-1870s (and changed the
"provincial parliament" from a bicameral to a single chamber legislature) there was
little controversy. Indeed, one of the few opponents of the elimination of bicameralism
argued that the innovation was objectionable mainly because the one change tended to
divert attention from more "necessary" alterations: disposing of denominational
schools and the official status of the French language. See J.H. O'Donnell, Manitoba
Matters: Being a Short Chapter Devoted and Dedicated to the Davis-Royal
Administration, The Autonomy of Provinces no Longer respected, Ottawa Dictates,
Manitoba Obeys (Winnipeg, 1875).
This page intentionally left blank 
Alexander Morris, 1875
(Public Archives of Canada [(C26837)]
"Morris began to wonder if the great effort that was needed to keep Riel
out of politics was worth the trouble."
66
Chapter 5
Eliminating the Kiel Factor from
Manitoba Politics
News of the delegates' accomplishments in Ottawa preceded their
homecoming, and since Father Ritchot was known to be the principal nego-
tiator, he returned to a hero's welcome.
1
 By the same token, the responsi-
bility for explaining the settlement in all its aspects fell on Ritchot's
shoulders at a special meeting of the Legislative Assembly of the provi-
sional government called by President Kiel for June 24.
On the appointed day, Ritchot addressed the Fort Garry assembly in
French, pausing from time to time as Riel translated for the English-
speaking minority. They indicated that the result of the negotiation was the
Manitoba Act and other promises to follow by Order in Council and Royal
Proclamation. A general amnesty, for example, was expected with the
arrival of the Lieutenant Governor (a Nova Scotian named Adams G.
Archibald). He was to arrive about July 15, the new date set for the transfer,
and the first day in the history of the new province.
Provincial status had been considered earlier by the representatives of
the parishes and rejected
2
 in favour of a cheaper territorial administration
but no one objected to the fait accompli on June 24. Nor did anyone com-
plain that the whole settlement was not spelled out in every detail in the
Manitoba Act.
3
 The audience cheered their President and his principal
1. Stanley's Riel, pp. 147-213, is the standard account of the Manitoba reaction to the
delegates' work in Ottawa and the subsequent difficulty on the amnesty question. His is
the account followed here, except when evidence not cited by Stanley suggests a
different emphasis or elaboration.
2. Most historians consider the revision of the Bill of Rights in this and other respects to
be conclusive proof of a dictatorial style on Kiel's part. See, for example, Creighton,
Old Chieftain, pp. 61-63 and Morton, Birth of a Province, pp. xvi-xviii. It is important
to note, however, that such changes appear to have been more significant to historians
after the fact than to Kiel's colleagues in the provisional government in 1870.
3. "General meeting held at Fort Garry. Manitoba Bill accepted unanimously" (PAC,
Records of the Governor General, KG 7 G 13, vol. 3, Young telegram to Granville, 8
July 1870). See also the eyewitness account in Provincial Archives of Manitoba
(hereafter cited as PAM), William Coldwell Papers, MG 2 14, item 528, "Rev. Mr.
Ritchot Thanks the Legislature," 24 June 1870.
67
68 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
delegate when they had finished, and the same assembly voted unanimously
to ratify what was before them.
4
 The only issue the representatives dis-
cussed further was the kind of honour-guard they thought appropriate for
Archibald, and how far they might travel east for escorting the gentleman
safely to Red River.
Of course, the Government of Canada had no intention of exposing
Archibald to unruly subjects.
5
 That was the purpose of the "Red River
Expeditionary Force" of about 1,200 troops.
6
 They departed by fast steam-
ship from Collingwood, Ontario, in May but one delay after another
impeded their progress. First the Americans stopped them at the canal con-
necting Lake Huron and Lake Superior until the British ambassador in
Washington repeated the assurance that the delegates had from Canada, to
the effect that the army was on a "mission of peace" and carried a procla-
mation of general amnesty and no warrants for arrest. Then, once the troops
completed the boat trip to Fort William and began the trek following the
old fur-trade route to Red River, they encountered the first of more than
seventy portages of supplies and artillery, which explained why they did
not reach the last leg of their journey at the source of the Winnipeg River
on Lake of the Woods until August.
By that time, the date of the transfer was long passed. Since Archibald
had not arrived at the expected time, Riel began to doubt the good faith of
Canada's promises. Finally, on August 23, he received word that the
advance guard of the army, the British 60th rifles, had come up from Lake
Winnipeg as far as Point Douglas, only one bend in the Red River from
Fort Garry. Late that night, Riel went within sight of their camp fires, stood
in the rain, and listened to the sound of the soldiers' excitement over the
next day's expected activities.
In the morning, the first of the troops marched the last miles to the
fort. Later, their commander falsely reported that the "inhabitants wel-
comed troops as deliverers from oppression and plunder." The truth was
that no crowd stood along the muddy road to embrace the vanguard of their
supposed liberators, and there were no "half breed banditti" to be routed
from the fort.
7
 The gates of Fort Garry stood open; inside, the place was
4. Stanley, Riel, pp. 148-149.
5. The Governor General informed the Colonial Office on 8 June 1870 that "the
Ministers wish Mr. Archibald so to time his arrival as to reach Fort Garry immediately
after HM troops shall have established themselves there" (PAC, Records of the
Governor General, RG 7 G 10, vol. 4, Young to Granville). Later, he reported a
slightly different arrangement: "the Lt Gov shall proceed via Lake Superior and join
the troops. If, on his arrival at the Lake of the Woods, he finds everything quiet... he
can at his own discretion precede the troops..." (ibid., Young to Kimberley, 27 July
1870).
6. The force consisted of 373 British troops and 2 battalions of Canadian militia (382 men
from Ontario, 389 from Quebec). See Stanley, Birth of Western Canada, p. 131.
7. PAC, Records of the Governor General, RG 7 G 13, Young telegram to Lord
Granville, 1 September 1870.
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 69
empty. Moments before, Riel had received a warning that his life was in
danger. "For the love of God, clear out," the messenger shouted, "you are
going to be lynched."
8
Riel had fled in time. There was no hanging on August 24, only a
flag-raising ceremony that Riel himself witnessed from the safety of the
steps of Tache's cathedral on the other side of the river. He stood there with
the Bishop watching the troops race into the empty fort, whooping for
blood and finding no one to hang or to shoot. Feeling disappointment and
anger of his own, Riel turned to Tache and said, "It appears that we have
been deceived."
If Tache had known the intentions of the British colonel commanding
the troops, he would have agreed with Riel. Colonel Wolseley wrote later
that there was "sad disappointment in all ranks" when they found the fort
empty. Forgetting the alleged purpose of his mission, Wolseley confessed
in his memoirs that Riel had three choices on August 24: he could surrender
and hang for murder; he could resist and hang for treason; or he could run
and hope for escape. There was no amnesty that included the "murderers"
of Scott.
9
 The day before Wolseley's arrival, however, Tache had returned
from an errand of his own to confirm in Ottawa the promise Ritchot had
brought to Red River in mid-June. Tache obtained the assurance he sought
from Carrier. Unfortunately, Sir George Cartier was mistaken in his expec-
tations, as much as were the others.
To unravel the pattern of deception that came to a focus on August 24,
it is necessary to return to the record of the negotiations in April and May.
Early in the discussions (on April 26), the Prime Minister asserted that
Canada could not include the amnesty in the settlement to be enacted by
Parliament because the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the Domin-
ion until the transfer was completed. When Ritchot insisted that a general
amnesty was the sine qua non of a peaceful transition, Macdonald and Car-
tier conceded—according to Ritchot's account of April 26—that "they
would undertake to get the matter settled and that it was easy by such or
such means that they indicated to us.. . ."
10
A week later, the day after agreeing to the text of the Manitoba Act
that was first introduced to Parliament, the delegates met the Governor
General, Sir John Young (soon elevated to the peerage as Lord Lisgar).
Five people attended the meeting on May 3. In addition to the three
delegates and Young, the fifth participant was Sir Clinton Murdoch, per-
sonal representative of Lord Granville, who was monitoring Canada's han-
dling of the negotiations. They chatted in general about the settlement;
then, according to Ritchot, Young turned to the amnesty issue and said,
"no one .. . who had taken part in those unfortunate violation of laws
8. Stanley, Riel, p. 155.
9. Ibid.
10. Ritchot's journal, in Morton's Birth of a Province, p. 139.
70 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
would be troubled...." Murdoch added that "Her Majesty's government
desired only one thing, which was to re-establish peace and to pass the
sponge over all the facts and illegal acts which had taken place in the North
West and its territories."
11
 Ritchot replied that the delegates needed the
promise in writing, but Murdoch expressed surprise that anyone could
question the reliability of a vice-regal promise simply because it was ver-
bal: "when one dealt with men such as those before whom we were, it was
1 0
not necessary to dot all the f s. Still, the delegates insisted that "the peo-
ple would not be satisfied" with anything less than a written promise.
Young then repeated his assurance that "everything would go well, that the
settlers of the North West could be reassured that no one would be trou-
bled."
The next day Carrier asked Ritchot if the meeting with the Governor
General had proceeded satisfactorily. Ritchot answered that the delegates
were "well satisfied" that Britain would provide what Canada could not,
and returned to the part of the settlement that Carrier wished to reopen in
view of the parliamentary debate that had begun on May 2. More than two
weeks elapsed before Ritchot's attention could return to the amnesty ques-
tion. Then there was a second meeting with the Governor General on May
19, a meeting attended by four people: Ritchot and Scott accompanied by
Cartier, meeting Sir John Young (without Murdoch). According to
Ritchot's journal entry of May 19, he repeated his insistence that he must
have something in writing to confirm what Murdoch and Young had prom-
ised verbally on May 3. Finally Young gave in to Ritchot's pressure and
agreed to furnish a document saying that "Her Majesty was going to pro-
claim a general amnesty immediately" and that the proclamation would
arrive with the Lieutenant Governor.
Ritchot expected to receive Young's letter the next day. When no
communication arrived on May 20, or during the next several days, he
returned to Cartier who explained on May 24 that Young and Murdoch had
reconsidered the matter and had found a different procedure more appropri-
ate. They had decided that the committal of the Queen to an amnesty before
it was requested through the Colonial Office was a breach of form. It was
more appropriate for the delegates to petition the Queen through the Gover-
nor General. When Ritchot resisted the petition proposal, Cartier responded
with profuse assurances that the process was "only a matter of form."
14
Finally Ritchot agreed to pursue the amnesty as suggested and
Carrier's secretary prepared the petition for Ritchot's signature on May 26.
At the same time, Cartier reiterated his certainty that the outcome was
"only a matter of form." What Cartier did not realize is that the Governor
11. Ibid., p. 146.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 154.
14. Ibid., pp. 155-156.
13
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 11
General had no intention of supporting an amnesty on Carrier's authority
alone.
As far as Cartier knew, he was the minister primarily responsible for
the matter. When Young asked for a full "report on the petition," he made
the request to Cartier; and it was Cartier who responded on June 8 with a
full "narrative of facts ... leaning towards safety for the conduct of the
insurgents."
15
 Normally such a document would have gone from its author
for approval by Cabinet and then to the Governor General as a Minute of
Council. But Parliament was not in session. Macdonald was gravely ill, and
most of the other ministers were away from Ottawa on summer holidays.
Only two other Cabinet ministers saw Cartier's report. Neither voiced any
particular objection, not even to the passage in which Sir George advised
against any exceptions to the amnesty because the exclusion of Riel, for
example, would "tend to perpetuate a feeling of irritation... ,"
16
Notwithstanding approval by Cabinet (such as it was), Sir John Young
sent the report on the amnesty to the Colonial Secretary on June 9 with a
covering letter asserting that the document was "not to be regarded as a
Minute of Council nor as the expression of cabinet."
17
Clearly, Young did not think that Cartier had the authority to promote
the position he and Macdonald's colleagues proposed. Simultaneously,
however, Cartier was completing other delicate negotiations and made
promises that were even more sweeping in their consequences. All were
reported to Granville without any of the disqualification Young heaped
onto the amnesty report. Apparently Cartier had the authority to promise a
delegation from British Columbia a transcontinental railway, to be started
within two years and completed in ten,
18
 but he could not draft the rationale
for the amnesty he and Macdonald promised the Red River delegates on
April 26. The difference between the two matters was not a difference in
Carrier's authority, but his consistency with the wishes of Sir John A. Mac-
donald as they were known to Sir John Young. Thus Cartier's role in the
amnesty is only part of the story, the rest is the part played by Macdonald.
When Cartier and Macdonald learned that the amnesty issue was the
sine qua non of negotiations on April 26 and both negotiators for Canada
promised the delegates that they would have what they demanded—but
15. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41654-41657, Francis Hincks
to Macdonald, 18 March 1874.
16. The reading of the report by the other ministers, Hincks and Campbell, is mentioned in
the letter by Hincks to Maconald, 18 March 1874, cited above. The memorandum itself
is printed in the "Report of the Select Committee on the Causes of the Difficulties in
the North West Territory in 1869-70," in Journals of the House of Commons of
Canada, 8 (1874), appendix 6, item 131, pp. 171-178; a manuscript copy appears in
PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41435-41454.
17. "Report of the Select Committee," item 126, p. 169, Young to Granville, 9 June 1870.
18. For Carrier's role in the negotiations for the admission of British Columbia to
Confederation, June 6-9 and June 25, see W.L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union
of British North America, 1857-1873 (Toronto, 1964), pp. 247-248.
72 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
from the Crown directly, not from Canada—Macdonald reported to Mur-
doch that two demands were impossible. Murdoch then informed Granville
on April 28 that two "clearly inadmissible" demands had arisen. One
involved vesting control of the territory in the local inhabitants. The other
"would secure an indemnity to Riel and his abettors for the execution of
Scott, and to all others for the plunder of the Hudson's Bay Company's
stores, and for other damages committed during the disturbances, conces-
sions which this Government could not venture even if it had the power to
grant... ."
19
Murdoch indicated that, under the circumstances of the negotiations,
' 'there was no choice but to reject these terms and to endeavor to arrange
others that would not be open to objection." No details of the arrangements
appeared in Murdoch's report of April 28. He did not write, for example,
that the land question was nearing a settlement by the appearance of a
compromise, nor that the amnesty was being disposed of by a more compli-
cated subterfuge. Murdoch did not suggest that the delegates were given a
promise Macdonald had no intention of keeping, or that Macdonald's stra-
tegy called for Young and Murdoch to join him in deceiving the delegates
(and Cartier as well). The conclusion seems inescapable, however, that the
"arrangement" to which Murdoch referred was exactly such action.
In concocting the ruse, Macdonald must have dreaded the inevitable
conflict it would cause with Cartier. By April 28, the stress had become so
intolerable that Sir John began to drink—apparently with the intention of
remaining "indisposed" for some considerable period because he was still
drunk on Friday and took to his bed over the weekend with nothing but a
large stock of newspapers and his favourite port wine.
No one close to Macdonald knew how much longer his "break out"
f\r\
would continue. Finally, the lack of progress that Cartier was making in
concluding the negotiations between April 29 and May 1 prompted the
Prime Minister to drag himself over to Cartier's for one last meeting on
Monday morning, May 2, where a final round of concessions completed the
negotiation charade. Then, Macdonald drew upon his phenomenal stamina
to go into the House of Commons later in the day to characterize the settle-
ment in words that were coherent if not elegant. And so he continued for
the next several days.
On May 6 Macdonald reached the limit of his endurance. Just after
eating a quiet lunch in his office, he felt a sudden sharp pain that sent him
writhing in agony to the floor. A physician came to the Prime Minister's aid
19. "Report of the Select Committee," item 135, pp. 193-194, Murdoch to F. Rogers,
Undersecretary of the Colonial Office, 28 April 1870; a manuscript copy appears in the
PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41640-41642.
20. According to Creighton, Macdonald was "sick of Riel, and Red River, and these
interminable negotiations. The piled papers lay on the desk in front of him. The gaze of
the delegates was fixed upon him with implacable ferret-like intentness." That drove
him to drink. See Creighton's Old Chieftain, pp. 66-67.
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 73
a few moments later and concluded that the aging politician suffered from
"biliary calculus" (gall stones). The violent pain signalled the passing of
one stone, doubtless there were others. Dr. Grant prescribed complete
immobility, and turned the Prime Minister's office in the East Block into a
11
sick room for the duration of the crisis.
Since there were no more attacks like the one of May 6, Macdonald
began to show enough recovery to be moved as far as the more comfortable
main room of the Speaker's chambers on June 2. He continued to improve
and the doctor ordered the completion of Macdonald's convalescence on
Prince Edward Island. There, in July and August, the Prime Minister
"received few letters and sent fewer replies."
22
In Macdonald's absence, Cartier became Acting Prime Minister and
handled all matters including the amnesty. But since the Governor General
knew that Macdonald's views differed from Carrier's, he disqualified the
amnesty report of June 8 and subsequently secured Macdonald's approval
for his action. In July Macdonald confirmed that "neither the Governor
General nor the Cabinet should be committed to the General Amnesty."
Even the lesser proposal of clemency for all but the "murderers" of Scott
was to "proceed from England without advice from Canada."
23
Meanwhile, Cartier continued to believe that the general amnesty was
forthcoming, even though he did recognize that public opinion in Ontario
was too strong to proclaim it immediately. Canada would have to delay at
least until the people of Red River welcomed their governor, and esta-
blished their undoubted loyalty.
24
 Tache feared that the delay running into
July had a different, sinister meaning. That was why the Bishop had set off
to Ottawa for reassurance.
According to Tache's account of his meeting with Cartier, the acting
prime minister asserted that the "thing has not changed"
25
 and encouraged
Bishop Tache to see for himself in a meeting with the Governor General
who was on holiday at Niagara. Indeed, Cartier suggested that they might
travel there together. By the time they reached Kingston, however, they had
become so fearful of public meetings protesting the Manitoba Act that the
two decided to by-pass Toronto. They travelled separately, with the "rebel
Bishop" completing the journey by himself through the United States.
Then the Governor General refused Tache the expected assurance. Instead,
Young sent him back to Cartier saying, "he knows my views upon the sub-
ject and he will tell you all."
26
21. The account of the nearly fatal illness, complete with a description of the peculiar
method of hospitalization is in ibid., pp. 68-72.
22. Ibid., p. 72.
23. PAC, Records of the Governor General, RG 7 G 12, vol. 73, pp. 242-245, quoted in
Young to Granville, 21 July 1870.
24. "Report of the Select Committee," item 16, pp. 38-39, Cartier to Tache, 5 July 1870.
25. Quoted in Stanley, Riel, p. 150.
26. Ibid., p. 151.
74 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Young knew Carrier could only repeat what Sir George already knew,
but the Governor General preferred having Carrier spinning the old yarn to
repeating the lie himself. Since Carrier still believed
27
 that the matter was
settled in principle—only the right moment was lacking for
implementation—he dutifully repeated the "all" that the Governor Gen-
eral demanded and enabled Tache to return to Red River satisfied that a
general amnesty was forthcoming. The Bishop arrived at his "palace"
opposite Fort Garry on August 23, and told Riel that "there was not the
slightest danger." The next day, Tache still hoped that he had not been
"deceived" as he stood beside the former President watching the troops
swarming into the fort.
Riel fled to safety at St Joseph's, a Metis community a few miles west
of Pembina in the United States. Canadians hunting for him found alternate
satisfaction in the stoning to death of Elzear Goulet and the shooting of
Franois Guillemette (Goulet, for sitting on the tribunal that condemned
Scott and Guillemette for firing the second shot in the execution).
28
 There
was no civil administration to keep the peace. In fact, the Orange Order was
the first social or political institution established after the transfer when
Orangemen among the volunteers set up Loyal Orange Lodge 1307 at Fort
Garry on September 18. In the next several months, the majority of the
population of the little village of Winnipeg joined the Mother Lodge in ini-
tiations that occurred twice a week, every week over the winter.
29
When Archibald finally arrived on September 2, he perceived immedi-
ately that the Canadians were the unruly element of the population. His first
report to Ottawa asserted that there was little difficulty between the native
English and the Metis, and he hoped Riel would continue his "voluntary"
exile until the mood of the Canadians became less violent.
30
 In the interim,
Riel left the leadership of Manitoba in the hands of persons who, like him-
self, were educated in Montreal, but unlike Riel, were not implicated in the
events of 1869-70. Both trustees were in Quebec until the summer of 1870.
One was Joseph Dubuc, old friend and schoolmate of Riel. The other was
o i
Joseph Royal, sent to Riel's aid on Carrier's recommendation.
As the "outrages" of the Canadians against the Metis continued even
after Archibald's establishment of a civilian police force, many Metis
began to wonder if they should not launch a second resistance or at least
seek outside help in the enforcement of the settlement with Canada. Riel
27. PAC, Records of the Governor General, RG 7 G 12, vol. 73, pp. 242-245, Young to
Granville, 21 July 1870.
28. Other "outrages" are itemized in Stanley, Riel, pp. 159-161.
29. Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical
Geography of the Orange Order in Canada (Toronto, 1980), pp. 58-59.
30. "Report of the Select Committee," item 88, p. 137, Archibald to Cartier, 3 September
1870. On the same theme, see also PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 24960-24967, Archibald to Macdonald, 9 October 1871.
31. Stanley, Riel, p. 165.
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 75
recognized the potential for disaster in such discontent when William B.
O'Donoghue reappeared in a fresh, even more troublesome role. When
Scott's killer returned, it was to seek support for a movement to annex the
territory to the United States. Hoping to prevent a drift of the Metis to
O'Donoghue's cause, Riel left the security of St Joseph's for a public meet-
ing at St Norbert on September 17, and argued that the "treaty" with
Canada was far better than anything they could expect from the Americans.
To O'Donoghue's chagrin, the rest of the group agreed. Instead of adopting
a petition asking the United States to annex Manitoba to Dakota territory,
they petitioned President Grant to ask Queen Victoria to demand enforce-
ment of the Manitoba Act. Then Riel returned to St Joseph's.
32
By the end of September it was clear that the leader of the Metis might
come and go more or less as he pleased in the parishes south of the Assini-
boine River. In that sense his exile was not only a voluntary one, but also
little more than an inconvenience. As soon as Archibald inaugurated the
"true constitution of Manitoba," Riel expected his people would control
the legislature and set the stage for the former President to become Prem-
33
ier.
Before elections could take place, boundaries for electoral districts had
to be drawn; before drawing the electoral map, there had to be a census for
an equitable apportionment of the twenty-four seats in the provincial leg-
islature. With the additional purpose of locating and enrolling the persons
entitled to land under the Manitoba Act, Archibald took steps to enumerate
the population in October. Five teams of enumerators canvassed as many
census districts. Each team consisted of a Metis and a native English settler
working independently, comparing their results only when the task was
completed. According to the "French Report," there were 5,757 "French
Half Breeds" and 4,083 "English Half Breeds" in a total population of
11,963. The English enumerators reported 5,696 of the first group and
4,082 of the second in a total of 11,967.
34
 Such double enumeration, and
the similarity of the two tabulations, tended to support Archibald's later
contention that the accuracy and impartiality of the enumeration were
beyond reproach.
As soon as the results were known (early in December), the Lieutenant
Governor drew electoral boundaries proportional to population, and true to
Riel's prediction, the "Rielites" triumphed in the subsequent election, tak-
ing seventeen of the twenty-four seats. Schultz was defeated, as were all
other Canadians except Royal and Dubuc.
35
The Orange faction (also known as the Ontario party) was determined
32. Ibid., pp. 161-163.
33. George Stanley, general editor, The Collected Writings of Louis Riel, 5 vols.
(Edmonton, 1985), I, pp. 120-121, Riel to Joseph Dubuc, 21 October 1870.
34. Canadian Sessional Papers, no. 20 (1871), p. 91.
35. Stanley, Kiel, pp. 165-167.
76 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
that such a result would not be repeated in the voting to choose the four
members for the House of Commons. Rioting, bribery, and more subtle
intimidation ensured subsequently that three out of the four successful can-
didates were anti-Riel English. Two of the honourable members, Lynch and
Schultz, were Orangemen.
36
 That success, and the orgy of brawling at the
polls, convinced Archibald that the lust for vengeance had run its course.
Since the Ontario party was also about to receive a generous balm of cash
compensation for alleged suffering during the late "insurrection," Archi-
bald reasoned that all except the most violent Orangemen would tolerate a
general amnesty if it were proclaimed in the summer of 1871. Remember-
ing previous conversations with Cartier
37
 and a letter from Macdonald in
which the Prime Minister seemed concerned only about the proper tim-
ing,
38
 Archibald wrote Cartier in May asking him about clemency. "Don't
you think it quite time now to have that matter settled?" he suggested. In
the same letter, Archibald enclosed a note from the native English politi-
cian, John Norquay, agreeing that ' 'the spirit of Clear Gritism which was
rampant... is gradually subsiding." Norquay agreed that a general
amnesty would be tolerated in the summer of 1871.
39
Cartier passed Archibald's letter on to the Prime Minister, but Mac-
donald did not reply. He might have thought that his earlier letter still
applied. The earlier instruction was
to discourage any pressure for a general amnesty on the one hand, and, at
the same time, to convey the assurance verbally that those who have only
been guilty of taking up arms to keep out McDougall to obtain a constitu-
tion for the country will not be molested. Time, the great curer of evils will
soon calm down the apprehension of those engaged in the rising and all will
go well with you especially if Riel and those directly implicated in Scott's
death submit to voluntary exile.
40
Clearly, Archibald had misinterpreted the Prime Minister's position.
The second half of the quotation indicated an expression of concern about
the supporters of Riel, not the Orange fanatics. Macdonald hoped and
expected that by Riel's exile the Metis would eventually lose track of their
leader and in that loss forget their former claims to national status. Then all
would "go well" for Canada's colonization of Manitoba and the rest of the
North West.
36. Houston and Smyth, The Sash Canada Wore, p 58.
37. Referring to his briefing with Cartier and Francis Hincks before his departure to
Manitoba in a letter to Macdonald (2 December 1871), Archibald said, "I have taken
care not to allude to anything which was confidentially communicated to me by Sir
George or Sir Francis while you were ill, and have committed nobody but myself"
(PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 78062-78065).
38. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 14, p. 422, Macdonald to Archibald, 1 November 1870.
39. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41536-41541, Archibald to
Cartier, 28 May 1871.
40. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 14, p. 422, Macdonald to Archibald, 11 November 1870.
Eliminating the Kiel Factor from Manitoba Politics 77
Macdonald should have clarified the misunderstanding as soon as the
matter came to his notice in June 1871, but he did not, probably because he
knew that he could not tell the whole truth to Archibald without the facts
getting to Cartier. Consequently, one deception led to another and the entire
matter became exceedingly more complicated in the autumn of 1871 with a
second attempt by O'Donoghue to exploit the Metis for his own purposes.
By September 1871, with none of the promises fulfilled, O'Donoghue
believed that, if he crossed the border with a small force of his followers at
Pembina, he might attract hundreds of dissatisfied Metis before reaching
Fort Garry. Together, they might take the fort, throw out the ' 'Ontario ban-
dits," and seek the protection of the United States to secure their indepen-
dence.
As soon as Riel learned of O'Donoghue's new plan, he returned to
Manitoba and called a meeting of the Metis captains from every parish to
take place at St Vital on September 26. On the appointed day, Riel brought
them to the same resolution they had adopted the year before. In the new
crisis, however, Riel recognized that by withholding his support from
Archibald until the last minute, he might force the amnesty so long delayed.
Consequently, when Archibald finally learned that Manitoba was about to
be invaded, and issued a proclamation on October 4 calling everyone to
"rally round the flag of our common country," the native English
responded at once, but the Metis waited for some indication that past prom-
ises would be fulfilled. They did not have long to wait. On October 5 Archi-
bald gave them what they wanted when the Governor authorized Father
Ritchot to tell Riel that "the co-operation of the Metis and their leaders in
the support of the Crown .. . cannot be looked upon otherwise than as enti-
tling them to most favourable consideration." Then several companies of
Metis cavalry mustered at St Boniface and Riel promised Archibald in writ-
ing that "so long as our services continue to be required, you may rely on
us."
41
Before the Metis departed for the frontier to reinforce troops already
on the scene, Joseph Royal (speaker of the provincial legislature), asked
Archibald to cross the river and review the 200 men ready for war on
Canada's behalf. The Lieutenant Governor accepted the invitation in an
instant and met the men in their traditional dress (light blue capote, bright
red sash, dark corduroy trousers, and knee-high moccasins). Then he shook
hands with their leaders, one by one, taking in friendship even the right
hand of Louis Riel.
The meeting of the former President and the Lieutenant Governor on
October 8, 1871, might have marked the end of a lingering twenty-four-
month crisis. Instead, the handshaking incident only brought Orangemen to
new heights of vituperation in Ontario. Macdonald told Archibald later in
the month that "Scott's murder by Riel, & the handshaking are the topics
41. Stanley, Riel, pp. 169-174.
78 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
that we have to fear on the stump & at the Hustings before the next General
Elections and if no change takes place some of our best friends will be
unseated as supporters of the present government."
42
What made the episode particularly unforgivable to critics outside
Manitoba was a total lack of apparent necessity. The facts reported in the
eastern press were that Archibald learned that a Fenian raid was imminent
on October 3; he issued a call to arms to the loyal population on October 4;
O'Donoghue made his move on October 5; and, on the same day, the whole
invading force of less than fifty men was taken by an American border
patrol, thus ending the crisis even before it began. What Archibald found
everyone ignoring was that, in the opinion of the Canadians commanding at
the "front," the crisis was far from over with the arrest of O'Donoghue's
first contingent. As late as the morning of October 8, Archibald was still
receiving panicky dispatches for more reinforcements.
43
Archibald's defence of his action to Macdonald focused on the other
military reality that he "had either to go over to St Boniface, or risk giving
offence to half, and that the most warlike half of the population at the
moment when they were assuming an attitude that I had been urging on
them ever since the invasion was threatened."
44
 For his fellow Nova Sco-
tian, Joseph Howe, Archibald added a constitutional dimension to the
justification explaining that the majority of the French- and English-
speaking Manitobans had approved his action. "It seems to me," he con-
tinued, "that the people here must be allowed to be judges of how to
manage their own affairs...." Archibald reminded Howe that Manitoba
was a province with as much right to autonomy as Nova Scotia or the oth-
ers and suggested that "you can hardly hope to carry on responsible
Government by inflicting death penalties on the leaders of the majority of
the electors."
45
The real issue was that the renewal of excited denunciations reflected
a broad-based prejudice in Ontario that Manitoba was not a province to be
trusted with the same powers as the others. Thus Riel became convinced
that no matter how "loyal" he was, he would never be loyal enough for the
"wicked" men in Ottawa. Consequently, after November 1871 he hinted to
Tach6 that he was not going to continue standing outside affairs, waiting
indefinitely. That led the Bishop to intercede once more on Kiel's behalf
and he did obtain a significant concession at the end of December when
Macdonald agreed to pay the costs of maintaining Riel, his associate
42. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 16, pp. 537-542, Macdonald to Archibald,
30 November 1871.
43. Stanley, Riel, p. 174.
44. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 78093-78103, Archibald to
Macdonald, 20 December 1871.
45. "Report of the Select Committee," item 107, p. 151, Archibald to Howe, 20 January
1872.
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 79
Lepine (and their families), if they would agree to "leave the country and
be absent for at least a year."
46
 The implication was clear enough. If they
accepted one more year of voluntary exile, they could come home in 1873
expecting a resumption of their political careers—exactly as Sir George
Carrier had gone into exile after his youthful participation on the rebel side
in the "troubles" of 1837.
47
There was a critical difference, however, between Carrier's experience
and that of Lepine and Riel. No one hunted Carrier with a price on his head,
whereas the legislature of Ontario had offered a $5,000 reward
48
 in 1871
for the capture of the persons responsible for Scott's death. Since bounty
hunters could take their quarry more easily from a St Paul hotel than vari-
ous guarded places in Manitoba, Lepine and Riel might have felt both
would be more secure at home (even without an amnesty). Consequently,
Lepine returned to St Vital in May, and Riel followed in June.
If Riel's return assured his safety, coming home brought him peace of
mind on other accounts as well. Riel was better able to look after his
mother, younger brothers, and sisters,
49
 and he could attend to speculative
interests that included a claim to a potentially valuable parcel of real estate
near the Lake Manitoba terminus of a prospective canal the government
was considering as a link between the Red and Saskatchewan river sys-
tems.
50
 Above all, however, Riel's return enabled him to play a leading role
in the politics of his "small nation."
51
By July, his political intentions were well known. He would seek elec-
tion to the House of Commons and, after a seat had been vacated for him in
the provincial legislature, Riel would force Macdonald to concede the
amnesty or deny responsible government by refusing to recognize the wish
of the elected majority in its choice for premier. Campaigning openly in the
French-speaking parishes, Riel recognized that his continuing popularity
was his greatest security, and Sir John A. Macdonald conceded as much
after Riel's political intentions were reported to the Prime Minister by
Manitoba informants.
52
46.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 16, p. 682, Macdonald to Tache, 27
December 1871; vol. 19, p. 544-545, Macdonald cypher letter to Alexander Morris, 6
January 1873.
47. PAM, Riel Papers, item 60, Royal to Riel, 17 December 1870.
48. Stanley, Riel, p. 178.
49. See Riel Papers, I, pp. 194, 201-202, 205 (letters to his mother and sister Marie) for
indications of Riel's anxiety about the well-being of his family.
50. A concluding paragraph in a letter to his mother, 17 May 1872, suggests that Riel was
worried about the security of his claim to the property and urged her to get one of
Reil's cousins to plant some acres conspicuously in barley and to send him any news
about the government's plans to proceed with the project (ibid., I, p. 212).
51. Ibid., I, pp. 206-208,213-216,220-221.
52. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 110715, Gilbert McMicken
cypher telegram to Macdonald, 13 July 1872.
80 Canada and the Mfris, 1869-1885
Macdonald's concession was to grumble then, as he did later, that Riel
had "cheated and deceived" him, but short of posting a guard in every
Metis home in Manitoba, or having Louis Riel assassinated, there was noth-
ing that could be done to check the embarrassment of Kiel's return. In any
case, Macdonald was more preoccupied at the time with getting his
"friends" re-elected elsewhere, an exercise that was complicated by many
different election days across the country. The absence of simultaneous
elections dictated easy victories first to help bring the more reluctant rid-
ings along later, or to rescue important candidates defeated in one place by
running them in another. Thus, in 1872, after Cartier suffered defeat in
Montreal, Macdonald instructed Archibald to "get Sir George elected in
your province." Knowing that Riel was about to take the riding of Pro-
vencher in Manitoba, and fearing another episode like a handshaking if Riel
yielded to Cartier, Macdonald added two more sentences to the same coded
message: "Do not however let your late President resign in his favour. That
would make mischief in Ontario."
53
Archibald was happy to follow Macdonald's instructions but Riel was
the only likely winner who was open to offers of rewards for temporary
retirement from the federal scene. When the Governor notified the Prime
Minister that Tache believed that the minimum price ought to be the
amnesty, Macdonald responded with an assurance on September 12 that
"Sir George will do all he can to meet wishes of the parties." Since that
was almost what was demanded, Macdonald said, "This statement should
be satisfactory."
54
 When Tache passed the message on to Riel, the former
President replied that the government had to reaffirm its commitment to the
whole "treaty" of 1870. Once again, Macdonald responded in language
that seemed to serve while still leaving room for evasion: "Cartier who is
at Montreal agrees with me as to pledges. It will be his interest to secure the
approbation of his constituents and he can be of more service to them than
any other man."
Refusing to be more specific, Macdonald still obtained the result he
wanted. Riel declined the nomination on September 14; no other local can-
didate accepted in Riel's place; and Cartier won the seat by acclamation.
Then Tache informed Macdonald that, since they had done their part, "I
hope we will be rewarded by the grant of the amnesty which alone can
secure peace to this country." At the same time, Tache made a pitch for
keeping Archibald in the office of Lieutenant Governor: "he is really the
right man in the right place and the Dominion is greatly indebted to
him."
56
By mid-September, however, Archibald was virtually out of office
53. Ibid., p. 85929, Macdonald cypher telegram to Archibald, 7 September 1872.
54. Ibid., p. 85944, Macdonald cypher telegram to Archibald, 12 September 1872.
55. Ibid., p. 85942, Macdonald cypher telegram to Archibald, 13 September 1872.
56. Ibid., pp. 41552-41553, Tache to Macdonald, 15 September 1872.
55
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 81
already. Angered and embittered by the outrage over the handshaking
episode (and other matters, discussed in the next chapter), he had offered
Macdonald his resignation on the eve of the new year and, four months
later, the offer to go quietly became a request to be released at once.
57
 Mac-
donald responded by urging Archibald to stay until an appropriate replace-
ment could be found, a task that presented considerable difficulty because
the Prime Minister was already discouraged in his quest for a suitable Chief
Justice for the Manitoba Superior Court created the year before.
58
 It was
not until the summer of 1872 that Macdonald found his "Chief" in Alex-
ander Morris—one of the original proponents of Canada's expansion west-
ward, a lawyer of some talent, and a more tactful expansionist than
McDougall. At the same time, while Morris was a conciliator, Macdonald
had reason to believe that his recruit would be more firm in the cause of
building "Nova Britannia" in the West than Archibald had been. When
Macdonald sent him to Manitoba in August, he probably thought Morris
would be a good successor to the gubernatorial office if he succeeded in the
judicial appointment.
Morris arrived in Winnipeg on August 13, 1872.
59
 By the end of the
month, he was sending Macdonald valuable information indicating that he
was likely to be one of the government's best sources of political intelli-
gence as well. Indeed, Morris may have played a role in the Cartier elec-
tion. At least he appeared to be receiving part of the thanks for the affair
when Macdonald wrote him on September 26 saying how pleased he was
with the way that the matter was "managed." In the same letter, Mac-
donald confirmed that Morris was becoming "Administrator" as well as
Chief Justice.
60
 After September 26, Sir John A. Macdonald addressed all
the significant communications about Riel to Morris, not to Archibald.
There was plenty to communicate because the reality became plain in
October that the Metis leader was still determined to force the amnesty on
the local level. The strategy was for the sitting member for St Vital to
57. Ibid., pp. 78107-78109, Archibald to Macdonald, 31 December 1871; and pp. 78177,
Archibald cypher telegram to Macdonald, 30 March 1872.
58. At Macdonald's insistence, the tribunal was renamed the "Court of Queen's Bench."
Ontario and Nova Scotia lawyers were extremely worried that the judicial system
might follow Quebec models because the majority of the province was French-
speaking. In names and forms and the appointment of personnel, Macdonald made
certain that the Manitoba judicial system resembled that of Ontario. See PAC
Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 16, pp. 19,537-542, Macdonald to Archibald, 12
July 1871 and 30 November 1871; and vol. 18, pp. 546-549, Macdonald to Morris, 24
September 1872. See also, ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 77983-77992,
Archibald to Macdonald, 8 November 1871 and pp. 113998-114001, Morris to
Macdonald, 16 January 1873.
59. See Dale and Lee Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba,
1670-1970 (Winnipeg, 1972), pp. 94-99.
60. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 18, p. 571, Macdonald to Morris, 26
September 1872.
82 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
resign in Kiel's favour, and force Macdonald's hand on the responsible
government question. On October 11, Macdonald wrote that he preferred
the risk of arresting and convicting Riel for murder to seeing the M6tis
leader become Premier of Manitoba. "The quarrel with Riel must come
sooner or later," he confided to Morris. "We may as well have it now .. . if
there are any warrants out they should be executed against Riel. He should
be arrested for the murder of Scott & put upon his trial."
61
Morris responded
62
 that the situation was not as critical as Macdonald
thought. Nothing would happen before a by-election confirmed Riel's elec-
tion, and that could be frustrated, first, by delay (because Archibald was
about to leave the province without a successor in the office of Lieutenant
Governor). With executive functions only partially in the hands of Morris
in his role of Administrator, the perfect delay was pleading incapacity to
sign the writ for an election, "leaving it to be dealt with hereafter by the
Governor." Such a situation would buy time to defeat the candidate either
by bribery of the electorate ("with $1,000 Riel could be beaten in St
Vital") or by intimidation ("Have warned Royal that if Riel persists, war-
rant will inevitably be issued").
Ultimately, the threat of legal proceedings was the effective
discouragement to Riel's seeking the premiership in 1872. On December 3
a failed attempt to arrest him sent the Metis leader back into hiding.
63
 Then
delegations, deputations, petitioners, and Tache appealed for the amnesty in
the old manner, with the same result as before.
By mid-December, Morris began to wonder if the great effort that was
needed to keep Riel out of politics was worth the trouble. "It is a pity," he
suggested, that "this amnesty could not be settled," particularly since
Tache was so "warm" on the subject. "Could not Cartier get the English
gov't to dispose of it on their own responsibility .. .?"
64
Macdonald's response was to write his other confidant in Manitoba,
Gilbert McMicken, asking him to see Morris and "revive his recollection
of affairs." In Macdonald's version of the relevant history, the "cir-
cumstances connected with the Amnesty were these":
When the disturbance first broke out, and McDougall was prevented from
entering into the Province... Lord Lisgar, by express instructions from
England, invited the malcontents by Proclamation to lay their grievances
before him, and promised an Amnesty if they would lay down their arms
and cease to obstruct the entry of the Canadian Authorities.... [Unfor-
tunately] they continued in rebellion until the arrival of the Military
61. Ibid., pp. 681-682, Macdonald to Morris, 11 October 1872.
62. The advice from Morris is found in two messages; see ibid., Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 113890-113892, Morris to Macdonald, 8 November 1872, and p.
113901, Morris cypher telegram to Macdonald, 16 November 1872.
63. Stanley, Riel, p. 188.
64. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 113948-113951, Morris to
Macdonald, 11 December 1872.
Eliminating the Riel Factor from Manitoba Politics 83
Expedition at Fort Garry in September.
The people therefore forfeited all claim to amnesty. However, I fancy
there will be no difficulty in getting Her Majesty's Government to grant an
amnesty except to the murderers of Scott.
The delegates sent down here by the people demanded a Constitution
for Manitoba, with representative Institutions and responsible Government
and insisted upon it. The Canadian gov't, for peace sake, yielded and the
Manitoba Act was passed. But by the passage of that Act, at the request of
the people there, the Dominion Government were deprived of all authority
in the administration. This was not the voluntary wish of the Canadian
Gov't, it was forced upon them by the Agents of the insurgents themselves.
As it is now the Gov. General's authority is limited altogether to the
exercise of the pardoning power after conviction. His commission as
Governor General gives him no power to prevent any criminal from being
arrested and tried and sentenced.
65
There were no more suggestions from Morris for clemency that would
include Riel. Of course, Tache still pressed the demand. In January 1873,
he threatened to publish all that he knew on the subject if the amnesty were
not granted immediately.
66
 Anticipating such action from Tache, Mac-
donald had already asked Morris to have a "straight up and down talk with
the Archbishop" in order to "ascertain all that he can say on the sub-
ject."
67
When Morris eventually reported on the matter, the news was unset-
tling to say the least. He suggested that "vague promises were made but
there is little evidence of it," meaning almost nothing in writing.
68
 Still,
prudence called for denials from everyone who talked to Ritchot at the time
of the negotiations on April 26, May 3, and May 19, 1870. Murdoch's sub-
sequent letter was ideally suited to Macdonald's purpose. "I have no recol-
lection," he wrote in March 1873, "of any promise or expectation of an
amnesty to Riel and his associates having been held out by Lord Lisgar,
when Mr. Ritchot had an interview with him in my presence or at any other
time."
69
Cartier was less sweeping in his denial. "I always took the same
ground we both did," he wrote Macdonald on February 23, "namely that
the question of an amnesty was not for our decision, but for the Queen and
Imperial Government. In his interview of the nineteenth Lord Lisgar also
gave assurance to Father Ritchot that the military expedition was going to
Red River not to arrest anyone... ."
70
 Clearly, for Cartier, the issue was
65. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 19, pp. 528-531, Macdonald to McMicken, 4 January 1873.
66. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41580-41583, Tache to Macdonald, 25 January
1873; also printed in "Report of the Select Committee," item 20, pp. 49-50.
67. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Transcripts, vol. 583, Macdonald to Morris, 16 December
1872.
68. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 114043-114050, Morris to Macdonald, 12
February 1873.
69. "Report of the Select Committee," item 53, p. 104, Murdoch to Herbert, 5 March
1873.
70. Ibid., item 125, p. 105, Cartier to Macdonald, 5 March 1873.
84 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
not whether the delegates were promised that the whole population was
"safe from all harm" but who was to guarantee the immunity from
prosecution. Recognizing that Carrier's position was a distinction without a
difference, Macdonald wrote again hoping for a more useful denial,
71
 but
before his faithful Quebec lieutenant could respond, Sir George lapsed into
the final phase of the illness that had taken him to Britain for treatment
shortly after the 1872 elections.
The death Sir George Cartier in May of 1873 renewed the problem of
the amnesty. Riel decided to run for the vacant seat, and Tache awaited the
government's handling of his election before publishing the pamphlet he
had written on the amnesty promise. Macdonald knew that he could not
delay calling the by-election indefinitely, but by setting the date for
November the Prime Minister thought he had enough time to eliminate Riel
by political manoeuvring. Reports from his most trusted informants in
Manitoba indicated that the Riel party had been disintegrating since Janu-
ary 1873.
72
 Consequently, the opportune moment to grant an official
' 'amnesty for all... except to those who were concerned in the murder of
Thomas Scott'' seemed at hand. A general proclamation in the summer of
1873 would isolate Riel and "drive him out of the country, which is a con-
summation devoutly to be wished." The less preferable alternative was
Riel's arrest and trial because of the potential for acquittal or a hung jury
"and while he is there he will be a continual fire brand."
73
 Unfortunately
for Macdonald, the British insisted that Canada had to recommend the
matter first.
74
Thwarted from the preferred political strategy, but still determined to
eliminate Riel by any means short of assassination, a second attempt to
arrest Riel occurred on September 14. Constables could not find him, but
they did seize Ambroise Lepine, and the court indicted the lesser villain
one month later. Then, thirty days after Lepine's first court appearance, the
voters of Provencher chose Louis Riel to fill Cartier's vacant seat in Parlia-
ment.
75
In 1874, proceedings against Lepine and Riel worked as parallel
developments to bring the amnesty issue to a crisis and resolution. Another
variable in the story was the change of government in Ottawa in November
1873 following scandalous disclosures concerning the Conservatives' elec-
tioneering in 1872. The result was that Riel arrived in the capital almost the
71. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41572-41578, Macdonald to
Cartier, 22 March 1873.
72. Ibid., pp. 114010-114015, Morris to Macdonald, 26 January 1873; pp. 110786-110791,
McMicken to Macdonald, 29 January 1873; and pp. 114028-114033, Morris to
Macdonald, 7 February 1873.
73. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 583, Macdonald to Dufferin, 2 June 1873.
74. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 41619-41629, Kimberley to Dufferin 24 July
1873.
75. Stanley, Riel, pp. 191-195.
Eliminating the Kiel Factor from Manitoba Politics 85
same day that the new government led by Alexander Mackenzie decided to
seek a more thorough condemnation of Macdonald's corruption in a gen-
eral election, and Riel saw Parliament dissolved before he could take his
seat. But Provencher re-elected him in February 1874. After his second
return to Ottawa, the House of Commons demanded his expulsion in April.
At the same time as that bizarre proceeding, Tache published the facts of
the long-withheld amnesty and the House decided to form a committee to
collect evidence of its own.
76
Neither the new evidence collected by the parliamentary committee in
April and May nor a third election of Riel in Provencher broke the impasse.
The rush to resolution developed after the Court of Queen's Bench in Man-
itoba found Ambroise Lepine guilty of murder and worthy of hanging in
the matter of Thomas Scott. At that point early in 1875, the Governor Gen-
eral intervened to proclaim that two years' of imprisonment and permanent
deprivation of political rights were the appropriate punishments. By impli-
cation, Riel deserved a similar release from the threat of execution. Conse-
quently, when Parliament disqualified the member for Provencher from tak-
ing his seat in the House of Commons the second time (in February 1875),
he and Lepine were both excused from murder charges conditional on a
deprivation of political rights and a five-year banishment from British terri-
tory.
77
Mackenzie might have preferred to have hanged both, but he knew as
well as Macdonald that the Canadian union was still a fragile entity
demanding "prudence and moderation .. . to prevent the discordant ele-
ments from ending in a blowup."
78
 Thus, Mackenzie followed the Gover-
nor General's lead in moderating the Orangemen's cry for blood against the
Riel sympathizers' demand for unconditional amnesty. In any case, said
Mackenzie, his hands were tied. The evidence presented to the select com-
mittee proved that Macdonald had promised clemency.
Of course, Macdonald denied any such promise had ever been given
by his government and denounced Mackenzie's proposal of the five-year
banishment as an "absolute pardon." Elaborating his objections in a
private letter he wanted burned, Macdonald explained that, since Riel and
Lepine were likely to pass their exile in the United States, "the Haven of
Hope for all French Canadians," a place to which many others had
migrated already, it seemed clear to Sir John that the "Gentlemen as Mar-
tyrs will be amply supplied with funds and live like fighting cocks.
76. Ibid., pp. 199-204.
77. Ibid., pp. 205-213.
78. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 17, pp. 320-323, Macdonald to Rose, 5
March 1872.
79. He told the same story in Parliament that he presented to the Select Committee the year
before. At that time, according to Tache, "Macdonald lied (excuse the word) like a
trooper "(Stanley, Riel, p. 206).
86 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Meanwhile they will infest the frontier—keep up the discontent in Mani-
toba and have petitions annually before Parliament praying for pardon. In
fact there is no end of the nuisance."
80
 He added a special note of outrage
when he exclaimed, "this is the punishment for murder!"
The five-year exile did defuse the Kiel issue for the present, and, when
Louis Kiel did finally re-enter the Canadian political scene, Manitoba was
not his field of combat. Too angered by Kiel's small victories between 1869
and 1874, the former Prime Minister did not see that in the larger battle the
victory was already his.
80.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Transcripts, vol. 584, Macdonald to T.C. Patteson, 16
February 1875.
Survey Party, ca. 1875
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
Gilbert McMicken, 1880
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"McMicken ... subverted Archibald's arrangements...."
88
Chapter 6
"Unlocking" the Territory for
"Actual Settlers"
While the denial of an amnesty to Louis Riel amounted to a denial of
responsible government to Manitoba, the opening of the Metis land base to
newcomers between 1870 and 1874 was probably even more important in
the defeat of the Metis as a people. Macdonald hinted that such an objective
might be pursued when he intimated to his old friend John Rose in Febru-
ary 1870 that "these impulsive half breeds have got spoilt by their emeute
[riot], and must be kept down by a strong hand until they are swamped by
the influx of settlers."
1
 The inundation he contemplated was a flood of
newcomers reducing the Metis to minority status. The "strong hand" for
the interim included denial of community control of land claims.
In the midst of the negotiations with Ritchot, Macdonald made plain to
Sir Clinton Murdoch and the Governor General that local control of land
was as "inadmissible" as the amnesty. At the same time, "for the sake of
peace," the delegates were led to believe that their accord with Canada
included a pattern of self-government extending to the administration of the
Metis homeland in the District of Assiniboia. Sections 30, 31, and 32 of the
Manitoba Act (and Carrier's explanatory memorandum to Ritchot on May
23) indicated that the ownership of the occupied territory was conceded.
The Old Settlement Belt was not Dominion land. Similarly, Section 31 of
the act (and the same memorandum from Cartier) asserted that the Lieu-
tenant Governor would set aside another 1.4 million acres, confirming
selections by heads of families for their children. The two territories
together meant that a Metis homeland of approximately two million acres
would not count in the territory to be "administered by the Government of
Canada for the purposes of the Dominion."
2
l.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 14, pp. 24-28, Macdonald to Rose, 23
February 1870.
2. Section 30 of the Manitoba Act is usually interpreted as Canada's authority for
Dominion control of natural resources, a control that was exercised in Manitoba until
1930. But the clause appeared to contain an implied exemption of certain portions of
the new province from such control: "All ungranted or waste lands [all territory except
occupied land] shall be, from and after the date of the said transfer, vested in the
Crown, and administered by the Government of Canada for the purposes of the
Dominion...."
89
90 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Since the Me"tis expected to select their childrens' shares of the 1.4
million acres from the vacant, wooded territory fronting on the rivers and
streams near the occupied land on the Red and the Assiniboine rivers, few
among the people of Manitoba imagined that the remaining bald prairie
would attract many newcomers. "Locking away" the best land from new
settlers was, therefore, a primary reason for the Legislative Assembly of the
provisional government to be jubilant when Father Ritchot and President
Riel explained the provisions of the "Manitoba Treaty" to the public on
June 24,1870.
3
Two months later, Archibald's instructions
4
 appeared to acknowledge
that the river-frontage had been pre-empted for use by the native popula-
tion. At least Archibald understood the requirement that he ascertain what
might be opened for immediate settlement in that light. Even when Mac-
donald wrote the Lieutenant Governor later in the year on the importance of
dispelling the notion that Manitoba was a "half breed" reserve, he did not
seem to challenge the more basic principle that some significant other por-
tion of the land of the province was to be distributed pre-emptively to the
original settlers.
5
As a result, when Archibald prepared his report, he estimated the
acreage that would be left after accommodating claims to the occupied land
and the 1.4 million acres to be selected by parents for their children. In this
way, he made the access of newcomers conditional on the resolution of
native land claims; he believed firmly that the Metis land rights had priority
over those accorded to emigrants from Canada,
6
 and arrived at the number
of acres that were likely to be available for the "considerable emigration"
that Macdonald expected in the spring of 1871 by deducting all of the Old
Settlement Belt (409,600 acres in Archibald's estimate), plus another 1.4
million acres for the children's claims. Then, after making allowance for
the land that was covered by lakes and swamps, he deducted another mil-
lion acres for the Hudson's Bay Company reserve, land for schools, and
other religious institutions. Finally he arrived at the figure of 5.25 million
acres of prairie that might be opened to immigrants, and recommended
adoption of the American grid system of sectional survey, with 160-acre
free grants for homesteaders.
3. The same point was a lingering cause for resentment by newcomers to Manitoba. "All
the world believes that it was done to hinder settlement and lock up the country against
development," the Manitoba Free Press reported on 11 January 1873.
4. Order in Council of Canada, 2 August 1870.
5. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 14, pp. 422-425, Macdonald to Archibald,
1 November 1870.
6. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 229, file 1/1871,
Archibald to Joseph Howe, 20 December 1870; vol. 228, file 796, Archibald to Howe,
27 December 1870.
' 'Unlocking'' the Territory for ' 'Actual Settlers'' 91
At first, the government appeared unperturbed by Archibald's
forthright approach to the land question. At the end of January 1871, Mac-
donald acknowledged receipt of Archibald's "very interesting dispatches
as to the mode of survey and also as to the settlement of the half breeds."
But since he was making preparations for his diplomatic mission to Wash-
ington, D.C. — treaty negotiation that kept him out of the country from late
February to mid-May—Macdonald turned the Archibald reports over to
his old law partner, the former Minister of Crown Lands and Surveyor Gen-
eral for Ontario, Alexander Campbell. Macdonald assured Archibald that
Campbell would make a "good report. He has already told me that he
agrees in the main with your ideas as to the surveys."
7
It was Alexander Campbell, nominally the Postmaster General in
1871, who revised Archibald's recommendations into a policy for disposing
of the "public lands in the province of Manitoba," a policy the Cabinet
approved on March 1, 1871. The leading statement in the Order in Council
adopting Campbell's report was an endorsement of the American pattern of
columns of "ranges" of square "townships" in uniformly numbered rows,
each township containing thirty-six numbered "sections" (one mile on a
side), with the basic unit of subdivision being the "quarter-section" of 160
acres available as free grants in return for five years of settlement duties by
"homesteaders." In Manitoba, the sectional system would open 43,200
quarter sections, or 8.3 million acres by Campbell's reckoning.
The discrepancy of three million acres between Campbell's and
Archibald's estimates derived in part from a different measure of the total
area of the province (Manitoba was still defined only in terms of latitude
and longitude, and the distance covered by a degree of longitude at 49
degrees north latitude was uncertain). Campbell believed that the total area
of Manitoba was 9 million acres; Archibald's estimate was 7.7 million. The
rest of the discrepancy resulted from Campbell's placing the children's 1.4
million acres, the Hudson's Bay Company's allotment of one-twentieth of
the area, and the school lands in the basic sectional survey, reflecting the
Cabinet's rather smug confidence that all of that land would be open to
"actual settlers" almost as soon as it became available for anyone.
8
Instead of affirming that sixty-eight townships adjoining the Old Set-
tlement Belt were areas from which heads of families might select their
7. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 15, pp. 161-164, Macdonald to Archibald,
25 January 1871.
8. Whereas Archibald had predicted that Canada would have to "tie it up for a long
time" because nearly half of "these half breeds are under ten years of age: for eleven
years to come you withdraw 490,000 acres from the market" (PAC, Records of the
Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 229, file 796, Archibald to Howe, 27 December
1870).
92 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
children's land, and that such territory was guaranteed to the intended reci-
pients for at least one generation — what Carrier promised Ritchot and
Tache— Campbell's regulations called for distribution by lottery, and
stated that there would be no federal restrictions concerning the sale of such
territory after allotment.
9
Still, the statements on the distribution process were sufficiently gen-
eral to seem to accommodate Carder's old assurances. For example, there
was nothing in the wording of the regulations to prevent small groups from
selecting river-frontage in certain "townships or parts of townships," peti-
tioning the governor to designate such locations as their land, and having
the same official make a drawing of "location tickets" for distribution to
individuals just as lands were distributed in Upper Canada among com-
panies of Loyalists in the 1780s. Similarly, on the matter of trusteeship, the
regulations did not seem to preclude the Province of Manitoba from enact-
ing "Infant Estates" legislation forbidding the sale of lands granted to
minors.
10
It would appear that the Order in Council proclaiming the first Domin-
ion Land Policy was carefully crafted to avoid infuriating groups with
opposing interests. Campbell did not want to give Tache and Ritchot the
impression that the Manitoba Act was being ignored, and he was even more
anxious to impress Ontario members of Parliament with the modest amount
of land "locked up" — temporarily unavailable for immediate settlement.
Yet he failed in his primary objective because it was the Ontario opposition
(the same group that was so adamantly opposed to the Manitoba Act in the
first place), who saw through the government's dual purposes.
The Opposition objected, in the first place, to such an important matter
being enacted by Order in Council, rather than by Parliament after full
debate of details. Secondly, critics objected to the substance of what was
established. They opposed, for example, the concession that the river-
frontage of nearly one-half million acres was already pre-empted, while
requiring five years of settlement duties from incoming homesteaders. The
Opposition wanted no more than a three-year trial period for newcomers
and stringent examination of the claims of "half breeds" before giving
them the valuable river-frontage of virtually the whole province.
Campbell brought the Order in Council of March 1 back before
Cabinet on April 25. In the amended version of the Dominion Land Policy,
9. Nor did Archibald. While admitting that the "French, or their leaders, wish the land to
be so tied up ... to prevent them ... for a generation from passing out of the family of
the original grantee," he recommended against too much protection, arguing that the
"effect would be to lock up a large portion of the land of the country, and exclude it
from the improvements going on in localities where land is unfettered" (ibid.).
10. The language of the regulation was "there shall be no ... restrictions as to their power
of dealing with their lands when granted than those which the laws of Manitoba may
prescribe" (Order in Council of Canada, 1 March 1871).
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 93
the paragraph that admitted that some land was already occupied was
dropped entirely; a penalty clause for newcomers attempting to establish
claims by fraud disappeared; more persons became eligible for military
bounty
11
 grants; and the homestead period was reduced to three years.
Probably the most important change was the total disappearance of
any admission that there was "occupied land" in Manitoba at the time of
the transfer. Indirectly, that deletion was equivalent to dropping section 30
of the Manitoba Act, the clause that distinguished between "ungranted or
waste lands" and the surveyed lots of the Old Settlement Belt. The first
belonged to the Crown in the right of Canada, to be "administered by the
Government of Canada for the purposes of the Dominion," while the terri-
tory that was already occupied fell by implication under the jurisdiction of
the Crown in the right of the province.
The April 25 designation of all land as Dominion land had the
immediate result of interrupting a process that Archibald proposed for
confirming the titles of river-lot occupants. Early in April he had proposed
the enactment of
a local statute whereby a party applying to be enrolled and treated as owner
of a defined lot, should be required to put up certain public notices of his
intended application.
In case no opposition to his claim should be made within a prescribed
time, he would be considered as entitled.
If opposition were made, an inquiry should be held, the facts reported,
and the title declared according to the evidence.
This preliminary inquiry would settle the right to a Grant of the land if
applied for.
12
Archibald believed that such local adjudication of the question could
settle all the claims to the occupied land perhaps in one year, or two at the
most. And the Lieutenant Governor appears to have thought that adjudica-
tion of native land claims had to be a priority of the Macdonald govern-
ment, even though Sir John A. Macdonald himself had written Archibald
that all he wished to accomplish quickly was the settlement of as many
Canadians as possible in Manitoba. "You know how industriously the
Opposition have attempted to disseminate the idea that Manitoba is to be a
Popish Preserve and this impression will be confirmed unless there is evi-
dence of energetic action in the way of provision for a general immigra-
tion."
13
 That overriding consideration became even more clear once the
11. A free grant of 160 acres was included in the original regulations as a bonus to people
who were still serving with the Red River Expedition. The amended regulations
provided the same benefit for men already discharged from service.
12. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 229, file 1437, Archibald
to Howe, 9 April 1871.
13. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 14, pp. 422-425, Macdonald to Archibald,
1 November 1870.
94 Canada and the Mitis, 1869-1885
Prime Minister returned from Washington in May, and the Cabinet
approved yet another Order in Council concerning Dominion Land Policy
on May 26,1871.
The defect found in the previous orders was the assumption of com-
pleted surveys before new settlement would take place. The latest order
solved that deficiency by giving newcomers the right to settle in advance of
the surveys, to establish themselves wherever they found "vacant" land,
assuring them that they would be "protected" so long as they filed their
claims within three months of being found by the surveyors. Significantly,
the Old Settlement Belt was not specifically excluded from the territory in
which vacant land might be taken.
As soon as Riel learned of the intent to promote emigration before
recognizing existing settlement (or Me"tis preferences in the location of the
1.4 million acres), he predicted that severe conflicts were likely to arise
between newcomers and the people native to the country. Since June 1870
many Metis families had been staking claims to land that they expected to
receive as their childrens' allotments.
14
 Consequently, Riel urged Dubuc
and Royal to pressure the Lieutenant Governor to resolve native land
claims before a flood of immigration poured into the province in the sum-
mer.
15
 Archibald readily agreed that quick action was necessary and that he
had authority under the Order in Council of April 25 — at least to move
tentatively towards setting aside the townships from which the 1.4 million
acres would be drawn. On June 17 he proclaimed in the newspapers:
the fairest mode of proceeding will be to adopt, as far as possible, the selec-
tions made by the Half breeds themselves.
Whenever, therefore, any parish of Half breeds shall have made choice
of a particular locality, and shall have publicly notified same... so as to
prevent settlers entering upon the tract in ignorance of the previous selec-
tion, I shall, if the duty should fall to me... , be guided by the principle I
have mentioned, and confirm the selections so made....
16
At the same time, Archibald wrote a long letter to Joseph Howe
explaining his action, writing as Riel had written Dubuc and Royal,
14. "They worked with wonderful alacrity and unanimity. Since '62 or about that time
they had been in the habit of wintering stock along the Seine, Rat and La Salle [sic]
Rivers. These lands naturally offered the favorite playground for the staker who in
short order had the entire river-front neatly staked off. A man didn't confine himself to
1 claim. He frequently had 2 or 3. Sometimes for children, present or in expectancy, he
would have the riverside dizzy with blazes and stakes" (Provincial Archives of British
Columbia, Archer Martin Papers, Add. Mss 630, box 1, file 5, [R.A. Ruttan] to Archer
Martin, 11 July 1894).
15. PAM, Riel Papers, item 498, Riel to Dubuc [June 1871].
16. Printed in The Mardtoban, 17 June 1871. Dipping appears as enclosure in PAC,
Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 230, file 167, Archibald to
Howe, 17 June 1871.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 95
stressing the probability of severe conflict if newcomers had unimpeded
entry to the province without resolution of the claims of the old settlers
first. The particular difficulty, in Archibald's view, was the Canadians'
asserting that they were "free to go where they choose, to take possession
of any land that suits them." Archibald agreed with Kiel that the "half
breeds" were the group with the "right of first selection," and settlement
of their claims was the prerequisite for preventing "dangerous colli-
sions."
17
Howe perceived that Archibald's action was inconsistent with the
"rules and regulations, first confidentially printed and carefully reviewed,
and then sanctioned by Order in Council."
18
 Referring the matter to Mac-
donald, he urged the Prime Minister to correct Archibald's misplaced prior-
ities with "definite instructions." In Howe's assessment, "the point is very
important and ought not to be left in doubt."
19
In the circumstances, Macdonald had to agree that "definite instruc-
tions" were apparently necessary. Yet the kind of document that Howe
thought necessary would probably have contravened section 32 of the Man-
itoba Act.
20
 At the minimum, such instructions would have amounted to a
denial of the interpretation of section 31 that was promised the delegates
the year before. Perhaps because he feared the repercussions with Tach6,
Macdonald did not send the memorandum or scolding that Howe recom-
mended, but he did send a suitable instrument for achieving the same result.
Macdonald found a man in Ottawa who would put the Order in Council of
May 26 above the "fancied" land rights of "half breeds," and he would go
to Winnipeg with the title of Dominion Lands Agent, knowing that the
Lieutenant Governor had contrary views, agreeing to watch him on that
account—and for the variety of other ways that "old Archibald's conduct
and policy towards the Canadians" was likely to cause embarrassment at
the next election.
21
Macdonald's man was a former magistrate and policeman who knew
nothing about land surveys or adjudicating land claims but a great deal
17. Ibid.
18. PAC, Joseph Howe Papers, MG 24, B 29, vol. 9, Howe to Archibald, 26 December
1871.
19. PAC. Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 46907-46909, Howe to
Macdonald, 20 August 1871.
20. The preamble to the section stated that the intent was "For the quieting of titles, and
assuring to the settlers in the Province the peaceable possession of lands now held by
them " For such a purpose to have had any practical effect, the claims of original
settlers would have to be dealt with as the first determination of what was "vacant."
21. The political problem with Archibald is indicated by PAC, Macdonald Papers,
Incoming Correspondence, pp. 157223-157230, J.Y. Bown to Macdonald, 3 September
1871; the view that Metis rights were unreal appears in pp. 110681-110686, McMicken
to Macdonald, 22 December 1871.
96 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
about espionage, particularly spying on conspirators against the state, such
as Fenians. Indeed, that was the guise under which Macdonald introduced
the new Lands Agent to Archibald once the concern about Fenian raids
began to brew in Manitoba in the autumn of 1871. At the close of a long
letter to Archibald about the danger, Macdonald announced that
"McMicken will shortly be with you... . We are sorry to lose him here, in
fact I do not know what to do without him. You will find him of the
greatest use to you from his judgement & discretion, and the good faith
with which he will act."
22
Gilbert McMicken's arrival in late September was timely, and he did
help Archibald through the crisis with O'Donoghue in the first week of
October. Then and later, however, McMicken was even more useful to
Macdonald with his constant flow of detailed correspondence reporting on
Archibald's activities.
23
 At the same time, it was McMicken who faced the
awesome task of accommodating newcomers at the Dominion Lands Office
without seeming to repudiate the understanding that Cartier had with Tache
about where and how the 1.4 million acres were to be allotted.
From November 1871 until the spring of 1872, it was the impression
of Tache and Archibald that their major problem was getting Macdonald to
recognize that the time was right for conceding the amnesty and settling
land claims. Neither Tache nor Archibald seemed to realize that there was
more to both matters than the question of timing. On the eve of Archibald's
bidding bon voyage to the Metis cavalry, for example, Archibald wrote
Macdonald that the public peace depended upon speedy resolution of both
issues. He stated that the "resolution in council relative to their lands" of
May 1871, must have been inadvertent because it gave the impression that
"the promises relative to the lands ... were not to be kep"
24 A
rchibald
said that was why he had been so conciliatory with his own promises and
had publicly thanked the Metis for their joining in the defence of the pro-
vince.
Macdonald replied rather blandly that "their feelings, & prejudices
and rights are to be respected," but he was deeply concerned about the
unhappy aspects of the handshaking for the electoral prospects of the Tory
party in Ontario. There was not one word further on the land question.
Macdonald had passed the burden of giving the official critique of
22. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 16, pp. 236-238, Macdonald to Archibald, 24 September 1871.
23. Typical of McMicken's spying assignments was Macdonald's demand at the end of
November for McMicken to "quietly collect all the information you can as to Kiel's
connection with the [Fenian] rising & his sudden change [to aid Canada] on finding
that the raid had ended in a fiasco." Moreover, Archibald was not to know about the
investigation. "It is no affair of his" (ibid, vol. 16, pp. 522-523, Macdonald to
McMicken, 29 November 1871).
24. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 77972-77976, Archibald to Macdonald, 7 October
1871. See also ibid, pp. 24960-24967, Archibald to Macdonald, 9 October 1871.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 97
Archibald's land policy to Joseph Howe.
25
Howe told his fellow Nova Scotian that he "very much regretted" the
information that the Lieutenant Governor was "giving countenance to the
wholesale appropriation of large tracts of country by the Half breeds." He
said "all the lands not in actual occupation are open to everybody," and
urged his compatriot to "leave the land Department and the Dominion
Government to carry out their policy without volunteering any interfer-
ence."
26
Howe's scolding had such an authoritative tone that Archibald
responded with a letter to Macdonald asking the Prime Minister if Howe
was his official messenger.
27
 Once again, Macdonald did not respond
directly to the Governor. He spoke to Howe, and Howe sent another letter
to Archibald saying he had met "several times" with Macdonald and other
ministers who were concerned with the subject of Dominion lands. The
message was that a "million and a half acres... were to be surveyed and
set apart by the Government, and until this was done the settlement of the
country was not to be obstructed. Emmigrants and volunteers going into the
country had a right to occupy and pre-empt vacant lands anywhere." The
Government of Canada wished to avoid large concentrations of native peo-
ple. "If any of these classes staked off and claimed en bloc, large tracts of
land in favourable situations, in my judgement they violated the instruc-
tions and their claims cannot be sustained."
28
One more time Archibald responded to Howe with a letter to Mac-
donald informing him that he was unhappy with Howe's position on the
land question and wondered if Howe's opinions were official policy.
29
 On
the occasion of Archibald's last letter on the subject, Macdonald would nei-
ther confirm nor repudiate the Lieutenant Governor's position. Instead, he
emphasized the need to delay any action on "half breed" matters until after
the general election of 1872.
30
 In the meantime, he refused to pursue the
land issue as a matter of abstract principle. By January 1872, Macdonald
knew that such a pursuit was beside the point. He knew that McMicken had
already subverted Archibald's arrangements of the previous summer.
McMicken's first letter to the Prime Minister from Winnipeg was
dated October 5, 1871 — in the midst of the Fenian crisis. His message was
that he had talked to local people about the land question and readily
25. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 16, pp. 537-42, Macdonald to Archibald, 30 November 1871.
26. PAC, Howe Papers, vol. 9, pp. 729-745, Howe to Archibald, 4 November 1871.
27. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 78062-78065, Archibald to
Macdonald, 2 December 1871.
28. PAC, Howe Papers, vol. 9, pp. 746-760, Howe to Archibald, 26 December 1871.
29. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 78124-78130, Archibald to
Macdonald, 19 January 1872.
30. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 17, p. 301, Macdonald to Archibald, 4 March 1872.
98 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
persuaded them that their Dominion Lands Agent was a "good fellow and
that all was being rightly and well done." No commitments were made; "it
was all palaver and nothing else." Soothing words gave Ritchot the impres-
sion that' 'the selection of Lands may be as they wish and Riel and Lepine
be subjects of an amnesty." Trouble was likely in the future, however, and
there were not enough Canadian troops at Red River to deal with it effec-
tively. Having sent the 400 British home in September 1870 and having
reduced the remaining contingent of 800 Canadians to a mere corporal's
guard of 80 in the spring of 1871, a minimum of 200 reinforcements was
needed at once. According to McMicken, the occasion of the Fenian crisis
was the "most desirable opportunity to augment the force here. Let them
not come as opposed to the half breed, but to keep out the Fenians."
31
Macdonald appeared to respond at once to McMicken's suggestion. In
fact, the troops had been recruited already from among the veterans of the
first expedition to keep the reinforcement of the army secret. As Macdonald
had explained the ruse to one political friend, "strictly speaking there is no
new Expedition going to Red River. The two companies that are now there
are to be strengthened by two additional ones ... chosen from those who
had served there before."
32
 After the Fenian crisis, few people in Manitoba
questioned the militia's return, and McMicken's continuing to play the role
of "good fellow" at the Lands Office appeared to satisfy newcomers and
old settlers alike. He reported in mid-November that there were no
difficulties of any kind. He believed that "even the Half breed claims ...
can all be acceptably and quietly arranged." McMicken believed that the
more clever of their "class" had begun to see the wisdom of selling out
and moving on, "the more interested amongst the French half breeds
already begin to see that their true interests will be served other than in
adhering rigorously to their first conception of what was their rights." The
important point for the moment was getting the land allotted quickly so that
it might be patented and pass to "actual settlers" without further delay.
33
Even into the new year McMicken continued to write optimistically to
Macdonald that he was "A No. 1 with the very Grit settlers" and, at the
same time, he believed he had found the ideal way to deflect the "French
half breeds" from their "fancied rights." The scheme that attracted him
would ' 'require explanations and consideration which can only be properly
given through a personal interview." On that account, McMicken proposed
a return to Ottawa in February 1872 for meetings with the relevant minis-
Q A
ters, including Macdonald, of course.
31. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 24934-24941, McMicken to Macdonald, 5
October 1871.
32. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 16, p. 342, Macdonald to JJ. Burrows, 17 August 1871.
33. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 110657-110672, McMicken to Macdonald, 12
November 1871.
34. Ibid., pp. 110681-110686, McMicken to Macdonald, 22 December 1871.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 99
Early in January, McMicken reported by coded telegram that he had
completed a memorandum on the "half breed" land question. "Have
prepared scheme for settling .. . claims." He asked Macdonald if he should
solicit some local reaction to the proposal: "Would it answer to evoke
expression upon it here?" Macdonald's immediate reply was negative. "I
await your scheme by mail. Do not discuss it beforehand in Manitoba."
3
Unfortunately, from Macdonald's point of view, secrecy was impossi-
ble, in part, because McMicken could not resist sharing his thoughts with
the "loyal Metis"
36
 and also because the French-Canadian clerk in the
Land Office, A.A.C. Lariviere, told everything he knew to Bishop Tach6.
37
Consequently, the McMicken scheme that was treated so confidentially
38
 in
Ottawa was well known to Tache before the plan reached Macdonald's
desk, and the Bishop did not hesitate to launch a campaign against the plan
before McMicken's departure for Ottawa. He complained to Archibald, and
he wrote a blistering letter of protest to Macdonald.
39
What Tache* preferred was the Archibald plan, the scheme that the
Metis believed had already been implemented, at least partially. In Tache's
view of Archibald's proceedings, bands of Metis, groups of about 150 peo-
ple (roughly twenty-five families), had selected their townships (23,040
acres per block) in accordance with the custom of the country, choosing
townships that straddled rivers and creeks that were tributaries of the Red
and Assiniboine rivers — streams such as the Sale, the Rat, and the Roseau.
The land was to be held en bloc; none could be sold to outsiders.
40
 Ques-
tions of distribution and individual occupancy would be settled in the same
way that such matters had been dealt with in the Red River Settlement over
35. Ibid., p. 110687, McMicken cypher telegram to Macdonald, 9 January 1872; p.
110688, Macdonald cypher telegram to McMicken, 11 January 1872.
36. The loyalists were probably James McKay and Pascal Breland, see ibid., pp. 110691-
110694, McMicken to Macdonald, 13 January 1872.
37. The discovery that Lariviere was a pipeline of information to Tache' and the "Rielites"
did not occur until 1873, see ibid, pp. 114004-114009, Morris to Macdonald, 20
January 1873.
38. So secret was McMicken's memorandum that all copies appear to have been either
destroyed or retained in files still closed by the relevant departments. No copy has been
found in the Macdonald Papers or in the records of the Department of the Interior in
the Public Archives of Canada. The copy used here was found by Dale and Lee Gibson
in the Archives of Ontario, J.C. Aikins Papers, with a covering letter to Aikins from
McMicken, 8 January 1872.
39. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 78135, Archibald cypher
telegram to Macdonald, 24 January 1872; and ibid., pp. 41548-41551, Tache to
Macdonald, 23 January 1872.
40. See, for example, the petition of 23 families (150 claimants) led by John Grant. They
wanted Township 3, range 4 East on the Roseau River, submitted by Henry Clarke to
Archibald, 7 August 1872 (PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15,
vol. 229, file 1937).
100 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
the last half-century (by staked claims and community consent).
So attractive was the idea of small groups of families finding their own
reserves in townships that many heads of families in parishes such as St
Norbert had already sold their old land, staked claims on the new, and peti-
tioned Archibald for confirmation of their claims with Tache working as the
go-between in the negotiations for the location of larger groups. Then all
such preliminaries were overturned by the McMicken scheme. Only the
overall appropriation of 1.4 million acres remained. To establish an indivi-
dual entitlement close to 160 acres per head, Macdonald's man in Winni-
peg proposed a new census, something to diminish the total number of reci-
pients from the 10,000 cases evident in the 1870 enumeration (a figure that
yielded an individual share of 140 acres per head) to a number closer to
8,750 (the magic total for making an individual entitlement one-quarter
section). With that number, quarter sections of prairie could be drawn ran-
domly from all 408 Manitoba townships. Since no one native to the country
had ever settled on bald prairie before, there was every reason to think that
nearly all of the "half breeds" would sell such grants at their earliest
opportunity. To expedite sale
let 'scrip' be issued to each for their respective shares—representing at the
standard rate at which the public lands are held for sale.... Such scrip to be
receivable ... in payment for lands [in the sections randomly designated as
"half breed" lands].... Scrip shall be transferable.
41
None of the land was to be held in trust.
Clearly, McMicken had the ideal formula for "unlocking" the terri-
tory for "actual settlers" without repudiating the letter of the law in section
31 of the Manitoba Act. Incredible though it may seem, McMicken actually
believed that his plan was a "very fair way of meeting the difficulty."
Moreover, he believed that the time had come for such "generosity," if
only for the sake of political expediency. Elaborating the point for
Macdonald's consideration, McMicken reported:
The Metis are very uneasy at present. They are expressing themselves
greatly dissatisfied with the Canadian Gov't — chiefly in regard to the
Lands not being given to them and alleging that injustice has been done to
Kiel, that good faith has not been kept
There has been something said about a number of them having inten-
tions of moving up on the Saskatchewan and the plains of the NW.
It is an undeniable fact that Riel is an object of the strongest regard
with them and for him they would do almost anything especially if incited
to it on grounds affecting their common interest or touching their feelings.
The North West already contains elements of apprehension and with any
considerable party of excited Metis with Riel at their head retelling the
41. Archives of Ontario, J.C. Aikins Papers, "Memorandum Re Dominion Lands,
Manitoba," Gilbert McMicken, 5 January 1872.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 101
story of their rising, etc., great difficulties... would be more than possi-
ble.
42
McMicken had no idea that his concept of generosity would be
denounced as a gross injustice by the self-appointed guardians of the best
interests of the Metis, critics such as Bishop Tache, who wrote Macdonald
at the end of January objecting in the boldest phrases imaginable. Tache
told the Prime Minister that the McMicken scheme was "unjust to our peo-
ple, impolitical to yourselves, and unfair to Governor Archibald" because
it repudiated the notion that the Metis should make "selections and distri-
butions of their lands in such a way as they please." The inevitable dissa-
tisfaction was bound to be troublesome, and the immediate gratitude of the
Orange party in Manitoba would not last. How long, Tache asked, "is this
province to be governed especially with the view of pleasing a party which
in fact it is impossible to please?"
43
The challenge to Macdonald and McMicken was softening the scheme
while keeping the essential feature of distribution by random selection from
bald prairie. The result was a policy proclaimed by Order in Council on
April 15, 1872, with all of the apparent emphasis upon settling the question
quickly, authorizing the Lieutenant Governor to "make selections of town-
ships in such number as is necessary to make up 1,400,000 acres...."
From Archibald and Tache's standpoint, the order had no more effect than
sanctioning what had already been done. But since the order was silent on
the distribution issue, the door was still open for the key aspect of the
McMicken scheme. Tache, though, was satisfied; and that satisfaction
pleased Archibald who was anxious to leave the province on a point of har-
mony. Consequently, Archibald congratulated Macdonald for the policy
that "quieted all apprehensions" and asked to be relieved from his office at
once. The Order in Council of mid-April 1872 was precisely the kind of
break for which he had hoped.
44
Having submitted his resignation earlier, Archibald packed his belong-
ings in May and awaited permission to make his exit on a moment's notice.
With "only one suit of clothes and a Bag of Paper Collars to fall back on,"
he made it clear to Macdonald that his continuation on the scene was a per-
sonal hardship of the first degree.
45
 Macdonald, though, continued to dither
in naming a replacement and put his captive Lieutenant Governor through
several more crises arising from Macdonald's own indecision and delay. In
addition to the tortuous ebb and flow of the amnesty promise, Archibald
had to weather a renewal of conflict between newcomers and old settlers
42. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 110691-110694, McMicken
to Macdonald, 13 Jaunary 1872.
43. Ibid., pp. 41548-41551, Tache to Macdonald, 23 January 1872.
44. Ibid., pp. 78181-78183, Archibald to Macdonald, 8 May 1872.
45. Ibid.
102 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
for the same reason that strife had developed the first time in 1871: Canadi-
ans were settling on "half breed lands" and the Lands Office was
confirming their occupancy. Evidently, the promise that the Lieutenant
Governor had power to set aside townships was just another hollow
affirmation. Trouble seemed imminent.
Even McMicken was frightened by the renewal of conflict in 1872. He
reported to Macdonald early in July: "Half breeds are annoyed that their
claims have not been adjusted and settled—the arrival of strangers here,
some of whom settle upon what they consider their claims, exasperates
them very much." Moreover, the resentment was "not confined to the
French Half Breeds alone." As usual, however, the Metis were taking a
more advanced position in protest, going so far as to force homesteaders off
their land. McMicken's explanation to Metis petitioners at the land office
was that nothing could be done until the new governor arrived: "his first
duty would be distribution of the land." In the meantime, everyone should
be calm. Privately, however, McMicken was frantic, fearing "great
danger." The most frightening development he reported to Macdonald was
the possibility of an alliance of the Metis and native English to promote
their mutual interests against newcomers.
46
McMicken's letters to Macdonald brought instant results. Within ten
days of McMicken's alarm, Archibald had instructions to finish the desig-
nation of "half breed" townships so that the Lands Office might withdraw
them from further entry by homesteaders. By the end of July, the task was
finished.
"It was easy," Archibald reported on July 27, "in a general way to
select a number of townships." Altogether, he reserved thirty-nine for the
Metis and twenty-nine for the native English. That still left 340 Manitoba
townships for newcomers. According to Archibald, "This quite satisfied
Half breeds; and meets, I think, general approval. Everybody wishes ques-
tion settled."
47
The apparent settlement was barely a beginning, however, towards
resolving the land issue in its larger complexity because there were two
other aspects of the matter that the designation of sixty-eight townships did
not approach, indeed, that it ignored. Eventually, that neglect rendered the
designation process Archibald thought he had completed quite useless. One
facet was the hay question, the other was recognizing the occupancy of land
that had been taken up for settlement before the transfer. In his first reports,
Archibald had called the right to hay lands extending an additional two
46. Ibid., pp. 110704-110707, McMicken to Macdonald, 12 July 1872; pp. 110723-
110728, McMicken to Macdonald, 17 July 1872; and PAC, Records of the Department
of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 228, file 940, McMicken to J.C. Aikins, 6 July 1872.
47. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 228, file 1091, Archibald
to Aikins, 27 July 1872; Archibald telegram to Aikins, 29 July 1872.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 103
miles back from the river lots "only an easement" that might be commuted
easily with compensation in land elsewhere.
48
 But the settlers claimed that
their hay privilege was an "exclusive right" and without it their use of the
inner lot was nullified. The two strips were two together or nothing at all.
The wooded river-front part gave them their shelter, fuel, and patches for
gardens (sometimes as extensive as thirty or more acres), while the marshy
back part gave them the winter fodder they needed for their livestock.
Denial of the right to one amounted to a denial of the right to the other.
That, however, is exactly what occurred when Archibald designated the hay
lands part of the "half breed reserve" and when Gilbert McMicken gave
the land to homesteaders.
Once Alexander Morris became the acting Lieutenant Governor (in his
role of "Administrator" in the autumn of 1872), he was fairly stupefied by
the mess that had developed from the open land policy for newcomers and
the closed claim process for old settlers. In the context of Kiel's quest for
the premiership in November, Morris found the policy of calculated delay
to be particularly unfortunate. On November 16 he telegraphed Macdonald
for permission to give at least the appearance of comprehensive action:
Authorize me at once to announce that plan of allotment of half breed lands
has been adopted and allotment will be made forthwith, & that hay privilege
will be settled this winter under statute, and on completion of survey the
32nd section of the Act will be carried out. Need this to meet attempt of
Kiel. Agreed on at secret meeting to combine both races of half breeds.
Have warned Royal that if Riel persists, warrant will inevitably be issued by
some magistrate, & that then civil force must be employed to effect arrest.
Reply at once. If Riel persists in being a candidate what do you advise?
49
Macdonald resisted the appeal for hasty action on the land question
merely to head off Kiel's rising popularity. He did not reply with an
immediate authorization along the lines Morris demanded. Macdonald's
position apparently had not changed from what he had written to Morris a
month before when he indicated that the preferred way to deal with Kiel's
candidacy was to arrest him or to ignore the election because Orangemen
could be relied on to "dispose" of the Metis leader should he make an
appearance at the local legislature. In Macdonald's words: "If Riel is such
a fool as to poke his nose into that mess he must abide the consequences on
his person. I have little doubt that the mob will soon dispose of him."
50
Morris persisted. He followed his telegram to Macdonald with a letter
48. Ibid., file 796, Archibald to Howe, 27 December 1870.
49. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 113901, Morris cypher
telegram to Macdonald, 16 November 1872.
50. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 18, pp. 702-703, Macdonald to Morris, 14 October 1872. The
arrest advice had been offered several days before. See pp. 681-682, Macdonald to
Morris, 11 October 1872.
104 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
on the same subject to the minister responsible for lands.
51
 After a pro-
longed period of inaction by Ottawa, and after the attempt to arrest Riel
sent the shadow premier back into hiding, Macdonald did take one small
step towards conceding the assurances Morris had sought in mid-
November. Late in December, he authorized the Lieutenant Governor to
begin making allotments from the townships designated by Archibald. The
process he contemplated was a drawing of 10,000 tickets, each with the
legal description of a parcel of land, and at the time of the drawing, enter-
ing the name of a particular "half breed" (as indicated by the 1870 census)
in a register. On this basis, it was theoretically possible that all 10,000
"location tickets" could be drawn and become available to applicants for
patent as early as the spring of 1873.
To get the maximum political effect from the apparent move towards
resolution of at least one aspect of the land question, Macdonald announced
the decision to Tache on Christmas eve, but in general terms (avoiding any
reference to the random rather than self-selection process of distribution).
The two other thorny facets of the land question remained, and no one in
Manitoba was prepared to see either the "hay privilege" or the river-lot
claims delayed much longer. Meetings occurred in nearly every parish
early in January 1873. All demanded that the multifaceted land issue had to
be settled before immigration could resume in the spring. Even the Winni-
peg press, usually the voice of the Ontario party, united in support of the
old settlers' demands — at least to the extent of admitting that the claimants
had a legal right to such claims; the newspapers asserted that the sooner all
land promises were resolved the sooner the whole province would be open
for cultivation and would contribute to the more rapid development of the
North West.
53
The newfound support of the Ontario party for comprehensive resolu-
tion of Manitoba land matters was in fact little more than thinly disguised
sympathy for some of the more enterprising Winnipeggers who were gam-
bling in claims of all kinds, but especially in allotments of the 1.4 million
acres. By 1873 it had become fairly common knowledge that the "half
breed heads of families" were not going to get the kind of reserves that
they had expected in 1870 or as laid out on the rivers in 1871-72. Those
lands would have to be claimed under the occupancy clauses in section 32
of the Manitoba Act, or perhaps as homesteads in accordance with what
was contained in the codification of the Orders in Council on the subject
enacted in 1872 as the Dominion Lands Act. All was not lost. But what
51. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 229, file 1721, Morris to
Secretary of State for the Provinces, 20 November 1872.
52. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 19, pp. 427-429, Macdonald to Tache, 24
December 1872.
53. Manitoba Free Press, 11 January 1873.
54. For the Department of the Interior's view that the Dominion Lands Act, Statutes of
Canada (1872), Chapter 23 was nothing more than a codification of the land provisions
of the Manitoba Act and the Orders in Council of 1 March, 25 April, and 26 May 1871,
see PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 45076-45087,
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 105
was expected from the 1.4 million acres was likely to be section land
stripped of river-frontage and distributed by lottery. Consequently, hun-
dreds of "half breed heads of families" responded positively to offers to
buy such shares, frequently taking as little as $25 for an assignment of
rights to a claim.
55
Tache fought both developments. On the one hand, he continued to
insist that the townships that had been chosen through his mediation "were
selected merely and solely to secure the wood and the land along the
rivers."
56
 Thus, he protested withdrawal of the woodlands and river-
frontage from the townships to be divided into allotments just as he
vigorously opposed the method of distribution by lottery. Once it became
evident that he had lost both of those battles, he set up a next line of
defence on the issue of trusteeship.
Early in February 1873 Morris telegraphed Macdonald that a bill was
in preparation to forbid heads of families from selling their allotments of
the 1.4 million acres. "Pretension is that only actual children have rights,
therefore, heads are trustees." Morris doubted that a province had the
power to enact a law of special application affecting land reserved in recog-
nition of Indian title. The question was not academic and the problem was
urgent. "Reply," he demanded.
57
 Macdonald referred the matter to his
former law partner, Alexander Campbell, still the Postmaster General.
Campbell concurred with Morris, saying such a law would violate section
91(24) of the British North America Act. As he put it, "No law dealing
exceptionally with the rights of the half breed heads of families and
preventing them from making conveyances which any of Her Majesty's
subjects can make, would be constitutional."
58
In the end, Morris had a different measure for the Governor General to
veto because the movement to have the lands of the "half breed" heads of
families "entailed" was resisted by the very people who were the intended
beneficiaries of the action. In fact, it was a "deputation from St Norbert"
that led the opposition to the trusteeship proposal and killed the measure in
mid-February. What followed was a "land grant protection act" that was
a sale-cancellation scheme enabling vendors to repudiate any and all such
sales but leaving purchasers with the power to ' 'recover the price which is
"Memorandum on Regulations for Disposal of Agricultural Lands in the West," A.M.
Burgess to Macdonald, 7 March 1882.
55. Ibid.
56. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 229, file 1992, Tache to
Morris, 14 January; and PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp.
113996-113997, Cypher Morris telegram to Macdonald, 15 January 1873.
57. Ibid., pp. 114035-114036, Morris telegram to Macdonald, 10 February 1873.
58. Ibid., p. 114041, Campbell telegram to Morris, 12 February 1873.
59. Ibid., pp. 114054-114059, Morris to Macdonald, 14 February 1873.
106 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
made a lien on the land when allotted." Though not as burdensome as an
outright prohibition on sales, Morris still thought that the measure "sins
against sound principle" and recommended disallowance. On that account,
he withheld assent pending more detailed consideration by officials in
Ottawa.
60
In the meantime, Tache's suggestion that the intent of section 31 was
to convey a land base to the children through their parents sent legal advi-
sors back to the previous Orders in Council and the Manitoba Act. They
concluded in March, to Tache's great relief, that the parents were indeed
outside the class of persons to receive shares of the 1.4 million acres, and a
new Order in Council was proclaimed on April 3 excluding the heads of
families from allotments. Since the number of persons entitled to share was
instantly reduced by about 4,000 cases, the whole allotment process under-
taken to date was rendered obsolete and inoperable.
At almost the same time, the location of the townships from which
allotments were supposed to be drawn was made equally meaningless by a
confidential, quasi-judicial opinion that the only equitable resolution of the
hay question was concession of the outer two miles, since the recognized
tenure of the inner lot would be robbed of all its benefit by the loss of the
outer half of the estate.
61
By the end of March 1873, it had become clear that the entire question
of land claims under the Manitoba Act was in total chaos. Three years had
passed. Not one promised patent to a river lot had emerged. Not one of the
1.4 million acres was allotted. Most important, the little that had been
accomplished to date suddenly had to be redone. To put the best possible
face on the chaotic situation, the inner two miles of the Old Settlement Belt
was closed to further sale or homestead on March 21,
62
 and at the end of
May a Dominion statute laid out procedures for adjudicating claims to river
lots as soon as the government saw fit to hear them.
63
 But the personnel on
the inside, Lieutenant Governor Morris, for instance, knew that the
"multi-form" land question had become loaded with nearly insoluble
difficulties.
Yet another spring passed into summer, and one more time the native
population set out to cut their hay in July. For the third year in succession, a
frantic Lieutenant Governor telegraphed for help: "Cutting
60. Ibid., pp. 114092-114095, Morris to Macdonald, 5 March 1873.
61. Morris had been authorized to appoint a commission of inquiry into the hay privilege
by Order in Council of Canada, 13 January 1873. The confidential report of Judges
Betournay and McKeagney, assisted by the Surveyor General, J.S. Dennis, was
submitted to Morris in March and appears in the Morris Papers, Provincial Archives of
Manitoba.
62. The closure date of 21 March 1873 is cited in Order in Council of Canada, 20 April
1876, section 4.
63. Statutes of Canada (1873), Chapter 6: An Act respecting claims to Lands in Manitoba
for which no Patents have been issued.
"Unlocking" the Territory for "Actual Settlers" 107
commences... what course do you advise? Collisions between the
conflicting interests are threatened."
64
 One more time the response from
Ottawa was that the Metis and the native English had to give way to the
newcomers. Only the terminology varied. In the messages of 1873, the
"old settlers" became "former occupants."
65
 In yet another dimension,
inaction appeared to be inviting disaster.
Was delay a deliberate strategy of discouragement? It is possible that,
since the government had so many other important matters under con-
sideration, the Cabinet, by innocent inattention, found it easy to let ques-
tions of native land claims drift .
66
 But there were so many occasions when
Archibald or Morris had outlined a clear approach to the complex problem,
only to have their suggestions rejected by Sir John A. Macdonald, that it
seems more likely that delay was intentional. The stated policy between
1870 and 1873 was to "unlock" the territory for newcomers and that
objective had come close to fulfillment. In the spring of 1873 Macdonald
informed the Lieutenant Governor that future conflicts between "actual
settlers" and "former occupants" ought to be handled by local militia. He
encouraged Morris to "stir up the people to form volunteers or active mili-
tia corps ... to protect themselves," and intimated that the army of occupa-
tion was to be removed in May 1874.
67
 If the overriding goal of the preced-
ing several years had been to govern the "unruly" Metis with a strong
hand until they were swamped by the influx of new settlers, that was within
sight of achievement and a matter of some consolation to Macdonald even
if Louis Riel had not yet "stood his trial." Yet there is little evidence that
Macdonald gave Metis matters any consideration one way or another in the
last months of 1873. In the autumn he faced a more disturbing problem
over other indiscretions, a crisis that forced the resignation of his ministry
on November 5,1873.
64. PAM, Morris Papers (LG Collection), Morris telegram to Alexander Campbell, 18 July
1873.
65. Ibid., Campbell telegram to Morris, 22 July 1873; and letter, Campbell to Morris, 31
July 1873.
66. Incapacity is the official interpretation, the one that appeared in the annual reports of
the Department of the Interior after it was created in 1873. That interpretation, with
some evidence of incompetence, reappeared in the work of professional historians in
the 1950s following Douglas Kemp's assertion that the "need to do many things
quickly and, what is more, to do them simultaneously, despite conflict and confusion,
would account for many of the problems which faced the administrators." There is no
suggestion of deliberate delay in Kemp's work, "Land Grants under the Manitoba
Act," Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, Transactions, series 3, No. 9
(1952-53), pp. 33-52.
67. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 20, p. 157, Macdonald to Morris, 19 May
1873.
Archbishop Tache, ca. 1870
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"Tache suggested that if they did amend the Manitoba Act somebody would
probably launch a legal action contesting the constitutionality of the
legislation."
108
Chapter 7
Amending the Manitoba Act
Sir John A. Macdonald's embarrassment over public disclosures that he
appeared to have traded the presidency of the Canadian Pacific Railway for
campaign contributions in the elections of 1872 and the subsequent resigna-
tion of his government late in 1873 were the prelude to an important test of
the former Prime Minister's political substance for at least two reasons. The
first was his acquiring the luxury of being the opposition. He was free to
attack anything, everything, with all the rhetorical cunning and biting wit
he had learned over the previous thirty years of his political career.
Secondly, and more importantly, since Macdonald was an aging politician,
in thorough disgrace, with no hope of recapturing his former power (and
determined to retire from the Conservative leadership as soon as possible),
he was more free to show his true political colours.
Concerning the Metis, it has already been shown that Macdonald
vehemently opposed Mackenzie's amnesty for Riel when that was con-
ceded (conditional on five more years of exile starting in 1875).
Macdonald's position was that murder was a capital crime; Riel was a
murderer; he ought to hang. Consequently, notwithstanding the widespread
support for unconditional clemency in Quebec, and despite the importance
of Quebec's sixty-five seats to the Conservatives' strength in Parliament,
Macdonald struck a high profile of opposition to Mackenzie's conditional
amnesty, and urged the editor of the Toronto Mail to stir up reaction in
Ontario. ' "The changes should be rung on the names of the Ontario men
who voted for the resolutions," he wrote T.C. Patteson on February 16.
1
They amount to an absolute pardon. Riel and Lepine are French. The US is
the haven of Hope for all French Canadians. The people of Quebec won't
stay at home, but flock in crowds to the US and the Quebec Gov't proposes
bonuses to get them back in vain — and this is the punishment for murder!
The Gentlemen as Martyrs will be amply supplied with funds and live like
fighting cocks for 5 years. Meanwhile they will infest the frontier—keep
up the discontent in Manitoba and have petitions annually before parliament
l.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Transcripts, vol. 584, Macdonald to T.C. Patteson, 16
February 1875.
109
110 Canada and the Mitis, 1869-1885
praying for pardon. In fact there is no end of the Nuisance.... Burn this.
Three days later, Patteson printed Macdonald's words as his own,
repeating all the key phrases with only minor rhetorical embellishment:
Edward Blake and his fifty seven associates from Ontario voted the
equivalent of an absolute pardon to the murderers of Thomas Scott. They
voted that two more French Canadians should go across the line into the
haven of hope, whereas the Quebec Government is offering large bonuses
to get back the truant population ofBas Canada. Fifty-eight Upper Canadi-
ans thought it enough to send Riel and Lepine to live in clover among the
old friends of their childhood, amply supplied with funds, and revelling ...
in one five years spree! They will infest the frontier, keep alive discontent
in Manitoba, have petitions placed yearly before Parliament praying for
pardon, and be and remain a nuisance, the mainspring of social, political,
and religious agitation. But they will all the while be paying the Parliamen-
tary penalty for murder, a murder of which the cruelty, the highest authori-
ties assure us, can claim no indulgent mitigation whatever from the com-
plexion of contemporaneous events.
2
Macdonald's incitement of Patteson for rekindling anti-Riel sentiment
to embarrass the new government in Ontario may have indicated more of
the former Prime Minister's political cleverness than his true sentiments,
but the absence of any evidence of simultaneous exploitation of the issue in
Quebec suggests not. Macdonald used Patteson to "inflame sectional
jealousy" in Ontario; he did not instruct Quebec editors to denounce Mack-
enzie for stopping short of unconditional amnesty and "inflame the worst
passions" of the people there.
3
 Moreover, Macdonald had done nothing to
exploit the Liberals' significant transformations of the Manitoba Act
before — or after— the amnesty controversy of 1875.
Mackenzie's initial amendment had appeared in the first session of the
new Parliament in the spring of 1874. A bill introduced in the Senate on
May 13 (and brought into the House of Commons three days later) ack-
nowledged that section 31 set aside land "towards the extinguishment of
Indian Title" of families of part aboriginal ancestry by reserving 1.4 mil-
lion acres for the children, and observed there was "no provision... for
extinguishing the Indian title to such lands as respects the half-breed heads
of families." The proposed remedy was to grant each parent "one hundred
2. Toronto Mail, 19 February 1875. The next day, Patteson repeated the substance of the
same editorial, adding a special note of sarcasm about Kiel's comfort in his escape
from punishment: "For once across the border and his place of residence known,...
his French Canadian friends will see that he lives in a luxury commensurate with the
extra halo of heroism which his banishment will in their eyes throw around him."
3. Ironically, in ringing the changes on the names of the Ontario men who supported the
resolutions, Patteson suggested they were the group who excited "sectional jealousy"
and "inflamed passions" on the Riel question originally. For his part, Patteson
asserted: "We have been at pains... to avoid the saying of a word that was likely to
inflame sectional jealousy, religious animosity, or rouse a spirit of vindictive
retaliation." Toronto Mail, 19 February 1875.
Amending the Manitoba Act 111
and sixty acres of land or ... scrip .. . to be receivable in payment for the
purchase of Dominion Lands."
4
A critical observer of the proceedings might have wondered how the
Liberals had become such sudden converts to the recognition of the aborigi-
nal title of "half breeds" and might have asked them if they were taking a
first step towards establishing "scrip," a form of personal property, as a
legal equivalent to real property, meaning land. A watchful guardian of the
Manitoba Act would have asked if the commutation in scrip that was being
proposed for the parents was contemplated for the children as well.
The same defender of native rights might have raised an equally
embarrassing question concerning the proposed changes to section 32. The
part of Bill 51 amending rights to the river lots declared that the old clause
giving the Metis, the native English, and other original settlers pre-emptive
right to land beyond the Old Settlement Belt was "hereby repealed" and
substituted new language that implied a right to consideration, but no
guarantee of recognition. An interested critic of the change might have
attacked the proposed amendment on at least two levels. First, one might
have observed that the new language amounted to a denial of rights because
the onus of proof was shifted from the government to the claimants. Then a
defender of the Manitoba Act could have taken up a second line of criti-
cism with the argument that the statute in question was not within the
power of Canada to alter since the the original act had been confirmed by
the Parliament of Great Britain in 1871.
Macdonald, the parliamentary champion of the Manitoba Act in 1870,
was not prepared to defend his creation in 1874, or later. He did not object
to any provision of Bill 51, nor did any other member of the official Oppo-
sition. In fact, the matter went back to the Senate after having passed all
three readings in the House, virtually without debate. But before the bill
came up for consideration by the Upper Chamber, someone had apparently
spoken with the amendment's senatorial sponsor, R.W. Scott (Secretary of
State in the Mackenzie ministry), about the possible constitutional
difficulties that might arise from declaring one of the clauses of the Mani-
toba Act "hereby repealed." The result was that Scott proposed somewhat
altered language to reach his original intended objective. Instead of declar-
ing that subsection 4 of section 32 was repealed, the revised text appeared
merely to provide some procedures for administering the rights in subsec-
tions 3 and 4:
Whereas it is expedient to afford facilities to parties claiming lands under
the third and fourth subsections of the thirty-second section of the Act
thirty-third Victoria, chapter three, to obtain letters patent for the same, —
4. Statutes of Canada (1874), Chapter 20: An Act respecting the appropriation of certain
Dominion Lands in Manitoba, preamble.
112 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Be it enacted that persons satisfactorily establishing undisturbed occu-
pancy of any lands within the Province prior to, and being by themselves or
their servants, tenants or agents, or those through whom they claim, in
actual and peaceable possession thereof on the eighth day of March, One
thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine, shall be entitled to receive letters
patent therefor, granting the same absolutely to them respectively in fee
simple.
5
The original purpose of the amendment was achieved in the sense that
the earlier pre-emptive right was reduced to an opportunity to prove a satis-
factory level of improvements, while appearing to maintain the fiction that
the fuller, unqualified right was undisturbed.
6
 After the change, the bill
went back to the House. Once again, the matter passed without objection,
and the revision of the land-promise provisions of the Manitoba Act
received royal assent on May 26, 1874.
The Conservatives' acquiescence in the first set of changes invited
other, bolder adjustments to the offending land promises to "half breeds."
The Liberals were especially anxious to eliminate the "tremendous obsta-
cle to the speedy settlement of the region" that they found in section 31 of
the Manitoba Act, the "curse" of the reservation of the 1.4 million acres
for the children.
7
 With a view towards making the distribution as soon as
possible, officials devised a scheme for making allotments immediately
among the children enrolled in the 1870 census with lists of allottees to be
published in every parish. It was expected that "this plan would at once
give the rights of the Metis a marketable value,.. . a feeling of ownership
in the land" even though no Metis child would be eligible to claim a patent
or make use of the soil until reaching eighteen years of age.
8
 A
5. Ibid., section 3.
6. The text of subsection 4 promised: "All persons in peaceable possession of tracts of
land at the time of the transfer to Canada, in those parts of the Province where the
Indian Title has not been extinguished, shall have the right of pre-emption of the same,
on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Governor in Council."
Ritchot was promised an Order in Council confirming the "most liberal interpretation"
of the clause, and the promise did appear to be fulfilled by an Order in Council of 11
November 1872 providing a "free grant" to any claimant outside the Old Settlement
Belt (squatters within the two-mile limit of the rivers were already protected by the
occupancy provision of subsection 3 of section 32 given the meaning of the clause in
relation to the homestead policy of the Council of Assiniboia since 27 February 1860).
An important legal point is that section 33 provided that the Orders in Council
giving final shape to the incomplete rights defined in sections 31 and 32 were to have
"the same force and effect as if.. . a part of this Act." Consequently, the issue of
alteration of 32(4) by SC (1874), cap 20 would appear to be not simply how the
amendment compared with 32(4), but how 32(4) in conjunction with OC 11 November
1872 was affected by the alteration of terms.
7. PAC, Alexander Mackenzie Papers, MG 26 B, General Correspondence, pp. 599-605,
E.B. Wood to Mackenzie, 3 July 1874; and pp. 801-808, Wood to Mackenzie, 25 May
1875.
8. PAM, Morris Papers, Ketcheson Collection, Alexander Morris to David Laird, 11
February 1874.
Amending the Manitoba Act 113
complicating historical reality was that at least six per cent of the original
population had left the province already. If the land allotted to absentees
were never patented, it would be argued that a full 1.4 million acres had not
been divided among the children as the act required. Consequently, the
same bill provided for a distribution of scrip covering the residual amount
of land.
In late March 1875, the Manitoba Free Press received a garbled ver-
sion of the proposed bill and announced all problems were solved. The
paper indicated that the sixty-eight townships making up the 1.4 million
acres were to be thrown open for immediate settlement and the children,
like their parents, would receive scrip instead of land. The paper praised the
government for correcting a gross injustice. "We do not think that it can be
reasonably asked on behalf of the minor participants that the whole country
should be kept back, until they are of age. Another advantage of the scrip
system is that it will speedily put the lands of those who are not disposed to
utilize them into the hands of those who will."
9
Subsequent developments showed that the Liberals' long-range inten-
tion was indeed to commute all "half breed claims" with scrip, but the pro-
posal of the moment was certainly less grandiose than what the Free Press
reported. The wording on the scrip provision was to cover only "an
amount equal to the sum total of the acreage of allotments the right of
which may fail to be proved" (to be distributed among the persons whose
claims were confirmed in order to bring the total up to 1.4 million acres).
Another section of the bill offered a refinement of the meaning of the word
"children" in section 31, but the overall package fell far short of what was
hoped for by Manitoba's Ontario party.
Still, Macdonald and his fellow Conservatives did support the measure
when the Minister of the Interior, David Laird, moved second reading of
the new "Bill to amend" the Manitoba Act on March 27. Unfortunately,
the maverick leader-in-waiting of the Liberals, Edward Blake, saw an
opportunity to impress the House with his knowledge of constitutional
detail while reinforcing Macdonald's disgrace by reminding Parliament that
the former Prime Minister had stuck them with a statute they could not
alter. Blake observed that the "Bill was to amend the Act creating a consti-
tution for Manitoba." Citing section 6 of the BNA Act (1871) he asserted
that such a step would be "beyond the powers of this House."
10
Macdonald responded with lame agreement that the Parliament of
Canada could not alter the provisions of the Manitoba Act, but the former
Prime Minister "fancied" that the substitution of scrip for land was "quite
consistent'' with the original act; therefore, he saw no reason to obstruct the
9. Manitoba Free Press, 23 March 1875.
10. House of Commons Debates, 27 March 1875, pp. 931-932.
114 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
measure's passage through second reading. As for the redefinition of chil-
dren, Mackenzie agreed to look into the matter in more detail over the next
several days. On that reflection, he and his legal advisors decided it was
better to abandon legislative action—to Laird's disgust, who wrote Morris
a few days later complaining that the "bill was dropped, as it was supposed
in some way to amend the Manitoba Act." Laird stated that he thought
Blake had raised a "false objection" because, in Laird's view, the Mani-
toba Act "has been amended already two or three times almost as far as I
proposed."
11
The amendments to which Laird referred had arisen from the Liberals'
continuing refusal to recognize pre-emptive rights in the original statute.
Macdonald's way of coping with the same difficulty had been to delay con-
sideration of claims to river lots while opening "vacant lands" to new
settlers despite reports from one official in charge of the surveys that "the
complaint of encroachment by newcomers is universal."
12
 It was not until
May 1873 that an apparatus for receiving claims had been established even
in principle, and the actual opening of the application process was delayed
for another season of immigration put off until mid-September 1873.
13
Then, when applications came forward without proof of title from the
Hudson's Bay Company, and without any acknowledgement of occupancy
in the field reports of the Dominion land surveyors, officials in Winnipeg
asked for authority to refuse to consider such "weak" claims.
Two civil servants who pursued the issue like terriers after a rat were
McMicken's successor as Agent of Dominion Lands, Donald Codd, and the
new Inspector of Surveys, A.H. Whitcher. Both reported to the Surveyor
General, John Stoughton Dennis, the same J.S. Dennis who had tried to
rally the counter-insurgents against the Metis in December 1869. As if to
make the world even smaller than that coincidence implied, Donald Codd
had been on the scene at the same time serving as a draughtsman and aide-
de-camp to Dennis until he too was forced to flee Red River on foot to Min-
nesota.
14
 Later, from 1870 to 1873, Codd worked as a clerk in the Domin-
ion Lands Branch when it was part of the Department of Secretary of State.
Then, with the creation of the Department of the Interior in 1873, and after
the decision to begin to entertain claims to river lots in the autumn of the
11. PAM, Morris Papers, Ketcheson Collection, Laird to Morris, 27 April 1875.
12. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 227, file 155, Lindsay
Russell, Assistant Surveyor General, to J.S. Dennis, Surveyor General, 21 September
1871.
13. For claim adjudication see Statutes of Canada (1873), Chapter 6: An Act respecting
claims to Lands in Manitoba for which no Patents have been issued. A sample notice
of intent to receive claims, dated 10 September 1873, appears in Manitoba Free Press,
3 January 1874.
14. Donald Codd, "Some Reminiscenses of Fort Garry'in 1869-70," Great West
Magazine 13 (1899), pp. 294-299.
Amending the Manitoba Act 115
same year, it was Dennis who nominated Codd for the vacancy at the Lands
Office in Winnipeg, notwithstanding Tache's objections that Codd despised
the Metis as much as he was ignorant of the French language.
The persistence of Dennis in the position of overall authority and the
emergence of Codd in the important role of first-level consideration of
claims
16
 may have illustrated nothing more than the cronyism that charac-
terized so much of the public service in the nineteenth century. But the
placement of Codd may have been an indication of a desire for revenge
17
inasmuch as Dennis had found officials who could be trusted to exploit the
surveyors' field reports for maximum discouragement of "half breed"
claims.
1 8
It is clear that some of the surveyors were prejudiced, and may have
intentionally misrepresented the actual pattern of occupancy. For others,
the haste to finish the settlement surveys as quickly as possible prompted
them to be less than conscientious about their instructions to "search and
note all farm lines,... note all fences, the several buildings and reputed
owners."
19
 The oversight appears to have caused little inconvenience for
newcomers to the province. Codd and Whitcher investigated their requests
for another look at the land with prompt courtesy.
20
 It was the overlooked
Metis and native English that Codd and Whitcher suggested were "not
entitled to any consideration at all."
21
 Immediately after the change of
government late in 1873 they recommended referral of sample cases to the
Department of Justice, urging that "the sooner they are stopped the better,
15. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 96892-96895, H.L. Langevin
to Macdonald, 5 October 1873.
16. The role of the Agent of Dominion Lands is set forth in a memorandum of J.S. Dennis
to the Minister of the Interior, 5 September 1873. Later, the same set of procedures
was reiterated, and reapproved "for the information of the Minister of Justice" in
1876. Both memoranda are in PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15,
vol. 164, MA file 7390.
17. Tactic" and Royal believed such was the case. See PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming
Correspondence, p. 8884, J. Royal to Macdonald, 2 November 1880.
18. William Pearce, for example, considered the Dominion Government "prodigal in
dealing with these claims." In Pearce's opinion, "The grants did not do the half breeds
any good. As a class they would have been better had they received neither land nor
scrip, it only demoralized them." See his manuscript, "Lands Obtained Under the
Manitoba Act in Manitoba, and Surveys Incidental to the Granting of Titles Thereto"
(15 December 1913). Archives of the University of Alberta, Pearce Papers, MG 9/2,
series 6, vol. 4, file 9.
19. Letter of instruction from J.S. Dennis to George McPhillips, 10 June 1871, in Survey
Field Book #562, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.
20. See Table 1 and supporting documentation in P.R.J. Mailhot and D.N. Sprague,
"Persistent Settlers: The Dispersal and Re-Settlement of the Red River Metis, 1870-
1885," Canadian Journal of Ethnic Studies 17 (1985), pp. 1-30.
21. Department of Justice, Central Registry Files, file 13/1873, Codd to J.S. Dennis, 19
November 1873.
116 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
or they will pour in from every direction."
22
Over the winter of 1873-74 officials in the Justice Department did con-
sider the matter, apparently deciding that the claims Codd and Whitcher
wanted disallowed would have to be entertained, unless the words of sec-
tion 32 of the Manitoba Act were altered. Such was the background to the
repeal of subsection 4 in May 1874, the amendment that required claimants
to establish occupancy that was first satisfactory to Codd and Whitcher,
before referring the matter for action in Ottawa.
Unfortunately for the officers in the Dominion Lands Office at Winni-
peg, many of the 800 vulnerable families were reluctant to take refusal of
their cases quietly. On the chance that some might take their claims to the
judicial body created for such matters by Canadian statute in 1873, the act
was amended in 1875 to remove disputes against Canada from the jurisdic-
tion of the "court of claims," leaving that body to adjudicate nothing more
than the conflicts between settlers (newcomers versus old settlers, most typ-
ically). At the same time, another of the amendments Laird had in mind in
his protest letter to Morris changed the date on which occupancy had to be
sworn from March 9 to July 15, a time of year when the largest number of
Metis and native English were likely to have been out of the province at
work in the production of pemmican or freighting supplies for the HBC.
23
Macdonald supported both measures. No one in his party observed
that the conflicting claims bill amounted to the denial of due process to per-
sons whose land rights had already been reduced merely to consideration
by the Department of the Interior. Nor did anyone on his side of the House
object to the second measure by quoting H.Y. Hind's observation that
"about the 15th of June they [the Metis] start for their summer hunt of the
buffalo"
24
 as Hind had been quoted in the House of Commons before (in
1867 and 1869) to excite enthusiasm for annexation of Rupert's Land.
25
 In
1875 no one seemed interested in the obvious implication that the routine
of the hunt meant absence from occupation at the time required under the
new act. Later, with the same acquiescence, Macdonald's Conservatives
did not object to the provisions of the defunct Bill 110 when they reap-
peared as an appendage to an Order in Council dated April 26, 1875.
Bill 110 as an Order in Council began reasonably enough; it provided
nothing more than a set of regulations for distributing the 1.4 million acres
22. Ibid., A.H. Whitcher to J.S. Dennis, 19 November 1873.
23. The date-change appeared in Statutes of Canada (1875), Chapter 52: An act to amend
'An Act respecting the appropriation of certain Lands in Manitoba'; the amendments to
the court of claims legislation were in Statutes of Canada (1875), Chapter 53: An Act
respecting Conflicting Claims to Lands of Occupants in Manitoba.
24. Hind, Narrative, I, p. 179.
25. See, for example, the speeches of Alexander Morris, collected and reprinted in 1884 as
Nova Britannia.
Amending the Manitoba Act 117
to the children and scrip for their parents. Lists were to be posted in every
church announcing "the names from the census" and inviting all such per-
sons to appear before special commissioners sitting in each locality at vari-
ous times over the summer of 1875. At each sitting, sworn affidavits were
to be collected for establishing each claimant's right to an allotment of land
(for the children) or an issue of scrip (for heads of families). The amending
part of the Order in Council came at the end. There were the abandoned
clauses of Bill 110 refining the definition of children, excluding, for exam-
ple, any child resident at the time of the transfer if his or her parents were
absent from the province on July 15, 1870. A searching critic of the
government would have seized upon such provisions the moment they
appeared in the Canada Gazette in May 1875 and asked the government
(while Parliament was still in session) whether it was Liberal Party policy
to pursue by Order in Council that which they thought was illegal by statute
of Parliament. No one asked.
Nor did the Opposition oppose yet another erosion of the land-promise
provisions of the Manitoba Act in 1876 when the government proclaimed a
more precise definition of what was meant by "satisfactory occupancy" in
claims to land under section 32 and its amendments. Here as well, the
amending instrument was an Order in Council, not an Act of Parliament,
despite the sweeping nature of the policy and its conflict with the Manitoba
Act. The document distinguished three categories of claims to river-
frontage: one was land occupied "in accordance with the custom of the
country" before January 15, 1870; a second was unimproved land "alleged
to have been taken up" before the transfer; and the last was land "resided
upon and cultivated continuously .. . as homesteads under the Order in
Council of 26 May, 1871." Under the new regulations, claims arising from
categories one and three were admissable, those in class two were "not
entitled to consideration."
The difficulty created for potential claimants was that many families
who ought to have been included in class one automatically fell into the
second category because the document incorrectly asserted that the cus-
tomary method of taking up land before the transfer was ' 'to employ one of
the two surveyors in the colony to survey and lay out the land." In fact,
such proceedings were rare and exceptional occurrences. The normal prac-
tice of intending occupants was simply to plant stakes at the corners of a
chosen area; if no one objected, no survey was needed. In the event of a
dispute one of the two surveyors was called in. If he found that the property
was no more than twelve chains wide and did not encroach on the land of
any prior, neighbouring occupants, no objection could be sustained.
26
 In
26. Minutes of the Council of Assiniboia, 27 February 1860, quoted in Department of the
Interior Memorandum, 19 April 1876 (PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior,
RG 15, vol. 235, file 5537).
118 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
effect, the new Order in Council barred all claims where occupancy was
unrecorded by the Hudson's Bay Company or overlooked by Dominion
surveyors after 1870, and took the entire history of the region back to
October 1869 in the sense that hundreds of M6tis claimants became sud-
denly uncertain that their hold on the land was secure. The order of April
1876 seemed to confirm the original "rumour" that everyone without HBC
title might be "driven back from the river and their land given to others."
27
Sir John A. Macdonald knew that land loss was the central anxiety of
the "half breeds" in 1869-70. He knew the issue of "squatters' claims"
was one of the most important topics to be dealt with in the negotiations
with the delegates. He was there. He knew what Ritchot wanted in the
Manitoba Act, and why. He had appeared to agree. Yet six years later,
Macdonald uttered not one recorded whisper to challenge the Liberals'
completion of the elimination of that assurance. One possible explanation
was that Macdonald had no interest in maintaining a promise that he him-
self had not wished to keep. Another was his preoccupation with more
opportune bases of opposition.
28
By the spring of 1876, Canada was moving into the third year of a
severe economic recession. National revenue, for the most part derived
from the tariff on imports, was down fifteen per cent, and the Finance Min-
ister, Richard Cartwright, refused any increase in his budget of February
25, calling "every increase in taxation a positive evil" at the best of times,
but particularly inappropriate during present circumstances. "This is no
time for experiments," he explained.
29
Macdonald seized upon Cartwright's declaration with an endorsement
of the opposite position. Asserting that a stiff tariff increase would boost
the national revenue, he claimed such a rise would also promote Canadian
industrial development. Then Canada would be in a better position to finish
the Pacific Railway and see a tide of settlement pour into the West. Calling
his panacea the "National Policy," he began to spark enthusiasm outside
of Parliament as well as among his own colleagues; he began to feel that he
was riding a wave of returning popularity. The perception of political
recovery convinced the old leader (he was sixty-one in 1876) that he ought
to abandon recent plans for retirement. Apathy turned to more vigorous
opposition, but Macdonald and his party did not discover any newfound
dislike of the Liberals' administration of Manitoba land claims.
Archbishop Tach£ became increasingly worried. Earlier he had
27. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 40751-40758, William
McDougall to Macdonald, 31 October 1869.
28. Macdonald's opportunism is fully described by P.B. Waite, "Depression, Protection,
and the Resurgence of Sir John Macdonald, 1874-1878," in Canada, 1874-1896:
Arduous Destiny (Toronto, 1971), pp. 74-92.
29. Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 211.
Amending the Manitoba Act 119
watched and waited, hoping the Liberals would soon pass from political
power, and with Macdonald or his successor back where the Conservatives
belonged in the Prime Minister's office, he might resume his patient whee-
dling, believing the Tories were the lesser of two evils (if only because they
saw the expediency of having a Cartier or, after Carrier's death, a
Langevin, at the Prime Minister's right hand). In 1876, however, with
Macdonald's new, seemingly reckless advocacy of a high tariff, his
renewed commitment to rapid completion of the Pacific Railway regardless
of cost, and his statements about completely unrestricted immigration to the
West, together with the recent boldness of the Liberals' bypassing of the
Manitoba Act, Tache appears to have decided that it was unwise to observe
further innovations with quiet contempt. He would have to protest, even if
that meant face-to-face meetings with the "Protestant fanatics"
30
 govern-
ing in Ottawa.
In the autumn of 1876 Tach6 met David Mills, known to the
Archbishop earlier as the most outspoken opponent of the Manitoba Act
when it was debated in 1870 and 1871. In October, Mills became the new
Minister of the Interior. Tache hoped to impress him with his distress at
what had been done to date and took special exception to the recent Order
in Council, which presumed that every settler had been required to have a
survey of his lot before 1870. Tachd informed Mills that "staking was the
customary way of proclaiming intent to settle." He contended that denial of
that fact would jeopardize the only home of the claimants and, contrary to
reports of Dominion surveyors, the lands in question were far from vacant.
Mills promised an investigation.
31
Responding to ministerial instructions late in November, Dennis asked
Codd for a confidential report on the number of cases in which land was
claimed but surveyors indicated there were no improvements. He wanted to
know whether such claims conflicted with other potential patentees in Man-
itoba and whether there was ' 'any reason to believe that similar claims are
likely to be preferred to land on the Saskatchewan, or elsewhere in the Ter-
ritories "
32
If Codd had answered consistently with his previous memoranda on
the same subject, he would have indicated that there were hundreds of cases
in which land was allegedly occupied in 1870, but not covered by any kind
of Hudson's Bay Company grant, and quite unimproved according to the
30. " 'I don't like French,' often was the only answer obtained to legitimate requests";
clipping of article by Tach6 appearing in Montreal Herald and Daily Commercial
Gazette (15 December 1885) in PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence,
p. 43928.
31. The substance of the meeting between Tactic" and Mills is found in a letter from Dennis
to Codd, 20 November 1876 (PAM, Morris Papers, LG Collection, item 1327).
32. Ibid.
120 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Dominion survey. In many such cases, the claim would conflict with recent
entries for homesteads or sales to newcomers, and it was important to
discourage them on that account alone, as well as to prevent similar chaos
from arising along the branches of the Saskatchewan River. Eventually, a
full inventory of "doubtful claims" was prepared. In the short term, how-
ever, Codd and Whitcher had to wait for a reply to test cases submitted in
an earlier attempt to find the minimum of acceptability. In September they
had pointed out that the amendments to the Manitoba Act required "undis-
turbed occupancy and actual peaceable possession, etc" and their under-
standing of the recent Order in Council was that without adequate improve-
ments, a claimant needed to show authorization by the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany. To find the acceptable minimum, they had sent an assortment of
examples, hoping for their return with "a Memo attached to each applica-
tion, shewing the opinion in each case definitely as to whether they will or
will not pass."
34
fyf
An opinion was rendered quickly on many of the cases. Some failed,
some passed (although the Justice Department approved one in 1876 that
the same officials rejected when the dossier was returned for immediate
patent).
36
 The test cases still not ruled upon in the late autumn of 1876 were
referred by Dennis to his Minister, and from the Department of the Interior
to Justice at the end of January 1877.
37
The January referrals involved eighteen claimants in Ste Agathe
whose homes and gardens were on the west side of the Red River, with the
land immediately opposite used for timber and hay. Having asked the sur-
veyors to take account of both parts of their lots at the time of the survey,
the residents had learned that the government was not likely to recognize
any such claims, so they filed a formal petition for the land on November 4,
1873, asserting that the east portions of their holdings were an "integral
part of our first property and even the principal part'' given the value of the
land for fuel, building timber, and fodder.
38
 Earlier, officials at the Domin-
ion Lands Office in Winnipeg had advised against the claimants, suggesting
33. See "List of Lands in the parishes of Baie St Paul, Poplar Point, High Bluff and
Portage la Prairie prepared in accordance with Instructions of the Surveyor General
dated 17 November 1877" (PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15,
MA file 9683). Presumably there were other lists to cover the same subject in the other
parishes but they have not been found.
34. Ibid., vol. 140, MA file 13, A.H. Whitcher to J.S. Dennis, 8 September 1876.
35. Ibid., Dennis to Whitcher, [23] September 1876.
36. Ibid., Whitcher to Dennis, 13 February 1878.
37. Department of Justice, Central Registry Files, file 21/1877, J.S. Dennis to David Mills,
30 January 1877.
38. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, file 720 (petition in which
eighteen claimants assert that the dominion survey does not reflect the boundaries they
themselves had agreed to), 4 November 1873.
Amending the Manitoba Act 121
that if they succeeded "there will be little if any land in the Settlement
Belt, or indeed in the Province which cannot be claimed in this way."
39
While the dossiers moved from department to department in Ottawa,
Tache became increasingly anxious for news about the general inquiry, and
asked for a meeting with Mills in January 1877. But the Minister was not
available. His letter of explanation, dated February 6, acknowledged
Tache's concerns, promised the Archbishop that the government had "no
intention to disturb anyone in actual possession of the lands," qualified the
assurance with the warning that there would be no recognition of claims
without significant improvements, and stated that nothing could be done for
the moment because "certain papers" had not yet arrived from Winni-
peg.
40
If Mills had been more honest, he would have admitted that the matter
was before the Department of Justice, and the issue under consideration
was the legal limit of stringency, not generosity. After rulings in June, and
more memoranda between Dennis and Mills, the policy that finally came
down to Codd in October 1877 (the instructions for preparing the
comprehensive lists of doubtful claims) was that all would fail "without
some really valuable improvements." The specified minimum was a house
and five acres under cultivation in every case where there was no HBC sur-
vey, and no indication of occupancy in the Dominion surveyors' field notes.
Even then, what the claimant earned was the right to buy his land "in cash
or scrip at the Government price of one dollar per acre." A final stipulation
was a forty-acre maximum purchase.
41
The impact of the policy concerning "staked claims" was horrendous
from the standpoint of the Metis. At Rat River, for example, the implemen-
tation of the ruling in late December of 1877 meant that eighty-four of
ninety-three families were told that they were vulnerable to eviction by
"writs of ejectment."
42
 Only nine of the claimants passed the "really valu-
able improvements" test establishing their right to buy the land they con-
sidered already their own. To be sure, the government had recently distri-
buted $160 scrip to each "half breed" head of family, but that benefit had
passed almost immediately to persons with powers of attorney alleging
ownership of the right; and no head of family who did collect scrip was told
that it would buy anything but vacant section land—bald prairie. The
39. Ibid., Whitcher to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 13 November 1873. The locations
of the petitioners was illustrated by a map enclosed with the letter. The map is in PAC,
National Map Collection, 54106.
40. Archives of the University of Western Ontario, David Mills Papers, Letter Book, Mills
to Tache, 6 February 1877.
41. PAM, Morris Papers, LG Collection, Dennis to Codd, 24 October 1877.
42. PAM, Morris Papers, LG Collection, Fragment of "Memorandum on the subject of the
so called 'Staked Claims' in Manitoba," [20 December 1877].
122 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
policy innovation that permitted occupants of "staked claims" to clear
their titles with the scrip they had lost two years earlier was, therefore, an
innovation that came two years too late.
From Mills' point of view, the solution to the "staked claims" issue
was sensible and just. The formula did not please Tachd, of course, but
Tache's pleasure was none of his concern, even though the Archbishop was
proving useful as a sounding board, particularly in testing the nature of
opposition to innovations in the field of Metis land rights. The day after
Tache had made his inquiry into the river-lot question in January 1877, J.S.
Dennis wrote the Archbishop informing him that the minister was anxious
to "confer" on another matter. Dennis indicated that the issue of the
' 'lands granted to the children of Half Breeds in Manitoba'' was something
to which Mills had given "earnest consideration since assuming the office
of Minister of the Interior" on October 24, 1876. According to Dennis,
"The minister fears that the Grant, as proposed to be made, is not likely to
realize the anticipated value to the recipients, while it is certain to operate
greatly to the public disadvantage in retarding for an indefinite period the
settlement of a very considerable area, say one-seventh, of the lands in the
Province." From the point of view of the government, the appropriate
remedy was to "commute the claim of each Half Breed child entitled to
participate in the land grant by a fixed cash payment...." Mills admitted
through Dennis that an amending act of Parliament was needed. Tache's
views were invited to set the just price. "What sum," Dennis asked,
"would be a reasonable commutation for each claim?"
43
The Minister of the Interior and the Surveyor General both knew that
the Archbishop would probably refuse to consider their proposition. Nei-
ther Mills nor Dennis could have expected Tache to come up with a liqui-
dation value. They both knew that he had stood firmly on the principle of
trusteeship in the past. What Dennis and Mills probably wanted to learn
was how far Tache might take his opposition. They could not have been
surprised when he sent a critical reply to their proposal in mid-February
1877.
The letter began quietly enough. Tache expressed surprise that the
government believed "the majority of claims ... will pass from their own-
ers for comparatively a merely nominal consideration," and suggested that
if speculators were operating on such a vast scale "if there be any means of
checking their efforts it would be advisable to do so...." Tache agreed
that it was futile to forbid grantees to sell their land after they came of age.
Still, for those who should choose to sell, it would be well to have a leg-
islated minimum price as a discouragement to fraud and speculation.
43. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 236, file 7220, Dennis to
Tache", 22 January 1877.
Amending the Manitoba Act 123
Indeed, Tache believed that the most effective approach to assuring fair
value would be having the government itself "offering a fair price." Of
course, that was not the commutation Dennis and Mills had in mind. Turn-
ing to their proposition, Tachd suggested that if they did amend the Mani-
toba Act somebody would probably launch a legal action contesting the
constitutionality of the legislation. He reminded Mills (who fancied himself
an expert in constitutional law) that "the Manitoba Act having received the
sanction of an Imperial Act, its provisions cannot be re-adjusted by the
Canadian Parliament, and I am very doubtful as to the willingness of the
Imperial Parliament to enact for the disposal of lands set apart for minors."
Tache also doubted the wisdom of presuming to know the wishes of seven-
year-olds, the youngest of the allottees, eleven years hence, when they
would be eligible to receive patents to their allotments. "I would not feel
justifiable in recommending any action which minors, when of age, might
deem as having been prejudicial to their interests." Then, with clear refer-
ence to the losing battle he was waging over river lots, Tache concluded:
"Scarcity of land in a few years ... may render the children of Half Breeds
better able to appreciate its value than their relatives do at present, and the
preservation of their grant may be the only way to secure a footing for them
in their native country."
44
As Dennis and Mills learned that the legislation they were contemplat-
ing was likely to be challenged in the courts, the matter was dropped. At
the same time, both officials should have perceived a remarkable change in
Tache's pleading. He called their proposal unconstitutional, said he was
afraid to be identified with it, and warned the government that champions
of Metis rights might use the measure as a rallying point in the future.
While defining coherent grounds of opposition, the letter lacked the cutting
edge that was evident in his earlier writing concerning, for example, the
amnesty. The letter seems to have marked a turning point in Tache's rela-
tions with the Metis, a change that Riel perceived as early as September
1874 when he began to complain that the Archbishop was a friend but one
who was too "soft" in adversity.
45
 By 1877, with Riel out of the country,
with the Archbishop having little success on the river-lot question, and
expecting the worst on the disposal of the 1.4 million acres, he appears to
have decided that the Metis would have to be replaced by a French-
speaking, Catholic population recruited from Quebec, or repatriated from
the United States, to save his church and language from British-Protestant
inundation.
46
 He no longer believed, as had Ritchot and Riel in 1870, that
44. Ibid., Tachd to Dennis, 5 February 1877.
45. Riel Papers, I, pp. 386-394, Riel to Dubuc, 10 September 1874.
46. See Benoit, Vie de Mg. Tache, II, pp. 295, 298-300; and Robert Painchaud, "French-
Canadian Historiography and Franco-Catholic Settlement in Western Canada, 1870-
1915," Canadian Historical Review 59 (1978), pp. 447-466. Both observe that Tache~'s
recruitment effort was most emphatic in the later 1870s.
124 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
the Metis colony might be shaped into an "independent province in the
Canadian Confederation."
47
 They were swamped. Tache's new hope was
to salvage some of the Metis homeland for acceptable replacements
recruited from elsewhere.
The Archbishop's protest of 1877 discouraged Mills temporarily, but
one year later the government achieved the desired end of immediate disso-
lution of the reserves by other means, and without significant opposition
from anyone in Manitoba. On July 4, 1878, the Department of the Interior
gained authority by Order in Council "for the issue forthwith of Patents to
all claimants of Half-breed lands, irrespective of age." Suddenly, children
as young as eight years became the legal owners of 240-acre parcels of sec-
tion land, became responsible for its taxation, and were unprotected by
legislation — federal or provincial — concerning their "Infant Estates."
48
In about eighty per cent of the cases, the land passed to new owners the
moment the patent arrived in Winnipeg.
49
Part of the reason that "half breed grants" passed so quickly to
"speculators" was another Order in Council restricting the distribution of
patents to individuals known personally to Donald Codd or to the agents of
patentees with power of attorney "in proper form, duly executed in the
presence of a Justice of the Peace."
50
 The problem with the procedure was
that it was open to fraud. Anyone could make up fraudulent documents by
getting information from published lists of allottees, and determining
whether the family had already left the province. Since the signatures of the
patentee and the subscribing witness were rarely more than an X, and since
the Justices of the Peace attesting to the validity of such legal instruments
were leaders in fraud and speculation themselves, there was no obstacle to
creating forged documentation that looked entirely proper in form and exe-
cution.
 l
Of course, the criminal behaviour that was easy for one "speculator"
was just as simple for another. As a result, many "attorneys" sometimes
descended on the patent for the same land. Codd's way of coping with the
circling flock of "speculators" was to recognize powers of attorney on a
47. Kiel Papers, I, p. 276, Kiel to Royal, 2 August 1873.
48. See Gerhard Ens, "M6tis Lands in Manitoba," Manitoba History 5 (1983), pp. 2-11.
49. See Table 1 in D.N. Sprague, "Government Lawlessness in the Administration of
Manitoba Land Claims, 1870-1887," Manitoba Law Journal 10 (1980), pp. 415-441.
50. The words in the directive are taken from a form letter sent to patentees or recipients of
heads of family scrip by Codd, a sample of which appears in PAM, E.L. Barber Papers,
MG 14 C66, p. 2954, Donald Codd to Mrs. E.L. Barber, 10 May 1879. Codd's
authorization for such a requirement was Order in Council of Canada, 23 March 1876.
51. A.G.B. Bannatyne, for example, was one of the most frequent signers of powers of
attorney covering children's allotments (See PAC, Records of the Department of the
Interior, vols. 1421-1423). His frauds were known to the Government of Canada, but
never prosecuted (ibid., vol. 232, file 2447).
Amending the Manitoba Act 125
first-come, first-served basis.
52
 It was against policy to investigate—or
even to report—instances of fraud of any kind (either of patentees nego-
tiating multiple sales of the land, or of agents claiming to act for persons
they had never met).
53
The overriding consideration stated by the Chief Justice of the Mani-
toba Court of Queen's Bench, E.B. Wood, was that the "half breed
reserves, like other reserves of every kind .. . are a curse to the country and
should be distributed without delay."
54
 Wood profited personally in the
distribution, as did most of the other members of the legal profession of
Manitoba. No one voiced any squeamishness about the irregularities in the
transfers of "half breed lands." According to one informed lawyer, "It was
the opinion of nine out of ten of the profession that it was an improvident
grant to the half breeds — in the first place — that it would bring them more
harm than good—and that the sooner the whole of these lands was settled
the better."
55
In the same spirit of expeditious settlement, the Liberal government
proposed one final statutory adjustment to the Manitoba land question in
1878. Having had three years experience with their own version of the
"court of claims" for adjudicating disputed ownership of river lots, they
decided that even the previously streamlined proceedings were too cumber-
some and costly. Lieutenant Governor Morris, commissioned by Order in
Council to hear the cases, reported that the requirement of several months
notice, and the presence of both parties to the dispute before the case could
be heard, led to unnecessary delay. Morris suggested reducing the notice
period to thirty days, and permitting proceedings even if one of the parties
to the dispute was absent. The two together would mean that all of the out-
standing conflicts could be "speedily disposed of." Morris did not add that
many of the claimants were absent from their lots for months or even years
at a time in such work as freighting, fishing, or hunting. The more impor-
tant consideration was speedy closure of outstanding claims.
56
Mills agreed. The appropriate amending legislation appeared and
passed through the House of Commons without debate in early April 1878.
Then, as the matter reached the Upper Chamber, a Manitoba Senator, Marc
52. "I transmit... seventy three (73) receipts for said letters patent. The Powers of
Attorney are retained in this office for reference" (ibid., vol. 238, file 9321).
53. Originally the policy was more of a tacit understanding between Codd and Dennis than
a written rule handed down to every agent. See ibid. In 1913, however, the matter
became the subject of a written rule (PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior,
RG 15, vol. 21009, ruling 893).
54. PAM, Mackenzie Papers, General Correspondence, pp. 801-808, Wood to Mackenzie,
25 May 1875.
55. Heber Archibald quoted in Ens, "Metis Lands," p. 9.
56. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 235, file 4666, Morris to
Mills, 26 November 1877.
126 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Girard, produced an amendment reflecting Tache's concern with the earlier
dismissal of the so-called "staked claims." Girard's move was not a com-
plete surprise; the Senator had declared only days before: "We hear of
confiscation everywhere. The people are told that they cannot remain any
longer on the lands on which they have been settled for years...." Quoting
a phrase in section 32 of the Manitoba Act, Girard stated that he could not
understand "why so many improvements are requisite when the law merely
requires peaceable possession." Hinting that the amendments of 1874 and
1875 and the Order in Council of 1876 were all unconstitutional, he
asserted, "By an Order in Council you cannot over-ride the law of the
land."
Senator Scott, still a minister of the Crown in the Mackenzie govern-
ment, denied that any injustice had been done to "actual settlers." He
asserted that' 'it is only in the case where there has been no expenditure of
muscle" that patents were denied. Scott said it was "speculators that the
Crown is not bound to recognize."
57
Girard replied that, if the government were so confident of the facts,
there was nothing to fear from people telling their stories in the "court of
claims." Consequently, no one was shocked when Girard proposed an
amendment on April 11 broadening its scope to include the disputes involv-
ing a claimant against the Crown.
Scott repeated his assertion that "no man... had been overlooked
.... All well-founded claims had already been recognized." The disal-
lowed claims had arisen from the question: "What occupancy gave posses-
sion? And that was a question which the Minister of Justice and the Minis-
ter of the Interior should agree upon." Later he suggested that "it would
not do to give away the public property right and left," and asserted that
serious delays and costs would arise from opening the court to all the
claims that the department had refused to consider.
Macdonald's old law partner, Alexander Campbell, answered Scott
with an appeal for a more compassionate regard for minority rights. "Of
course the majority could say, 'You shall not be heard, because your pos-
session is very slight, and your usages and customs are different from ours,'
but that would be inflicting an injustice upon those people and wounding
them in a manner from which they would not recover." A majority of the
Senators seemed to agree with Campbell's appeal for fairness and voted
twenty-two to eighteen in favour of the Girard amendment.
58
Campbell's noble words about minority rights and due process of law
did not stir Conservatives in the House of Commons one week later when
Mills called for rejection of the proposal repeating Scott's point that
57. Senate Debates, 8 March 1878.
58. Ibid., 11 April 1878, pp. 559-563.
Amending the Manitoba Act 127
officials in his department could handle all such cases "more expeditiously,
efficiently, and cheaply than can be done under this amendment." Sir John
A. Macdonald did not rise from his seat to reiterate the sentiments of his
old friend Campbell.
59
 He sat quietly with the rest of the Opposition,
silently supporting the latest denial of rights to the native settlers of Mani-
toba even though his party was in a full fury of anger over almost every
other action by the government. By 1878 they sensed that Mackenzie's
was a ministry in deep trouble and were serving up no-confidence motions
for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. On the land rights of the ' 'former occu-
pants" of Manitoba, however, what one hand had done, the other had
undone, and both hands of the two national parties quite contentedly
washed one another.
59. Journal of the House of Commons, 20 April 1878.
Joseph Royal, ca. 1880
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"Royal said that Codd and Dennis had been working in collusion to
subvert the entire claims process since 1871."
128
Chapter 8
Completing the Dispersal of the
Manitoba Metis
Continuing recession, unrelenting criticism of the Liberals' handling of
economic issues, and clever use of political "picnics" by the Opposition
led to a crushing defeat of Alexander Mackenzie's party in the federal elec-
tion of September 17, 1878. The remarkable recovery of the Tories with Sir
John A. Macdonald still leading was an unqualified triumph, except in one
important detail. For the first time in his political career, Macdonald him-
self suffered defeat in Kingston. Under the cover and novelty of the new
secret ballot, a majority of the city's 3,000 electors expressed a preference
for Macdonald's opponent, the totally undistinguished Alexander Gunn.
1
Macdonald might have become the outside leader of the inside party
on September 17 were it not for his running in two other constituencies on
the same day. He won by acclamation in Marquette, a predominantly native
English riding in Manitoba, and by a comfortable plurality in Victoria, Brit-
ish Columbia.
2
 Under normal circumstances, a politician probably would
have accepted the compliment of the electorate that appeared to approve
him most highly; at the same time, such a successful candidate might have
shown his gratitude by pledging support for the special demands of his par-
ticular admirers. In the Manitoba case, Joseph Royal reminded Macdonald
of the earlier rescue of Cartier, and pointed out that he considered the old
promises all the more binding in view of the repetition of the courtesy for
Macdonald himself. Among the items on Royal's list of nine requested
favours were demands that the Prime Minister should intercede in Mani-
toba affairs for the maintenance of confessional schools and the two official
languages; that he should concede a "complete and final amnesty to all per-
sons implicated in the trouble of 1869-70"; and that Macdonald should
finally guarantee the distribution of patents to river-lots in accordance with
the original intended meaning of section 32 of the Manitoba Act.
3
1. Canadian Sessional Papers (1879), no. 88, p. 44.
2. Ibid., pp. 220,221.
3. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 118172-118177, Royal to
Macdonald, 28 September 1878.
129
130 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Refusing to be snared in the defunct promises of his previous ministry,
Sir John declined election in Marquette. All the Victoria electors demanded
was a transcontinental railway, and the railway demand was consistent with
Macdonald's own priorities. In his view, native issues were settled. As far
as he knew, all 1.4 million acres had been alloted to the children of the
"half breed heads of families"; the parents had received their scrip in
1876; and, at the same time, nearly all of the old settlers with land granted
by the HBC had their titles confirmed by letters patent from Canada.
Further west, the last of seven treaties had extinguished the aboriginal title
of every Indian on the Prairies. The great work that remained was complet-
ing the railway to the Pacific, promoting the industrial development of
metropolitan Canada, and pouring a flood of farmers into the "empty"
West.
4
Macdonald admitted that he was not fully familiar with the intricacies
of the land policy which he himself had contrived with Campbell in 1871
and 1872, nor was he conversant with the details of the treaties.
5
 Still, he
recognized that the Department of the Interior was one of the most impor-
tant arms of the government for promoting Canadian expansion. Conse-
quently, when the Cabinet positions were announced in October 1878,
Macdonald emerged as the Minister of the Interior and therefore also as
Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs.
Macdonald's hope that he would be presiding over the transformation
of the West rather than concluding dealings with aboriginal people was sus-
tained by a welcomed freedom from Manitoba matters for nearly one full
year until Tache resurrected the old land-claims issue in the autumn of
1879. Refusing to be stirred from his preoccupation with more important
concerns, Macdonald referred Tache's inquiry to J.S. Dennis, the new
Deputy Minister of his department. Dennis advised refusal of the
Archbishop's appeal, saying that the government had already "erred" too
much in the direction of "liberality." Dennis recommended an Order in
Council proclaiming that all legitimate claimants had been accommodated
and that the time had come for "all other persons" claiming land under the
Manitoba Act to pay for their land at the government price of five dollars
an acre or face eviction for illegal trespass.
Macdonald's problem was Tache's continuing complaint that a case-
by-case analysis would show that "Colonel Dennis" did not understand the
custom of the country in staking claims. After the Archbishop appeared to
convince Macdonald that Dennis suffered from narrow vision, Tactic"
4. Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 246.
5. Ibid.
6. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 88777-88784, Dennis to
Macdonald, 10 October 1879.
Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 131
received a promise in November 1879 that a thorough investigation of
river-lot claims would follow, and recommended Joseph Dubuc (then a
Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench) for the role of commissioner investi-
gating outstanding claims in the French-speaking parishes. Unlike Chie150
Justice Wood (still charged with adjudicating conflicting claims in general),
Dubuc had the advantage of knowing "all the people of the district"; and
since he was "young and active," Tache believed that he was capable of
making a "full investigation that would relieve us all of any further com-
plaint with regard to that question."
7
Macdonald preferred to leave matters as they were. The promised
investigation was not followed by the nomination of an investigator. Weeks
passed into months, and Tache prompted Joseph Royal (still prominent in
Manitoba affairs and about to enter the federal scene under the Tory
banner) to use his influence with the Prime Minister. Royal's action was a
letter reciting the history of river-lot claims from 1870 to 1880, beginning
with the statement that the "fears" of the Metis
relative to the Land Question were one of the first causes of the outbreak in
the Country. Among the means resorted to by the Government to quiet the
people were the repeated assurances that the most liberal policy would be
followed in that respect and that no one would lose an inch of land to which
he had a claim.
Unfortunately, according to Royal, the law had been set aside, and replaced
by administrative processes that meant "hundreds of claims are disallowed,
not having this or that, which was never required by the Act of Mani-
toba."
8
About the same time as Royal's appeal, the Legislative Assembly of
Manitoba added the influence of the provincial government to the urging
for a final disposition of land claims. A letter to the Government of Canada
revealed that a final disposition of land claims. The Me*tis parishes of St
Franois Xavier and Baie St Paul had been unaccountably left out of the pro-
cess of allotting the 1.4 million acres that was completed elsewhere
between 1875 and 1878. In the same communication, the legislature
appealed for patents for any person who "staked out and pre-empted claims
to certain unoccupied land, and were in peaceable possession of the same at
the time of the actual transfer on the 15th July 1870 "
9
Surprised to learn that all of the children's allotments were not distri-
buted already, Macdonald ordered completion of the process at once. At the
same time, he thought it was expedient to make a final, declarative
7. Ibid., pp. 167897-167899, Tache to Macdonald, 25 November 1879.
8. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 245, file 22638, Royal to
Macdonald, 8 March 1880.
9. Quoted in Order in Council of Canada, 12 April 1880.
132 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
statement on the river-lot question. In the Order in Council that answered
the formal address of Manitoba (and the private pressure exerted by Tache
and Royal), the Government of Canada declared that "staked claims" were
inadmissible by definition, reiterating the Liberal's position that "the mere
fact of staking out the land, without entering into bonap.de possession and
occupation ... did not bring that class of claims within the operation of the
Manitoba Act, and therefore patents were refused."
10
 Moreover, since
Macdonald did not want the agitation on such matters to continue intermin-
ably, a final amendment of the Manitoba Act declared, in April 1880, that
any claim not proved "to the satisfaction of the Minister of the Interior...
[before December 1882] shall be barred as fully and effectually as if such
claims had not been made."
11
The two discouragements of denying "staked claims" and shutting
out all other "claims by occupancy" in two years prompted Joseph Royal
to seek fresh assurances that the general investigation Macdonald had
promised Tache was about to proceed. A face-to-face discussion with
Macdonald, during which the Prime Minister took sketchy notes on every-
thing from the English-only effrontery of the Winnipeg Lands Agent (still
Donald Codd) to the necessity of a case-by-case review of the river-lot
question, prompted Sir John to tell Colonel Dennis, "We must talk over
these matters."
12
The result of Macdonald's subsequent discussion with his Deputy
Minister was the decision to have a two-person delegation from Ottawa
investigate affairs on the spot. Lindsay Russell, the new Surveyor General,
was to look into the allegations against Codd. Robert Lang, the officer prin-
cipally in charge of Manitoba Act cases at their last stage of consideration
in Ottawa, was to investigate the "staked claims" issue.
13
The conclusion of Russell's inquiry was that Codd was either incredi-
bly lazy or intentionally negligent. As soon as Tache launched a fresh
round of complaints about the Dominion Lands Agent's refusal to deal with
anything French, Russell sought Codd's resignation.
14
Lang's assignment was both more complicated and more time con-
suming. He took the entire summer of 1880 to examine literally hundreds
of claims in Ste Agathe and St Norbert. Two patterns were readily evident
in his case-by-case rendition of the facts. The first was that officials were
10. Ibid.
11. Statutes of Canada (1880), Chapter 7: An Act for the final settlement of claims to lands
in Manitoba by occupancy, under the Act thirty-third Victoria, chapter three, Section 2.
12. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 245, file 22638,
Macdonald to Dennis, 11 May 1880.
13. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 118191-118192, J. Royal to
Macdonald, 11 June 1880.
14. Ibid., pp. 88868-88870, Russell to Dennis, 12 October 1880.
Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 133
contemptuous of patterns of land use other than full-time farming. In the
case of Jean Baptiste Jolibois, Jr., for example, Lang found a young man
who claimed that when he was eighteen years of age he "staked out" an
attractive point of land on the Red River several miles south of his father's
farm on lot 41 in St Norbert. Jolibois built a log house on his claim in 1868,
lived there until 1870, then decided that he had built his home in the wrong
place. In the summer of 1870, Jolibois disassembled the first structure and
moved the timber to a preferred corner of his claim. In the meantime, he
lived with his parents when he was not working on the relocation of the first
building. Later in the year, Jolibois accepted work freighting supplies from
St Cloud to Winnipeg, then resumed construction of his new dwelling in
the summer of 1871 (considerably discouraged in the task because over the
winter someone carted off most of the logs from the partially completed
structure of the previous summer). Still, Jolibois was able to complete a
habitable home before freeze-up, and a second work-opportunity took him
away to the North West, and kept him there for the next four years. When
Jolibois finally returned in 1875 to resume the development of his land, he
discovered that vandals had dismantled his house entirely, again probably
for the firewood in the oak building timber. From 1875, however, Jolibois
lived on his lot more or less continuously, and demanded a patent from
Lang on the basis of the "peaceable possession" that had begun in 1868.
15
The case of Jean Baptiste Jolibois, Jr., illustrates what Joseph Royal
had called the principal reason for old settlers fearing the transfer. Accord-
ing to Royal, "They knew perfectly well that their right to the portion of
the Settlement Belt regularly surveyed and occupied could not be disputed,
but they apprehended that the same right to the land they possessed outside
the surveyed Settlement Belt might be contested." They were afraid that
"they would be more or less at the mercy of the New Government that
might refuse to accept or understand the former conditions of this Coun-
try."
16
Of course the process of delay and amendment after 1870 proved that
their fears were justified. Notwithstanding the words in section 32 of the
Manitoba Act, and the promises of liberal interpretation that accompanied
the negotiation, Jean Baptiste Jolibois, Jr.,—and hundreds like him—
received "nil" consideration because they failed on three points. First,
they did not exhibit the "continuous occupation" required by the amend-
ments of 1874 and 1875. In the second place, they were not covered by the
Hudson's Bay Company survey required by Order in Council in 1876. And
finally, they did not show the "really valuable improvements" demanded
15. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 1554, "Lang's Report on
claims in the parishes of Ste Agathe and St Norbert [October, 1880]," Lot 267, Ste
Agathe.
16. Ibid., vol. 245, file 22638, Royal to Macdonald, 8 March 1880.
134 Canada and the Mttis, 1869-1885
by executive memorandum in 1877.
Hearing of Donald Codd's repeated refusals of their claims, many of
the claimants had become increasingly suggestible in the late 1870s to the
offers of newcomers willing to gamble in such matters. As a result, the
other pattern that was readily apparent in the Lang report—indeed, the
central tendency in the cases he described—was recent settlers obtaining
their land at unspecified prices from unnamed "squatters." If newcomers
paid less than five dollars an acre, their gamble was that they could obtain
valuable river-frontage at less than the government price merely by improv-
ing the defective claim of the vacating "half breed." Simon Callum, for
example, bought a claim to 242 acres from such a "squatter." Instead of
paying the government price of $1,210, Callum admitted that he paid a
mere $300 for the faltering claim of his predecessor. Since Callum had
built a house, several substantial outbuildings, and had almost 100 acres of
fenced land in crop by 1880, he was clearly serious about farming the land
he had acquired by dubious means in the late 1870s. The marginal note
beside the report of his claim was "yes."
17
The two patterns together showed that the "staked claims" issue had
acquired a new complexity with the passage of time and the transfers that
were encouraged by the statutes and Orders in Council amending the Mani-
toba Act. Moreover, some of the Callum-type newcomers were repatriated
French Canadians recruited by Tache to carry on a Franco-Manitoban pres-
ence after the Metis had begun to give up on their own unrecognized
claims. Consequently, after Lang returned to Ottawa in September 1880,
and a rumour began to circulate in Manitoba that the government was plan-
ning to auction all the unpatented river-lots, Tache and Royal mounted a
campaign to discredit Lang's report, calling the investigation little more
than a superficial and hurried visit.
18
 Dennis replied to Macdonald that the
inquiry was "minute" on every detail of each particular case.
19
 Royal's
continuing insistence that the report was defective, and his assertion that
the one French-speaking surveyor in the province, Roger Goulet, had
"refused to sign Lang's report" gave Macdonald some cause to consider
more radical allegations.
Royal said that Codd and Dennis had been working in collusion to
subvert the entire claims process since 1871. Their motive was that neither
official could forget the opposition to their "odious conduct" in 1869.
Warming to his theme with considerable passion, Royal asserted, "It is a
fact that only in the county of Provencher [the Metis parishes] are found to
17. "Lang Report," Lots 317,319, Ste Agathe.
18. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 118196-118197 88884-
88890, Royal to Macdonald, 25 October and 2 November 1880.
19. Ibid., pp. 88876-88878, Dennis to Macdonald, 29 October 1880.
Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 135
exist such a large number of questions of delayed patents and disputed land
claims." He thought the pattern of delay running to 1880 was clear enough
proof of prejudice "fixedly adhered to and persistently carried out."
20
After Macdonald passed Royal's letter to Dennis, and the Deputy Min-
ister dismissed all charges against himself and his officials as a "slanderous
attack," Colonel Dennis did agree to meet with Russell and Tache to go
over the outstanding claims. Subsequently, the threesome worked from
November 6 through November 10 adjusting "all outstanding claims
except staked claims." On those, according to Dennis, "I declined to have
any discussion."
21
Of course Tache and Royal would not be satisfied until the entire col-
lection was disposed of in accordance with the original intent of the Mani-
toba Act. At the end of December 1880, the Archbishop proposed, there-
fore, a two-class system of consideration. Class I would consist of claims
with the "original owners or their legal representatives" living on the lots.
In Class II, the claimant or new owner at least would have paid local taxes
on the land. Tache suggested that everyone in Class I was entitled to
patents without further delay, and the others should receive at least the right
of purchase from the Crown at the price of one dollar per acre.
22
Father Ritchot added his voice to the same appeal two weeks later in a
letter that seems to have been the only direct communication he had had
with Macdonald since 1870. The subject of his message of January 1881
was their negotiations in Ottawa. "You will remember," he said with the
firmness of a patient schoolmaster, "I showed Sir George and yourself the
localities where the lands had been taken possession of, among others, I
showed you on the map, the Rat River, Sale River, the Little Prairie de
Chenes, and the Upper Red River, etc., etc." All, according to Ritchot, had
been "fully explained" and it was freely admitted that there were but slight
improvements on such lands. Indeed, some were "not inhabited but marked
only by posts, lines, ploughing, little houses or otherwise, and that this
manner of taking up lands in the country had been respected, in fact, for
ten, twelve, and fifteen years." That was what the delegates understood the
"peaceable possesion" clause to cover. Pursuing the point as relentlessly
as Royal, Ritchot asserted that section 32(4) was
not intended to say that all persons having a good written title and duly
registered, etc. etc. that he shall have continually resided and cultivated so
many acres of land yearly and for so many years before the Transfer to
Canada, and that he shall cultivate and continually reside during the period
of ten years after the Transfer to Canada, so many acres etc. etc. to be
20. Ibid., pp. 88884-88890, Royal to Macdonald, 2 November 1880.
21. Ibid., pp. 88880-88883, Dennis to Macdonald, 10 November 1880.
22. Ibid., pp. 172990-172992, Tache to Macdonald, 28 December 1880.
136 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
entitled to Letters Patent for lands so cultivated and inhabited, [but]... this
is what is required today by the Government through their employees.
That could not be the meaning of the words contained in the Manitoba
Act; nor the meaning the Hon. Minister gave them, you told the North West
Delegates in 1870 that the greatest liberality was meant by these words and
that all lands thus taken were and would be the property of those who were
in possession thereof.
Ritchot suggested that if another meaning were more strictly correct, then
Macdonald and Cartier had deliberately "deceived" the Metis to "dispos-
sess" them. "Was their intention then to add [a] few words to the phrases
which would later deprive the Manitoba settlers of their rights?"
23
Macdonald did not respond to Ritchot's letter, but a new Order in
Council governing "staked claims" did appear to accommodate Tache's
appeal by broadening the scope of consideration on February 25. Cases pre-
viously refused were to be considered if the land was still in the hands of
the original claimant, or if the acreage had passed to new owners who sub-
sequently took up residence on the land. Unimproved lots sold to someone
who still did nothing "in the way of cultivation or improvement" were to
be referred to a special commission consisting of Judges Dubuc and Miller.
If the claimants in the first category were given free grants, and if
Miller and Dubuc granted pre-emption rights to persons in category two,
the most that Tache and Ritchot could have said in objection to the policy
was that the generosity was ten years too late. Unfortunately for the
claimants, officials still clung to their stringent concept of "possession."
24
Persistent old settlers with improvements similar to those of Jean Baptiste
Jolibois, Jr., won nothing more than the right to buy their land at five dol-
lars per acre, while newcomers such as Callum received free grants. The
rationale, of course, was that the new settlers were serious farmers.
The Order in Council of February 1881 was even less satisfactory for
claimants referred to the special commissioners. Before the two judges
began, Macdonald coached Miller with a confidential letter explaining that
"all those claims that deserve to be settled had already been adjusted and
disposed of." The only reason the commission had been appointed was that
' 'Archbishop Tache is now kicking up such a row about the matter.'' Mac-
donald warned Miller that his "co-commissioner" will be "very apt" to
lean towards generosity. On that account, the Prime Minister instructed the
trustworthy judge to hold the line where it was meant to be held: "the par-
ties must prove a claim which could be enforced in a court of Law or
Equity."
25
^
Naturally, Royal and Tache disliked the discriminatory treatment of
old settlers. They were pleased that some of the newcomers whom they
23. Ibid., pp. 141514-141526, Ritchot to Macdonald, 15 January 1881.
24. Ibid., pp. 45051-45060, Royal to Mackenzie Bowell, 20 September 1881.
25. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 21, pp. 411-412, Macdonald to Miller, 24 February 1881.
Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 137
themselves had recruited would not have to buy land they had already paid
for once, but they refused to see the justice in requiring persistent old
settlers to pay for their land simply because their improvements were slight.
Moreover, the perennial problem of delay continued.
No patents covering "staked claims" appeared in the spring of 1881,
or in the summer of the same year. Instead, panic developed over the
renewal of rumours that the government intended to auction unpatented
river-lots, and when the list of lots for sale finally appeared late in Sep-
tember, it became clear that some unpatented claims were included.
Mainly, though, the government seemed determined to defeat inadmissible
claims by delay.
On May 1, 1882, the clock began to run on the final six months
allowed for the settlement of claims by occupancy. May 1 was the last day
for filing applications; November 1 was the date by which the Minister had
to be satisfied that the claim was legitimate. The clear implication was that
the claims that were filed as many as nine years earlier—and still not acted
upon—would be rejected if Macdonald were not persuaded of their legi-
timacy by the end of 1882. Royal panicked in August because there was
still no action on the cases the government had agreed to recognize in
February 1881. He complained that one promise had followed another, all
"without any result." Royal estimated that over the last ten years he had
personally written "50 memoranda on the subject." Royal admitted that
his patience was at its absolute limit and begged Macdonald, "Now, for
God's sake, let your government once and forever attend to and settle these
land claims... ,"
27
The first result arising from Royal's emotional appeal for immediate
resolution of the "everlasting question" was a blistering rebuke from the
Prime Minister for the excessive "frankness" of the letter. Macdonald
heatedly denied that any officer in his department was guilty of any gross
"incapacity or prejudice." Still, Macdonald did hint that the entire package
was about to be turned over to a recently created Lands Board that had been
established by the Department of the Interior at Winnipeg to supersede the
special commissions held by Governor Morris, followed by Chief Justice
Wood, and most recently by Judges Dubuc and Miller.
28
Increased efficiency was part of the reason for turning the "staked
claims" over to the Lands Board. Another motive was secrecy in the inves-
tigation of scandal, the first suggestion of which came to Macdonald in
26. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 45051-45060, Royal to Mackenzie Bowell, 20
September 1881.
27. Ibid., pp. 4506145064, Royal to Macdonald, 11 August 1882.
28. The Lands Board was authorized by Order in Council of Canada, 31 October 1881.
The content of Macdonald's private letter to Royal is inferred from the text of Royal's
apologetic reply (ibid., pp. 118231-118232, Royal to Macdonald, 28 September 1882).
138 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
September 1882,
29
 just before he wrote Royal with unqualified praise of the
officials in his department. The first evidence of trouble was a letter from
Codd's successor in the Winnipeg Land Office informing the Minister of
the Interior that Robert Lang had been exploiting his position to extort land
from claimants in Manitoba. Working through local accomplices (a ring
that included A.G.B. Bannatyne and probably also J.C. Schultz) potential
patentees were informed that' 'for a consideration ... in which parties are
in straits to obtain their Patents, he undertakes to put them through upon
being well recompensed." Soon the allegations were discovered to be
"well founded."
3
 Then an Order in Council declared that the positions of
Minister of the Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs ought
to be separated, and Macdonald withdrew from the affairs of his old depart-
ment long before the scandal became public.
31
 D.L. Macpherson was Min-
ister of the Interior after October 1883, and by the time the "Lang con-
spiracy" first appeared in the pages of the Toronto Globe (in the spring of
1885) the country was in the midst of another controversy of infinitely
greater interest to the Opposition.
In the meantime, the Lands Board dutifully worked its way through
the hundreds of unresolved claims to river lots. In most of the cases the
patentee was a newcomer claiming through an old settler who had long
since departed. The original settlers who persisted in Manitoba were nor-
mally the people with nothing to fear from the process in the first place.
32
They were the claimants with HBC titles, or settlers with significant
improvements recorded by surveyors (a house, outbuildings, and at least
ten acres under cultivation — a group of about 800 families out of a total of
nearly 2,000).
33
 The others, the cases resembling that of Jean Baptiste Joli-
bois, maintained a tenuous hold on the land they believed they owned until
they were evicted or sold their defective claim to newcomers like Callum
(who received his patent in 1888; the land claimed by Jolibois was patented
29. Saskatchewan Archives Board, William Pearce Papers, Letter Book, Pearce to A.M.
Burgess, 22 November 1883.
30. The earliest confirmation was reported to Macdonald in the spring of 1883 (PAC,
Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 134760, A. Walsh to Macdonald, 26
April 1883). The final report of the subsequent investigation did not arrive in Ottawa
until March 1886 (see PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol.
232, file 2447).
31. The separation of the two ministerial offices was by Order in Council of Canada, 17
October 1883. The first public disclosure of the "Lang conspiracy" appears to have
been in the Toronto Globe, 10 May 1885.
32. Compare "Table 4: Geographical Location and Children of Manitoba Families, 1870"
with "Table 5: Recognition of Riverlot Occupants by the Government of Canada" in
Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of the First Metis Nation.
33. See "Table 1: Ethnic Groups' Recognition by Land Surveyors and the Distribution of
Patents for River Lots" in Mailhot and Sprague, "Persistent Settlers," p. 11.
Completing the Dispersal of the Manitoba Metis 139
to another newcomer, James Begg, in 1882).
34
The dispersal of the Metis and native English from Manitoba
35
 was
gradual but perceptible between 1871 and 1876; it became remarkable from
1877 to 1880; and the migration increased to a rush of personnel between
1881 and 1884.
36
 Overall, more than 4,000 persons participated in the
exodus, mainly to Saskatchewan.
37
The migration of Manitobans was not unnoticed by police. Nor did
the clergy fail to appeal for aid in resettlement. To understand the
government's reaction to the alarms from the one source, and the supplica-
tions from the other, it is necessary to see the complicated larger pattern of
Canada's emerging settlement priorities in the early 1880s.
34. See Table 5 in Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of the First Metis Nation.
35. A parallel development occurred in North Dakota at the same time. In the case of the
American M6tis, the United States government had negotiated a treaty guaranteeing
that every family would be secure on the land then occupied but the Senate refused to
ratify the agreement and the area became "a part of the white man's farming frontier
of the post-Civil War Period." The non-ratification of the North Dakota treaty would
appear to be the analytical equivalent of the non-enforcement of the Manitoba Act in
Assiniboia. Moreover, the American government's suspicion that the North Dakota
Me"tis had abetted Sioux "renegades" in 1862 was an exhibition of resentment by
newcomers analogous to Ontario's hostility towards the Manitoba Metis for their acts
of "insurrection" in 1869-70. See N.L. Woolworth, "Gingras, St Joseph and the
Metis in the Northern Red River Valley, 1843-1873," North Dakota History 42:4
(1975), pp. 16-27.
36. The periodization of the Manitoba exodus is neatly illustrated by the timing of new
arrivals at new communities in the North West. At the largest settlement of displaced
Manitobans, only 10 per cent emigrated between 1871 and 1876; 20 per cent from
1877 to 1880; and fully 70 per cent between 1881 and 1884. See Mailhot and Sprague,
"Persistent Settlers," pp. 18-26.
37. See "Table 3: Metis and Native English Population of the North-West Territories
(June 1884)," in ibid., p. 12.
George Stephen, ca. 1885
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
"Stephen hinted that he would resign before letting the government take
over even part of his property.''
140
Chapter 9
Reaching for the Commercial
Value of the North West
The basic promise to newcomers in the statute that first proclaimed
Canada's homestead policy in 1872 was that "any person, male or female,
who is the sole head of a family, or any male who has attained the age of
eighteen years," could claim a free grant of 160 acres, and a pre-emptive
right to buy the adjoining quarter section at one dollar an acre. Such appli-
cants had to pay a $10 registration or "entry" fee, and "occupy and cul-
tivate" their homestead for three years before claiming patent, but where
else could a person hope for 320 acres of some of the finest wheat land in
the world for the paltry sum of S170?
1
The United States had made no such offer to its settlers. By their ear-
lier, competing legislation (enacted in 1862), "pre-emption" meant a
"squatter's right" to claim land occupied before survey, and the settlement
duties required of later arrivals extended to five years.
2
 In principle, the
intending settler who knew both laws should have found Canada more
attractive than, for example, North Dakota. In practice, however, the more
generous offer to Canadian homesteaders was almost as hollow as the ver-
bal accommodation of the Metis in the Manitoba Act.
Throughout the early 1880s most of the land that ought to have
attracted homesteaders was either closed or available only for purchase
because of the overriding impact of section 125(b) in the 1879 revision of
the Dominion Lands Act. The overriding clause empowered the Cabinet
To reserve from general sale and settlement Dominion lands to such extent
as may be required to aid in the construction of railways in Manitoba or in
the Territories owned by the Dominion, and to provide for the disposal of
such lands, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, in such
manner and on such terms as may be deemed expedient....
1. See "Homestead Rights or Free Grant Lands" covered by section 33(1-12) in Statutes
of Canada (1872), Chapter 23.
2. Chester Martin, "Dominion Lands" Policy (Toronto, 1973), p. 16.
141
142 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
In July 1879, expediency seemed to dictate the reservation of every
acre of vacant land for 110 miles on either side of the expected route of the
Pacific Railway for the entire distance from Winnipeg to the Rocky Moun-
tains. None of the 100 million acres within the 220-mile railway belt con-
templated in 1879 was to be given away in 160-acre homesteads. All was
for sale; the closer to the railway, the higher the price. Any quarter section
in Belt "A" (five miles either side of the main line) was priced at six dol-
lars an acre. Further out, homesteads up to eighty acres were permitted, if
the settler agreed to buy the other half of the quarter section at twice the
normal pre-emption price.
3
 The rationale, Macdonald explained to the
House of Commons on May 10, was that the railway was to be built on the
value of the lands through which it passed.
4
Critics, including the Lieutenant Governor of the territories, con-
sidered the scheme unworkable because they imagined that there were few
individuals who would "spend a small fortune to reach the country and
afterwards submit to pay two dollars [minimum] per acre for the land."
5
 Of
course Macdonald did not intend to restrict the pace of railway construction
to the rate of collection of payments in land sales to individuals. His aim
was to use the 100 million acres as collateral for $50 million to be recruited
in 1879 from British capitalists buying Government of Canada railway
bonds. As the railway advanced into new territory ahead of settlement, he
expected that newcomers would cheerfully pay the required price, and that
would provide the revenue to retire the bonds paying four per cent to inves-
tors in the interim.
6
The Prime Minister went to London in August 1879 hoping that the
British government would support his public works proposition for defence
reasons, just as the imperial authorities had taken an interest in earlier rail-
way and canal schemes that were initially uneconomic—sensible only
from the standpoint of imperial defence.
7
 In the case of the Pacific Railway,
the Canadian prospectus boasted that once the system began sea-to-sea
operations about 1890 it would provide a safe, reliable, all-British route
across North America, a vital "Imperial link" between the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans. Moreover, if the British government supported the concept
through the construction phase, Macdonald assured Prime Minister Disraeli
that Canada's railway would cost Great Britain nothing. "Not only will the
credit of Canada be pledged for, and all its revenue charged with, the
3. See the memorandum on regulations for the disposal of agricultural lands in the West
in PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 45076-45087, prepared by
A.M. Burgess for Macdonald, 7 March 1882.
4. Martin, "Dominion Lands" Policy, p. 42.
5. PAC, Mackenzie Papers, Letter Books, pp. 2282-2287, David Laird to Alexander
Mackenzie, 1 July 1879.
6. W. Kaye Lamb, History of the Canadian Pacific Railway (New York, 1977), p. 65.
7. Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 267.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 143
redemption of the bonds," Macdonald asserted, the "tracts of land to be
assigned and the railway itself with its earnings will stand as additional
securities, and these .. . will be found eventually sufficient of themselves to
redeem the debt "
8
In other words, Macdonald and his colleagues were quite prepared to
ignore the declared policy of free land for homesteaders in the interest of
securing the capital to build the transcontinental railway that the Cabinet
agreed was indispensable if Canada was to become more than "merely a
geographical expression." To their credit in 1879, they did at least contem-
plate a trade of one public property for another. The Pacific Railway
envisioned then was to be a public work, not a private enterprise paid for by
the public.
As the British government seemed less than enthusiastic about endors-
ing Macdonald's public works scheme in August, the next alternative was
to attract private investors with a large cash subsidy and land grant, as in
1872. Fifty million dollars was the estimated total cost of the work to be
done in British Columbia, the Prairies, and over the north shore of Lake
Superior. An offer of the sections completed to date plus $20 million in
cash and 30 million acres in land was the subsidy agreeable to Cabinet, but
Macdonald's old friend and President of the Bank of Montreal, George
Stephen, insisted that $26.5 million subsidy and a 35 million-acre land
grant were the minimum he would need to build the rest of the railway as a
private undertaking.
9
The anomaly of the Government of Canada providing the capital to a
private company troubled some senior members of the government. As a
result, a second attempt to recruit support from the British government was
undertaken in London in the summer of 1880—with the same result as the
year before. Once more, Macdonald and company entertained an offer from
Stephen and associates, conveniently on hand in London.
On September 4, Macdonald telegraphed the information back to
Ottawa: "Best terms can be got are twenty-five million cash, twenty-five
million acres...." He added that four colleagues with him in England
agreed that they could do no better for the moment. Macdonald asked for
concurrence from the rest of the Cabinet in Canada. "Absolute secrecy.
Answer quick."
10
 They concurred, and the preliminary agreement on the
award of the most lucrative patronage plum in Canadian history was signed
on the same day.
The contracting parties then recrossed the Atlantic, and pursued the
8. See the Cabinet memorandum on the Pacific Railway scheme in PAC, Macdonald
Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 52521-52529, attributed to J.A. Macdonald,
S.L. Tilley, and Charles Tupper, 20 August 1879.
9. Lamb, CPR, pp. 66-67.
10. Macdonald quoted in Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 299.
144 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
terms of their arrangement through more meetings before signing the for-
mal agreement on October 21, 1880. The final accord called for several
special tax exemptions, monopoly rights, and specified how the cash and
land grant were to be paid. A portion of the money was to be claimable
after the completion of each 20 miles of the main line,
11
 and the fiction that
the cost of the railway was to be born by the value of the vacant land
through which it ran persisted in the implication that a new 48-mile belt
from Winnipeg to the Rocky Mountains was going to yield 25 million acres
in the odd-numbered sections reserved for the CPR, with a similar quantity
of land to be sold for at least $25 million by the Government of Canada
from the even-numbered sections of the same 48-mile belt.
A particularly important aspect of the land subsidy was the railway's
right to claim its 25 million acres from outside as well as within the 24-mile
belt on either side of the route. The justification for the "indemnity"
promise was ostensibly nothing more than the reasonable recognition that
some of the sections along the railway's main line were likely to be unsuit-
able for agriculture, therefore, unsaleable. The full story of the privilege for
taking the land grant from within or beyond the railway belt was, however,
more complicated and reflected the political artistry of its authors as much
as the geographical imperatives. In the first place, it was mathematically
impossible for the CPR to have found 25 million acres of odd sections in
the 48-mile belt even if every acre were "fairly fit for settlement." If
every inch were the Garden of Eden the most that could be located in the
48-mile belt was 10 million acres.
12
 The second consideration was that
from the beginning the directors had contemplated
13
 a radical change from
the surveyed route through the Saskatchewan Valley (then following Yel-
lowhead Pass to the Pacific), preferring a flatter, shorter run close to the
American border through near desert (using as yet undiscovered passes
through the mountains). Selecting their grant from a 48-mile belt of that
territory would mean most of their land would be unsaleable at any price.
14
The "indemnity" clause gave the CPR the benefit of flexibility in choosing
its route without jeopardizing the railway's claim to a full share of the best
25 million acres of farmland to be served later by its own branch lines run-
ning north. The pretence that nearly all the land was likely to come from
the 48-mile belt only made the contract look more palatable to Parliament.
11. Lamb, CPR, pp. 70-74.
12. Martin, "Dominion Lands" Policy, p. 49.
13. The change in route was on the minds of the directors as early as August of 1880,
according to Lamb, CPR, p. 79.
14. The proportion is the CPR's own estimate, based on the rejected quantity in preference
for acreage elsewhere. See James B. Hedges, Building the Canadian West: The Land
and Colonization Policies of the Canadian Pacific Railway (New York, 1939), pp. 38-
39.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 145
But the other lucrative aspects of the contract (the tax concessions and
the monopoly clause) were not so easily disguised, and received an unusu-
ally rough passage through the House of Commons when the matter was
debated between December 13, 1880, and February 1, 1881. The Opposi-
tion hurled its greatest denunciation at the monopoly and tax benefits, ques-
tioning the apparent ease of the relationship between Macdonald and
Stephen, wondering if other businessmen without similar access to the
Prime Minister had received equal consideration for their proposals. And
even if Stephen's group was the only Canadian syndicate capable of taking
on the enormous project, Liberals asserted that the alternative of building
piecemeal along with demand, rather than extravagantly in advance of set-
tlement, was more sensible. Winnipeg had acquired a north-south railway
connection to the outer world in 1878; soon its east-west link was expected
to be in operation (no later than 1882) with the completion of the line that
they had started from Thunder Bay. Later, no doubt, other lines would
serve Winnipeg and points west as well.
15
Macdonald answered the Opposition by exploiting nationalist senti-
ment, insisting that the country could not afford a continuation of the slow
construction pace of the previous years. Canada faced a national emer-
gency, he said. A railway had to be running from sea to sea within ten years
or the Dominion would likely perish; the issue was, therefore, a matter of
"patriotism." Macdonald claimed that the Canadian Pacific Railway he
proposed was the only "arrangement which will give us all we want, which
will satisfy all the loyal, legitimate aspirations, which will give us a great, a
united, a rich, an improving, a developing Canada, instead of making us tri-
butary to American laws, to American railways, to American bond-
age. .. ."
16
For saving Canada, Stephen expected to gain a great deal personally.
His private estimate of costs was $45 million. He and the other directors
were putting up $5 million of their capital. With the expected cash subsidy
and another $15 million raised from other "resources," the original inves-
tors would still enjoy exclusive ownership if they avoided a public issue of
stock or bonds. Stephen guessed that shares would sell at miserably low
prices until the railway proved itself. A bond issue was abhorrent because
he dreaded mortgaging the company's future. Stephen's intention in 1881
was to depend mainly on the cash subsidy, revenue from the portions of the
line that were already in operation, and from land sales.
17
The desire to generate millions from real estate was potentially in
15. For the most balanced brief account of the debate of the CPR bill, see P.B. Waite,
Canada, 1874-1896, pp. 108-112.
16. Macdonald quoted in Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 308.
17. Lamb, CPR, p. 88.
146 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
conflict with the traffic-generating, large-scale influx of newcomers which
might have followed the distribution of free grants of land.
18
 Stephen's
hope was that he might exploit Macdonald's often-repeated notion that the
railway and the government were partners co-ordinating the distribution of
government land for maximum benefit to the railway. At first, that meant
having the Department of the Interior sell the government's even-numbered
sections near the main line for a higher price than the railway's odd-
numbered sections in the same vicinity. With a government price of $6 per
acre, there was a strong incentive for settlers to prefer CPR lands that were
$3.50 per acre cheaper, and even more attractive in terms of payment—
installments over five years with a fifty per cent rebate if the land came
under cultivation within four years.
19
By the end of 1881, however, Stephen realized the absurdity of com-
peting against the Americans' free-land policy with a cheap-land scheme in
Canada. Stephen's solution was for his country to give its land away free.
A return to the free-homestead system would encourage a more rapid influx
of newcomers, sustain heavy traffic on the completed sections, and as soon
as the free land showed the slightest development, the CPR acreage would
look attractive at $2.50 per acre for the later arrivals. Consequently, late in
December, Stephen advised Macdonald that "it is a mistake charging more
for the land near the railway" and urged his partner to consider that it
might be "better to give that advantage away to the first comers." In
Stephen's view, "that attraction if speedily set forth will be more potent
and immediate in its effect upon emigration than anything else we can
offer."
20
 Macdonald agreed and persuaded the Cabinet to open all even-
numbered sections for settlement as homesteads on January 1,1882.
21
The restoration of the free-homestead policy contradicted the fre-
quently repeated assertion that the cost of the subsidy was to be born by the
value of the land through which the railway passed. Still, the announcement
did accord with Stephen's request, and was timely as well in the election
campaign that Macdonald was leading at the same time. His "national pol-
icy" of tariff protection for the industrializing east and rapid settlement of
the Prairie West—the central thrust of 1878 — was reiterated in January
1882, when he announced that the railway was going to be completed, not
in 1890, but four years earlier than the contract required. Macdonald said
he was proud to think that he might be able to ride a train from sea to sea
18. If the conflict proved insurmountable, Stephen confided to Macdonald in May of 1881,
"It is settling, not selling that we must aim at.. . if our lands won't sell we will give
them away to settlers" (quoted in Lamb, CPR, p. 216).
19. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 53186-53189, Dennis to
Macdonald, 9 May 1881.
20. Ibid., pp. 121297-121302, Stephen to Macdonald, 20 December 1881.
21. Martin, "Dominion Lands" Policy, p. 43.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 147
before he was "quite an angel" (and, he might have added, before the next
election anticipated in 1886).
22
The reason for the unexpectedly rapid completion of the line was not
entirely attributable to the engineering skill of Stephen's construction chief,
Cornelius Van Home, or the alleged financial wizardry of George Stephen.
Two other important factors were the nearly unlimited support of the
Government of Canada and a new, more easily constructed route which
was many miles shorter than the line previously surveyed through the rol-
ling agricultural lands along the Saskatchewan River. Of course, the change
to the south tended to belie the assertion that the CPR was a "settlement
railway," but that problem was addressed by Stephen and his directors who
met in May 1881 with a Canadian botanist, John Macoun, finder of flowers
in the desert wilds west of Moose Jaw Creek.
23
 The owners of the CPR
encouraged him to publicize his notion that the flora he had just collected
were nothing in comparison with the bountiful yield of wheat that might be
expected from the same area.
24
 It made no perceptible difference later
when other experts, including H.Y. Hind, declared that Macoun's
"meteorological tables are all faked." The CPR and the Canadian Geologi-
cal Survey had the report they wanted, and Stephen could claim that the
cause of settlement was just as well served by running the main line south
of the "fertile belt."
25
In fact, the real settlement emphasis was still on the fertile belt where
Hind and Palliser had placed it originally. Consequently, the emphasis in
land distribution remained on land sales in that area rather than on free-
homesteads along the main line. In March 1882, the first row of sections in
the relatively arable land east of Moose Jaw Creek was withdrawn from
*yf\
homestead entry, and Macdonald invited applications from syndicates for
wholesale purchase of settlement tracts twenty-four miles north of the rail-
27
way.
New regulations permitted land sales on an unlimited basis. Promoters
could approach the government for almost any quantity and acquire
22. Macdonald quoted in Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 326.
23. Lamb, CPR, p. 79.
24. The work that completed Macoun's mission as publicist was Manitoba and the Great
North-West (Guelph, 1882).
25. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 186562-186566, H.Y. Hind to
Macdonald, 8 March 1883 and PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 16,
vol. 295, file 61147, "The Corruption of the Geological Survey" by Henry Hind [May
1883]. See also the chapter on Macoun in Owram, Promise of Eden, pp. 149-167.
26. March 11,1882 is the withdrawal date mentioned in a subsequent Order in Council of
Canada (30 April 1884) that reopened the "mile belt reserve" for homestead and pre-
emption.
27. See A.N. Lalonde, "Colonization Companies in the 1880s," Saskatchewan History 24
(1971), pp. 101-114.
148 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
millions of acres for half the normal price by "placing two settlers on each
section in the tract." Macdonald envisioned a total distribution of perhaps
10 million acres for 10 million dollars. As a land boom developed in Win-
nipeg in 1881 and continued into 1882, hundreds of other speculators
applied for good positions in what they hoped would be an extension of the
same land rush further west. Over 250 applications crossed Macdonald's
desk between February and April 1882, many stressing long and loyal ser-
vice to the Conservative Party among the reasons why their proposals
should receive prompt and favourable consideration. By June 1882, 106
applications had received the approving initials of "JAMD" and 6 million
acres of the best agricultural land in central Saskatchewan were designated
"colonization tracts."
28
A typical prospectus of the emerging companies was that of the Land
and Colonization Company of Canada, nominally headed by the Duke of
Buckingham and two Liverpool "capitalists"—though the real leaders
were a group of Montreal Tories that included Thomas Cram, John Rankin,
F.W. Henshaw, and JJ.C. Wurtele. Their award was one million acres on
the North Saskatchewan River near Prince Albert. Like the others, they
promised to perform a great philanthropic service by assisting the surplus
population of England to make new homes for themselves in the Little Bri-
tain of the Canadian North West. "It is well known," the prospectus
asserted, "that a large portion of the industrial population of Great Britain
are unable to avail themselves of the liberal offers of land by the Canadian
Government, as... it requires at least 500 dollars (100 pounds) to com-
mence farming operations and they cannot provide themselves with that
amount." The remedy was to back the newcomers with the resources of a
company, "so that the Settler will at once be enabled to begin farming
operations without having to undergo the preliminary expenses...." In
time, newcomers might accumulate a large enough surplus to challenge
their status as share-croppers or tenant farmers and buy their land outright.
But either way, the promoters were confident that the "sources from which
the company will obtain the large profits expected from its operations will
be as follows: A) Sale of improved farms B) Letting farms on lease C)
Farming on the sharing system D) Sale of Town lots E) Cattle Ranches F)
General trading."
29
No such proprietorial regime succeeded, however, because the
28. The most important record of such patronage is in PAC, Records of the Department of
the Interior, RG 15, vol. 277, file 44447. There one finds the full "Schedule of
Colonizaton Tracts proposed to be granted." Each entry contains the names of the
grantees, the area to be granted, the legal description of the land, and the approving
initials of Sir John A. Macdonald.
29. Ibid., vol. 273, file 42819, "Prospectus: Land and Colonization Co. of Canada,"
[1882].
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 149
Winnipeg land boom collapsed in the summer of 1882, and investors
developed second thoughts about the North West at the same time. Conse-
quently, of the 106 applications approved, only 27 paid the first installment
of one-fifth of the total purchase price.
30
 Moreover, officials in the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the CPR reacted adversely to allowing so many
latecomers into the land business on such a vast scale. A.M. Burgess (soon
to be the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior) warned
Lindsay Russell in September that so much land was reserved for one com-
pany or another, "we practically deny the intending settler an asylum" on
free land.
31
As Macdonald began his withdrawal from the affairs of the Depart-
ment of the Interior in the spring of 1883, the pressure to abandon his
colonization company scheme increased. His successor as Minister, D.L.
Macpherson, recommended outright abolition in May,
32
 but only a discreet
halt was declared in June when an Order in Council announced that enough
land had been allotted "to test the plan... [therefore] no new grants or
allotments should be made ... to colonization companies."
33
 By that time,
the CPR was recovering its commanding lead in the wholesale land market.
Early in 1881 CPR officials estimated that the entire 48-mile railway
belt through the southerly route was not likely to yield more than 6 million
acres acceptable to the company. They advocated reservation of a vast
tract of land in the Saskatchewan Valley early in 1882 before all the best
acreage were alloted to colonization companies. They were particularly
anxious to secure all the land between present-day Saskatoon and Edmon-
ton. From such a vast northerly tract they were certain of finding at least 19
million suitable acres.
34
Anticipating the closure of the arrangement at any moment, Stephen
arranged for a colonization company of his own in the summer of 1882. A
syndicate calling itself the Canada North West Land Company emerged as
the CPR's prime customer, agreeing to buy 5 million acres of the expected
Saskatchewan property with $13.5 million of its own bonds, negotiable
paper that Stephen might sell in his turn to realize cash for construction
purposes.
35
When Macdonald seemed reluctant about setting aside the northerly
tract, the railway president reminded the Prime Minister that he was a
30. Lalonde, "Colonization Companies," p. 103.
31.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 45574-45584, Burgess to
Russell, 11 September 1882.
32. Ibid., pp. 112596-112597, Macpherson to Macdonald, 4 May 1883.
33. Order in Council of Canada, 4 June 1883. See PAC, Records of the Department of the
Interior, RG 15, vol. 277, file 44447.
34. Hedges, Building the Canadian West, p. 38.
35. Lamb, CPR, p. 92.
150 Canada and the Mitis, 1869-1885
"senior partner in the outside wing of our co-partnership," and repeated
that "it is of utmost importance that we get all the lands we have earned
located at once... ."
36
 Subsequently, Macdonald did as he was told, and
moved as quickly as he dealt with anything to complete the arrangements.
The required Order in Council reserving the entire western two-thirds of the
Saskatchewan River Valley was approved in October, by which time the
land boom had collapsed, the Canada North West Land Company was
refusing to purchase all the land originally negotiated, and a new estimate
of the inferiority of the land in the 48-mile belt prompted Stephen's people
to inform the Department of the Interior that another million acres had to be
located in a second vast reserve elsewhere.
37
The reservation of yet another tract amounting to 2.5 million acres in
the Qu'Appelle Valley in November 1882 appeared to resolve the question
of locating the last of the CPR's 25 million acres, but the disappointing out-
come of the Canada North West Land Company left Stephen cash poor at
the end of the year. His solution in December was a $30 million stock issue
to be sold to a New York brokerage firm at a 48 per cent discount. The
resulting $15.5 million would take him most of the way through 1883 but
left him doubly determined to find more effective means for recruiting land
buyers in large volume.
38
Early in the new year he went to England with two purposes (other
than capital recruitment) in mind. One was to persuade the Hudson's Bay
Company to pool its land resources with the Canada North West Land
Company to reduce overhead costs and co-ordinate recruitment of immi-
grants. In February, John Rose (representing the HBC in the negotiations)
reported to Macdonald that the "scheme, or rather idea is still in embryo,
and might not meet with the approval of the shareholders... ,"
39
 Still, the
idea continued "simmering" and Stephen was hopeful late in March when
he reported to Macdonald that Rose and the railway president were still
pursuing their "land pooling project." Stephen believed that he was
extremely close to creating "one great powerful colonization agency...
which will have a great influence in promoting the Settlement of the North
West."
40
Ultimately, however, pooling was not possible because the interests of
the two largest companies proved irreconcilable. Stephen wanted to sell his
land at comparatively low prices to generate a quick cash return for the
36. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 121437-121440, Stephen to
Macdonald, 16 July 1882.
37. Hedges, Building the Canadian West, p. 39.
38. Lamb, CPR, p. 93.
39. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 117699-117703, Rose to
Macdonald, 1 February 1883.
40. Ibid., pp. 121992-121994, Stephen to Macdonald, 22 March 1883.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 151
construction of the main and branch lines, while the HBC was more
prepared to wait for an unearned increment. The Hudson's Bay Company
feared that dumping too much land on the market at once would depress
prices even further.
41
Unable to persuade the directors of the Hudson's Bay Company that
they could not afford to wait for a profit in a region that would not develop
in the first place, Stephen pressed all the more firmly on his second objec-
tive, which was selling an assisted emigration scheme to the British. In
mid-May, Gladstone did agree to invest 1 million in resettlement loans for
impoverished Irish, if Canada would guarantee repayment. Stephen cabled
his coup to Macdonald on May 11. The Prime Minister replied the same
day that the timing was less than ideal: "No legislation possible this sea-
son. Government favourably inclined. Await details."
42
Subsequently, however, nothing developed in what might have been
Canada's first experiment in foreign aid. Macdonald tried to console
Stephen with the apology that the proposal was simply unworkable: ' 'If we
endorsed the first million for the Irish, we couldn't stop when asked to
assist Settlers from England, or Scotland and there would be no end to
it."
43
 In fact, Macdonald's real objections concerned the proposed
beneficiaries, as he confessed to Tupper later in July: "Entre nous, we
don't want the Western Irish emigration. They are bad settlers and
thoroughly disloyal. It won't do to have a little Ireland in the North
West."
44
Although Stephen (who was Scots Protestant by birth) agreed that the
Irish were "a doubtful lot at best," he preferred any kind of European set-
tlement to the impoverishment of his railway. Consequently, the CPR
president scolded his "senior partner" late in August for his apparently
half-hearted attitude towards settler recruitment. "I have a feeling,"
Stephen confided, "that the co-partnership between us & the government
for the settlement of the country is not so active and efficient as it should
41. The clearest evidence of the conflict of interest between the two companies was the
discrepancy in the average price at which their lands were sold: gross average of
$12.10 per acre for HBC lands, $7.63 for CPR land (Martin, "Dominion Lands"
Policy, p. 144). Still, it must be admitted that the HBC did face a dilemma. On the one
hand, the Company wanted an immediate land revenue and feared the possible political
consequences of being regarded as too speculative. Both of those considerations called
for quick sales. On the other hand, the directors were equally determined to reap the
largest possible profit from their land resources and did not hesitate to criticize persons
in charge of the land department for selling the company's real estate too cheaply (See
J.E. Rea, ed., The Letters of Charles John Brydges, 1883-1889, Publications of
Hudson's Bay Record Society, 33 (Winnipeg, 1981).
42. Macdonald quoted in Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 351.
43. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Transcripts, vol. 584, Macdonald to Stephen, 23 June 1883.
44. Macdonald quoted in Lamb, CPR, pp. 218-219.
152 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
be."
45
 If the government balked at assisted emigration, the least that might
be done was releasing some of the government-held even-numbered sec-
tions near the railway main line for immediate occupancy by homesteaders.
"We must in some way make it easier for emigrants to get on to home-
steads." Stephen asserted that "good settlers" had looked at opportunities
for free land in Canada, found nothing, and "left our country annoyed at
the difficulty of finding homesteads."
46
Shamed by previous timidity, Macdonald did agree to that small con-
cession. Late in 1883, the "mile belt reserve" of even sections immedi-
ately alongside the railway main line (withdrawn from settlement in March
1882) was opened again from Winnipeg to Moose Jaw after January 1,
1884.
47
 At the same time, Stephen hoped for another favour in the form of
an infusion of financial support beyond the $25 million in the contract.
The scheme Stephen devised in October 1883 was for the Government
of Canada to guarantee current and prospective CPR stockholders a
minimum five per cent dividend on their investment. Part of the dividend
guarantee was to come from $15 million to be deposited by the railway
with the federal treasury. The remainder would flow from the public
credit.
48
 Stephen's gamble was that the promise of a certain return would
exert an upward pressure on the value of stock already issued, and attract
new buyers for a fresh block to go on the market early in the new year. In
mid-December, however, the value of CPR stock moved unexpectedly in
the wrong direction, suggesting that knowledgeable buyers interpreted the
guarantee as nothing less than the last desperate attempt to save an overex-
tended enterprise before the railway passed into receivership, or suffered a
r- 4Q
worse fate.
On December 15, Stephen informed Macdonald that "things have
gone to the devil in New York" and pleaded for "something ... at once to
put the company out of discredit or we better give up and let the govern-
ment step in and carry on the business of the company."
50
 Stephen's
"something" was to make a new arrangement for expediting the dispersal
of the $25 million cash subsidy, $12 million of which had yet to be earned
45. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 121711-121714, Stephen to
Macdonald, 13 August 1883.
46. Ibid.
47. Order in Council of Canada, 29 November 1883. See also PAC, Records of the
Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 275, file 43449.
48. Lamb, CPR, pp. 107-108.
49. According to Creighton, the falling price of CPR stock was clear proof of a conspiracy
to destroy the railway. In his interpretation, "Macdonald had known from the
beginning ... that there were powerful interests in the world which had deliberately
determined to effect the ruin of his railway." Creighton, Old Chieftain, p. 362.
50. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 122029-122030, Stephen to
Macdonald, 15 December 1883.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 153
by the requisite miles of completed railway. At the same time, he
demanded a $15 million low-interest loan. With that $27 million, Stephen
believed "the road can be completed by the spring of 1886" — well before
the next general election. He asserted that "nothing short of this will do
any good."
51
Macdonald hesitated. His first impulse in any crisis was to wait and
see. Time and again he had learned that inaction would make some of the
most complicated problems apparently dissolve; the unforeseen conse-
quences of a quick fix often made a touchy situation even more compli-
cated. The CPR financial crisis of 1883-84 was the kind of problem he
hated most. It was not a matter of placating an angry colleague with
pleasant assurances of future action, or soothing the electorate by climbing
the fiscal oak tree to shake loose a few acorns to the swine below.
52
 The
issue called for bold strategic action, a make-or-break decision that had to
be taken at once.
One set of colleagues in the Cabinet, a small group headed by J.H.
Pope (the Minister of Railways) informed Macdonald that the matter was
uncomplicated and clear. Stephen knew his business. They had to follow
his instructions. "The day the Canadian Pacific busts," Pope predicted,
"the Conservative party busts the day after.
"
53 Other Tories agreed that the
national railway was an economic and political necessity, and agreed as
well that the campaign promise of 1882 had to be fulfilled before the next
general election in 1887. Yet a group of Cabinet ministers around D.L.
Macpherson and Sir Alexander Campbell had become increasingly resent-
ful of Stephen's imperious attitude towards the "partnership" sealed with
Canada in 1880-81.
Macpherson reasoned that if Canada and the CPR were partners in any
meaningful sense, it was inappropriate to shoulder yet more of the risk
without acquiring a tangible interest in the railway they were paying for
without buying. Macpherson proposed a stock purchase that would give
the company the needed capital for an 1886 completion date, and leave
Canada with a 48 per cent interest in the national railway forever after.
54
Stephen's reaction was horrified opposition. When he first heard a
preliminary verbal rendition of Macpherson's late-December written propo-
sal, the railway president advised Macdonald that "our friend Macpherson
has not grasped the situation, or he would not talk as he does." Then, mov-
ing from condescension to indignation, Stephen hinted that he would resign
51. Ibid.
52. Macdonald's swine model of democratic politics is discussed in Carl Berger, The
Writing of Canadian History (Toronto, 1976), p. 225.
53. Pope quoted in Lamb, CPR, p. 109.
54. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 112498-112504, Macpherson
to Macdonald, 26 December 1883 .
154 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
before letting the government take over even part of his property. Canada
was suddenly no longer the partner he wanted, but a threatening "outside
pressure."
55
Fearing he would lose his CPR president if he followed Macpherson's
and Campbell's advice, and fearing he would lose control of his majority if
he agreed to Stephen's demands, Macdonald tried doing nothing a little
longer. Increasingly excited notes and telegrams from Stephen finally con-
vinced Macdonald in January 1884 that he had run out of time. He turned
his back on the Macpherson-Campbell proposal and called his friend
Charles Tupper home from Britain to take the heat of the parliamentary
fury which was certain to erupt when the railway-aid bill was introduced to
the House of Commons in February.
When the aid package did come before the House, Opposition
members claimed that the proposal was clear confirmation of their earlier
warnings against the original bill in 1881. Opposing the matter even more
furiously in 1884, they claimed that the new route would leave the com-
pany teetering on the edge of bankruptcy indefinitely, that it would con-
stantly require fresh assistance and perennially receive it from the corrupt
intimacy between Stephen and Macdonald. That prompted Stephen to
demand a speech from his Ottawa partner. "The pretension that the line
cannot pay for many years to come is an invention of the enemy which it is
absolutely necessary to correct." As asserted in his letter to Macdonald on
February 10, "If the North West succeeds, the CPR cannot fail." But he
also said, ' 'if the CPR should prove to be a commercial failure, it will be
because the North West is a delusion—nothing in it."
56
Macdonald preferred to leave the speech-making in Parliament to
Tupper. Occasionally the Prime Minister spoke on procedural issues or in
personal defence of his old friend for returning to work for the salvation of
the railway.
57
 Tupper performed well, as did the rest of Macdonald's
obedient majority. There were no public utterances by opponents in
Cabinet. Nor did any other Conservatives oppose the aid package in the
House. Yet Macdonald knew that party discipline was strained to the limit.
A significant portion of his colleagues opposed aid in the form Stephen had
demanded. As a personal favour to their "Old Chieftain" they had not
rebelled openly. They voted with their leader to the last division. As Mac-
donald slumped back into his seat after the final vote late on the evening of
February 28,
58
 he must have known that he had reached the limit of normal
55. Ibid., pp. 122029-122030, Stephen to Macdonald, 15 December 1883.
56. Ibid., pp. 122037-122040, Stephen to Macdonald, 10 February 1884.
57. House of Commons Debates, 18-19, 21, 26 February 1884, pp. 373, 376, 460, 468,
524.
58. Ibid., p. 569.
Reaching for the Commercial Value of the North West 155
parliamentary manoeuvring. If there were any more crises in the construc-
tion of the Pacific Railway before the expected completion date in 1886,
such matters would have to be resolved by something beyond normal parli-
amentary manoeuvring.
Lawrence Clarke, ca. 1880
(Provincial Archives of Manitoba)
" ... the Metis reacted to Clarke's news as the final provocation."
156
Chapter 10
Confronting Riel and Completing
the CPR
As the construction of Stephen's railway proceeded across the Prairies, the
largest exodus of Red River Metis moved from Manitoba towards
Saskatchewan. The most frequent destination was the district of Prince
Albert, attractive because of employment by the Hudson's Bay Company
(distributing freight to or from nearby Fort Carlton) and because the vacant
land fronting the south branch of the Saskatchewan River closely resem-
bled that of the old Red River colony. As positive reports from the first
migrants reached discouraged relatives and former neighbours still in the
large Metis parishes of St Norbert, St Franois Xavier, and Baie St. Paul,
one relative followed another with increasing frequency in 1882 and 1883.
l
In the new colony, called St Laurent, the many settlers of the early
1880s were careful to avoid trespassing on the claims of their countrymen,
2
but normally they paid little attention to the settlement status of particular
parcels as designated by the Department of the Interior. The Metis were not
concerned with the grid pattern of townships, sections, and ranges, and
whether the parcel on which they landed happened to fit into an even-
numbered section (potentially open for homesteading) or was odd-
numbered (reserved for some system of sale).
3
 And even if they had been
careful to settle exclusively on even-numbered sections fronting on the
river, they would still have encountered difficulty with the Dominion Lands
Branch because, although the basic sectional survey had been completed in
1879 (and in the normal course of events would have been open to home-
stead entry within one year), there was an inexplicable delay in the case of
1. See Mailhot and Sprague, "Persistent Settlers."
2. There were no "Class 16" claims (land disputes) in the detailed report upon St
Laurent submitted by the Lands Board to headquarters in the autumn of 1884. See
University of Alberta Archives, William Pearce Papers, MG 9/2/4-4, vol. 4, pp. 224-
275.
3. For the system of sectional survey adopted by Canada see Chester Martin, "Dominion
Lands'' Policy.
157
158 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
St Laurent.
4
Part of the delay is attributable to the effect of Macdonald's land pol-
icy: on the south branch of the Saskatchewan, portions of several townships
amounting to more than 50,000 acres had been reserved for the Prince
Albert Colonization Company in April 1882; and the area underwent an
inspection nearly equivalent to resurvey in 1883 before the final reservation
occurred in November 1883.
5
 Homestead entries became acceptable in
February 1884.
6
In the interim, almost 300 Metis families had come into the territory
and settled mainly on river lots they laid out for themselves. Periodically,
the Metis settlers asked George Duck, the Dominion Lands Agent at Prince
Albert, to record their claims and to recognize the emerging river-lot pat-
tern. Of course all such requests were frustrated, at first because the land
was not open to entry of any kind; then, after February 1884, the Metis
found their claims were complicated by the distinction between river lots
and section land, and whether the land was odd or even-numbered in the
sectional survey.
7
 A few residents complied with the legal complexities;
more than ninety per cent of the population held out for their own pattern of
settlement and for the demand for patents immediately. What made
claimants all the more persistent was seeing that approximately one-fifth of
the area of new settlement had been laid out as river-lots as the Metis had
wanted (in 1878 to take account of the observed pattern of occupancy at the
time of original survey),
8
 but even the occupants of the regularly surveyed
river lots were deemed to be "squatters" until they made legal entry and
completed the settlement duties that would make them eligible for patents.
9
The Minister of the Interior might have recommended use of the
sweeping powers in section 125 of the Dominion Lands Act to cut through
the complexities depicted on Map 2. He might have exempted the St
Laurent Metis from the odd circumstances that made their case so compli-
cated, but there was no political advantage to be gained by moving boldly
on the matter. Sir John A. Macdonald preferred continuing doing nothing,
4. Flanagan, Riel and the Rebellion, pp. 30-33, 3740.
5. PAC, RG 15, vol. 277, file 44447, p. 19; and House of Commons Debates, speech by
Edward Blake, 6 July 1885, p. 3100.
6. The report of William Pearce, "All Claims to land... on the South Saskatchewan"
(University of Alberta Archives, Pearce Papers, MG 9/2, series 5, vol. 1, file 6 and
series 4, vol. 4, pp. 888-901) states that some of the land was open for entry as early as
1881. But in response to a question on the subject in the House of Commons on June 8,
1885, Macdonald admitted that much of the district was not open for homestead entry
until February 15,1884 (House of Commons Debates, 8 June 1885, p. 2358).
7. PAC, Records of the Department of the Interior, RG 15, vol. 336, file 84478, George
Duck to Commissioner of Dominion Lands, 15 June 1884.
8. Flanagan, Riel Reconsidered, p. 33.
9. Pearce, "All Claims to Land," p. 6-8.
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 159
Map 2:
Conflicting Claims to the Colony of St. Laurent
160 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
a position he had chosen deliberately in the spring of 1879 after Metis land
claims first came to his attention as the Minister of the Interior following
the Conservatives' return to power in September 1878.
Early in 1878, the North West "half breeds" had petitioned for land,
seed grain, and implements to ease their transition to farming as the extinc-
tion of the buffalo became more and more evident in the late "1870s."
10
But none of the pleas for assistance had found favour with Macdonald's
predecessor, David Mills, who dismissed all such appeals with a peculiar
contradiction that was frequently evident in the utterances of officials writ-
ing on the subject of "half breeds." On the one hand, they denounced the
allegedly inherent aversion of the Metis to field agriculture. On the other
hand (in response to explicit requests for aid to make the transition to the
way of life for which priests and certain government officials seemed to
have prayed so fervently), they were told that non-Indians need not apply.
In Mills' case, a letter went to the territorial governor explaining that the
Metis were either Indians or not. If non-Indian, Mills could "not see upon
what grounds the half breeds can claim to be treated in this particular dif-
ferently from the white settlers in the territories."
11
But the North West Territorial Council (the appointed committee
advising the Lieutenant Governor) saw the matter rather differently. In its
view, all native people previously dependent on the buffalo were entitled to
aid. Council members recommended an assistance programme in August
1878 that was remarkably similar to the scheme adopted by the British for
the resettlement of Loyalists in Canada after the American Revolution.
They proposed that a ' 'non-transferable location ticket'' entitling the reci-
pient to 160 acres should be issued to every "half breed" left without land
in the North West. Once located on plots of their own choosing, each fam-
ily could then make free use of government supplied seed-grain and farm
implements for up to three years, just as the British had resettled their dis-
placed persons in North America a century before. Then the Metis settle-
ments would be carefully monitored in their agricultural development. The
council members recommended a ten-year period of probation for each
assisted claimant of a free grant. It was not recommended that they should
receive their land automatically. The "half breeds" would have to perform
settlement duties in their first three years, then continue in residence for
seven more years before they would be eligible to claim patents for their
farms.
12
10. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42053-42056,42067-42070.
11. Ibid., pp. 42048-42050, Mills to Laird, 18 March 1878. Later, Macdonald told the
House of Commons that Mills had given the appropriate response. See House of
Commons Debates, 6 July 1885, p. 3112.
12. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42067-42070, Minutes of the
Council of the North West Territories, 2 August 1878.
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 161
Such was the policy recommended by the persons closest to the scene.
Since the North West was a kind of crown colony ruled from Ottawa, one
delay followed another. After Sir John A. Macdonald replaced David Mills
in the Interior Ministry, he neither accepted nor rejected the advice of the
Territorial Council, preferring instead to refer the matter to his Deputy
Minister, J.S. Dennis, for more study. Dennis, in his turn, did draft a
broader range of alternatives, adding two other possibilities to the council's
proposal late in December 1878. One was extending the provisions of the
Indian treaties to the Metis and native English, to "treat them as wards of
the Government... and look forward to their remaining for many years in
their present semi-barbarous state." The other possibility was giving them
an issue of scrip as had been done with the Manitoba "half breed heads of
families" with the same doubtful benefit to the nominal recipients in the
North West. Reluctantly, Dennis recommended the package proposed by
the North West Council.
13
Macdonald still hesitated. He disliked rewarding the Metis for what he
considered their own improvidence—it was they who spoiled their oppor-
tunities in Manitoba, and they as well who killed most of the buffalo.
14
 Not
worrying about further delay, the Prime Minister instructed Dennis to send
his memorandum on the subject to the three bishops most acquainted with
the Metis. The two Roman Catholic consultants added their endorsements
to the Territorial Council's scheme, saying, "the half breed cannot compete
with the White man in the discharge of the duties of civilized life unless
some steps are taken at the outset to equalize the conditions on which they
start." They admitted that the appropriate affirmative action would be
expensive, but the first costs were expected to be fully returned by the pros-
perity of future generations of Metis.
15
 Later, the Anglican bishop contri-
buted more muted approval to the growing chorus of promoters of aid, say-
ing that he thought that the free land, seed grain, and implements would be
"necessary at first." Still, because he believed that fear of starvation was
God's way of teaching respect for civilization, Bishop Machray added that
"the less of such gifts the better. They are apt to do mischief."
16
The result of Macdonald's fruitless quest for a cheap and simple alter-
native to the proposal of the North West Council was the addition of a few
phrases to the Dominion Lands Act in the spring of 1879. The new words
13. Ibid., pp. 138984-138987, "Confidential Memorandum: Remarks on the Condition of
the Half Breeds of the North West Territories, 20 December 1878."
14. See Macdonald's sketch of the history of Manitoba land claims reported to the
Governor General in August 1884 (ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to
Lansdowne, 5 August 1884).
15. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42072-42083, Bishop Grandin to Dennis, 18
January 1879.
16. Ibid., pp. 42084-42091, Bishop Machray to Dennis, 15 February 1879.
162 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
appeared to recognize that the North West "half breeds" had a claim to a
share of the Indian title to the territory and that the Cabinet was empowered
to set aside land "to such extent, and on such terms and conditions, as may
be deemed expedient" to satisfy such claims.
17
 But in 1879, 1880, 1881,
1882, and 1883 nothing was done towards implementing the new authority
to deal with the Metis. Not surprisingly, Macdonald was no more inclined
to respond favourably to the new demands of the Metis reinforced in
number and resolve by the large migrations from Manitoba. Consequently,
the St Laurent claims underwent the same rigour of evaluation as those of
any other group of complaining homesteaders. Of the more than 250 per-
sons demanding patents in 1884, less than 10 were considered legally enti-
tled to what they claimed.
18
 Then a new factor suddenly caused Macdonald
to reassess his sense of political profit and loss in "half breed" claims. He
received an alarming assessment of the situation in June 1884.
Lawrence Clarke, Chief Factor of Fort Carlton, had informed James
Grahame (Clarke's superior officer in Winnipeg) that a pattern of escalating
discontent was reaching a point of crisis; "repressive measures" were
needed. Clarke explained that as "half breeds" in the District of
Saskatchewan were losing freighting employment to the railway and steam-
boats, they were becoming poorer and poorer, and were pressing extrava-
gant claims on the government in the hope of getting something they might
readily sell for cash. As their first appeals were failing, they were on the
point of taking extreme action—threatening to repeat the events of 1869-
70. A delegation had gone to Montana intending to bring Louis Riel back.
The repression Clarke proposed was arresting Riel at the border if he
accepted the offer of leadership. Otherwise his presence among hundreds
of armed Metis and native English might involve the Indians and even
some of the disgruntled white settlers who resented having been bypassed
by the CPR. Clarke admitted that taking Riel prisoner would anger some
people, but he said a "strong detachment" of police near St Laurent could
deter the most militant. The others would be calmed by judicious use of the
"influence" at Clarke's disposal and that of the Catholic priests in the
area.
19
Receiving the alarm via Grahame,
20
 Macdonald reacted immediately
by seeking more information. On the one hand, he asked his man on the
spot, Edgar Dewdney, for his assessment. The Lieutenant Governor replied
in a matter of days that the "half breeds" had been "ventilating their
17. Statutes of Canada (1879), Chapter 31: "An Act to amend and consolidate the several
Acts respecting the Public lands of the Dominion," section 125(e).
18. Pearce, "All Claims to Land," p. 6.
19. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42244-42250, Clarke to
Grahame, 20 May 1884.
20. Ibid., pp. 42242-42243, Grahame to Macdonald, 29 May 1884.
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 163
grievances" in secret meetings, and Dewdney also agreed that the principal
reason for their discontent was economic because the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany had drastically cut both the volume and the rate of pay for overland
freighting. But Dewdney added that a little group of Prince Albeit specula-
tors (including Clarke) had suffered from the collapse of the recent land
boom. They welcomed the idea of a larger police garrison for the money it
would bring into the district. Indeed, Lawrence Clarke was playing a dou-
ble game. Having goaded the "half breeds" to bold protest, his "very sen-
sational" letter now played to his speculator's interest more than to a real
crisis.
21
Dewdney's reassuring letter was not confirmed by the result of the
police inquiries that Macdonald requested at the same time. He wanted to
know the overall number of "half breeds" in the North West, how many
were disaffected Manitobans, where they lived, and their probability of fol-
lowing Riel in the event of his attempting to form a second provisional
government. Macdonald had also asked the Deputy Minister in charge of
the police, Fred White, to go west for his own first hand impressions.
Before his departure, Comptroller White ordered Superintendent Cro-
zier and Commissioner Irvine (the field officers in the North West Mounted
Police with military ranks of major and colonel, respectively) to collect the
statistical data. On June 10, White ordered Irvine to make discreet inquiries
while travelling from community to community under some improvised
purpose—"with some object... other than the real one."
22
 On the same
day, White sent identical instructions to Crozier, ordering him to "visit the
settlements and... form an opinion which you can communicate to me
confidentially."
23
Thus, Macdonald did not ignore Clarke's warning. He moved quickly
for a comprehensive view and from diverse sources, even though he
rejected the appeal for immediate "repressive measures." Riel and the
delegation were not arrested when they reached the Canadian border in late
June, but the police did "shadow" the progress of Riel and his entourage
closely, and kept the Prime Minister fully informed of what followed.
While Dewdney continued to report that Riel's return was a political
nuisance but no threat (not unless the Metis leader ' 'tampered'' with Indian
discontents),
24
 White's report was remarkably consistent with the original
alarm sounded by Clarke. Canada's most senior policeman was certain that,
despite peaceful appearances, Louis Riel did aim for something like a
21. Ibid., pp. 42767-42778, Dewdney to Macdonald, 14 June 1884.
22. Ibid., pp. 42251^2253, White to Irvine, 10 June 1884.
23. Ibid., pp. 42254-42255, White to Crozier, 10 June 1884.
24. See, for example, the letter from Andre to Dewdney, 7 July 1884, that the Governor
forwarded to Macdonald (ibid., pp. 42277- 42280).
164 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
second provisional government. "I am convinced that there is an illegal
movement of some kind in contemplation."
25
 A detailed statistical report
substantiating the danger of such a development suggested that, of the
5,400 "half breeds" in the North West, 4,400 were Manitoba emigrants.
Although they were found in twenty-one separate localities, almost half
were settled near the forks of the Saskatchewan. There Riel could expect
support from an estimated force of 600 men capable of bearing arms in the
event of trouble. St Laurent was the true centre of "disloyalty" because its
population was "chiefly from White Horse Plains, Baie St Paul, etc. in
Manitoba. A hard lot, were Riel's supporters in 1869."
26
 Other communi-
ties were either too small or too far away from St Laurent to pose any seri-
ous difficulty. "They would take no steps unless Kiel's party was fairly cer-
tain of being successful," or "not... mixed up, but if Indians were once
on the warpath they would likely join them."
27
On July 10, Macdonald reported the disturbing news to the vacation-
ing Governor General, Lord Lansdowne, saying that the situation was seri-
ous but manageable. He believed land was the key. "Some of the Half
breeds have land claims which are in the process of adjustment. The claims
are for the most part invalid, but they will be liberally treated."
28
 Then, as
the news continued to be "disquieting," Macdonald outlined a broader pro-
gramme of conciliation in more correspondence with the absent representa-
tive of the Queen. On August 5, the Prime Minister repeated the idea that
he was prepared to honour the land claims of Riel's followers, and some-
thing special might be offered to Riel himself:
In his answer to the invitation sent him which was a temperate and unobjec-
tionable paper, he spoke of some claims he had against the Gov't. I presume
these refer to his land claims which he forfeited on conviction and banish-
ment, [but] I think we shall deal liberally with him and make him a good
subject again.
If I don't mistake his character, he will make a good Moral Agent or
Detective for the Gov't and keep the metis in order.
29
Lansdowne replied the same day with a note stating that the idea of
conciliating the leader was the key factor, and urged Macdonald to "make
every endeavour to 'obtain touch"' with Riel and offer him a bribe; "it
might be intimated to him that you were prepared to deal generously with
him in so far as his private requirements seem concerned, and that you were
25. Ibid., pp. 134906-134916, White to Macdonald, 7 July 1884.
26. Other sources tend to corroborate the police report. See "Supplement 2: The Settlers of
the Colony of St Laurent," in Mailhot and Sprague, "Persistent Settlers," pp. 18-26.
27. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 148567, "Estimated Number
of Half Breeds."
28. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 10 July 1884.
29. Ibid., Macdonald to Lansdowne, 5 August 1884.
Confronting Riel and Completing the CPR 165
ready to consider in a general conciliatory spirit the demands put forward
by the half breeds."
30
 In the arrangement envisioned by Lansdowne, the
people would get their land, and Riel could receive at least an appointment
to the North West Council if not to the Canadian Senate.
In Macdonald's opinion, the contemplated patronage for Riel was
excessive. Macdonald protested that Louis Riel had "committed a cold-
blooded murder in '69, which will never be forgotten by the whites either
in Manitoba or Ontario."
31
 A less extravagant offer was more appropriate,
but the rest of Macdonald's answer did make clear that he was still commit-
ted to conciliation in principle. Emissaries of good will would see Riel and
his lieutenants as in 1869 and "encourage them to specify their grievances
in Memorials and send them with or without delegations to Ottawa." Such
a course would "allow time for the present effervescence to subside—and
on the approach of winter—the climate will keep things quiet until next
spring." Meanwhile officials in the Department of the Interior could use
the respite bought by the promise of conciliation to go over the land claims
and concede patents to any with "a semblance of foundation."
32
Lansdowne approved. He appreciated that the problem of Riel and his
people was "intricate," and Macdonald's proposed method of handling
Riel would make him ' 'understand that he has more to gain, personally and
as a public man, by confining himself to the legitimate ventilation of the
grievances of his clients, than by leading a disorderly movement."
33
The first person recruited to have a private word with the Metis leader
was C.B. Rouleau, a French-Canadian lawyer recently appointed to judicial
responsibilities at nearby Battleford, Saskatchewan. A second, more prom-
inent prospective emissary was Sir Hector Langevin, the Minister of Public
Works in the federal Cabinet and already committed to tour the West on
other errands. Here as well the Governor General gave unqualified appro-
val. On August 13, he agreed that Rouleau could "gauge the situation
pretty accurately"
34
 and on August 23 Lansdowne expressed special satis-
faction that Langevin was going on his errand to "set Riel's head the right
way."
35
All was arranged by the end of August for avoiding the political liabil-
ity of Riel leading several hundred families into a second provisional
government. Macdonald had reliable intelligence from diverse sources that
30. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 32872-32879, Lansdowne to Macdonald, 5
August 1884.
31. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 12 August 1884.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 32884-32887, Lansdowne to Macdonald, 13
August 1884.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., pp. 32893-32895, Lansdowne to Macdonald, 23 August 1884.
166 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
such a development was possible, and he had a plausible plan for undercut-
ting the basis of the "foolish plot"
36
 and for buying Riel's loyalty. Should
conciliation fail, the safety of the government was still assured by a
planned expansion of police power. Macdonald told Lansdowne that he
intended to increase the police force in the West by thirty per cent with a
flying column of 100 to be garrisoned at Fort Carlton. If there was a
second "Riel rebellion," it could be checked quickly by a mounted consta-
bulary already on the scene. Still, timely conciliation was expected to
prevent such a development.
The policy Macdonald described to the Governor General in July and
August flowed from the obvious calculation that an "outbreak" in the
North West was an avoidable political liability. The cost would be land
that the Metis already occupied and money or patronage to be invested in
Riel with the expectation of larger dividends in more general native
pacification. In this sense, Macdonald had to agree with Lansdowne that
Riel's return was "anything but a misfortune."
38
 Yet Macdonald appears
to have decided near the end of August 1884 that an angry Riel could be
even more useful in the broader field of Canadian politics. For some rea-
son, the Langevin visit was mysteriously
39
 cancelled; the land claims were
36. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 23, pp. 33-34, Macdonald to J.C. Aikins, 28 July 1884.
37. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 12 August 1884; and Letter
Book, vol. 23, pp. 56-57, Macdonald to Donald A. Smith, 5 September 1884.
38. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 32872-32879, Lansdowne to Macdonald, 5
August 1884.
39. Why Langevin failed to fulfill the mission is a problem of considerable complexity.
The conventional explanation (See Stanley, Riel, p. 285; and Bob Beal and Rod
Macleod, Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebellion [Edmonton, 1984], pp. 117-
118) is that Langevin's change of itinerary represented his own independent alteration
of plans. Having arrived at Regina in the last week of August, he is supposed to have
been so fatigued by the earlier part of his journey that he could not face travelling 200
miles over muddy cart trails to St Laurent just to suffer the harangues of political
malcontents. Thus he cancelled the trip despite the consequences. Langevin proved
later that he was indeed capable of foolish initiatives. But the cancellation of the Riel
mission was more than foolhardy. Once Riel had been informed that Langevin was
visiting in 1884 — in the role Smith had played in 1869-70 — and once it became
known that Riel regarded the meeting as "marked proof of good will towards the
North West" (Riel quoted in Beal and Macleod, Prairie Fire, p. 118), cancellation
without justification or notification of regret was equivalent to provocation.
The difficulty with assigning sole responsibility to Langevin is evidence of earlier
communication with Macdonald. The day of Langevin's departure from his home,
August 18, Sir Hector sent a brief note to the Prime Minister inviting last-minute
instructions (PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 97438-9743).
There is no record of Macdonald's response, but on August 19 a telegram went from
Langevin to Judge Rouleau at Battleford informing him that Sir Hector would not be
making the digression to Batoche (Stanley, Riel, p. 285). Subsequently, Rouleau either
forgot or was instructed not to report the news to Riel, with the result that the Metis
continued an unsatisfying vigil, constantly watching the roadways to Batoche for some
face resembling Langevin's.
If the change was Langevin's mistake, Macdonald had an opportunity to correct it
on August 29 when his good-will ambassador sent him a message before leaving
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 167
handled more in conformity with the Dominion Lands Act than with what
the "half breeds" demanded; and none of Kiel's personal claims received
favourable consideration. In the context of escalating discontent the Metis
did become more militant; Kiel did lead them into an illegal government;
and the Government of Canada did respond with force—with the mobili-
zation of militia from as far away as Halifax, as well as with the police
power already on the scene. What were the political advantages of the
sequence of events as they actually occurred?
The political problem that made provocative inaction ultimately
worthwhile was renewed difficulty with Stephen's railway. At the time that
Macdonald was first thinking about his programme of Metis conciliation,
Stephen had begun to hint that he might need more assistance from
Canada.
40
 Macdonald's reaction was so swift and completely discouraging
on July 18
41
 that the railway president promised not to say another word on
the subject, then violated his own promise in the same letter: "I will only
say here that I cannot under the existing condition of affairs, any longer,
look forward to the land grant as affording an available asset... and our 35
million capital is equally useless... ,"
42
Concurrent with Macdonald's corresponding with Lansdowne, Mac-
donald and Stephen exchanged eight letters
43
 (which have survived) and
held at least two meetings (mentioned in the correspondence). The Prime
Minister fretted about the "many threads" of crisis he had to attend to per-
sonally and showed the railway president the papers documenting develop-
ments in the North West.
44
 Stephen assured Macdonald that the railway
construction was proceeding better than expected but continued to com-
plain about a serious deficiency of capital for other needs. Macdonald could
not agree to what Stephen thought essential, but he did agree to help in
Manitoba for Regina (PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 97441-
97442). Langevin reported that the train had taken him as far as Brandon. After a
brief visit with Dewdney he expected to continue on to the end of the railway: "In a
week I will have reached the end of the road and be on the return." Obviously, that
itinerary precluded the errand to Batoche. If Macdonald's previous plans were still in
effect, it was important to intercept Langevin before his return. No record of attempted
interception has been found. Nor did Macdonald complain later about a unilateral
upset of his conciliation scheme.
40. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 122328-122331, Stephen to
Macdonald, 17 July 1884.
41. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Stephen, 18 July 1884.
42. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 122340-122347, Stephen to Macdonald, 22 July
1884.
43. Macdonald's letters to Stephen were dated 24 and 30 July 1884 (both in ibid.,
Transcripts, vol. 585). Stephen's to Macdonald were 27 July, 2 August (two letters),
and 13,16,19 August (all in ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 122353-122419).
44. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Stephen, 30 July 1884.
168 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
recruiting $5 million from private bankers in London and to accompany the
railway president on his Atlantic crossing.
Unfortunately for Stephen, neither a letter of recommendation
45
 from
Canada's Prime Minister nor Macdonald's presence in London was
sufficient to persuade Baring Brothers that the railway was a safe risk, and
Stephen's need for the additional $5 million from Parliament matured
before anything else to convince Macdonald's colleagues (or the country)
that additional legislative assistance was warranted. Then, once Macdonald
returned to Ottawa, Sir David Macpherson complained that Langevin had
returned from the West as the perfect champion of "dead beats."
46
Langevin's position even without seeing Riel was that the Metis leader
was too dangerous to ignore. ' 'We must take care not to make a martyr of
him and thus increase his popularity." The solution was "good treatment
of the half breeds." Langevin believed even a little would "go a long way
to settle matters."
47
 Macpherson tried to convince Langevin that every land
claim had been "fully considered and equitably disposed of," but Sir
David believed Sir Hector remained unconvinced. A meeting with Sir John
was needed.
48
 That appears to have ended the matter. At least there were no
more memoranda advocating concessions such as Langevin had proposed
early in November.
Macdonald's greater difficulty was calming Stephen. By mid-January
the railway president was insisting that the survival of his company abso-
lutely depended on aid from the government, but Macdonald insisted that
the proposition was still "hopeless." A telegram from the Prime Minister
on January 20 urged Stephen to "postpone matter to eighteen eight six can
carry it in Council."
49
 Stephen replied that postponement was "impossi-
ble" and begged for a meeting the next day to "decide finally on course am
forced to take."
50
 They did meet, but the only surviving record of what was
apparently agreed to was a letter from Stephen in mid-April alluding to
maturing obligations that "three months ago were postponed till now on
the faith that by this time we should be in a position to meet them."
51
Further contextual evidence that something had been agreed to in late
45. Ibid., Letter Book, vol. 23, pp. 59-60, Macdonald to Baring Brothers, 6 September
1884.
46. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 112802-112805, Macpherson to Macdonald, 31
December 1884.
47. Ibid., pp. 97452-97456, Langevin to Macdonald, 6 November 1884.
48. Ibid., pp. 112802-112805, Macpherson to Macdonald, 31 December 1884.
49. Ibid., Letter Book, vol. 23, p. 101, Macdonald cypher telegram to Stephen, 20 January
1885.
50. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, p. 122608, Stephen cypher telegram to Macdonald,
20 January 1885.
51. Ibid., pp. 122818-122821, Stephen to Macdonald, 15 April 1885.
Confronting Riel and Completing the CPR 169
January was a more optimistic tone and shift in Stephen's correspondence
on the subject in February and early March as he devoted most of his letters
to the terms of the rescue he was clearly expecting.
52
 Conversely, Mac-
donald seemed more depressed than ever. On January 24 he reported to his
old friend Tupper that the situation was nearly as bad as the worst the two
had imagined in the previous autumn. "Geo Stephen says the CPR must go
down unless sustained," and he enumerated the key personnel in Cabinet
who were adamantly opposed to any such additional aid. "How it will end
I don't know."
53
Nothing had happened to change "the thing"
54
 in Ottawa. Yet the
abandonment of straightforward conciliation had meant that Metis discon-
tent was maturing into an exploitable crisis. Riel had spent the entire
autumn and early winter writing — and rewriting—the draft of a
comprehensive statement of grievances covering claims. The most prelim-
inary statement specified: territorial self-government; land rights similar to
the assurances in section 32 of the Manitoba Act; a 2-million-acre trust (the
income from which would provide long-term development capital for the
Metis); 64,000 acres of "swamp lands" to be reserved for the children of
Metis heads of families (to be distributed every eighteen years over seven
generations); reconsideration of the land rights of the Manitoba Metis; and
preferential consideration of "half breeds" for "works and contracts" in
the Territories.
55
After consulting Bishops Tache and Grandin, Riel dropped some of
the demands that the clerical consultants and his own close advisors con-
sidered "extravagant."
56
 The petition that the St Laurent Metis finally
mailed to the Governor General on December 16 was more limited in its
focus upon land titles, home rule, and compensation for alleged malad-
ministration of the Manitoba Act. Considering the last point, it was not
surprising that the document was addressed to the Governor General with a
covering letter requesting that the Queen's representative should forward
the document directly to England in the hope that the British would compel
Canada to act as in 1870.
57
Given the direct parallel that the Metis drew between their present
52. See Stephen's letters of 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19 February and 2 March in ibid., Incoming
Correspondence, pp. 122643-122704.
53. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Tupper, 24 January 1885.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42935-42937, Riel to Bishop Grandin, 7
September 1884.
56. See PAM, Riel Papers, item 414, Tache to Riel, 4 October 1884.
57. Lansdowne did not forward the petition as requested. See Lansdowne to Derby, the
Colonial Secretary, 21 April 1885 (PAC, Records of the Governor General, RG 7 G
10, vol. 8).
170 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
situation and the events of 1869, the alarms that kept streaming in from the
North West might have led Macdonald to expect the formation of a provi-
sional government at almost any moment in January. The police reports of
the previous summer had indicated that delay would almost certainly result
in some "illegal combination," and six months had passed without meeting
any of the agitators' principal demands or taking steps to break up the agi-
tation with police power. But nothing had happened. In late January Riel
was still not acting according to prediction even as Stephen's financial
crisis reached new, more frightening proportions, and nothing had altered
Macdonald's inability to deliver his partner the promised aid.
Here was the context and perhaps also the explanation for the pecu-
liarly provocative content of an important Order in Council that was
adopted on January 28. Telegraphed to Dewdney, the news was that
Canada would "investigate claims of Half Breeds and with that view
[Cabinet] had decided [to make an] enumeration of those who did not parti-
cipate in Grant under Manitoba Act."
58
 The provocation was that only a
small minority of the residents of St Laurent could benefit from awards to
non-Manitobans. Morever, the government already had the figures: 200 of
1,300 potential claimants.
59
 Dewdney was so stunned by the news he
refused to pass on the information without alteration. Imagining the pur-
pose of the Order in Council was conciliation rather than provocation, he
changed the announcement before transmitting the telegram to St Laurent:
"Government has decided to investigate claims of Half Breeds and with
that view has already taken preliminary steps." Then Dewdney reminded
Macdonald that "the bulk of the French Half Breeds" had "nothing to
expect" from the unrevised text. The original news would "start a fresh
agitation."
60
No prime ministerial congratulation came back over the wire thanking
Dewdney for his editorial intervention, and Dewdney's text was still far
short of the news the Metis wanted. They demanded recognition of their
aboriginal title demand, not additional consideration of the matter. Equally
important, they wanted news that their claims to river lots were recognized.
Here too the telegram from Dewdney was silent. Then on February 6, the
Dominion Lands Agent at Prince Albert learned from the Deputy Minister
of the Department of the Interior that the river-lot question was about to be
58. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42977-42983, quoted by
Dewdney to Macdonald in reply, 4 February 1885.
59. Ibid., p. 148567, "Estimated Number of Half Breeds." Although the document is
undated, contextual evidence makes clear that the numbers were determined in the
summer of 1884. See also the Governor General's recital of the same figures in PAC,
RG 7, G 10 (Drafts to Colonial Secretary, Secret and Confidential), vol. 8, Lansdowne
to Derby, 21 April 1885.
60. Ibid., pp. 42977-42983, Dewdney to Macdonald, 4 February 1885.
Confronting Riel and Completing the CPR 171
disposed of. He could expect instructions "in the course of a few days."
61
The claims reported to Winnipeg in June 1884 had passed from Win-
nipeg to Ottawa in October, and finally back from headquarters to Prince
Albert near the end of February 1885. The news the Lands Agent was to
report to the claimants was an enormous disappointment to the vast major-
ity of the families hoping for confirmation of titles.
62
 They felt they had
done their part. All but a small non-co-operating group of forty-five had
compromised their original demand for river lots laid out in the old Mani-
toba pattern. More than 200 settlers had provided evidence of compliance
with the boundaries of subdivisions as laid out in the government survey.
Eight such claimants received notification that their periods of settlement,
extent of cultivation, and value of improvements entitled them to patents.
The others were processed as applications for "entry." Consequently,
more than sixty per cent of the settlers expecting patent were confronted
with an infuriating contradiction: their claims were allowed; patents were
denied. They would not become the owners of their land in the eyes of
Canada until paying fees, performing more settlement duties, and going
through another process of application, inspection, and consideration by the
local agent, by the Winnipeg Lands Board, and by the Dominion Lands
Branch in Ottawa. Even then they would have to pay for any acreage in
excess of the 160-acre maximum allowable "free grant" (some claimants
were told that the pre-emption part of their claim would cost $1 per acre,
for others the price was $2). Finally, the question of trespass on the lands of
the Prince Albert Colonization Company was unresolved; thirty families
were excluded from "entry" as well as from patents.
63
Canada's handling of the river-lot question was far from conciliatory,
but the government could defend itself by saying that the claimants
received all the consideration they were entitled to expect under the
Dominion Lands Act. Indeed, in one respect—waiving the distinction
between odd- and even-numbered sections (except in the vicinity of the
Prince Albert Colonization Company) — the government could say that the
Metis claimants were treated more liberally than the law required.
One last provocation was similarly defensible from the standpoint of
rigid adherence to principle. On February 20 the Prime Minister informed
Lieutenant Governor Dewdney that the answer to Kiel's private claims was
a definite no. With uncharacteristic moral outrage Macdonald declared:
"We have no money to give Riel. He has a right to remain in Canada and if
61. PAC, RG 15, vol. 336, file 84478, A.M. Burgess to Duck, 6 February 1885.
62. See University of Alberta, William Pearce Papers, MG 9/2/4-4, vol. 4, pp. 224-275,
961-962 in relation to Pearce's published report of "All Claims to Land."
63. Their claims were taken up in the autumn of 1885, and accorded the same entry
privilege as the others. See University of Alberta Archives, William Pearce Papers,
MG 9/2/4-4, vol. 4, pp. 961-962.
172 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
he conspires we must punish him. That's all."
64
The last two provocations together—the personal disappointment of
Riel and the general frustration of the land claimants—finally broke Metis
patience the day after Lands Agent Duck sent out the last disturbing
notification on March 7. On March 8, Riel announced that he thought that
the time had come to form a provisional government.
Three days later, Lieutenant Governor Dewdney telegraphed the latest
development to the Prime Minister, saying there was a possibility that the
declaration was no more than a "bluff" but "if the Half breeds mean busi-
ness, the sooner they are put down the better." Dewdney advised taking
them by surprise. "They are like Indians. When they gather and get excited
it is difficult to handle them, but if they are taken unawares there is little
difficulty in arresting the leader."
65
On the same day, March 11, Stephen demanded bold action for the
railway, complaining that his finances were "getting beyond all control."
Stephen expressed sympathy for Macdonald's political problems, but the
CPR president insisted that the time had come for the Prime Minister to do
whatever was necessary to alter the current political impasse. "I know and
appreciate fully the reason for delaying consideration of our matters till the
proper and most favourable time arrives but I am really concerned about
ways and means to carry us along in the meantime.... I hope you will
think of this and bring things to a head as soon as possible."
66
True to his favourite maxim, "He who waits wins,"
67
 Macdonald did
nothing, but not with any evident comfort. On March 17, he informed
Tupper that "Stephen asks a loan for a year of 5 millions (that Tilley [the
Minister of Finance] can't face)" and complained that everyone was reach-
ing the limits of endurance. "How it will end God knows—but I wish I
were well out of it."
68
 No doubt Stephen and Dewdney were equally per-
plexed. Unable to get a satisfactory answer to his letters and telegrams,
Dewdney pursued his own initiative.
On March 12, the Lieutenant Governor convened a meeting to con-
sider the Riel crisis with four other people in Regina: Hayter Reed (the
Indian Commissioner), A.G. Irvine (the Police Commissioner), Hugh
Richardson (the Stipendiary Magistrate of the district), and Lawrence
Clarke (still Chief Factor at Fort Carlton). The primary concern was Riel's
proclamation of intent: whether it was genuine or "a mere matter of
64. PAC, Glenbow Dewdney Papers, p. 545, Macdonald to Dewdney, 20 February 1885.
65. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 43010-43013, Dewdney to
Macdonald, 11 March 1885.
66. Ibid., pp. 122735-122742, Stephen to Macdonald, 11 March 1885.
67. See, for example, Macdonald to T. Robertson, in ibid., Letter Book, vol. 23, pp. 85-86.
68. Ibid., Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Tupper, 17 March 1885.
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 173
bluff... to frighten the government into making concessions." Clarke sug-
gested that since the total force at Kiel's command was probably no more
than 350 poorly armed men "with their wives and children, who must be
exposed to extreme peril should they be so foolish as to resort to arms,"
and since the government force "already on the spot" numbered 120 well-
armed police backed by artillery, the Hudson's Bay Company officer
thought that the "only danger to be apprehended .. . would be in the event
of Riel attempting to tamper with the loyalty of the Indians." In that event,
it was agreed that they should arrest the Metis leader "no matter at what
risk." And even without Kiel's moving towards alliances with the Indians,
it was considered that "Mr. Riel and his band of discontents should not be
allowed to keep up senseless agitation, destroying all faith in the country
and ruining its peaceable inhabitants." Sooner or later they would have to
"settle this matter once for all." In Clarke's opinion the question was
"whether this was not the time." Under the circumstances of the moment,
it was agreed that Clarke should return to Fort Carlton at once, and Irvine
would "start for the 'seat of war'" several days later, about the time
Clarke reached Fort Carlton from Regina.
69
Arriving at his destination on the evening of March 17,
70
 Clarke
reported that Riel's movement had "apparently flattened out" but there
was no doubt as to his "tampering with Indians." Clarke did not think Riel
would win many over, but advised the immediate arrest of Riel to prevent
any further mischief. "No better time to deal with leader and followers."
71
Dewdney responded that he had still "heard nothing from Ottawa" and
reported that Irvine was departing for Fort Carlton the next day with 100
reinforcements.
72
 Then, as rather an afterthought, Dewdney sent Clarke a
second telegram on March 17 advising him to make the government's
intentions public. "Put in PA Times that an additional force is being
sent.... Get paper to enlarge and state scattered that government intend to
have peace in the district.
Clarke passed the instruction on to his new superior officer in Winni-
peg, Joseph Wrigley, who responded by telegram that he opposed the news-
paper advertisement, at least as a Hudson's Bay Company announcement.
Perhaps Wrigley feared that such information would be interpreted as a
provocative gesture and lead to criticism of the company later. "Better for
you not to act publicly but leave responsibility on Government."
74
 As a
69. Hudson's Bay Company Archives (hereafter cited as HBCA), D.20/33, fo. 67-74,
Lawrence Clarke to Joseph Wrigley, 14 March 1885.
70. HBCA, B332/5/1, vol. 1, fo. 96-121, Clarke to Wrigley, 6 July 1885.
71. Ibid., fo. 87, Clarke cypher telegram to Dewdney, 17 March 1885.
72. Ibid., fo. 82, Dewdney cypher telegram to Clarke, 17 March 1885.
73. Ibid., fo. 81, Dewdney cypher telegram to Clarke, 17 March 1885.
74. Ibid., fo. 44, Wrigley cypher telegram to Clarke, 17 March 1885.
,,73
174 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
result, the action that pushed Riel to take the next step was not a printed
word, but verbal communication that Clarke subsequently denied he had
ever spoken.
The story Lawrence Clarke later denounced as a "tissue of lies"
75
was that he had encountered a group of Metis near Fort Carlton some time
before March 19 and had given them information resembling the news that
Dewdney instructed him to spread through the district on March 17.
According to popular legend, the Metis asked Clarke if there was any
answer yet to their petitions and protest. "His reply was that the only
answer they would get would be bullets, and that, indeed, on his way north-
ward, he had passed a camp of 500 policemen who were coming up to cap-
ture the Half breed agitators."
76
 It is possible that Clarke said only that
more police were on the way with the intention of arresting Riel. The rest
may have been nothing more than the result of exaggeration in retelling the
news at Batoche.
What is certain is that the Metis reacted to Clarke's news as the final
provocation. The provisional government emerged on March 19 (with
eighty-eight per cent support from the inhabitants of the colony of St
Laurent).
77
 Despite the risk of police intervention, Riel did not foresee any
great danger because the newspapers were full of reports of the possibility
of war between England and Russia. With British (and Canadian) forces
occupied in a foreign war, surely Canada would dispose of a small domes-
tic crisis peacefully as in 1870. Riel miscalculated. The mobilization for
conflict overseas did not occur. Instead, Canada mobilized militia from
Halifax to Winnipeg to deal with the Metis, even though Dewdney's
dispatches indicated that he thought the police were competent to deal with
the situation unfolding in late March.
Macdonald did not anticipate a war against the Metis. At the time of
the mobilization (March 23), he cautioned the Minister of Militia, J.P.R.A.
Caron, to ' 'remind General Middleton that the [NWMP] Commissioner and
Officers are magistrates and well acquainted with the character of the
Half-breeds and Indians and must understand the best mode of dealing with
them and inducing them to lay down their arms and submit to legal author-
ity."
78
 A massive show of force would compel surrender without a fight.
75. Ibid., fo. 96-121, Clarke to Wrigley, 6 July 1885.
76. N.F. Black, History of Saskatchewan and the Old North West (Regina, 1913), p. 267.
The same story appeared in a contemporary account of Clarke's role by James Isbister.
See clipping from Winnipeg Sun, 19 June 1885, in PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming
Correspondence, p. 43861.
77. The opponents of Riel are named in Pearce's manuscript copy of "All Claims to
Land" (University of Alberta Archives, Pearce Papers, MG 9/2, series 4, vol. 4, pp.
888-901.
78. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Transcripts, vol. 585, Macdonald to Caron, 23 March 1885.
Confronting Riel and Completing the CPR 175
Although Dewdney preferred resolving the problem with local resources
("I would have rather seen the trouble stopped entirely by the police"), the
Governor had to concede that the Metis were even less likely to resist if
thousands of troops suddenly appeared on the scene, especially if the
government met Kiel's price and whisked him out of the country before the
troops arrived. "How far can I go?" Dewdney asked on March 23.
What Macdonald seems to have envisioned was a sudden dash to the
Prairies, a mysterious "escape" of Riel back to the United States, concilia-
tory gestures to the surrendering Metis, and aid for the railway after it
played such a key role in breaking up the "outbreak" so "speedily and gal-
lantly."
80
On March 26, however, the situation became unexpectedly compli-
cated by bloodshed. Since the Metis believed 500 police were en route to
arrest Riel, they prepared to fend off the NWMP in a long siege by sending
a force to seize supplies from a store at Duck Lake. Simultaneously, a party
of police went to the same place to spoil the attempt. When the two groups
came face to face, both sides sent out spokesmen to talk under a flag of
truce, but the meeting soon deteriorated into single-champion combat with
two men dead, then into general shooting with twelve fallen on the Cana-
dian side and five Metis killed.
81
The confrontation between police and "half breeds" was followed by
sporadic Indian action and raised the spectre of war such as the Americans
had fought in the 1860s and 1870s. After March 26, greater prospects of
danger and longer delays filled Macdonald with increased dread. "This
insurrection is a bad business," Macdonald wrote Dewdney on March 29,
"but we must face it as best we may."
82
Since the Americans were almost as worried as some Canadians that
the "outbreak" would become a general Indian war, they offered full co-
operation in the movement of troops and supplies and their own cavalry for
patrolling the border.
83
 Macdonald accepted the transport offer for shipping
equipment, but he insisted on the CPR as the vehicle for transporting the
unfortunate Canadian volunteers, the first contingent of whom left Toronto
on March 30 in two separate trains. When the men reached the north shore
79. Ibid., Incoming Correspondence, pp. 43020-43023, Dewdney to Macdonald, 23 March
1885.
80. "Speedy" and "gallant" were Macdonald's adjectives in Parliament. See House of
Commons Debates, 6 July 1885, p. 3117.
81. A detailed, sensational account of the conflict appears in Beal and Macleod, Prairie
Fire, pp. 151-159.
82. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Letter Books, vol. 23, p. 140, Macdonald to Dewdney, 29
March 1885.
83. See Blake's questions on the matter, House of Commons Debates, 31 March 1885, p.
838; and 1 April 1885, p. 872.
79
176 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
of Lake Superior in the first week of April, they discovered that there were
four gaps in the line that had to be crossed by sleigh or on foot. The worst
part, however, was one section of isolated railway where the men had to
ride on flat cars in the open, bitter cold.
84
 Still, in less than two weeks,
more than 3,000 troops did reach the Territories ready to be deployed
against the "half breeds" and their few Indian allies.
In the fighting that occurred here and there in late April and early May
there were several encounters that could be called battles.
85
 For more than
fifty Canadians and a similar number of "half breeds" and Indians, death
was as final as in any global conflict. And yet Macdonald did not exag-
gerate later when he dismissed most of the military side of the ' 'North West
Rebellion" as a "mere riot."
From Macdonald's point of view, the more important aspects of the
affair were showing the flag of British authority and proving that the rail-
way had transformed Canada into a country capable of suppressing chal-
lenges to its sovereignty in the most remote sections of habitable territory.
To be sure, the Opposition made searing accusations of mismanagement,
but Macdonald met their charges that the war could have been avoided with
counter-charges that his own "half breed" policy had been far more liberal
than his opponents.
86
 Indeed, on native affairs in general he claimed to be
the epitome of enlightened and progressive action, and he moved to sub-
stantiate his claim in April with a diversionary franchise bill that included
proposals for nearly universal suffrage for white men and extension of the
vote to certain single women and the Six Nations of Loyalist Indians in
Ontario.
87
The Liberals were triply embarrassed. Having denounced
Macdonald's handling of North West matters, they seemed sympathetic to
natives; then, having posed as friends of the Indians and the Metis, they
were embarrassed by their own vehement opposition to the inclusion of cer-
tain loyal native people in the national franchise because David Mills said
they were "savages." Thus, they were set up to be embarrassed the third
time when they fought the aid for the railway that had saved the nation
from a prolonged war with Canada's native peoples.
The CPR did receive its aid package in July. In the same month, Louis
Riel stood trial at Regina where he was held accountable for treason and
sentenced to hang. Riel dropped to the end of the hangman's rope in
84. Desmond Morton, The Last War Drum (Toronto, 1972), pp. 40-44.
85. On the final siege, in particular, see Walter Hildebrandt, The Battle ofBatoche: British
Small Warfare and the Entrenched Metis (Ottawa, 1985).
86. See Blake's seven-hour speech and Macdonald's shorter reply in the House of
Commons Debates, 6 July 1885, pp. 3075-3117.
87. See Malcolm Montgomery, "The Six Nations and the Macdonald Franchise," Ontario
History 57 (1967), pp. 13-25.
Confronting Kiel and Completing the CPR 111
Regina on November 16. The railway reached its official completion
almost at the same time in a last-spike ceremony on November 7. Still jubi-
lant over the success of his railway, Stephen wrote Macdonald just before
Kiel's execution to inform the Prime Minister of his pleasure with the rising
value of CPR stock over the preceding week and to tell Sir John how
"glad" he was that the "mischievous crank Riel is going to have justice
meted out to him."
88
 No other correspondent with Macdonald was as quick
to link the two events so directly, but few people other than Stephen knew
how closely the Metis loss had been joined to the railway's gain.
88. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 123001- 123008, Stephen to
Macdonald, 14 November 1885.
Louis Riel, ca. 1880
(Public Archives of Canada [PA139073])
"His private land speculation and staunch loyalism both made him an
unremarkable candidate for the role of provincial premier."
178
Conclusion
The loose end of the "North West Rebellion" was Louis Riel. In the sum-
mer and autumn of 1885, French Canadians demanded clemency, in part
simply because the cry for hanging was so strident in Ontario. With Mack-
enzie Bowell, Grand Master of the Orange Order of Ontario, on one side in
the federal Cabinet and Sir Hector Langevin, a former head of Quebec's St
Jean Baptiste Society, at the other extreme, Macdonald was caught in
between. He was understandably eager to avoid confrontation with Riel in
August 1884 and anxious to get Riel quietly out of the country once the
Prime Minister had the exploitable crisis that was the salvation of Stephen's
railway. Unfortunately, no one reached the Metis chief in time. When Riel
surrendered on May 16, his capture alive meant that there would be a contr-
oversial trial and execution.
Macdonald's strategy for bringing the affair to a conclusion that was
satisfactory to Ontario without too severely damaging his party in Quebec
was to get the matter finished quickly, to permit free ventilation of resent-
ments by members of his own party at the postponed next session of Parlia-
ment, and to delay the next general election until the latest possible date in
the hope that more manageable distractions would arise in the interim.
"He who waits wins."
For the purpose of expediting the execution, Macdonald attempted to
downplay the significance of the "outbreak" in August, after having
already understated the "gallant and speedy" role of the railway in the
recent national mobilization to put down "rebellion." The Governor Gen-
eral had wanted to make a brief statement of commendation in his throne
speech proroguing Parliament in July. "Might not a sentence be added tes-
tifying to the value of the CPR as a military road?" he asked on July II.
1
The Prime Minister's reply has not survived in his or Lansdowne's papers,
but the text of the speech delivered on July 20 did not mention the railway
except as a great national project that was likely to "accelerate the progress
l.PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, p. 33147, Lansdowne to
Macdonald, 11 July 1885.
179
180 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
of settlement and augment the commerce of the Dominion" now that Parli-
ament had so wisely contributed the last essential subsidy guaranteeing its
success.
2
 In the new context of the CPR's certain completion (and Kiel's
inevitable execution), Macdonald wished to downplay the significance of
the "outbreak," reducing it from rebellion (a political crime likely to
receive Crown clemency) to mere riot and murder (criminal matters on
which an appeal to Great Britain would be inappropriate). Here Lansdowne
hesitated. At the end of August 1885, the Governor General reminded the
Prime Minister that
we have all of us been doing what we could to elevate it to the rank of a
rebellion and with so much success that we cannot now reduce it to the rank
of a common riot.
If the movement had been at once stopped with the NWM police the
case would have been different, but we were within an ace of Indian war;
the progress of the outbreak and its suppression has been described in glow-
ing language of the press all over the world; we brought up troops from all
parts of the Dominion; those troops have been thanked by parliament; they
are to receive an Imperial medal.
3
Macdonald had to admit in his reply on September 3 that the proposal sud-
denly to call the affair by a new name simply for a different political effect
was brazen. ' 'I fear you have me with respect to the character given to the
outbreak." But the Prime Minister reminded the Governor General that
important political objectives had been well served by attaching inflated
significance to the Metis riot previously. "We have certainly made it
assume large proportions in the public eye. This has been done however
for our own purposes, and I think wisely done."
4
 The implication was that
one justifiable manipulation called for another. Consequently, although the
execution did not proceed with unseemly haste (there was an inquiry into
Kiel's sanity), at the last step, royal intervention did not spare Kiel as the
Crown had pardoned political offenders elsewhere in nineteenth-century
British and Canadian history.
Anticipating the next step, Macdonald predicted that Quebec's sym-
pathy for Kiel would be an ephemeral phenomenon. He believed that the
outrage of the Opposition members was purely artificial, worked up by
their contrivance of a thematic similarity between the North West Rebel-
lion and Quebeckers' "own rising in 1837 and their 'Martyrs'.... The
attempt now made to revive that feeling in his [Kiel's] favour will not
extend far and will be evanescent."
5
 The Prime Minister was confident that
2. Canada Gazette, 25 July 1885.
3. PAC, Macdonald Papers, Incoming Correspondence, pp. 42559-42562, Lansdowne to
Macdonald, 31 August 1885.
4. Ibid., Letter Books, vol. 23, pp. 271-272, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 3 September
1885.
5. Ibid., pp. 264-267, Macdonald to Lansdowne, 28 August 1885.
Conclusion 181
the logic of the Toronto Mail would appeal, ultimately, even to French
Canadians. Macdonald's paper in Toronto had argued that, if there were
blame, "if the French-Canadians sought to bring down Sir John A. Mac-
donald, let them do it on grounds other than the execution of Riel." To des-
troy the government for hanging a rebel would mean more than the defeat
of Macdonald's ministry. According to the Mail, "if he should be
overthrown simply because he has upheld the majesty of the law ... then
Canadian institutions cannot survive him."
6
The problem, of course, was that the evidence for exposing the
government on the other grounds was not a matter of public record, and did
not become open to detailed investigation until 1917 when the surviving
bulk of Macdonald's private papers were sold by his widow to the Public
Archives of Canada. Even then, many pertinent documents continued to be
held in the surrounding warehouses of secrets in Ottawa. Indeed, the
secrecy of certain relevant documents was still being maintained by the
Canadian Department of Justice one full century later.
7
 Enough evidence
has emerged, however, to respond to the Mail's challenge, to the critical
questions raised in the introduction and pursued through the pages of the
preceding chapters.
It would appear on the evidence presented that recognition of Metis
demands in the Manitoba Act was regarded by the Government of Canada
as a kind of contract negotiated under duress. Macdonald admitted to the
House of Commons in 1885 that he had never accepted the concept of
Metis aboriginal rights in principle, or the notion that Manitoba was to have
continued as it began—a predominately Metis province. He declared that
the concessions in 1870 were for the sake of taking possession of the terri-
tory with as little force as possible:
to secure peace and order—in fact, to obtain possession of the country — it
was necessary to enter into an arrangement.... Whether they [the Metis]
had any right to those lands or not was not so much the question as it was a
question of policy to make an arrangement with the inhabitants of the Pro-
vince ... in order to introduce law and order there, and assert the
sovereignty of the Dominion.
8
No matter how inauspicious the beginning, in Macdonald's view, his
6. Toronto Mail, 20 November 1885. See P.B. Waite's interpretation of the same
quotation in the context of his discussion of the execution controversy in Canada,
1874-1896, p. 170 and the text of footnote 104, p. 305.
7. On the Justice Department's blanket claim to confidentiality, see James M. Whalen,
"The Application of Solicitor-Client Privilege to Government Records," Archivaria
18 (1984), pp. 135-141. Whalen's suggestion that access requests are sometimes
granted is valid. In the case of the present author, for example, access to thirty-seven
files was requested in the spring of 1986. Copies of six were provided. Access to
eighty-three pages of thirty-one other files was denied.
8. House of Commons Debates, 6 July 1885, pp. 3112-3113.
182 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
government had been consistently more liberal in its handling of Metis
matters than the Opposition had been during its term in office from 1874 to
1878. Their entire administration, according to Macdonald, was one vast
attempt to "keep down, and crush, and destroy the interests and the rights,
or rather the claims of those people."
9
 The Liberals' sudden conversion to
sympathy for the Metis in 1885 was hypocritical pretence, calculated for
partisan gain.
The indictment of the former government by the current administra-
tion was valid, as correct as the new Opposition leader's critique of Mac-
donald. Edward Blake's seven-hour denunciation, delivered on July 6
argued that the Conservatives had provided nothing more than "quasi-
recognition." The reality was "neglect, delay and mismanagement."
Each leader knew well the political practice of the other: Blake knew
the Conservatives promised accommodation that was vitiated by artful
delay; Macdonald correctly criticized the Liberals for brutal denials of
existing rights or their stubborn refusals to consider new Metis demands
from 1874 to 1878. In the period of the first Macdonald administration,
from 1870 through 1873, the land claims of original settlers were neither
denied nor honoured. They were held in an administrative limbo while the
territory was opened to newcomers whose claims were treated with unusual
swiftness and generosity. In the same period of declining Metis power in
Manitoba, nothing of any importance in the politics and government of the
new province was permitted in strictly Manitoba terms. Even though the
people had proven themselves capable of forming institutions of self-
government and operating them democratically in 1869-70, they were
excluded from the self-governing autonomy enjoyed by the other provinces
in Confederation. So long as the Metis were the majority, the Premier was
the Royal Governor, an outsider operated from Ottawa. To be sure, the first
Lieutenant Governor was sensitive to the wishes of his subjects. But
Archibald's was still a colonial administration, and his most important ini-
tiative to bolster Metis claims (his handling of the land question in the sum-
mer of 1871) was quietly repudiated by his superiors and subsequently sub-
verted by Macdonald's agent, Gilbert McMicken.
In the meantime, Riel and his followers kept waiting, remarkably
patiently, hoping for the restoration of the provisional government. Riel
considered himself a good Conservative. His private land speculation and
staunch loyalism both made him an unremarkable candidate for the role of
provincial premier as soon as the amnesty was proclaimed. But the Govern-
ment of Canada was no more prepared to see restoration of the provisional
government than it was ready to accept pre-emptive control of Metis land
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 3075-3110.
10
Conclusion 183
by a Metis controlled legislature.
Macdonald delayed and delayed. The time for implementing the
amnesty was never quite right, and there was always one more survey to be
conducted before this or that parcel of land could be allotted or patented. In
the meantime, the claims of new settlers in Manitoba went ahead smoothly,
and newcomers became more and more important in the politics, govern-
ment, and militia of the new province. As early as 1873, the tide was turn-
ing.
The Liberals' preference for straightforward denial over delay or sub-
terfuge was clearly evident in their position on both debates of the Mani-
toba Act, in 1871 as well as in 1870. Once in power, the Liberals remained
true to their original hostility and substituted perpetual loss of political
rights and five-years banishment for the vague amnesty promised by Mac-
donald and Cartier. At the same time, they shifted the burden of proof in
the land question from the government to the claimants. Metis "squatters"
retained only the right to present the facts of their cases to the Department
of the Interior. The claims that were consistent with new settlement-duty
criteria received clear titles. Claims that did not meet the criteria of the
Department of the Interior were denied and there was no right of appeal.
Then the land that was allotted and patented in the name of the children of
original settlers went through a process that could not have been better
suited to dissolution of their land base unless it were delivered directly to
speculators for sale to newcomers. Indeed, most of the patents arriving in
Winnipeg were handed directly to such persons, given the requirement that
recipients had to work through "attorneys" if patentees were not person-
ally acquainted with the Dominion Lands Agent.
Throughout the period when the Liberals were denying Metis rights,
Macdonald's party stood by in acquiescent opposition. Perhaps nothing
revealed Macdonald's true position on the Manitoba Act more clearly than
his unwillingness to criticize the Liberals' many amendments of the law
until they attacked his handling of Metis claims in 1885. Not surprisingly,
after the formation of his second ministry late in 1878, Macdonald moved
easily in the processes that his immediate predecessors had set in motion.
He was happy to call the matter of the Manitoba land question closed in
1882, the year of the largest migration of Manitobans to Saskatchewan. By
then, a second opportunity for genuine accommodation was being lost,
since Macdonald rejected the scheme of assisting Metis resettlement. The
Prime Minister preferred the noble but empty words of an inoperative
clause in a statute to actions that would have recognized the Metis as a peo-
ple with collective rights outside the homestead provisions of the Dominion
Lands Act. Finally, Macdonald had sufficient advance warning to prevent
the formation of the second provisional government by implementing a
programme of conciliation in the autumn of 1884, and he appeared willing
184 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
to pursue such a policy until the political advantages of doing nothing
deflected him from such a course.
The conclusion is that the North West Rebellion in 1885 was not the
result of some tragic misunderstanding, but of the government's manipula-
tion of the Manitoba Metis since 1869. Canada appeared to tolerate accom-
modation when conflict was deemed inexpedient for reasons of state, and
aggravation of conflict when confrontation was dictated by the same
grounds of expediency. In the theme of Canada and the Metis, there was
less noble intention than filled the public ear, and more dishonesty than
ever caught the public eye. The presumption of benevolence is not
appropriately replaced by one of consistent malevolence, but the exodus of
the Metis from their original homeland and their difficulties in resettlement
is more explicable by processes of formal and informal discouragement
emanating from Canada than by the alleged preference of the Metis for the
wandering life of homeless hunters.
Note on Sources and Method
A brief scan of footnotes will show that the work is based primarily on the
letters and papers of Sir John A. Macdonald (Public Archives of Canada,
MG 26 A). Persons familiar with other studies of Riel or Macdonald will
notice that a considerable number of manuscript letters and memoranda
appear to be cited here, and not elsewhere. It remains to explain how the
main corpus of the collection of Macdonald papers could be available to
researchers in the Public Archives of Canada since 1917
1
 and remain less
than fully exploited—even by such thorough investigators as Donald
Creighton, who wrote his two-volume biography of Macdonald in the
1950s.
In Creighton's case, there are several facets to the answer. First and
most obviously, he was interested in the whole life of his hero; he did not
consider the subject of Canada and the Metis a main theme when so many
other matters appeared either more important or more worthy of com-
memoration in Macdonald's biography.
2
A second reason that Creighton and the later "Creightonian" histori-
ans have not made full use of the Macdonald papers is that preconceptions
about Macdonald's "true" significance appear to have narrowed the vision
of what is relevant. Some of the material cited here is "newly discovered"
only in the sense that another researcher may have seen the same letter or
memorandum but, under the presumption of benevolence, such material has
been considered either irrelevant or misleading.
A third reason has less to do with the limitations of the historians than
the physical inaccessibility of the evidence because the size of the collec-
tion is intimidating, to say the least. Focusing on the period of Macdonald's
career from 1867 to 1885 there are only thirteen volumes of his Letter
Books, but the Incoming Correspondence (called "Political Papers" in the
archival finding aid) are organized in 535 roughly chronological volumes
1. Creighton, Young Politician, p. viii.
2. For Creighton's intentions see his article, "Sir John A. Macdonald and Canadian
Historians," Canadian Historical Review 24 (1948), pp. 1-13.
185
186 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
running to 276,646 consecutively numbered pages. Clearly, the sheer size
of the Incoming Correspondence has precluded researchers from going
through the back volumes of the Macdonald papers on a systematic, page-
by-page basis—until 1968.
In August 1968 the Public Archives of Canada unveiled a comprehen-
sive author, subject, and chronological index. The first step in the present
study was a careful reading of the subject compilation, which involved
scanning every line from A to Z. Since particular items can address several
or many different subjects at once, it is unlikely that any material relating
to the diverse facets of the Macdonald-Metis theme in the Incoming
Correspondence was missed. At the completion of the survey, the many
references were entered into a machine-readable form and printed by page
number to identify duplicate or multiple references to the same item.
Transcription of evidence began with a careful reading of the many
items thus identified. In the process, it became evident that the cast of char-
acters in the subject—the personnel who served, appealed to, or succeeded
Macdonald in the administration of Metis rights—was a remarkably small
circle. At the same time, impressions were formed about each individual's
role in the formation and administration of native policy in the period under
study. On the chance that other important papers of the same actors existed
elsewhere, a systematic search was made of collections outside the Mac-
donald papers. Footnote references show that some important manuscripts
were found in the Governor General's Correspondence with the Colonial
Office, Morris papers in the Provincial Archives of Manitoba, the Mills
papers at the University of Western Ontario Archives, the Pearce papers in
the University of Alberta Archives, and the correspondence of Lawrence
Clarke in the Hudson's Bay Company Archives. But the Macdonald papers
remained the core material.
Broadening the study from Macdonald's circle of correspondents to
the bureaucratic apparatus he headed, the Records of the Department of the
Interior, Dominion Lands Branch files (PAC, RG 15) were consulted for
every year of the period from 1870 to 1885, and the statistical record of
Metis occupancy and persistence was linked to the administrative and legal
aspects of Metis dispersal.
During the last stage of the research, transcriptions of the Macdonald
Letter Books in the PAC and transcriptions of Macdonald letters in the
same archive from collections other than the Macdonald papers were con-
sulted for a comprehensive view of Sir John A. Macdonald's own writing
on the subject. A final benefit of the comprehensive index to the Macdonald
Papers was its utility in decoding a number of important cypher messages
into intelligible English (see the research note on the subject by Timothy
Dube, available from the Prime Minister Section, Manuscript Division,
PAC).
Note on Sources and Method 187
The point is that new material is continually coming to hand. As the
research and writing of critical studies of Canadian history continues, there
can be little doubt that some of the gaps or poorly supported conclusions of
the present work will be remedied by succeeding historians' contributions.
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Selected Bibliography
Primary Material Cited
1. Private Papers
J.C. Aikins Papers. Archives of Ontario, Toronto. Primarily private
correspondence but significant cabinet papers also included.
William Coldwell Papers. Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg. MG
2 14. Important eyewitness account of ratification of the "Manitoba
Treaty" by provisional government in June 1870.
Joseph Howe Papers. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 24 B29.
Corresponded officially and as a fellow Nova Scotian with Archibald
during his stint as Lieutenant Governor. Valuable material on the
emergence of the first Dominion Lands policy.
Sir John A. Macdonald Papers. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 26
A. As mentioned in the preceding note on method, the Macdonald
Papers were the pivotal collection for the present study, as important
for the incoming correspondence as Macdonald's own writing.
Alexander Mackenzie Papers. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 19
A 7. Disappointingly little on Canada and the Metis.
Archer Martin Papers. Provincial Archives of British Columbia. Includes
notes and correspondence for Martin's study of the Manitoba land
question, a book published in 1898 entitled The Hudson's Bay
Company's Land Tenures and the Occupation of Assiniboia by Lord
Selkirk's Settlers, with a List of Grantees under the Earl and the Com-
pany (London, 1898).
David Mills Papers. Archives of the University of Western Ontario, Lon-
don. Important for Mills' correspondence with Archbishop Tache.
Alexander Morris Papers. Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg. Best
collection of private and official correspondence during his period as
Lieutenant Governor.
William Pearce Papers. University of Alberta Archives, Edomonton. MG
9/2. The letterbooks contain copies of many important official reports
189
190 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
and other papers that do not appear anywhere in the records of the
Department of the Interior in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
Louis Riel Papers. Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg. MG 3. The
multi-volume collection of Kiel's letters and other works edited by
George Stanley, et al. (The Collected Writings of Louis Riel. 5 vols.
Edmonton, 1985) makes Riel material readily accessible but the
archival manuscripts are still the only location of letters incoming
from Kiel's correspondents.
2. Official Papers
Colonial Office Papers. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 11 CO42.
Microfilm of the British record of correspondence with the Governor
General on Canadian matters. Contains copies of materials that have
disappeared from the papers of the Canadian writers of such reports.
Records of the North West Rebellion. Hudson's Bay Company Archives,
Winnipeg. D.20/33 and B332/b/l. Crucially significant reports, letters
and telegrams to government officials not available elsewhere.
Records of the Governor General. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. RG
7. The pipeline of official reporting to Britain.
Records of the Department of the Interior. Public Archives of Canada,
Ottawa. RG 15. Second only to the Macdonald Papers for finding the
story of Canada and the Metis.
Records of the Department of Justice. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
RG 13. Letterbooks contain legal opinions on many matters of consti-
tutional significance.
3. Printed Government Records
Canada, Canada Gazette
, House of Commons Debates.
, Senate Debates.
, Sessional Papers.
, Journals of the House of Commons.
, Orders of the Governor General in Council.
Statutes of Canada.
Statutes of Manitoba.
4. Contemporary Imprints
Codd, Donald. "Some Reminiscenses of Fort Garry in 1869-70." Great
West Magazine 13 (1899), pp. 294-299.
Denison, G.T. Reminiscences of the Red River Rebellion of 1869. Toronto,
1873.
Hind, H.Y. Narrative of the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition of
1857 and of the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expeditions
of 1858. 2 vols. London, 1860.
Selected Bibliography 191
. "The Corruption of the Geological Survey." n.p., May, 1883.
Copy appears in PAC, RG 15, vol. 295, file 61147.
Macoun, John. Manitoba and the Great North-West. Guelph, 1882.
Morris, Alexander. Nova Britannia; or, Our New Canadian Dominion
Foreshadowed, Being a series of Lectures, Speeches, and Addresses.
Toronto, 1884.
O'Donnell, J.H. Manitoba Matters: Being a Short Chapter Devoted and
Dedicated to the Davis-Royal Administration, The Autonomy of Pro-
vinces no Longer respected, Ottawa Dictates, Manitoba Obeys. Win-
nipeg, 1875.
5. Newspapers
Manitoba Free Press.
The Manitoban.
Ottawa Times.
Toronto Mail.
Toronto Globe.
Secondary Works Cited
1. Book and Journal Articles
Creighton, D.G. "Sir John A. Macdonald and Canadian Historians."
Canadian Historical Review 24 (1948), pp. 1-13.
Dorge, Lionel. "The Metis and Canadian Councillors of Assiniboia."
Beaver 305 (1974), 1:12-19, 2:39-45, 3:51-58.
Ens, Gerhard. "Metis Lands in Manitoba 1870-1887." Manitoba History 5
(1983), pp. 2-11.
Flanagan, Thomas. "Louis Riel: Review Essay." Journal of Canadian Stu-
dies 21 (1986), pp. 157-164.
Gagan, David. "Land, Population, and Social Change: The 'Critical Years'
in Rural Canada West." Canadian Historical Review 59 (1978), pp.
293-318.
Judd, Carol M. "Native Labour and Social Stratification in the Hudson's
Bay Northern Department, 1770-1870." Canadian Review of Sociol-
ogy and Anthropology 17 (1980), pp. 305-314.
Kemp, Douglas. "Land Grants Under the Manitoba Act." Historical and
Scientific Society of Manitoba. Transactions series 3, No. 9 (1952-53),
pp. 33-52.
Lalonde, A.N. "Colonization Companies in the 1880s." Saskatchewan
History 24 (1971), pp. 101-114.
. "Colonization Companies and the North-West Rebellion." In
F. Laurie Barron and James B. Waldram, eds., 1885 and After: Native
Society in Transition. Regina, 1986.
192 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
Mailhot, P.R. and Sprague, D.N. "Persistent Settlers: The Dispersal and
Resettlement of the Red River Metis, 1870-1885." Canadian Journal
of Ethnic Studies 17 (1985), pp. 1-30.
McLean, D. and Schulman, M. "Lawrence Clarke: Architect of Revolt."
Canadian Journal of Native Studies 3 (1983), pp. 57-68.
Montgomery, Malcolm. "The Six Nations and the Macdonald Franchise."
Ontario History 57 (1967), pp. 13-25.
Morton, W.L. "The Red River Parish." In R.C. Lodge, ed. Manitoba
Essays. Toronto, 1937.
. Review of Le Metis canadien by Marcel Giraud. The Beaver
281 (September 1950), p. 3-7.
Painchaud, Robert. "French-Canadian Historiography and Franco-
Canadian Settlement in Western Canada, 1870-1915." Canadian His-
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Pannekoek, Frits. "The Rev. Griffiths Owen Corbett and the Red River
Civil War of 1869-70." Canadian Historical Review 57 (1976), pp.
133-149.
Peterson, Jacqueline. "Prelude to Red River: A Social Portrait of the Great
Lakes Metis." Ethnohistory 25 (1978), pp. 41-67.
Reynolds, G.F. "The Man Who Created the Corner of Portage and Main."
Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba. Transactions (1970).
Roberts, A.C. "The Surveys in the Red River Settlement in 1869." The
Canadian Surveyor (1970), pp. 238-248.
St-Onge, Nicole. "The Dissolution of a Metis Community: Pointe a
Grouette, 1860-1885." Studies in Political Economy 18 (1985), pp.
149-172.
Sprague, D.N. "The Manitoba Land Question, 1870-1882." Journal of
Canadian Studies 15 (1980), pp. 74-84.
. "Government Lawlessness in the Administration of Manitoba
Land Claims, 1870-1887." Manitoba Law Journal 10 (1980), pp.
415-441.
Spry, Irene, ed. "The Memories of George William Sanderson." Cana-
dian Ethnic Studies 17 (1985), pp. 115-134.
Stanley, George. "Last Word on Louis Riel—The Man of Several Faces."
In F. Laurie Barron and James B. Waldram, eds. 1885 and After:
Native Society in Transition. Regina, 1986.
Thomas, Lewis H. "A Judicial Murder—The Trial of Louis Riel." In
Howard Palmer, ed. The Settlement of the West. Calgary, 1977, pp.
37-59.
Woolworth, N.L. "Gingras, St Joseph and the Metis in the Northern Red
River Valley, 1843-1873." North Dakota History 42:4 (1975), pp.
16-27.
Selected Bibliography 193
2. Books
Adams, Howard. Prison of Grass. Toronto, 1975.
Beal, Bob and Macleod, Rod. Prairie Fire: The 1885 North-West Rebel-
lion. Edmonton, 1984.
Benoit, D.P. Vie de Monseigneur Tache, archeveque de Saint-Boniface. 2
vols. Montreal, 1904.
Berger, Carl. The Writing of Canadian History. Toronto, 1976.
Black, N.F. History of Saskatchewan and the Old North West. Regina,
1913.
Brown, Jennifer. Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in
Indian Country. Vancouver, 1980.
Bryce, George. A Short History of the Canadian People. London, 1887.
Campbell, M.W. The North West Company. Toronto, 1957.
Careless, J.M.S., ed. Colonists and Canadiens, 1760-1867. Toronto, 1971.
Creighton, D.G. Sir John A. Macdonald. 2 vols. The Young Politician.
Toronto, 1956. The Old Chieftain. Toronto, 1955.
de Tremaudan, A.H. Histoire de la Nation Metisse dans V Quest canadien.
Montreal, 1935.
Flanagan, Thomas. Louis 'David' Kiel: 'Prophet of the New World.'
Toronto, 1979.
. Kiel and the Rebellion 1885 Reconsidered. Saskatoon, 1983.
Friesen, Gerald. The Canadian Prairies. Toronto, 1984.
Gagan, David. Hopeful Travellers: Families, Land, and Social Change in
Mid-Victorian Peel County, Canada West. Toronto, 1981.
Galbraith, J.S. The Little Emperor: Governor Simpson of the Hudson's Bay
Company. Toronto, 1976.
Gibson, Dale and Lee. Substantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba,
1670-1970. Winnipeg, 1972.
Giraud, Marcel. Le Metis canadien: son role dans I'histoire des provinces
de I'Quest. 2 vols. Paris, 1945.
Goldring, Philip. Papers on the Labour System of the Hudson's Bay Com-
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Hedges, James B. Building the Canadian West: The Land and Colonization
Policies of the Canadian Pacific Railway. New York, 1939.
Hildebrandt, Walter. The Battle of Batoche: British Small Warfare and the
Entrenched Metis. Ottawa, 1985.
Houston, Cecil J. and Smyth, William J. The Sash Canada Wore: A Histor-
ical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada. Toronto, 1980.
Howard, Joseph Kinsey. The Strange Empire of Louis Riel. New York,
1952.
Lamb, W. Kaye. History of the Canadian Pacific Railway. New York,
194 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
1977.
MacBeth, R.G. Making the Canadian West. Toronto, 1905.
McCallum, John. Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic
Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870. Toronto, 1980.
McKillop, A.B., ed. Contexts of Canada's Past: Selected Essays of W.L.
Morton. Toronto, 1980.
McLean, Don. 1885: Metis Rebellion or Government Conspiracy? Winni-
peg, 1985.
Mailhot, Philippe R. "Ritchot's Resistance: Abbe Noel Joseph Ritchot and
the Creation and Transformation of Manitoba." Unpublished PhD
Thesis: University of Manitoba, 1986.
Martin, Chester. ''Dominion Lands" Policy. Toronto, 1973.
Morice, A.G. History of the Catholic Church in Western Canada. 2 vols.
Toronto, 1910.
Morton, Desmond. The Last War Drum. Toronto, 1972.
Morton, W.L., ed. Alexander Begg's Red River Journal and Other Papers
Relative to the Red River Resistance of 1869-70. Toronto, 1956.
, ed. Manitoba: The Birth of a Province. Winnipeg, 1965.
. The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-
1873. Toronto, 1964.
. The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest
Times. Toronto, 1963.
. Manitoba: A History. Toronto, 1957.
Owram, Doug. Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement
and the Idea of the West 1856-1900. Toronto, 1980.
Patterson, George C. Land Settlement in Upper Canada. Toronto, 1920.
Payment, Diane. Batoche, 1870-1910. Saint-Boniface, 1983.
Pope, Joseph. Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald. 2
vols. Ottawa, 1894.
Pryke, Kenneth G. Nova Scotia and Confederation. Toronto, 1979.
Ray, Arthur. Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Hunters, Trappers,
and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870.
Toronto, 1974.
Rea, J.E., ed. The Letters of Charles John Brydges, 1883-1889. Publica-
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Silver, A.I. The French Canadian Idea of Confederation 1864-1900.
Toronto, 1982.
Sprague, D.N. and Frye, R.P., compilers. The Genealogy of the First Metis
Nation. Winnipeg, 1983.
Spry, Irene, ed. An Account of John Palliser's British North American
Exploring Expedition, 1857-1860. Toronto, 1960.
Selected Bibliography 195
Stanley, George. The Birth of Western Canada. London, 1936.
. Louis Riel. Toronto, 1963.
Waite, P.B. Canada, 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny. Toronto, 1971.
Warkentin, J. and Ruggles, Richard I. Manitoba Historical Atlas. Winni-
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Willson, Beckles. Lord Strathcona: The Story of His Life. London, 1902.
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Index
Archibald, Adams G.: accepts preferred
Metis method of taking 1.4 million
acres, 94; complains Manitoba is denied
responsible government, 79; critical of
OC of 26 May 1871, 94, 96; defends
himself over handshaking incident, 78;
expected arrival as Lt. Gov. (1870), 67;
initial instructions on land question, 90;
offers resignation as Lt. Gov., 81; ord-
ers first Dominion census of Manitoba,
75; proposes confirmation of titles by
deed poll, 93; reacts to scolding by
Howe, 97; report on land, 90; reports
renewal of trouble between old and new
settlers, 102; seeks permission to retire
from Manitoba, 101; shakes hand of
Louis Riel, 77; urges general amnesty,
76
Bannatyne, A.G.B., 138
Baring Brothers, 168
Batoche. See Metis
Begg, James, 138
Blake, Edward, 27, 110; attacks
Macdonald's handling of Metis rights
(1885), 182; reminds Parliament of
BNA Act (1871), 113
Bowell, Mackenzie, 179
Bown,J.Y.,30
British North America Act (1867): sec-
tion 24, jurisdiction over Indians, 105;
section 92(1), provincial constitutions,
59; section 146, admitting new pro-
vinces, 28; section 147, representation
in the Senate, 62
British North America Act (1871), 62,111
Brown, George, 19
Bruce, John, 39
Burgess, A.M., 149
Callum, Simon, 134,138
Cameron, D.R., 40
Campbell, Alexander: devises first
Dominion Lands policy (1871), 91;
informs Morris province may not leg-
islate for Metis, 105; resentment of
Stephen, 153; supports Girard amend-
ment, 126
Canada North West Land Company, 149
Canadian Pacific Railway, 10: in histori-
cal interpretation, 10-12. See also
Stephen, George.
Cartier, George: defends statute
confirming Manitoba Act, 63; in first
debate of the Manitoba Act, 59; informs
Ritchot that petition must precede
amnesty, 70; negotiates British
Columbia's entry to Confederation, 71;
negotiating text of Manitoba Act, 58;
negotiating with HBC on terms of
transfer, 28; participation in Rebellion
of 1837, 79; promises to Ritchot, 61;
reaffirms amnesty was promised
through British, 84; recommends gen-
eral amnesty to Lord Lisgar, 71; wins
Provencher(1872),81
Cartwright, Richard, 118
Clarke, Lawrence: advises arrest of Riel
197
198 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
(March 1885), 173; calls for repression
of Saskatchewan Metis (1884), 162;
meets Lt. Gov. Dewdney concerning
action against Metis, 172
Codd, Donald: connection with J.S.
Dennis, 115; dismissed from lands
agency, 132; ignores fraud in transfers
of Metis land, 124; offensive behaviour
reported to Macdonald, 132; provides
J.S. Dennis with information on staked
claims, 119; receives instructions con-
cerning staked claims, 121; seeks
clarification of impact of Manitoba Act
changes, 120; seeks meaning of "occu-
pancy" in Manitoba Act (sec 32), 114;
worried about staked claims, 115
Colonization Company of Canada, 148
Cram, Thomas, 148
Creighton, Donald, 9
Crimean War, 19
Crozier, L.N.F., 163
De Salaberry, Charles, 46
Dease, William, 36
Dennis, J.S.: agrees to meet with Russell
and Tache on staked claims, 135;
becomes Surveyor General, 114; com-
missioned by McDougall to restore
peace, 45; considers Manitoba land
matters settled (1879), 130; defends the
Lang report, 134; flees Red River Set-
tlement (1869), 45; leads Red River sur-
vey (1869), 34, 37; notifies Ottawa of
Metis discontent (August 1869), 34;
prepares Metis resettlement scheme
(1879), 161; responds to interruption of
surveys, 39; seeks information concern-
ing staked claims, 119; seeks Tache's
reaction to commuting 1.4 million acres
with scrip, 122
Desalaberry, Charles, 41
Dewdney, Edgar: complains OC of 28
Jan. 1885 is provocative, 170; dismisses
Clarke report, 162; proposes course of
action for Clarke (17 March 1885), 173;
pursues independent initiative in Metis
matters, 172; reports Riel's appearance
is a nuisance but no threat, 163; thinks
police competent to handle North West
disturbance, 174; urges action against
Metis (March 1885), 172
Disraeli, Benjamin, 142
Dominion Lands Act, 141, 157-158: as
codifiction of OC's of 25 April 1871,26
May 1871,104; forerunner of, 91-92; in
historical interpretation, 3; in relation to
river-lot claims in Saskatchewan, 171;
recognizes Metis, 162
Dubuc, Joseph, 75,131,136-137
Duck, George, 158
Ellice, Edward, 24
Fenians, 78,96,98
Flanagan, Thomas, 14
Gaddy, William, 8
Girard, Marc, 126
Giraud, Marcel, 5-6
Gladieux, Pierre, 23
Gladstone, William Ewart, 151
Goulet, Roger, 134
Grahame, James, 162
Grandin, Vital, 6,169
Guillemette, Francois, 51,74
Gunn, Alexander, 129
Henshaw, F.W., 148
Hind, H.Y.: calls Macoun's work fraudu-
lent, 147; comments on agriculture at
Red River (1850s), 22; observes most
occupants of Red River away by 15
June, 23, 116; on land tenure at Red
River, 23; on the Metis as farmers, 23
Holton, Luther, 29
Howe, Joseph: sceptical about Canadian
colonial policy (1869), 27; scolds
Archibald for his independent role on
land question, 97; urges Macdonald to
instruct Archibald on land question, 95
Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), 7:
affected by British Order in Council on
transfer, 33; claiming compensation for
North West, 26; consequences of
merger with North West Company, 21;
involvement in North West Rebellion,
173; land policy in the 1880s, 150;
renewal of control of North West
(1859), 19; terms of transfer of Rupert's
Land, 28
Irvine, A.G., 163,172
Jolibois, Jean Baptiste, 133,138
Index 199
Laird, David: complains of obstruction of
Manitoba Act amendments, 114; pro-
poses amendment of Manitoba Act, 113
Lang, Robert: exposed in criminal con-
spiracy, 137; investigates river-lot
claims, Ste Agathe, 132
Langevin, Hector: as head of St Jean Bap-
tiste Society, 179; urges conciliatory
disposition of Metis land claims, 168;
western tour (1884), 165
Lariviere, A.A.C., 99
Lepine, Ambroise, 40,79, 85
Lepine, Jean Baptiste, 36
Lord Buckingham, 148
Lord Granville: approves result of nego-
tiations with Red River (1870), 61;
demands mediation of Red River trou-
bles, 51; reaction to arrest of Red River
delegates, 55; receives disqualified
amnesty from Lisgar, 71; reluctant to
co-operate in Red River expedition,
50-51
Lord Kimberley, 62
Lord Lansdowne: advises conciliating
Riel, 164; approves Macdonald's
scheme for Metis conciliation, 165;
discouraged from praising CPR for role
in rebellion, 179; receives Metis
grievances, December 1884,169; resists
unseemly haste in Riel's execution, 180
Lord Lisgar: agrees to put amnesty prom-
ise in writing, 70; disqualifies Carrier's
amnesty proposal, 71; requests delay in
passage of BNA Act (1871), 63
Lord Selkirk, 21
Loyalists, 59,92,160
Lynch,Joseph, 76
Macdonald, John A.: accepts necessity of
conquest of Red River, 52; accepts
Rose's advice on transfer delay, 43;
accepts Stephen's proposal concerning
homestead land, 146; accepts terms for
Stephen's railway, 143; according to:
Donald Creighton, 9, 11; George Stan-
ley, 3; Marcel Giraud, 5; W.L. Morton,
7; accuses Smith of cowardice, 46; ack-
nowledges receipt of Archibald report
on land, 91; adds Metis claims to provi-
sions of Dominion Lands Act, 161;
advises McDougall to be cautious, 42;
aid promised Stephen within three
months (Jan. 1884), 168; angered by
Riel's unexpected return (1872), 80;
anticipating native resistance to coloni-
zation (1869), 30; arrest and trial best
means to defeat Riel (1872), 82;
attempts to expedite Riel's execution,
179; authorizes Morris to allot 1.4 mil-
lion acres, 104; becomes Minister of the
Interior (1878), 130; blames McDougall
for transfer embarrassment, 46; bribes
Riel to leave Manitoba until 1873, 79;
commences negotiations with Red
River delegates, 56; compares his han-
dling of Metis rights with Opposition's
(1885), 182; complains of increasing
desperation over CPR, 169; confident
Orangemen will end Riel's polical
career (1872), 103; coping with the
Opposition during the NW Rebellion,
176; criticizes Archibald for handshak-
ing incident, 78; deceives Cartier and
delegates with false amnesty, 72;
defends CPR contract in Parliament,
145; delays consideration of North
West Metis (1879-1884), 160; denies
Manitoba Act amendments are altera-
tions, 113; denounces conditional
amnesty as pardon, 86; desperation over
CPR aid bill (February 1884), 154; dev-
ises elaborate Metis conciliation scheme
(1884), 164; distances himself from
Dept. of the Interior (1883), 138; expec-
tations after 26 March 1885, 175;
expectations in negotiations with Red
River delegates, 55; expectations on 23
March 1885,174; expects second provi-
sional government (1884-85), 170; first
Canadian colonial policy (1869), 29;
gravely ill during debate of Manitoba
Act, 73; hesitant to accept NW Council
scheme for Metis, 161; inadmissibility
of local control of land claims, 89;
informs McDougall of Smith mission,
46; informs Rose of trouble at Red
River, 42; informs Tache of intent to
allot 1.4 million acres immediately,
104; initial response to trouble at Red
River, 41; introduces Archibald to
McMicken, 96; introduces Manitoba
Act, 59; land promises outside the Man-
itoba Act, 61; learns of Lang conspiracy
(1882), 137; learns 1.4 million acres not
200 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
completely alloted (1880), 131; local
militia needed for inter-settler conflict,
107; mobilization for North West
Rebellion, 174; North West acquisition
scheme (1869), 26; on the intent of the
Manitoba Act, 18, 83; on the principle
of Metis aboriginal rights, 181; oppos-
ing amnesty for Riel, 109; opposing
Canadian expansion (1850s), 24; orders
delay in administration of Metis claims,
93; orders energetic action on general
homestead policy, 93; orders secrecy in
proposed allotment scheme, 99; orders
secret census of the Metis (1884), 163;
prepares for military solution to Red
River, 50; promises Tache to reopen
staked-claim issue (1879), 130; pro-
motes colonization-company scheme,
147; proposes imperial statute
confirming Manitoba Act, 62; reaction
to amnesty demand, 57; reaction to
arrest of Red River delegates (1870),
55; reaction to killing of Thomas Scott,
52; reaction to Stephen's demand for
second aid bill, 167; reaction to
Stephen's first loan proposal, 153;
reacts to amnesty proposal from Morris,
83; reacts to Clarke report, 162; reacts
to Kimberley proposal, 63; reacts to
Tache's threats over amnesty delay, 84;
ready to proclaim limited amnesty, 85;
receives warning of danger in North
West (1884), 164; recruits Morris for
Manitoba duties, 81; reinforces NWMP,
(1884), 166; reiteration of National Pol-
icy, 146; rejects Stephen's Irish emigra-
tion scheme, 151; reluctant to conciliate
Metis (1870), 49; reopens land for
homestead entry, 152; reports inadmiss-
able Red River demands to Murdoch,
72; repudiates Smith's actions as com-
missioner, 49; resignation in 1873, 109;
responds to McMicken's alarm about
inter-settler conflict, 102; retreat from
conciliation (1884), 166; running in
three ridings (1878), 129; scolds Royal
for jealous advocacy of Metis claims,
137; seeks British support for railway
scheme, 142; seeks Manitoba seat for
Carrier, 80; selective opposition to
Mackenzie, 127; sends McDougall to
Manitoba, 34; style in opposition, 109;
tardy about warning McDougall of
transfer delay, 43; unresponsive to
Archibald on land matters, 97; unveils
the "National Policy," 118; urged to
abandon colonization company scheme,
149; urges delay in amnesty question,
77; urges 10 month delay on all Metis
matters, 97; withdraws most land from
homestead for railway (1879), 142
Mackenzie, Alexander: accepts
Governor's advice on amnesty, 86;
agrees to reconsider proposed amend-
ment of Manitoba Act, 114; becomes
Prime Minister, 85; challenges constitu-
tionality of Manitoba Act, 62; defeat in
1878, 129; objects to dual status of the
Metis, 59; supports annexation of North
West, 27; supports terms of transfer, 28
Macoun, John, 147
Macpherson, D.L.: becomes Minister of
the Interior, 149; complains Langevin
championing "dead beats" (1884),
168; proposes government ownership of
CPR, 153
Mactavish, William, 34
Mair, Charles, 35,45
Manitoba: "Rielites" triumph in first pro-
vincial election, 76; population in 1870,
76
Manitoba Act. See also Statutes of
Canada: administration of: section 30,
93; section 31, 90-91, 95, 98, 100, 104,
106, 112, 124, 131; section 32, 90, 93,
95, 102, 104, 106, 115, 120-121, 126,
131, 133, 137; draft text, 57; forerunner
of, 28; in historical interpretation, 3, 5,
8-10, 14; meaning of: section 30, 89;
section 31, 89; section 32, 89; parlia-
mentary debate of, 59
Marion, Edouard, 39
McDougall, William: acting in accor-
dance with obsolete instructions, 43;
barred entry to Red River Settlement,
40; commissions Dennis to restore
peace, 45; departs Ottawa as governor
designate, 34; embittered over transfer
embarrassment, 45; informs Macdonald
of trouble at Red River, 41; Metis learn
of his arrival at St Cloud, 40; negotiat-
ing with HBC, 28; presenting terms of
transfer to Parliament, 28; proponent of
western annexation, 26; receiving news
Index 201
of Red River discontent in Ottawa, 34;
returns to Ottawa from Rupert's Land,
46
McMicken, Gilbert: accommodating
newcomers at Dominion Lands Office,
96; advises Macdonald to send more
troops to handle Metis, 98; devises
scheme for alloting the 1.4 million
acres, 98; frightened by conflict
between old and new settlers, 102;
gives verbal agreement to all Metis
demands, 98; makes first report to Mac-
donald from Manitoba, 97; predicts
long-range trouble over land question,
100; receives instruction to dissaude
Morris from amnesty, 83; recruited by
Macdonald for Manitoba matters, 95;
role in O'Donoghue affair, 96
McTavish, William, 41
Metis: basis of fear of land-loss in Mani-
toba (1869), 133; claims, according to:
Donald Creighton, 11; George Stanley,
3; Thomas Flanagan, 14; clash with pol-
ice at Duck Lake, 175; conflict with
Canadian troops (April-May 1885),
176; convention accepts invitation to
send delegates to Ottawa (1870), 48;
disintegration of Riel party in Manitoba,
84; disposition of claims in
Saskatchewan, 158, 171; draw direct
parallels between 1869-70 and 1884-85,
169; dual status under the Manitoba
Act, 57, 59; economy at Red River
before 1870, 20; election of first
representatives in resistance (1869), 41;
election of second council of delegates,
1870, 47; form National Committee
(1869), 39; form second provisional
government (1885), 174; impact of
Canada's staked claims policy, 121; jail
Canadian party (1869), 45; Manitoba-
origin population in Saskatchewan
(1884), 170; migration from Manitoba
to Saskatchewan, 157; National Com-
mittee bars road to McDougall, 40;
National Committee seizes Fort Garry,
40; North West Territorial Council
resettlement scheme, 160; oppose
Tache trust proposal, 105; origins, 20;
pattern and timing of dispersal from
Manitoba, 138; political organization of
buffalo hunt, 39; population in
Manitoba (1870), 76; population in
North West (1884), 163; preferred
method of receiving their 1.4 million
acres, 92, 94, 99; racial inferiority,
according to: H.Y. Hind, 23; Marcel
Giraud, 5-6; reaction to unacceptable
method of distributing 1.4 million acres,
104; resisting surveys at Red River, 35;
seek assistance for resettlement in
Saskatchewan, 160; versus native
English in provisional government
(1869), 45; vulnerability of recipients of
allotments of the 1.4 million acres, 124
Middleton, Frederick, 174
Miller,!., 136-137
Mills, David, 27; attempts to commute 1.4
million acres with scrip, 122; challenges
constitutionality of Manitoba Act
(1870), 62; corresponds with Tache
concerning staked claims, 121; objects
to inclusion of Indians in franchise
(1885), 176; opposes BNA Act (1871),
64; opposes Girard amendment, 126;
rejects Metis settlement assistance, 160;
responds to Tache's allegations about
staked claims, 119; responds to Tache" s
opposition to commutation scheme,
123; streamlines conflicting claims pro-
cess, 125
Morris, Alexander: adjudicating
conflicting claims, > 137; despair over
increasing complexity of land question,
106; promoting Canadian territorial
expanion, 1850s, 23; proposes general
amnesty, 83; proposes strategy to defeat
Riel (1872), 82; proposes streamlining
conflicting claims process, 125;
recruited for service in Manitoba, 81;
refuses assent to Manitoba Land Grant
Protection Act, 106; replaces Archibald
in gubernatorial functions, 82; reports
inter-settler conflict, third year running,
107; threatens to arrest Riel for political
activity, 103; urges government haste
on land question, 103; warns Mac-
donald of Metis trust proposal, 105
Morton, W.L., 4, 6-7; explanation of
Scott's execution, 8; first interpretation
of Red River Rebellion, 4; influenced
by Marcel Giraud, 6; on early Mani-
toba, 9; reinterpretation of North West
Rebellion, 12; reinterpretation of Red
202 Canada and the Metis, 1869-1885
River "Resistance," 7
Murdoch, Clinton: assures Red River
delegates they have general amnesty,
69; denies any knowledge of a promised
amnesty, 84; reports inadmissable
demands to Granville, 72
Norquay, John, 76
North West Company, 20
O'Donoghue, William B.: role in the exe-
cution of Thomas Scott, 51; second
attempt to lead Metis into annexation,
77; urges Metis to work for annexation
to United States, 75
Orange Order, 5, 74, 76-78,101,103,179
Orders in Council of Canada (OC):
1871: 1 March, 91; 25 April, 92; 26
May, 94,117;
1872: 15 April, 101;
1873: 3 April, 106;
1875: 26 April, 116;
1876: 23 March, 124; 26 April, 118;
1878: 4 July, 124;
1880: 12 April, 132;
1881: 25 February, 136; 31 October,
137;
1883: 4 June, 149; 17 October, 138; 29
November, 152;
1884: 30 April, 147;
1885: 28 January, 170
Palliser, John, 22,147
Patteson, T.C., 109
Pope, J.H., 153
Prince Albert Colonization Company, 158
Rankin, John, 148
Red River Settlement: agriculture before
1870, 20; customary land use, 103; cus-
tomary method of taking up land, 99,
117; development, 1820-1850, 22; HBC
land titles, 33; land tenures before 1870,
20, 36-37; origins, 21; population in
1856, 20; population in 1869,45; status
as "fur-trade company town," 20
Reed, Hayter, 172
Richardson, Hugh, 172
Riel, Louis: according to: Donald Creigh-
ton, 9-11; George Stanley, 3; Thomas
Flanagan, 14; W.L. Morton, 4, 7; antici-
pates premiership of Manitoba, 75;
appears in Saskatchewan (1884), 163;
as land speculator, 79; attempted arrest
by government (1872), 85, 104;
becomes Secretary of National Commit-
tee (1869), 39; begins to doubt
Canada's good faith, 68; challenges
leadership of Dease in resistance, 37;
complains of Tache's softness in adver-
sity, 123; consults with Grandin and
Tache about grievances, 169; contro-
versy over execution, 179; decides to
become re-involved in Manitoba poli-
tics (1872), 79; declares intent to form
provisional government (1885), 172;
defers to Cartier in election of 1872, 80;
disqualified from taking seat in Parlia-
ment, 85; election to Parliament, 85;
execution, 176; expectations in leading
second provisional government, 174;
explains interruption of surveys (1869),
39; handling of mass meeting (January
1870), 47; leaves leadership with Dubuc
and Royal (1870), 75; prepares first list
of rights (1869), 44; prepares list of
Metis grievances (1884), 169; private
claims denied by Canada (1885), 171
promises Archibald support against
O'Donoghue, 77; re-elected to Parlia-
ment, 85; re-enters Manitoba politics
(1872), 79; reacts to OC of 26 May
1871, 94; receives conditional amnesty,
86; refuses offer of bribe by Smith, 47;
responds to McDougall's proclamation
of transfer, 44; role in the matter of
Thomas Scott, 50; second frustration of
O'Donoghue, 77; seeks safety at St
Joseph's, Dakota Territory, 74; third
election to Parliament, 85; trial, 176;
urges Metis to remain loyal to Canada,
75; urges official proclamation of provi-
sional government, 48; works with
committee preparing second list of
rights (1870), 48
Ritchot, N.J., 10; accepts Carder's petition
proposal for amnesty, 71; advises interr-
uption of McDougall's entry, 40; com-
mences negotations with Canada, 56;
demands general amnesty, 56;
encourages Riel to challenge Dease, 37;
encourages resistance to surveys
(1869), 36; expects amnesty promise in
writing, 70; explains terms of Manitoba
Index 203
Act to provisional government, 67;
hopes for Manitoba as a Metis province,
123; reacts to alteration of draft Mani-
toba bill in House, 60; suggests Mac-
donald had deceived him to dispossess
the Metis, 136
Rose, John: advises postponement of
transfer, 42; involvement with HBC
land policy in the 1880s, 150
Ross, James: accepts office of Chief Jus-
tice in provisional government, 48;
responds to Riel's prepared list of rights
(1869), 44
Rouleau, C.B., 165
Royal, Joseph: accuses Codd and Dennis
of subverting Manitoba Act, 134;
discredits the Lang report, 134; leads
Metis in Riel's absense, 75; manipulates
Archibald into meeting Riel, 78;
reaches limit of patience in land-claim
matters, 137; recites history of river-lot
claims (1870-80), 131; seeks fresh
assurances on staked claims (1880),
132; seeks implementation of Manitoba
Act (1878), 129
Russell, Lindsay, 132, 149
Sanderson, George, 51
Saskatchewan. See Metis
Schultz, John C., 35, 37,40,45,76,138
Scott, R.W., 111,126
Scott, Thomas, 3,5, 8-9, 50
Smith, Donald A., 7; accepts double-agent
mission to Red River, 46; accepts Metis
list of rights, 48; failure of covert mis-
sion to Red River, 46; handling of mass
meeting, January 1870,47
Stanley, George, 2-4, 13; according to
Thomas Flanagan, 14
Statutes of Canada. See also Manitoba
Act, Dominion Lands Act:
1873: chapter 6,106;
1874: chapter 20,110;
1875: chapter 52,116; chapter 53,116;
1879: chapter 31,162;
1880: chapter 7,132
Statutes of Manitoba: land grant protec-
tion, 105; legislation concerning infant
estates, 92
Stephen, George, 10-11; attempts to legi-
timize route of CPR (1881), 147; con-
cept of partnership with Canada, 146;
concludes preliminary agreement for
CPR, 143; demands immediate aid,
March 1885, 172; expected cost of
CPR, 145; expresses interest in building
CPR, 143; expresses pleasure over
Riel's execution, 177; land policy, 146;
promotes Irish emigration scheme, 151;
reacts to Macpherson proposal, 153;
second aid bill needed from Macdonald
(1884), 167; seeks co-operation of HBC
in land policy, 150; seeks first loan
beyond contract, 152; seeks interest
guarantee by government, 152; seeks
northern reserves, 149; stock sale, 150
Tache, Alexandre, 6; comments on Riel's
second bill of rights (1884), 169;
confirms amnesty part of settlement
with Canada, 69; discredits Lang report,
134; distances himself from champions
of Metis rights, 123; informal under-
standing with Macdonald (1869), 55;
insists upon amnesty without further
delay, 83; meets Lisgar concerning
amnesty, 74; meets with Macdonald
about resolving staked claims, 132;
objects to Codd's appointment as Lands
Agent, 115; objects to Liberals' han-
dling of staked claims, 119; observes
arrival of Wolseley expedition, 69;
opposes commutation of infant estates,
122; proposes final settlement of staked
claims, 135; publishes facts on amnesty
promise, 85; reacts to McMicken's
allotment scheme, 99; reacts to Metis
trend toward cheap disposal of 1.4 mil-
lion acres, 105; recruits settlers to
replace Metis, 134; resurrects land-
claims issue (1879), 130; role in the dis-
tribution of the 1.4 million acres, 100;
seeks amnesty in return for Carrier's
election, 80; seeks exclusion of heads of
families from 1.4 million acres, 106;
wants Archibald continued as Lt. Gov.,
81
Thibault,J.B.,41,46
Thomas, Lewis H., 13
Tourond, Baptiste, 36, 39
Tupper, Charles, 10-11,151,154,169
Van Home, Cornelius, 147