The History of the German Resistance 1933—1945 This page intentionally left blank THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE 1933-1945 Peter Hoffmann Translated from the German by RICHARD BARRY Third English Edition McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca © Peter Hoffmann 1996 ISBN 0-7735-1531-3 Legal deposit fourth quarter 1996 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Published in West Germany in 1969 by R. Piper & Co. under the title Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat; fourth revised edition 1985. First English edition, Macdonald and Jane's 1977, MIT Press 1977; second edition, MIT Press 1979. Printed in Canada on acid-free paper Reprinted zooi McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP) for its activities. It also acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Hoffmann, Peter The history of the German resistance, 1933-1945, 3rd English ed. Translation of: Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1531-3 i. Anti-Nazi movement z. Hitler, Adolf, 1889. 1945 - Assassination attempt, 1944 (July 2.0). i. Title. FC2.56.3.H6I3 1996 943086 096-900478-8 Contents Author's Foreword Preface to the Third Edition IX xiii PART I THE BACKGROUND 1 The Year 1933 3 2 Forms of Resistance 18 3 Top-Level Crisis 36 PART II THE SUDETEN CRISIS AND THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1938 4 Operation 'Green' 49 5 Foreign Policy and Resistance 54 6 Beck's Plans 69 7 Haider's Plans 81 PART III PLANS FOR A COUP 1939-1940 8 Before the Outbreak of War 99 9 Plans, Probings and Memoranda 113 10 Haider's New Plan 128 11 Further Efforts 145 12 Soundings Abroad 153 PART IV INTERNAL POLITICAL PLANS 13 Schmid Noerr 175 14 Hassell 178 15 Popitz 180 16 Goerdeler 184 17 The Kreisau Circle 192 18 Socialists 198 PART V CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY 1940-1944 19 Albrecht Haushofer 1940-1941 205 20 Hassell 1941-1942 211 21 Lochner 1941-1942 214 22 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schonfeld 1942 216 23 Moltke 1943 225 24 Trott 1943-1944 228 v Contents 25 Gisevius 235 26 Miscellaneous Contacts 240 27 'Eastern Solution'? 243 28 Otto John 1944 246 PART VI ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS 1933-1942 29 The Early Days 251 30 Attempts of 1938-1942 255 PART VII TRESCKOW AND ARMY GROUP CENTRE 31 Preparations 263 32 Projections of 1943 278 33 Abortive Plans 290 34 'Valkyrie' 301 PART VIII STAUFFENBERG AND THE REPLACEMENT ARMY 35 Stauffenberg's Career 315 36 Assassination Attempts - Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch 322 37 Procurement of Explosive 333 38 Communications Planning 337 39 Internal Political Planning 348 40 Stauffenberg's First Two Assassination Attempts 373 PART IX 20 JULY 1944 41 'Wolfschanze' 397 42 Berlin: The Coup 412 43 The Coup in the Provinces 440 44 Prague, Vienna, Paris 461 45 Collapse in Berlin 479 PART X WRECK OF THE OPPOSITION 46 Summary Court Martial 507 47 Arrests 509 48 People's Court, Executions, Concentration Camps 524 Notes 535 Appendices Map of Europe as at 20 July 1944 724-5 Map of Germany - The Wehrkreise 726-7 Berlin Area 728-9 Berlin City Plan 730-1 'Wolfschanze' HQ Area with Airfield, 1941-1944 732-3 'Wolfschanze' HQ, July 1944 734-5 'Wolfschanze' Telephone Communications 736 'Wolfschanze' Teleprinter Communications 737 Signals Diagram - Eastern Germany 738 Diagram - Channels of Command 739 Plan of Briefing Hut in 'Wolfschanze' 740 Plan of Office of C-in-C Replacement Army 740 vi Contents Diagram - British Chemical Time Fuse 741 Diagram - British Adhesive Mine - The 'Clam' 741 Some Secret Reports on the German opposition received by the US Government 742 Text of important Teleprinter Messages 754 Report by Werner Vogel, 26 June 1970 762 Stauffenberg's Attendance at Briefings in the Fiihrer's HQ in July 1944 764 Some of the more important Headquarters 765 Ranks - Approximate Equivalents 767 Abbreviations and Glossary 769 Sources and Bibliography 773 Addenda to the Bibliography 813 Index 817 Errata and Addenda 850 vii This page intentionally left blank Author's Foreword There has always been resistance to authority ever since authority existed. If the possessor of power, based on a traditional or written code of law, abuses his authority, if he does not fulfil the obligations which men have always con- sidered inseparable from power, the victims of such abuse are entitled to con- sider themselves released from their own obligations. Mediaeval feudal law was based on such a reciprocity of service — protection and livelihood on the one side, obedience and allegiance on the other. In 1530 even the Lutheran princes, despite Luther's doctrine of god-given authority, claimed the right of resistance to the measures of the Emperor. In 1804, with the onset of the Napoleonic hurricane and the end of the Holy Roman Empire in mind, Friedrich Schiller put the following into the mouth of Stauffacher in Wilhelm Tell: When the oppressed for justice looks in vain, When his sore burden may no more be borne, With fearless heart he makes appeal to Heaven And thence brings down his everlasting rights Which there abide, inalienably his And indestructible as are the stars. Nature's primeval state returns again Where man stands hostile to his fellow man, And if all other means shall fail his need One last resource remains — his own good sword. Admittedly the right of resistance has never been undisputed. The Roman legal luminaries developed the concept of the majesty of the ruler and the sovereignty of the state, a notion overemphasized in 19th-century Germany by many; this hardly allowed room for any legal resistance. Many of the 17th- century philosophers of natural law, Thomas Hobbes for instance, flatly denied any right of resistance. Others, however, have deduced from the law of nature, from the assumed basic legal state of freedom, a right to resistance which has in practice been exercised over and over again. There is moreover no lack of examples of the exercise of this right of re- sistance. In 1649 the English followed the doctrine of sovereignty of the peo- ple to its extreme conclusion and beheaded their King, Charles I; in 1688 they refused the throne to one of his descendants. Between 1789 and 1795 the ix Author's Foreword French sought to assert the concept of the people's sovereignty with terrible consistency and during the 19th century almost all European peoples attempted, by means of more or less coordinated resistance to the established State authority, to obtain for themselves that which the French Revolution had achieved - individual freedom, legal and economic security, the 'rights of man', in short a constitution and a legal definition of the nation's existence. Resistance to a state of affairs felt to be intolerable but nevertheless main- tained by the State is therefore nothing unheard-of in the history either of Europe or of Germany. The resistance which is the subject of this book is in this line of tradition. In broad terms this resistance had already begun before Hitler's seizure of power; in the true sense, however, it began only in 1933 and even then took five years to progress to the stage which is the real hallmark of resistance, dealt with in this book - the attempt at a coup d'etat. For this the spur provided by the imminent threat of a major war was necessary. In this context, therefore, 'resistance' implies activity designed to bring about the overthrow of the Nazi regime from within; in general terms it was carried on by those groups direct- ly or indirectly involved in the assassination attempt of 20 July 1944. Active resistance to an unlawful regime can only be demanded from the mass of the people by someone both ready and competent to organize and lead it. In the state constructed by Hitler, with its feared and apparently ubiquitous police, with its social achievements and its apparently brilliant successes, this was not in practice possible and, when catastrophe was visibly approaching, the majority simply wanted to save their skins. In such a society only a few highly-placed functionaries possessed both the essential timely in- sight into the realities of the situation and the authority to deal with it accor- dingly by opposition to the government. Only a few were able to make up their minds unequivocally whether and when a sworn oath and pledged loyalty had become meaningless and were only assisting in the destruction of that which they were supposed to protect. Both condemnation and denigration of those who remained faithful to their oath are equally pharisaical. Equally wrong is condemnation of the conspirators, who refused to recognize 'law' based solely on force, when it was destroying life rather than preserving it. Such an at- titude elevates the form of the law above its purpose or content. The attitude of the conspirators was the more spiritually creative and fundamentally humane in that it accorded with the principle of life and the preservation of life. It is now thirty years since the end of the Second World War and during this period innumerable authors have dealt with Germany's most recent past. They have tried to explain how it was possible for a world conflagration to be initiated in which over forty million men lost their lives and which ended in the dismemberment of Germany, the division of Europe, and Russian military hegemony on the continent. Since the war thousands of books and articles have been published purporting to describe what was being done inside Ger- x Author's Foreword many, initially against the ruinous policy of the Nazi regime and its con- sequences, finally with the object of the regime's total elimination. These publications include a considerable number of outstanding works but an even greater number which fail to satisfy the requirements of historical scholarship. All have one failure in common: an inadequate basis of source material for an account of the concrete attempts to overthrow the Nazi regime and do away with Hitler. There are many reasons for this. Many authors have been and still are today more interested in describing the motives of the resistance than its actual deeds; many who wrote of their own experiences knew and saw only a small section of the whole; for others numerous important sources were inaccessible at the time of writing. In many respects the position in regard to sources was more difficult twenty years after the end of the war than it was in 1945. Numerous witnesses of these events had died; others had either forgotten or preferred to forget the details. On the other hand many of the former German Reich's official files relevant to research on the resistance have meanwhile been returned to the Federal Republic by the western Allies (it is, of course, hardly possible to say what important material is still stored away in the East); moreover discussion of the rights and wrongs of resistance can now take place in a calmer atmosphere than in the years immediately following the war, when 'denazification' and the search for the guilty were the order of the day. Many witnesses have therefore been prepared to give a factual account of their experiences when ten years earlier they would have held their tongues. My starting point has been the conviction that the resistance movement of 20 July 1944 and its tragic failure can only really be comprehensible if the previous history and course of events are known in detail; I have accordingly been concerned primarily to clarify the course of events connected with those attempts to overthrow the regime or assassinate its leaders which progressed beyond the stage of mere thought and discussion. They culminated in the rising of 20 July, the last attempt of a long series. The well-known books by Hans Rothfels, Eberhard Zeller, Gerhard Ritter, Annedore Leber and others remain the basic secondary works for any character study of the personalities involved or their motives, for any understanding of the overall phenomenon of the resistance movement and for any study of the activities of individuals. At this point I would wish to thank all those who have assisted me in my extensive researches. It is not possible to list them all individually but at least mention must be made of: the staff of the Federal Archives in Koblenz, that of the Wurttemberg Land Library in Stuttgart, that of the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte in Munich, of the Central Reference Archive of the Federal Archives in Kornelimunster, of the Central Office of Provincial Judiciaries in Ludwigsburg, of the Berlin Document Centre, of the National Archives, Washington (Messrs Wolfe, Bauer and Taylor were particularly helpv'ul), of the Library of Congress, Washington, of the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California, where Mrs Agnes F. Peterson was a constant and reliable source of assistance, and of the Library of the University of Northern Iowa in Cedar Falls; I should also mention the many people who were involved in these XI Author's Foreword events and who were prepared to tell me what they had seen (their names appear in the 'Notes' and 'Sources'). I am also grateful to the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Military History Research Office) for knowledge of certain important papers, although I did not succeed in gaining sight of all relevant documents stored there. Production of this book, which entailed much travel, would not have been possible had it not been for the initiative and generous financial support of the Hilfswerk 20 Juli 1944 Foundation from 1962 to 1964, of the Evangelische Verlagszverk from 1963 to 1965, of the Volkswagenwerk Foundation in 1965 and of the University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, from 1966 to 1968. My special thanks are due to all these institutions. Last but not least I owe the completion of this book and of this third (revised and expanded) edition to the patience, understanding and active assistance of my wife. My thanks are also due to my father, Professor Wilhelm Hoffmann, and to Professor Hans Rothfels for reading the original manuscript and for their encouraging comments. P.H. McGill University, Montreal. xu Preface to the Third Edition This third English edition follows upon six German editions, the latest of which is still in print, and a French edition j 1 the passage of more than fifty years since the end of the Second World War has not diminished interest in the subject. This is a tribute to the extraordinary courage and moral stead- fastness of the thousands of Germans who gave their lives to oppose Hitler's evil tyranny. Tens of thousands of Germans were killed for one or another form of resistance. Between 1933 and 1945 Special Courts killed 12,000 Germans, courts martial killed 25,000 German soldiers, and 'regular' justice killed 40,000 Germans. 2 Many of these Germans were part of the government's civil or military service, a circumstance which enabled them to engage in subver- sion and conspiracy while involved, marginally or significantly, in the gov- ernment's policies. They alone had any realistic prospect of overthrowing the evil regime, in contrast to the tens of thousands of declared or suspected opponents of Hitler's dictatorship who were in prisons and in concentrations camps. Military and political leaders opposed Hitler in 1937 and 1938 when he was obviously driving to war. Most of them were simply removed from office, through persuasion, pressure, or nefarious intrigue. The response of society at large to the threat of war was similar to that of the military and political leaders. For instance, Berliners flatly refused to cheer on 27 September 1938 when combat troops of the 2nd Mechanized Division from Stettin were marched through their streets. The American CBS correspondent William Shirer recorded their reaction in his diary: The hour was undoubtedly chosen today to catch the hundreds of thou- sands of Berliners pouring out of their offices at the end of the day's work. But they ducked into the subways, refused to look on, and the handful that did stood at the curb in utter silence unable to find a word of cheer for the flower of their youth going away to the glorious war. It has been the most striking demonstration against war I've ever seen. Hitler himself reported furious. I had not been standing long at the corner when a policeman came up the Wilhelmstrasse from the direction of the Chancellery and shouted to the few of us standing at the curb that the Fiihrer was on his balcony reviewing the troops. Few moved. xiii Preface I went down to have a look. Hitler stood there, and there weren't two hundred people in the street or the great square of the Wilhelmsplatz. Hitler looked grim, then angry, and soon went inside, leaving his troops to parade unreviewed. What I've seen tonight almost rekindles a little faith in the German people. They are dead set against war. 3 Mass action against the regime during the war was prevented, however, primarily by loyalty to the government in time of war and to the soldiers who were fighting and dying at the fronts, combined with the conditions of a brutally efficient police state. The attitude of the population was also affected by the fair chance of survival that most Germans enjoyed, despite enemy bombing of most of their larger cities, secret police surveillance and raids, and the threat of concentration camp. Attempts to organize popular resistance during the war proved to be impossible. Socialist and Communist resistance cells attempted to produce effective opposition to Hitler's regime both before and during the war, but the secret police kept them constantly on the defen- sive and arrested most of their activists. 4 For several months in 1942 and 1943 the White Rose student group secretly distributed leaflets in which they called for resistance against the war, the killing of the Jews, and the other crimes the regime was continuously committing; but they were arrested and executed before they were able to generate any significant support.' In June 1944 underground Communist and Social-Democrat functionaries planning concerted action were discovered and arrested before they could even begin to contact their followers to call on them to rise up against the regime. 6 After the war, recognition of the resistance was muted. The Western Allied occupation powers proscribed the entire German nation under a 'collective- guilt' theory which precluded the American, British, and French military governments in Germany from acknowledging any German resistance, while the Russian military government in the central and eastern German provinces approved only of the Communist resistance and discounted all other resis- tance as 'reactionary'. The ambivalence most Germans felt toward the resistance limited their acknowledgment as well. Once the regime's crimes had been revealed and the nation subjected to prosecution and condemnation by the victors, failure to have resisted Hitler's rule was an embarrassment. Celebrating the resisters, on the other hand, appeared to be taking the side of the victors. This ambivalence was reflected in the public positions of the major post-war political parties. While many of their leaders came from the ranks of Hitler's opponents, and some were survivors of the active resistance, they competed intensely for the most 'national' public stance, and for the votes of the more than ten million Germans who had been expelled from German territories annexed by Czechoslovakia and Poland. Ambiguities continued after two German states were constituted in 1949, under Western and Soviet Russian auspices respectively. From 1951 onward the government of West Germany regularly made public declarations of respect and approval of the anti-Hitler resistance. At the same time hundreds xiv Preface of thousands of former members of the National Socialist Party were reha- bilitated in the wake of the Korean War and the beginning integration of the Federal Republic into the defence structure of the West. More than six years after the fall of Hitler's dictatorship, the government got around to making some efforts to include survivors and dependants of executed resisters in programs for the compensation of victims of the National Socialist regime and to reinstate their pension rights and restore their confiscated property.' In the 1960s and 1970s there were concerted attacks on the German resistance from both the political Right and Left. Those from the Right commonly sought to portray Hitler's opponents as traitors to the nation and as otherwise morally flawed, while those on the political Left tended to accuse them of having been 'undemocratic' and anti-Semitic, or belittled the resis- tance as based 'merely' on the moral imperative. 8 Disdain for resistance motivated by a moral imperative must be based on a rather cynical view of human affairs. The accusations of treason, 'undem- ocratic' intentions, and anti-Semitism are unsupportable. Treason against the country is defined by the Criminal Code as the intention and attempt to harm the interests and integrity of Germany: the resisters' aim was the exact opposite. The claim that the resisters were not 'democratic' is based on the failure to recognize the resisters' plans as the necessary precautions against the recurrence of the 'democratic' chaos of the years before 1933 which had produced the Hitler dictatorship. The anti-Semitism accusation against most resisters is patently false, and for the rest at least disingenuous since it equates the anti-Semitism common everywhere before 1933 (deplorable as it was) with Hitler's murderous persecution, against which the resisters staked their lives. 9 Until the 1960s the government of the former Soviet zone of occupation, known as the 'German Democratic Republic' from 1949 to 1990, was unwill- ing to acknowledge that there had been any resistance except that by Com- munists. In 1964 a Soviet journalist published a book which credited parts of the 'conservative', 'bourgeois', and 'national' resistance with some mea- sure of 'progressiveness'. Since then the East German government, having always claimed to be the only legitimate custodian of the heritage of the German nation, has admitted some non-Communist heroes of the resistance to its own pantheon by declaring them 'progressive', which is to say friendly toward the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology. Historians and jour- nalists in the 'German Democratic Republic' have also published a few books and articles on the non-Communist resistance. 10 But the East German gov- ernment did not permit them free use of the archives within or outside their borders and forced them to subject their writing, even about the Communist resistance, to day-to-day political considerations. As a consequence, the y were not able to add much to our knowledge about the German resistance. On the contrary, East German writers sought to demonstrate that leading resisters such as Claus von Stauffenberg, Albrecht Mertz von Quirnheim, and Helmuth von Moltke had affinities to the 'progressive' forces of society; some of these writers did not stop short of forgery to do so. 11 XV Preface There have been periods in the Federal Republic of Germany when the so-called 'conservative resistance' to Hitler received a good deal of attention and recognition, both in public declarations and in the work of researchers. These periods have alternated with periods during which the dominant historians treated social, institutional, and system history as being more important than biography and the 'history of events'. During the latter periods Communist, Socialist, and 'grass-roots' resistance received more con- sideration, and there were also efforts in West Germany to rehabilitate the reputations of Communists and fellow-travellers who had cooperated with the Soviet Union from inside Germany during the war. But this historiogra- phy produced little new factual information, partly because the Soviet Union controlled much of the relevant archival material in Russia and East Ger- many and permitted only orthodox sycophancy. Judicial prosecution of National Socialist criminals and political events since 1949 have continued to cause controversy about the resistance, partly about what actually happened and partly about fundamental questions of its justification. A debate in the Bonn parliament in 1969 that led to the abolition of the statute of limitations for genocide, for example, provoked such a controversy. Since 1967 student unrest, anarchist terrorism, and media cam- paigns organized by the East German government have distorted public perception of the anti-Hitler resistance. Opponents of the social and demo- cratic order of the West achieved the same effect when they declared them- selves to be 'resisters', although they could not, and did not wish to, identify with the spirit of the morally motivated resistance against National Socialism. The periods of shifting attention and thematic emphasis have alternated approximately synchronously with changes of parliamentary majorities and governments between the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Dem- ocratic Party. The Christian Democratic Union led the government from 1949 to 1969 and 1981 to the present, and the Social Democratic Party from 1969 to 1981. Generational change has also had an impact on the way the resistance was perceived. The number of those born after 1945 has increased both absolutely and proportionately, and this new generation has tended to view the resis- tance with less bias than their elders. They were also attracted by the moral rigor and existential depth of the anti-Hitler resistance. From 1982 on, resis- tance against National Socialism generally has been given greater recognition than before. Polls taken in 1951, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1970, and 1985 indicate first a decrease, and then, in 1985, a significant increase in knowledge and approval of the resistance among the population. 12 The concept of the right to resist an evil regime has taken hold of the general consciousness in Germany to a much greater extent than before 1933. In 1968 the parliament in Bonn approved an amendment to the Constitution that declares that all Germans have the right to resist anyone attempting to do away with their constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible. 13 Knowledge about the German resistance against Hitler has increased outside of Germany as well. There has been a steady flow of publications, and in xvi Preface 1992 an American documentary film on the German resistance, The Restless Conscience, was nominated for an 'Oscar'. 14 Knowledge about the aims and the struggle of the resistance, and about its intellectual and moral roots, was generated after 1945 through the publi- cation of memoirs about the resistance and diaries and letters of resisters. These were soon followed by comprehensive assessments, biographies of Carl Goerdeler and Claus von Stauffenberg, a comprehensive history of Helmuth von Moltke's 'Kreisau Circle', numerous studies of issues and aspects of the resistance, and the first German edition of the present work. 15 Among the more substantial works about the resistance which have appeared since then are a new, more accurate, and more comprehensive edition of Ulrich von HasselPs diaries, 16 Helmuth von Moltke's letters to his wife, 17 a work on the foreign contacts of the resistance, 18 a new biography of Claus von Stauffen- berg based on a comprehensive collection of sources, 19 a notable account of the resistance activities of a hitherto relatively unknown group of progressive conservatives, 20 and a detailed treatment of the rescue of Jews by a resistance group in the German military counter-intelligence service. 21 An international conference on the resistance held in Berlin in 1984 resulted in a voluminous publication of conference papers, which was soon reprinted and sold com- mercially, and in numerous other publications. 22 The year 1994 again saw a flood of new publications on the resistance. Only a few of all the publications which have appeared since the second English edition of the present work, however, have at all modified the account given here; those that produced more than marginally new informa- tion are mentioned in the 'Errata and Addenda' in this third English edition. P.H. McGill University Montreal, 1996 NOTES Works which did not appear in the first two English editions of The History of the German Resistance and which are referred to in the following notes are cited in full in an addendum to the Bibliography. 1 Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, 4 editions and two licenced editions produced by other publishers; Peter Hoffmann, La resistance allemande centre 2 Trial, Vol. 38, pp. 362-5 ; Broszat, 'Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933 bis 1945' in Broszat, Jacobsen, Krausnick, Konzentrationslager, Kommissarbefehl, Judenverfolgung, pp. 158-9; Boehm, We Survived, p. viii based on Secret State Police (Gestapo) documents; equally Almond, 'The German Resistance Move- ment', pp. 409-527; cf. Sofsky, Die Ordnung des Terrors, pp. 56-7; Wagner, Der Volksgerichtshof im nationalsozialistischen Staat, p. 945; Messerschmidt and Wiillner, Die Wehrmachtjustiz im Dienste des Nationalsozialismus, pp. 49-50, 70, 73; Kiessel, 'Das Attentat des 20. Juli 1944 und seine Hintergrunde'; Hammer, 'Die "Gewitteraktion" vom 22.8.1944', p. IS. 3 Shirer, Berlin Diary, pp. 142-143. xvii Preface 4 See Glondajewski and Schumann, Die Neubauer-Poser-Gruppe; Duhnke, Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945. 5 See pp. 23, 30, 278 . 6 See pp. 363-4. 7 Reich Minister of Justice [Georg] Thierack to Heinrich Himmler 24 Oct. 1944, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Slg Schumacher; Large, 'Uses of the Past: The Anti-Nazi Resistance Legacy in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Large, Contending with Hitler, p. 167. 8 [Hans W. Hagen], Zwischen Eid und Befehl; Remer, 20. Juli 1944; Ribbentrop, Die Kriegsschuld des Widerstandes; Balzer, Der 20. Juli und der Landesverrat; Verrat und Widerstand im Dritten Reich; Mommsen, 'Gesellschaftsbild und Ver- fassungsplane des deutschen Widerstandes'; Hillgruber, 'Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der gegenwartigen Hitler-Forschung'; Miiller, General Ludwig Beck; Dipper, 'Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden'. 9 Hoffmann, 'Persecution of the Jews as a Motive for Resistance against National Socialism'. 10 Mel'nikov, Zagovor 20 iiulia 1944 goda v Germanii; Melnikow, 20. Juli 1944; Finker, Stauffenberg und der 20. Juli 1944; Finker, Graf Moltke und der Kreisauer Kreis. 11 Emrich and Notzold, 'Der 20. Juli in den offentlichen Gedenkreden der Bundes- republik und in der Darstellung der DDR', p. 10; Wegner-Korfes, 'Der 20. Juli 1944 und das Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutschland"'; Scheel, 'Die "Rote Kapelle" und der 20. Juli 1944'; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg (German ed.), pp. 472-4, 573-4. 12 Noelle and Neumann, Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung 1947-1955, p. 138; 1957, pp. 144-5 ; 1965, p. 235 ; Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, Der 20. Juli 1944; Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach to the author 20 Nov. 1978; Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 4056. 13 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, rev. and updated ed. June 1994, art. 20.4. 14 Large, Contending with Hitler; Nicosia and Stokes, Germans Against Nazism; Pejsa, Matriarch of Conspiracy; Schollgen, A Conservative against Hitler; The Restless Conscience, documentary film by Hava Kohav Beller, 1992. 15 Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler; Rothfels, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler; Zeller, Geist der Freiheit; Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung; Kraus, Die im Braunschweiger Remerprozess erstatteten moraltheologischen und historischen Gutachten nebst Urteil; Vollmacht des Gewissens; Roon, Neuordnung (German Resistance to Hitler); Hoffmann, Wider- stand, Staatsstreich, Attentat; Kramarz, Claus Graf Stauffenberg 15. November 1907-20. Juli 1944 (Stauffenberg. Life and Death of an Officer); Miiller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg; Peukert, Volksgenossen und Gemeinschaftsfremde; Cartarius, Bibliographie "Widerstand"; Laska, Nazism, Resistance, and Holocaust in World War II. A Bibliography; Schmadeke and Steinbach, Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus; Nicosia and Stokes, Germans Against Nazism; Large, Con- tending with Hitler. 16 Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebucher 1938-1944. 17 Moltke, Letters to Freya. 18 Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler. 19 Hoffmann, Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1905-1944; German ed. Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Bruder. 20 Sassin, Liberate im Widerstand. 21 Meyer, Unternehmen Sieben. 22 Schmadeke and Steinbach, Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. xviii PART I/THE BACKGROUND This page intentionally left blank 1 The Year 1933 On 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor by President von Hindenburg; he was commissioned to form a government, for which he was to find a majority in the Reichstag later. He had therefore come to power by vir- tue of the provisions of the German Reich's current constitution, although he had been proclaiming for years that he would change both the State and the con- stitution, through which he had reached his goal, on National-Socialist and authoritarian lines - in other words destroy them. The Weimar Republic, successor to the Prussian/German empire defeated in the First World War, had not been able to overcome its external or internal weaknesses and contradictions. In particular it had been unable to cope with the continuous and irresponsible attacks of its opponents, both left-wing and 'national' - German-National (Deutschnationale), reactionary, militarist and ultra-conservative; even in its early years there had been right- and left-wing extremist putschs, with uproar and separatism, with the refusal, primarily by the nationalist elements of the National Assembly, to affix their signature to the Treaty of Versailles and an equal refusal to assume responsibility for their action by forming a government. In the following years the victors too did not allow the young state to recover from the war; society and the economy were ruined and eroded by the burden of reparations and by inflation. When hatred finally began to give way to common sense and a good start had been made with economic consolidation, the reviving republic, in common with all in- dustrial nations, was rocked in 1929 by the most catastrophic economic crisis which die world had ever seen. Adolf Hitler, born in Austria, stateless from 1924 to 1932 and a devilishly clever demagogue, was the most adroit of all in exploiting this antipathy to the 'Weimar system', which was held guilty of everything; he was largely respon- sible for fanning this antipathy and finally, with the aid of his following, swollen into a mass party, he was in a position to administer the death-blow to the Weimar Republic. He had, however, by no means 'seized' power entirely on his own initiative, although this was what he said; it would in any case have been contrary to the legality by which he had ostensibly been setting so much store ever since the miserable failure of his putsch in 1923. Instead power had fallen into his lap as the result of the apparently insoluble problems of internal politics, the con- stitution and the economy. The politicians, whether opportunist, perplexed or 3 The Background dazzled, were at work behind the scenes with their intrigues; 'the people', however, had also played no small part in Hitler's rise to power. Precisely how strong Hitler's popular backing was can hardly be established; certain in- dications, however, enable some estimate to be made. In the elections of July 1932, 37.4% of all who went to the poll (84%) cast valid votes in favour of the NSDAP (NationalsozialistischeDeutsche Arbeiter-Partei — the Nazi party); in November 1932 the Nazi vote was 33.1% in an 80.6% poll. In March 1933, however, when the Nazis had been for a whole month in control of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior and therefore of the entire police force, when they had been terrorizing the population by means of the SA for more than four weeks, they still scored only 43.9% of all valid votes in an 88.7% poll. 1 The results of these three elections, of course, reflect the popular mood of 1933 only to a limited extent. Hundreds of thousands of people never registered their political views, at least not by going to the polls. The figures certainly require interpretation and must be looked at against the background of the situation at the time. It will rightly be observed that a thirty to forty per cent vote for a lawless demagogue like Hitler, who made no secret of his views, was too large, in other words that it indicated a degree of extremist and violent nationalism greater than could be carried by a state as young as the Germany of that time. A good illustration of the open acknowledgment of violent crime by Hitler and his Nazis was provided by the Totempa case'. In August 1932 some SAmen in the Silesian village of Potempa beat and kicked to death before his mother's eyes Konrad Pietzuch, one of their workmates who supported the Communist Party. Sentences of death and life imprisonment were pronounced. Hitler and the other Nazi leaders thereupon explicitly and publicly proclaimed in the Par- ty newspaper, the Vblkischer Beobachter, their solidarity with their 'comrades', swearing to revenge and release them. 2 Their acknowledgment of violence, crime and lawlessness was unmistakable in August 1932. The criminals were amnestied on 23 March 1933. Although the 'Potempa case' can justifiably be quoted as a typical example of Nazi methods, an explanation is also to be found in the general political at- mosphere of brutality and extremism characteristic of the years 1929—33. Disturbances and violence, political and criminal murder were the order of the day. Wildcat strikes broke out in various places, sometimes simply provoked by the extremists, who stood only to gain from chaos. The wildcat strike of transport workers in Berlin in 1932, for instance, was supported both by the communists and the Nazis. 3 A further factor was the colossal unemployment; by February 1932 this had reached the terrifying figure of over six million and no effective reduction took place between the winters of 1931-32 and 1932—33. Not until 1933 was there any significant fall in unemployment; in the first six months of that year alone the reduction was over 1\ million. 4 Despite some small improvement, in 1932 poverty was still very great, in many individual cases almost inconceivable. There were working-class 4 The Year 1933 couples paying 10 marks rent per month but receiving only 3.20 marks per week in national assistance, leaving them in theory only 2.80 marks per month to live off. If they were not to die of hunger they had to rely on gifts from relatives and friends or credit in the shops. Another worker with a wife and two children received 9 marks per week in national assistance but was paying 4.50 per week in rent, leaving available for the family 0.16 marks per person per day. 5 In this situation the communists promised class warfare and a better, but distant, future; the Nazis, on the other hand, promised work, bread and good order; since they also presented themselves as patriots, many believed in them rather than the communists who, it was feared, would bring revolution and civil war. The extent of Hitler's following can therefore largely be explained by the general economic situation and by ill-feeling towards both the victors of the war and the people's own leaders, who were trying to reach some accommoda- tion with the victor powers. On the other hand a very large section of the elec- torate, over half of the adult population which played any part at all in political life, had not been beguiled by Hitler and National-Socialism. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of voters were irreconcilably opposed to the Nazis. Only later, with the new government's growing success, did a broader-based measure of support develop among the masses and even this was coincident with the systematic destruction of all opposition organization by the new regimented ('gleichgeschalte?) Fuhrer State and the erection of the 'SS State' in which Heinrich Himmler, leader of an 61ite Party army, wielded an instru- ment of thorough domination in his capacity as 'Reichsfuhrer-SS and Chief of the German Police'. Then it seemed wise to keep quiet, to allow the new government, like the old, just to carry on, and to look for a job; things were now on the upgrade; the masses could see work and food ahead of them; those who behaved with the necessary propriety and were not in some way classified as 'enemies of the state' had no need to fear molestation by the regime. In the early months of 1933 there was still some form of legal opposition. An incessant stream of prohibitions on meetings and publications, together with other repressive measures, descended upon it but initially neither the Social Democrats nor the communists were banned as organized political parties. Nevertheless, despite all the proclamations and fine words of the preceding years and months, they did not offer any large-scale resistance to the excesses of the Nazi-controlled government. The Communist Party had long been in the forefront in preparing and arming for civil war against 'fascism'. Yet, when 'fascism' came to power, nothing really significant was done. 6 The German Communist Party was directed by the Communist Party Central Committee of the Soviet Union, and the prevailing view there was that the advent of a fascist government should promote Germany's internal self-destruction and prepare the ground for a communist seizure of power. As we know, Stalin had imposed the principle of 'socialism in one country' in opposition to Trotsky's doctrine of continuing world revolution and he frowned on any attempt to instigate revolutions in neighbouring countries in support of that in Russia. In this it is admittedly 5 The Background difficult to differentiate between Stalin's interest in the elimination of Trotsky and his genuine political convictions. In any case, however, persecution by the regime together with the ideological dissensions and quarrels between the German Communist Party and other left-wing political groupings made any real or effective cooperation between them impossible even in the hour of greatest danger. The call for a general strike on 25 February 1933 organized by the communists and Social-Democrats in concert was almost totally disregarded. Three days later all previous political developments were overshadowed by the Reichstag fire. This enabled the wielders of power to take far sterner action against the communists than they had probably planned to do at this early stage of their rule. 7 On 1 April the Executive Committee of the Comintern (Communist International, the coordinating agency for the work of non-Russian communist parties), which was impotent but never at a loss for tactical subterfuges, decided that, with the ban on the Communist Party, the open establishment of a fascist dictatorship must inevitably assist the masses to discard their democratic illusions; this would release them from Social-Democrat influence and accelerate the tempo of Germany's progress towards the proletarian revolution. Such opportunism does not detract from the heroism of the few Communist Party members who offered resistance. Nevertheless, as a revolutionary and anti-fascist organization, the German Communist Party had proved a failure. Many of its leading functionaries emigrated, leaving the perils of the underground struggle to their subordinate officials and members. The attitude of the German Communist Party therefore stood in sharp con- trast to its previous claims and public pronouncements but it was at least a truer reflection of its real influence on the masses than the reaction of the two largest left-wing political organizations, the Social-Democrats and the trade unions. They remained equally inactive, but there was nothing new or unusual in their inactivity. Ever since 1930, in a broader and more general sense ever since the early 1920s, since the Kapp putsch, even since the Reichstag vote on war loans in August 1914, the Social-Democrats had abandoned use of revolutionary methods. A legalistic attitude of mind was widespread and deep-rooted in the Party; a refusal to recognize the new government of 30 January 1933 was hardly possible; everything was confused, politically obscure and undefined; no one knew what to do. 8 The leaders were not sure of the support of the working masses and did not think that they could risk a general strike. Inactivity seemed to offer the only chance of survival. In the space of a few weeks the basis of real power had changed radically as a result of the dissolution of the Reichstag on 1 February 1933, the electoral campaign, the Emergency Ordinance of 4 February, Goring's terror campaign in Prussia where he was Minister-President, and the rapid widespread muzzling of the press. The emergency Ordinance of 4 February 1933, which was based on Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, forbade all open-air meetings or parades which might endanger public security. 9 It was now a simple matter to ban all opposi- 6 The Year 1933 tion demonstrations or gatherings and confiscate all publications which could be labelled as dangerous to public security and order. Anyone who con- travened the Ordinance, anyone who organized some gathering subject to a ban, even a retrospective one, anyone who distributed printed matter, be it newspaper, poster, leaflet or advertisement thought by the new rulers to merit a ban, and even anyone who knew of such things and did not report them, could be punished with imprisonment and consequently arrested. In this way all opponents could be eliminated, ostensibly legally. The timing of the various measures was merely a question of tactics; clearly it was wrong to try to disrupt all opposition groups at one and the same time. The more they could be separated from one another, treated in isolation and, if possible, assaulted individually, while leaving the remainder in hope, the more helpless- ly they would have to surrender themselves to the wielders of power. Everything else was designed more for the consolidation than for the seizure of power. The Nazis were as surprised as the communists by the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933. Many of the government's measures were totally unplanned and ill-considered, 10 but it seized the opportunity only five days before elections for a new Reichstag to complete its grip on all authority at home. The Emergency Ordinance abolished the basic rights and guarantees of personal freedom established under the Weimar constitution. Almost without restriction, certainly without a court order and without subsequent redress by the courts, people could now be arrested and detained for an in- definite period; theoretically, and largely also in practice, any human utterance, any exchange of information, any publication in word or picture was subject to censorship; periodicals and books could be banned, parties and associations dissolved, meetings forbidden and property confiscated. 1 ' All this struck at the whole basis of the rule of law in the state and the method used was that designed to save the state, the right of emergency legislation. The Enabling Law of 23 March 1933, giving the government complete freedom of action without regard to parliamentary or constitutional limitations, was merely the 'legal' culminating point. The government was now explicitly authorized, not only to promulgate laws without the participa- tion of the Reichstag, but even to introduce legislation incompatible with the constitution. 12 Shortly after the Reichstag elections of 5 March communist deputies were expelled from the House and their Party was banned; they could therefore do nothing against this law. The Social-Democrats fought it bravely but vainly. The Centre Party, the Bavarian Peoples Party and the remaining splinter groups lying between the socialists and the German- National/National-Socialist coalition voted for their own emasculation in the paradoxical hope of saving their existence thereby. 13 The previous opposition leaders had now been 'cut out', to use an apt technological phrase, and the National-Socialists proceeded to ensure themselves total control over all walks of life by means of Gletchschaltung, in other words projecting on to the level of the Lander the prevailing political conditions in the Reich, elimination of the Lander parliaments, assumption of power in the Lander by Nazi Reichsstatthalter (Regents), penetration of all 7 The Background official agencies and authorities by National-Socialists and finally the aboli- tion of all parties except the NSDAP and proclamation of the 'Unity of Party and State'. 14 Again and again the question has been asked: how was this possible ? Why was there no opposition movement or even any stubborn defence of es- tablished rights ? There is no short satisfactory answer. Those who wrestle with this ques- tion generally, with some justification, refer to the 'situation at the time' which, they say, must be understood. Formation of a totalitarian state was something entirely new; there was no previous experience on which to draw. Germany had not achieved her form of government as a result of centuries- long endeavour; it had just 'happened' in 1919 along with military defeat and the collapse of a once-brilliant empire. Germany had then passed through a series of severe economic and political crises, for which the people and the majority of its representatives held not only their ex-enemies but also their own government largely responsible. Now, after a continuous political, economic and social crisis lasting since 1930, the country was politically exhausted. A sense of democracy and republican vigilance would have been fortunate accidents, certainly not a natural development. Before 30 January 1933, even before the elections of July and November 1932, people knew of the Nazis' violence, brutality and contempt for the law. But violence and brutality were attractive; many mistook them for strength and were convinced. On the other hand in the free elections held between 1919 and 1934 only a minority had ever voted for the NSDAP. The individual German had no influence on the events of 30 January, 4 February, 28 February and 23 March, in so far as he understood them at all. Many even of those who possessed all the necessary knowledge and information did not believe that the threats to which Hitler and his adherents were continuously giving vent, were seriously meant; they genuinely hoped that the Nazis could be tamed if they formed a minority in a cabinet, and would then be compelled to assume political responsibility. The problem was therefore not solely lack of the will to resist but equally lack of comprehension of the nature of Nazism. Uncertainty and loss of the basic values added to ignorance, led to absence of comprehension and helplessness in face of the appearance of a totalitarian leviathan which felt itself bound by no dictates of humanity or law. People did not believe that the Nazis would obtain an absolute majority in the Reichstag to be elected on 5 March - and the Nazis did not; people naively hoped that the government could be held in check by parliamentary methods and by the checks and balances enshrined in the constitution, and be forced to return to the con- stitutional ways which from the outset it had rejected. As long as people thought this, there could be no question of an 'illegal' resistance. 15 For the Social-Democrats in particular adherence to legality had become an idee fixe. The fact that the Reichsbanner, the socialist militant wing, other similar organizations and many of the workers were ready, even clamouring, for a fight by means of strikes, demonstrations, disturbances and even an armed rising, was of no avail. The Social-Democratic leadership remained im- 8 The Year 1933 movable, hopeful, uncomprehending. There were sufficient subjective grounds for inactivity: the Reichswehr's apparent collaboration with the government; the formal legality of the Hitler government and its measures; the threat of the Social-Democratic Party's complete annihilation. Looked at from a distance, the most convincing explanation is lack of comprehension of Nazism and its true nature, despite the fact that there were plenty of warning voices. The courageous speech made in the Reichstag by Otto Wels, chairman of the Social-Democrats, protesting against the Enabling Law, should not be forgotten. 'Legal resistance', about which many cudgelled their brains, was an illu- sion. The electoral campaign preceding 5 March had shown that the Nazis were determined to cling to power 'by all methods'. The press was censored and deluged with restrictions; the radio was almost totally under Nazi control. More than four million adult Germans were quietly allowed to vote com- munist; then their elected deputies were arrested or forced into hiding and emigration, so that the relative Nazi strength in the Reichstag was increased. Finally the German Communist Party was banned altogether. The Social- Democrats were permitted to lead a shadowy existence for a time but on 22 June 1933 their hour of dissolution and proscription struck. By the end of the following three weeks no German political party existed apart from the NSDAP. 16 Meanwhile the terror increased; all who opposed or fell foul of the authorities were literally clubbed down. As early as February 1933 the Nazis began to misuse the police as an instrument of power and terror, also to transfer auxiliary police functions to uniformed members of the Party and SA. 17 So the 'legal' door was thrown wide open to arbitrary action and terror. A Party uniform and a white armband were adequate justification for the use of the rubber truncheon or revolver; arbitrary arrest was the rule; people were beaten up on the street, assaulted and kicked by undisciplined uniformed Nazis or 'shot while attempting to escape'. Thousands who survived their first assault were taken to 'wildcat concentration camps' run by the SA. Looting, theft, deprivation of liberty, bodily injury, manslaughter and murder were somewhat out-of-date expressions for measures now called 'police' and therefore 'legal'. Who can be surprised that many were intimidated by such terror? Despite all this, and often before the terror had reached its full height, resistance to certain of the new government's measures was offered in many places both by official institutions and by individuals. In Bavaria there was widespread and energetic opposition to the Gleichschaltung policy; restorationist and even separatist motives and tendencies fused and coalesced with those of the federalists and anti-Nazis. Representatives of the Bavarian Peoples Party acted with special energy. They petitioned the Reich President and obtained assurances both from him and from von Papen, the Vice- Chancellor. Heinrich Held, the Party's leader, declared on several occasions in February that no Reich Commissar would cross the line of the Main with im- 9 The Background punity; if, contrary to Hindenburg's assurances, one of them did enter Bavaria, he would be arrested forthwith. The Emergency Ordinance of 28 February, however, gave the government a 'legal' handle for the seizure of power in the Lander, including Bavaria, in so far as 'the necessary measures for the reestablishment of public security and order' had not been taken there. 18 Decision on whether this had in fact been done was the prerogative of the Nazi Minister of the Interior, Dr Wilhelm Frick. Further protests were of no avail; legal methods and procedures could achieve nothing against the os- tensible legality of a dictatorship which was in fact violating both the con- stitution and the law. Here was yet another illustration of the complete change in the location of power, also of the complete misappreciation of the situation by the victims and the protesters. After the elections, in which the Bavarian Nazis scored 43%, all possible methods were employed to impose Gleichschaltung on Bavaria, the last Land without a Nazi government. 19 On 9 March 1933 armed detachments of SAand SS dominated the streets of Munich; the swastika flag was hoisted on the City Hall tower; SA leaders in uniform demanded the immediate installation of General Ritter von Epp as State Commissar-General. The Bavarian govern- ment, however, remained firm and opened negotiations with the Reichswehr on measures to be taken against revolution in the streets. But the Reichswehr Ministry in Berlin was discouraging; events in Bavaria, it said, were purely in- ternal political matters, from which the Reichswehr must remain aloof; it would remain standing at ease. Heinrich Held, the Bavarian Minister- President, remained unshaken; Ernst Rohm, Chief of Staff of the SA, General von Epp, Adolf Wagner, Gauleiter of Bavaria, and Heinrich Himmler, com- mander of the SS, were sent unceremoniously packing. What could have been done? For technical reasons effective resistance was barely conceivable. How long would the police obey the orders of the legal Bavarian government? How long could they hold out against the SA and SS? Whom would the Reichswehr obey, should it cease standing at ease ? Should the population be incited to civil war and revolt against uniformed 'authority' ? Resistance would have implied disturbance of public order and so given the Reich government the handle for which it had been waiting all along. 'Legal' resistance could achieve nothing in the long run. The SA dominated the streets; there was much disorder and the government was largely powerless. So the inevitable happened; the Reich government intervened on the basis of the Emergency Ordinance of 28 February and appointed Ritter von Epp its representative in Bavaria. Protests and telegrams were of no further avail; the President, through Hans Otto Meissner, his State Secretary, replied that application should be made direct to Hitler. Thus the President registered his own impotence. In other Lander men were to be found no less courageous than those in Bavaria. Many of them were executed by the Nazis after 20 July 1944. Dr Carl Goerdeler, the Burgomaster of Leipzig, stopped the swastika flag, which was not yet the national emblem, being hoisted on the City Hall; he also intervened personally to protect Jewish businessmen from molestation by the SA. 20 Such 10 The Year 1933 resistance was frequently of short duration; it was offered in ignorance of the perils involved and in the belief that the incident concerned was due to an isolated, or at at any rate temporary, excess of zeal, not to deliberate policy. But in those days all were treated alike; everywhere the Nazis seized power with unexampled brutality. The discussions and parliamentary methods, of which the Social-Democrats were the main protagonists in their efforts to stop the Enabling Law, could no longer achieve anything. The reader will wonder to what extent the Nazis' partners in the govern- ment coalition offered resistance to the progressive totalitarian seizure of power; from the outset, after all, they had joined the coalition with the inten- tion of 'taming' Hitler and his party and confining them to proper legal procedures. Hugenberg was the one who at least made some move towards a demand for the association of President Hindenburg with those laws due to be promulgated on the basis of the enabling legislation. 21 Meissner, Hinden- burg's State Secretary, however, assured him that this was neither necessary nor would Hindenburg wish it. Nevertheless, he said it was for consideration whether Hindenburg's authority should not somehow be 'engaged' in the case of particularly important legislation; moreover the President had in fact 'in- superable objections' to one proposed ordinance whereby the Reichstag fire- raising would be punishable with death, a sentence not on the statute book when the fire took place. The resistance offered by the Nazis' political partners was therefore very small, in fact insignificant. In practice they placidly renounced their support from the President, in effect the whole basis of such influence as remained to them. They had no wish to cause a split by open opposition in cabinet. Ultimately, therefore, though in face of determined resistance from the socialist parliamentary party, the Reichstag was put out of business through the acceptance of the Enabling Law on 23 March 1933. It was a spectacle of opportunism, of desperate attempts by the parties to preserve their existence which in fact they succeeded in prolonging only by a few weeks. This spec- tacle of the weakness shown by the remnants of a never very robust democracy is undoubtedly both disillusioning and exasperating. In practice a refusal to vote the Enabling Law would have achieved nothing other than to allow the parties to make an honourable exit from the stage. This weakness was general and it applied to all walks of political life. Parliament did not, of course, agree to the Enabling Law entirely of its own free will. The Reichstag met under unconcealed pressure from the Nazi private armies, the SA and the SS, and under pressure and threat from the streets. Well-drilled supporters, who penetrated even into the Chamber, gave notice of violence; in the Kroll Opera House, where parliament had met ever since the Reichstag fire, SA and SS uniforms dominated the scene; SA and SS 'stewards' stood menacingly beside the opposition benches; there were shouts of 'Heil', thunderous applause for Hitler, swastika flags, the singing of the national anthem at the end of Hitler's speech - everything designed to create the intended mass-meeting atmosphere. 22 In a famous speech Otto Wels, the 11 The Background Social-Democratic Party leader, rejected the Enabling Law, defending freedom and democracy. Hitler thereupon replied that 'only for the sake of the law' had they sought from the Reichstag something 'which we could have taken in any case'. So the Enabling Law, giving the Nazis a free hand in almost everything, was forced through. In the end, however, the Nazis neither observed nor respected this law which had reached the statute book in so il- legal and unconstitutional a manner; they broke it as unscrupulously as they did all their other obligations and promises. With his unconcealed scorn for procedure adopted 'for the sake of the law', Hitler had, as always, given forewarning of his real intentions. In parallel with the elimination of the parties went that of the trade unions, potentially strong though they were; the major campaign against them, however, did not open until April 1933. Faced with an apparently in- evitable choice between Gleichschaltung and elimination, the trade unions, despite all earlier brave words and even occasional militant utterances in February 1933, proved as ineffective as the Social-Democratic leaders. One historian describes them as helpless, timid, resigned and fragile. 23 After the March 1933 elections the SA together with members of the Nazi factory cells began to occupy certain trade union offices. The reply to this was acquiescence instead of resistance. The Committee of the German General Trade Union Federation decided to address a memorandum to Hitler; in this Theodor Leipart, First Chairman of the Free Trade Unions, said that he wished to keep the trade unions out of politics and would accept any regime 'of whatever type'. The Nazis then succeeded in persuading large numbers of trade union members to participate in the May Day celebrations- the day had been declared a paid holiday, thereby forestalling the trade unions. The rest then followed 'blow upon blow'. On 2 May Gleichschaltung of the trade un- ions began with arrests of trade union leaders, occupation of trade union offices by SA and SS, expropriation of trade union banks and the trade union press. Trade union officials were thrown into concentration camps, their previous readiness to compromise being scoffed at as subservient hypocrisy. On the same day formation of the Nazi 'German Labour Front' was an- nounced. All this happened ostensibly without legal backing from the government; it was a purely Party initiative. In the following months such members of the Social-Democratic hierarchy as had not emigrated suffered a similar fate. On 29 May Party headquarters in Prague announced the start of illegal resistance and underground activity - in fact an admission of the loss of almost all freedom of action inside Germany. 24 Finally a split developed between the Social-Democratic leaders in Berlin and those in Prague; the Party collapsed and was in effect banned by the govern- ment at the end of June. Finally even Hitler's partners, the German-Nationals, were persecuted, by- passed and terrorized, primarily when they attempted to protest against Nazi encroachments and Nazi tutelage. Here again arrests, prohibitions, beatings- up and SA raids were the order of the day. 25 Were there other spheres, the intellectual for instance, where the Nazis met 12 The Year 1933 greater and more determined resistance ? Here too the general picture is one of acquiescence, weakness, opportunism, delusion and error. Hundreds of Ger- man professors hastened to acclaim Hitler and National-Socialism; the notorious speech by Martin Heidegger, Chancellor of Freiburg University, on 27 May 1933 was merely a particularly striking, but by no means isolated, instance. 26 Even the churches were not entirely immune to this conformism, although their whole raison d'etre was as vitally affected as that of the sciences. They were, however, the only organizations to produce some form of a popular movement against the Nazi regime. Admittedly in the early days of the regime the churches were hardly engaged in anything like a struggle. No one can deny that Martin Niemoller was the outstanding figure among the leaders of ecclesiastical resistance and that he suffered severely for his courageous stand by long years spent in a con- centration camp. Even he, however, in a thanksgiving sermon in the autumn of 1933 spoke of 'calling and status, race and nationality [Volkstum]' as in- escapable requirements and of the reawakening of the German people. 27 The Nazi regime initially treated the churches with the greatest circumspection; it had no wish to start a battle for the prevalence of a new ideology during its very first months; appeasement was the watchword. On the other side many evangelical pastors who had once been royalist and imperialist and were still patriots, hailed and accepted the spirit of Germany as preached by Luther, heroic piety and even a form of Christian faith 'suited to the times'; many even supported the movement known as 'German Christians' in their opposition to Marxism, Jewry, cosmopolitanism and freemasonry. Ludwig Miiller, the Nazi 'Reich Bishop', however, was not accepted by the evangelical church despite a public statement by Bernhard Rust, Commissar for Science, Art and Popular Education in Prussia, that the formation in the church of a 'first focus of resistance' was not to be tolerated. Soon such organizations as the 'Pastors Emergency League' and the 'Confessional Church' were formed, initially to combat the 'Aryan paragraphs' in the new German church constitution of 11 June 1933. Led by Martin Niemoller of Dahlem and the young theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, they resisted any adulteration of the evangelical faith by Germanistic or other non-Christian ideas. Thousands of pastors now felt themselves, and remained, under an obligation to offer religious resistance to Nazism; an equal number, however, evaded the issue, held their tongues or paid more or less thorough-going lipservice to the regime and 'our Fuhrer*. Nevertheless what the Nazis had feared had happened: a 'first focus of resistance' had formed. They were forced to abandon their attempts to regiment and control the evangelical church from within and shifted to brutal control from outside, using the police, the administration and the regulations. The Reich Bishop was dropped but refused to resign. At the end of the war he committed suicide in Konigsberg. In general terms the Catholic Church, like the Protestant, had reacted to the seizure of power by recognition of the new regime. 28 After the passing of the 13 The Background Enabling Law at the end of March 1933, for instance, the Bishops' Conference in Fulda thought it right to express a certain confidence in the new govern- ment subject to reservations concerning some 'religious and moral lapses'. In July, only a few days after the dissolution of the Catholic Centre Party, a con- cordat was concluded between the Vatican and the German government — Hitler's first major international success. The government explicitly guaranteed certain rights and prerogatives of the Church, on which the Catholics were proposing to insist. Catholic schools were not to be touched but, on the other hand, all Catholic organizations of a political, social or professional nature were to be disbanded. During the course of 1933, however, the Catholic Church too was literally forced to resist. It could not silently accept the general persecution, regimen- tation or oppression, nor in particular the sterilization law of summer 1933. Over the years until the outbreak of war Catholic resistance stiffened until finally its most eminent spokesman was the Pope himself with his Encyclical l Mit brennender Sorge' ('With burning anxiety') of 14 March 1937, read from all German Catholic pulpits. Clemens August Graf von Galen, Bishop of Miinster, was typical of the many fearless Catholic speakers. 29 In general terms, therefore, the churches were the only major organizations to offer comparatively early and open resistance; they remained so in later years. They achieved a certain success, for even during the war the Nazi rulers did not think that they could risk complete destruction of the churches. They were confronted here with barriers which they could not understand — the for- titude and integrity of religious conviction, conscience and a sense of respon- sibility for one's fellow men which were not to be extinguished by regulations and prohibitions. There were 'invisible frontiers' which proved to be genuine obstacles in bringing the new rulers to a halt. To the outward eye both religious and in- tellectual life was regimented and controlled; all intellectual utterances were subject to censorship. The object was to concentrate under unified control the press, the cinema, the radio, literature, the theatre, and mass demonstrations; their 'centralized employment' must be 'absolutely guaranteed', declared Dr Joseph Goebbels, the Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda; propaganda, he continued, was one of the most important arts by which a peo- ple could be ruled; all cultural life must now be concentrated in the service of the National-Socialist concept. 30 The control of the minds of the people, es- sential for total domination, could only be achieved if these were entirely permeated by the thinking of the rulers and purged of everything else. In this they did not eventually succeed - nor has anyone else anywhere. During 1933 the following were formed: a Reich Chamber of Authorship, a Reich Press Chamber, a Reich Radio Chamber, a Reich Theatre Chamber, a Reich Music Chamber, and a Reich Chamber of the Visual Arts. All these formed the Reich Cultural Chamber, which was subordinate to the Reich Ministry of Propaganda. Anyone who wished to pursue these 'registered' professions had to belong to the relevant Chamber. Executive instructions, under which, for instance, only 'Aryan' writers were permitted, laid down the 14 The Year 1933 system of control and regimentation in the minutest detail. Brecht, Doblin, Kaiser, Mann, Tucholsky, Zweig, Bergengruen, Borchardt, Hofmannsthal, Lasker-Schiiler, Werfel, Hesse, Heine, Kastner and Kafka were declared 'degenerate' authors; on 10 May 1933 thousands of 'degenerate literary works' were burnt on the Opernplatz in Berlin and in the squares of other Ger- man cities; students held the torches and suitable speeches were made by professors. During 1933 many people eminent in German intellectual and cultural life were deprived of their citizenship. 31 All this was accompanied by terror of incalculable brutality, without which the internal German situation would be incomprehensible. Terror was nothing new; it had been used by numerous political groupings in the party struggles of the previous turbulent crisis years. Now, however, it had risen to be an instrument of government policy. The government could easily have dealt with its opponents by the 'legal' means which had meanwhile become available. But Hitler had no intention of putting a brake on the terror - on the contrary. He knew that he could not convert the stubborn non-conformists and so the only alternative was their suppression by force. 32 Terror and violence, no matter against whom, kept the 'movement' going and without movement the masses might possibly come to their senses; the opponents whom Hitler rightly suspected of existing in all walks of life might congeal into an opposition. The campaign preceding the 5 March elections had already cost sixty or more lives. Goring had urged the police to abandon all political neutrality and not to be afraid 'to use their weapons' when dealing with 'anti-state', in other words left-wing, organizations or when supporting 'national' formations, in other words the SA, the SS and the Stahlhelm. 33 These latter three organizations were given the status of 'auxiliary police'; on 20 February Hitler threatened that 'the enemy' would be beaten, either constitutionally through the forthcoming elections, or in battle using other weapons — and this would, of course, mean more casualties. By mid-October 1933 this unequal struggle had cost between five and six hundred lives and over 26,000 people had been deprived of their liberty as 'police prisoners'. The various 'actions' were frequently characterized more by ill-treatment of prisoners in the notorious SA cellars, by sadism and material greed than by any genuine struggle against 'the enemy'. While on the hunt for communists, Jews and other 'enemies', the SA flying squads did not find housebreaking, robbery, looting, violence, kidnap- ping or blackmail for ransom to be beneath their national dignity. The murders of 30 June and 1 July 1934 were admittedly a terrible culmination of this unconcealed terror campaign, but incomparably more terrible were the sufferings of hundreds of thousands behind prison walls or the concentration camp barbed wire; what was not known was at least suspected by potential victims. The people were now fully regimented (gleichgeschaltet); fear prevented almost everyone leaving the well-drilled ranks. A few figures may perhaps give some vague idea of the extent of the terror and also of the breadth of resistance to it. Over six years the regular courts alone sentenced 225,000 persons in political cases to terms of imprisonment 15 The Background totalling some 600,000 years. In addition there were the far more numerous, but barely calculable cases, in which detainees were thrown into a concentra- tion camp without trial or done to death beforehand by police measures. 34 Official data show that between 1933 and 1945 about three million Germans were held at some stage in a concentration camp or prison for political reasons, some only for a few weeks, some for the whole twelve years; of these approximately 800,000 were held for active resistance. 35 A Gestapo report of April 1939 shows that at that time there were 162,734 persons held in 'preventive custody' for political reasons, 27,369 awaiting trial for political misdemeanours and 112,432 under sentence for political mis- demeanours. 36 On the outbreak of war an SS summary showed 21,400 prisoners in six concentration camps; by the end of April 1942 the number in these same six camps had risen to 44,700. In December 1942 there was a total of 88,000 persons in concentration camps and this had risen to 224,000 by August 1943. The total for August 1944 was 524,286, the majority Jews and forced labourers. The peak figure was reached in January 1945 when the total of concentration camp prisoners in Germany as a whole was 714,211. 37 In the space of fourteen months in 1935-36, 2,197 persons from left-wing circles were arrested in Berlin alone. 38 In 1936, 11,687 persons were arrested throughout Germany for illegal socialist activity. In 1936 the Gestapo seized 1,643,200 illicit leaflets distributed by the Communist and Social-Democratic Parties alone and, in 1937, 927,430. Anyone fortunate enough to be released from a concentration camp in- voluntarily contributed to an even more sophisticated system of terror, since the ex-prisoner was forbidden to speak of his terrible experiences. 39 His silence alone produced a sinister increase in the fear and horror aroused by these camps. Frequently, however, ex-prisoners did tell their acquaintances of the ill-treatment, starvation, rape, murder and homicide which were the order of the day in concentration camps; his listeners were then subject to the pressure of knowing the truth but being forced to hold their tongues on pain of permanent threat of the concentration camp. The register of executions kept by the Reich Ministry of Justice from 1871 to 1945 was known as the 'murder register' because, until 1933, the death sentence was only exacted for common murder. After 1933, however, it lived up to its name since, by legal principles, many of those executed were merely the victims of judicial murder. It is estimated that between 1933 and 1945 some 32,600 persons were executed in Germany after pronunciation of a death sentence but less than half of these are shown on the 'murder register'. 40 It carries only 11,881 names and does not include those sentenced by court- martial — over 20,000. The list is also incomplete because, particularly in the final weeks of the regime, executions could no longer be recorded centrally. On the other hand it does include the names of common criminals. It is estimated that 'only' 6,927 people were executed on political grounds, of whom 3,137 were Germans. 41 On the other hand, based on files captured after the war, the British estimate at 4,980 the number of people executed for participation in the 20 July 1944 conspiracy alone. 42 This figure, however, undoubtedly in- 16 The Year 1933 eludes many executions not connected with 20 July. All these figures are probably too low. They do not include the innumerable people shot 'while attempting to escape', those starved or beaten to death in concentration camps, the victims of bestial experiments, those shot or hanged under camp 'justice'. Nevertheless, they give only too clearly a picture of the conditions; they prove that, not only was there oppression, persecution and terror, but also widespread resistance to the regime. A glance at the suicide statistics for Germany will round off the picture. In the periods July-December 1942 and 1943 7,862 and 7,379 persons respective- ly took their lives; the figures remained constant despite the considerable reduction in population due to casualties at the front and the bombing of cities. 43 The figures for suicides of Jews are particularly illuminating; official statistics show that for the period July—December 1942 the figure was 1,158 but only 49 for the same period in 1943. Such, therefore, was the setting in which the resistance movement con- spired and acted — brave courageous men, all working against Nazism whether or not they knew each other or were in touch with each other; from them sprang that section of the movement responsible for the attempts to overthrow the regime and assassinate its leaders which will be recounted in this book. 17 2 Forms of Resistance While pursuing their revolution inside Germany, the Nazis succeeded in scoring victories and gaining respect in the outside world such as had never been vouchsafed to their democratic predecessors. Apparently uninterrupted- ly, they extracted piecemeal revisions of the hated Versailles Treaty from their former enemies, thus enabling Hitler to fulfil one of his best vote-catching promises. When he reintroduced universal military service in 1935, no one lifted a finger: on the contrary, while Hitler was tearing up the Treaty of Ver- sailles page by page, a stream of prominent visitors made the pilgrimage to Germany and were granted audiences. In 1934 came Jean Goy, President of the French Ex-Servicemen's Association; in 1935 a British Legion delegation arrived and was also received by Hitler. In March 1935 Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden came on a visit and in June of that year the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was concluded, allowing Germany to build warships up to 35% of the strength of the British Navy and submarines on a parity with those of the British. 1 Great Britain had thus given agreement to a partial rearma- ment of Germany in order to prevent a repetition of the pre-war arms race. How totally were people deceiving themselves 1 As early as 3 February 1933, only three days after his appointment as Reich Chancellor, Hitler had said in an address to senior Wehrmacht commanders that if France had any statesmen, she would not allow Germany the time to rearm but would attack the Reich in good time. 2 In December 1935 William Philips, the US Under-Secretary of State, came to Germany, and in February of the following year Lord Londonderry, the British Lord Privy Seal, visited Hitler. A few days later German troops marched into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized under the Ver- sailles Treaty; as we know, there were no consequences whatsoever apart from empty protests. Hitler, however, now had the freedom he required to construct fortifications in the west and so protect his rear in the event of a move eastwards; 3 moreover he had demonstrated that France and Britain would give way in face of determined action. Nothing was done when Hitler supported Italy during her invasion of Abyssinia. German troops gave even more effective support to Colonel Franco and his Civil War party in Spain; on this occasion new weapons and tactics were tested and, moreover, the line-up in the looming world war now became obvious: the Germans and Italians sup- ported Franco, the right-wing extremist, while numerous French, British and 18 Forms of Resistance American volunteers fought on the side of the republicans and communists. In July 1936 Hitler received Charles Lindbergh, the famous Atlantic flyer; in the same year the Olympic Games were held in Berlin amid incredible pomp and circumstance and were visited by many distinguished foreign guests. On 4 September Lloyd George, one of the Big Four of Versailles, came to Ger- many, followed in October by the Governor of the Bank of France and the French Minister of Commerce. In May 1937 the Marquis of Lothian, formerly Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and later British Ambassador in Washington, who had already attended on Hitler in 1934, paid a second visit; in the autumn of 1937 even the Duke of Windsor and Lord Halifax, then a Privy Councillor and later Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were un- willing to be excluded from the procession of dignitaries. This list is by no means exhaustive but names only the most prominent personalities. 4 Though probably unintentionally, their appearance gave an impression of approval of Hitler's regime, both externally and internally; his opponents were correspon- dingly discouraged. 5 Hitler seemed to be registering one success after another. The hated Treaty of Versailles was no longer valid; German-speaking areas, such as the Saar, were coming back to the German Reich, as were areas which had once formed part of the Holy Roman Empire but had never belonged to the Bismarckian Reich and had never been claimed by Bismarck or his successors of the Weimar Republic. Despite all the shortcomings of his regime, therefore, was not Hitler a great German ? Who either would or could offer 'resistance' and thereby expose himself to the reproach of being a traitor ? Nevertheless there were men who did exactly this; many of them had begun to resist even before 1933. One was Ernst Niekisch who, in 1926, founded the 'Journal for socialist and national-revolutionary Policy' entitled Der Wider- stand (Resistance); it campaigned against reparations, characterizing them as blackmail by the capitalist powers; it called for world revolution against world capitalism and so acquired the label 'National-bolshevist'. 6 In 1932 Niekisch published a pamphlet, 'Hitler — a German disaster* (Berlin 1932), and even after 30 January 1933 he continued his journalistic campaign against the regime in Der Widerstand. The paper was not banned until the end of 1934 when the Gestapo seized all available copies of the November issue. 7 Niekisch himself was allowed to go but in 1937 was accused of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment; he was not released from Brandenburg prison until 1945. 8 Contact between Niekisch and the communists had come about quite naturally since he championed an 'eastern orientated' German policy, in other words collaboration with Russia which, like Germany, had been isolated since the war and which had waived German reparations payments. Ever since 1932 Niekisch had been conspiring with functionaries of the German Com- munist Party, using as intermediary Dr Josef ('Beppo') Romer, an ex-Free Corps captain who had joined the Communist Party. After 1933, however, Niekisch's contacts extended even into extreme con- servative and nationalist circles. 9 Through his interest in questions concer- ning the East he came to know Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, an ultra- conservative Prussian monarchist landowner and politician, one of the most 19 The Background determined and uncompromising opponents of Hitler; he edited the Mitteilungsblatt der konservativen Hauptvereinigung (Information Journal of the Central Conservative Association) which courageously called a spade a spade until banned in 1933 because of an article Fabian von Schlabrendorff had published in it. 10 From March 1933 Kleist invariably visited Niekisch whenever he came to Berlin; they exchanged information and Kleist would express his scorn for Reichswehr officers, such as Rundstedt and Blomberg, for their failure to oust Hitler. In a draft of a leaflet Kleist wrote: 'In future the word will be: "As characterless as a German official, as godless as a Protestant minister, as unprincipled as a Prussian officer"." 1 Ewald von Kleist was due to be shot during the mass murders of 30 June 1934; he had steadfastly refused to fly the swastika flag or give even a penny to the NSDAP- the Nazi district leader had even been reduced to suggesting that at least he might contribute 10 pfennig. He was warned, however, and escaped in time; Niekisch, the left-wing radical, hid him in his Berlin apartment. 12 Here was one of the remarkable but characteristic features of the anti-Hitler resistance. 13 National-Socialism was not simply a party like any other; with its total acceptance of criminality it was an incarnation of evil, so that all those whose minds were attuned to democracy, Christianity, freedom, humanity or even mere legality found themselves forced into alliance. So after Kleist took refuge in Niekisch's apartment on 1 July 1934, political friends of both of them would meet there — 'left-wing' conspirators in one room, 'right-wing' in another. Kleist was executed after 20 July 1944 for his part in the attempted coup d'etat. However heroic the resistance offered by these brave men and however great the number who paid for it with their lives, it seldom had any prospect of success. Soon after 30 June 1934 Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, the old Court Chamberlain, did succeed in making his mark; by virtue of his great age, his total intrepidity and his commanding presence he contrived to push his way past all the guards and penetrate into Hindenburg's bedroom to tell him of the Nazi murders. Hindenburg, however, was already too old and sick to make any attempt to dismiss Hitler. Nevertheless some of those arrested on 30 June were released on Hindenburg's orders. 14 Many offered resistance simply by refusing to fly the swastika flag on the prescribed days, by suddenly turning into ardent church-goers, or by studiously failing to hear the cry 'Heil Hitler'. Many deliberately refused promotion to avoid having to join the Nazi Party; they concealed Jews and others on the run; if on the judicial bench, they awarded lenient sentences in political cases. Others joined the army to be safe from Nazi importunities or persecution and to escape the Gestapo. Journalists and authors wrote on sub- jects providing an analogy of the existing situation that was obvious to anyone and that enabled them to criticize in indirect, non-judiciable terms. These methods of resistance were aptly termed 'internal emigration'. 15 The more ac- tive forms of resistance, aiming at concrete results, had an equally wide range of possibilities and variations. For instance, people disillusioned by the ideological and organizational 20 Forms of Resistance rigidity and conformism of the German Communist Party formed a group led by Walter Lowenheim and known as the 'Leninist Organization'. 16 Ever since 1929 Lowenheim had been recruiting into his organization Social-Democratic and Communist Party members who wished to liberate the forces of socialism from their dogmatic immobility. He had to proceed secretly, since he wished to infiltrate his supporters into all socialist organizations and so ultimately control them or at least guide them back on to the true path of socialism. From the outset, therefore, this group inevitably had to work underground. Lowenheim, however, only realized somewhat late in the day the true significance of the Nazi seizure of power and its concomitant revolution. Not until the Reichstag fire and its accompanying wave of arrests was the group (known as 'The O' for short) convinced of the seriousness of the situation. 17 Many conspiratorial illusions were suddenly destroyed. It was not possible to produce a clandestine effect from within on workers' organizations which no longer existed or which had been banned and broken up. So 'The O' pinned its hopes on some crisis of the regime. It concentrated on information and on 'education', on under-cover agitation in the factories — 'industrial activity'; it attempted to form a 'unity front' with other class-warfare circles, even in- cluding those labelled 'bourgeois-democrat'. 18 Forbidden pamphlets were smuggled in — one written by Walter Lowenheim, for instance, entitled Neu Beginnen ('Begin afresh'), published in October 1933 by the Social- Democratic Party Committee-in-exile. This was then re-edited in the form of an advertisement booklet and issued in November by 'Graphia' of Carlsbad under the pseudonym 'Miles' and with the camouflage title 'Schopenhauer - On religion'; 5,000 copies made their way into Germany. 19 As a result the 'Leninist Organization' has frequently been called the 'Miles Group* or the 'Begin afresh Group'. In 1934 English, American and French editions of the pamphlet appeared and the resistance group became one of the best known of all in its time. Its reputation abroad was greatly assisted by the fact that its members had remained in Germany and were not emigres.™ Nevertheless, although its underground operations were adroit and it worked for a considerable period without losses, this organization came no nearer overthrowing the regime than had the socialists or communists; all had to relearn the conspiratorial trade. In the light of conditions in a totalitarian state even the first prerequisite for a revolution from below, in other words a mass movement, could not be created. 21 The 'Leninist Organization' in fact went so far as to state that formation of a mass movement was possible in the period following the fall of National Socialism, provided that democratic political structures were allowed enough 'elbow room'. 22 Under the prevailing circumstances, however, no mass movement could possibly be created; organization, however efficient, could do nothing to alter this fact. The great year of arrests and destruction of the communist, Social- Democrat and trade union underground organizations was 1935. For a time a flood of illegal brochures and pamphlets was produced from secret printing presses in Germany or neighbouring countries and distributed, usually with innocent bindings and titles, presenting the contents as a classical drama or 21 The Background cookery book. 23 At this period the Gestapo was still only in process of expan- sion; gradually its methods improved; the informer service and penetration of opposition organizations began to have their effect. Then came the period of mass arrests and mass trials; on one occasion, for instance, 400 Social- Democrats were placed on trial and on another 628 trade unionists; 232 Social-Democrats were tried in Cologne. In 1935 and 1936 fifty-five members of the little 'Begin afresh' group were arrested; the majority were given prison sentences of two to five years. Fate caught up with the remainder in 1938; in 1939 almost all surviving members of 'Begin afresh' were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and were only released in 1945. 24 Most other groups had similar experiences. In Mannheim, for instance, when the Social-Democratic Party was banned, Jakob Ott reformed it un- derground ; by distributing illegal newspapers he held together approximately one thousand members; he had no plan, however, for a coup or any other ac- tion. Another socialist group, formed by Emil Henk, also existed in Mannheim. It looked for ways of overthrowing the regime and maintained contact with other groups in Mannheim, Eberbach, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Offenbach, Darmstadt, Worms, Landau, and with the Party Committee-in- exile in Paris. Basically, however, it could do no more than inform, advise and pursue general conspiratorial activities. 25 In late summer 1934 this organiza- tion was blown when one of its members had a motor-bicycle accident and the propaganda material he was carrying was strewn all over the street. The organization's officers were arrested and, although the leadership was quickly reconstituted, it was broken up again in 1935. By that year the period of large- scale underground activity was over; the Gestapo had annihilated the various organizations. From 1936 many German communists and socialists, including Wilhelm Zaisser, Walter Ulbricht, Alfred Kantorowicz, Ludwig Renn and Willy Brandt, saw in the Spanish Civil War an opportunity of fighting Spanish and German fascism; Hitler was supporting Franco with troops and war material, and they regarded fascism as a class warfare phenomenon, not as a nationalist movement. The majority of these volunteers foregathered in the Thalmann Brigade. 26 With Franco's victory in 1938 this incident in the anti-Hitler resistance was over too. Of some 2,000 German survivors from the International Brigades (out of a total of about 5,000) hundreds next saw each other either in the French internment camps or in the hands of the Gestapo or later in the French resistance movement; some even escaped to Mexico or San Domingo. So when war broke out in 1939, apart from isolated groups and cells, there was no working-class underground movement in Germany worth mentioning. 27 Such will to resist as remained on the part of numerous com- munist groups was, at least temporarily, stifled by the Russo-German pact of 23 August 1939. War, and the crimes instigated by Hitler under cover of it, led to new forms of resistance, self-sacrificing but mostly impotent and hopeless. Even a semi- exhaustive description of this resistance would fill many volumes but certain outstanding instances can at least be quoted as illustrations. Communist cells and groups in particular felt it their duty to continue anti- 22 Forms of Resistance war and anti-regime agitation. In many cases they were even prepared to cross the line between treason against the government and treason against their country and to conspire with prisoners of war. One such group was that led by Dr Theodor Neubauer, a former communist deputy in the Reichstag. Neubauer spent five-and-a-half years in Buchenwald concentration camp between 1933 and 1939. On his release he immediately resumed his illegal ac- tivity; he drafted leaflets and from his base in Jena organized contacts to Berlin, Leipzig, Eisenach, Gotha, Erfurt, Weimar and the Ruhr. He was once more arrested and finally executed in Brandenburg prison on 5 February 1945. 28 Another group, led by Saefkow, Jacob and Bastlein and directed from the Soviet Union, engaged in similar activities. The organization led by Harro Schulze-Boysen and known as 'Red Orchestra' was primarily concerned with espionage. 29 Other groups, such as the one around Reinhold Mewes which cooperated with the former Free-Corps leader Dr Josef Romer, also became convinced by autumn 1941 that it was in the interests of the working classes to aid the struggle of the Soviet Union against National-Socialist Germany and at the same time to prevent an Anglo-French-American occupation of Ger- many. Romer, whose name is mentioned far less frequently by East Ger- man historians than the names of other communist underground fighters, led a resistance group that was perhaps the largest and best-organized of any operating in Germany under communist auspices. The Schlotterbeck brothers and some of their friends formed a smaller but equally ideologically- based organization; it carried on espionage for the Soviet Union — for political reasons, not for money. Their Russian contact man, however, who had arrived by parachute, fell into the hands of the Gestapo and was forced to transmit 'play-back' material, in other words false information, over his radio. As a result the group was destroyed. Friedrich Schlotterbeck alone contrived to escape into Switzerland; nine members of his family were executed on 30 November 1944. 30 One of the many groups resembling each other both in spirit and in action was that of the Scholls (brother and sister) and their friends; in 1942 and 1943 they prepared and distributed leaflets in Munich calling for resistance to the government and the war. Although they realized that their activities could hardly do any significant damage to the regime, they were prepared to sacrifice themselves. 31 Secretly they may have hoped to produce greater results, but primarily they were ready to stake their lives for the cause. Even Marinus van der Lubbe's act of fire-raising (the Reichstag fire) should be looked at in this light - as an attempt to rouse the working class and as altruistic self-sacrifice. Kurt Gerstein should also be counted as a resister. He had close links with the Confessional Church and had twice, the second time in 1938, been sent to a concentration camp for resistance activity on religious grounds; he had also been expelled from the Nazi Party. 32 He was a mine manager and industrialist, well-to-do and deeply religious, and had also studied medicine; he was con- vinced that, as an individual, he could only exert some effect from inside the machine. Accordingly on 10 March 1941, when he heard of the start of the 23 The Background euthanasia programme, he joined the SS. The improbable happened. In January 1942 Gerstein became Head of the Technical Hygiene Section in SS Headquarters and was commissioned by the RSHA (Reichssicher- heitshauptamt - Central Security Department) to obtain supplies of prussic acid; he thus gained an insight into the whole fearful extermination system in the concentration camps. He set about using chemical methods to make his consignments of prussic acid harmless; his main activity, however, was the broadcasting of his knowledge wherever he could; he told over one hundred people what he had discovered. In August 1942, after he had personally attended a mass gassing using the somewhat ineffective method of exhaust fumes from a diesel engine, he told a member of the Swedish embassy in Berlin what had happened, asking him to ensure that the news was passed on to London. Gerstein believed that, once the German people knew of this crime, they would put an end to the regime. This hope proved illusory, partly because it was based on an overestimation of 'the people', partly because the news was inadequately disseminated or alternatively, owing to the enormity of the crime, was received with incredulity. Gerstein's special merit, however, was the fact that he deliberately involved himself in crime, accepting respon- sibility thereby, in order to discover, to broadcast and, if possible, to sabotage the most secret and most appalling processes. In this he was only partially successful. The killing of alleged incurables was a different matter, since a far smaller number of potential victims was involved than in the 'Final Solution', the term for the liquidation of the Jews. The latter was carried out primarily on Polish territory, whereas the euthanasia programme was pursued in Germany itself and involved direct interference with charitable institutions, almost all closely connected with one of the two main churches. Knowledge of the murder programme ordered by Hitler on 1 September 1939 was therefore widespread and the leading personalities of the ecclesiastical opposition could count on considerable support. Dr Theophil Wurm, Bishop of Wurttemberg, and Graf von Galen, Bishop of Miinster, both called the programme what it was - murder. By means of petitions and courageous public protests they and other church leaders succeeded, by and large, in bringing the operation to a halt by the end of 1941. 33 If resistance was to be more promising than this, its focus had to be nearer the centre of power, in the higher levels of the Reichswehr for instance. Hindenburg had long since been pushed on one side. During the last days of January 1933 rumours of a putsch had in fact circulated here and there. It was whispered that the Reichswehr intended to use force to prevent the installa- tion of a government with Hitler as Chancellor. In fact Colonel-General Kurt Freiherr von Hammerstein, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Lieutenant-General Erich Freiherr von dem Bussche-Ippenburg, Head of the Army Personnel Office, had had a personal interview with Hindenburg on 26 January and had attempted to dissuade the President from appointing Hitler, emphasizing the dangers. 34 During this interview Hindenburg referred to the 'Austrian corporal' whom he would never appoint as Chancellor. 35 On 29 24 Forms of Resistance January, however, Hammerstein and Schleicher agreed that there could be no question of anyone other than Hitler as Chancellor, since, as Hammerstein and Schleicher saw it, a Papen-Hugenberg government would have had to rule with the support of only 7% as against 93% of the German people. Nevertheless they only visualized a Hitler government on condition that Schleicher was Reichswehr Minister in it. They had no thought of a putsch in their minds. 36 Hammerstein was far more concerned to avoid a general strike and civil war, involving the employment of the Reichswehr against the Nazis and the political Left. Rumours of a putsch involving an alleged proposal to declare a state of emergency and lay hands on the person of the President seem to have stemmed from circles interested in justifying the formation of a Hitler- Papen-Hugenberg government and extracting Hindenburg's agreement to it. 37 Be that as it may, when Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor, the Reichswehr took no action. Very soon after the 'seizure of power', however, people began to wonder how the Hitler government could be overthrown; Dr Heinrich Bruning, the former Reich Chancellor, was involved together with Schleicher and Hammerstein. 38 The true nature of the new regime had naturally become ob- vious soon enough, but no 'counter-action' was taken. A major obstacle was the new Reichswehr Minister, Werner von Blomberg; he was naive, weak and somewhat unrealistic; he was also favourably disposed to the Nazis. So, in July 1933, Hammerstein found himself deprived both of his influence and command authority in the Army. 39 At the end of 1933 he handed in his resignation and on 1 February 1934 was succeeded by General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch. 40 With Hammerstein retired the conflict between the SA and the Reichswehr became increasingly acute and in the spring of 1934 certain people in Papen's entourage were thinking of seizing the opportunity, when the anticipated SA revolt came, to persuade Hindenburg to proclaim a state of emergency. 41 To bring this about Generals von Witzleben, von Bock and von Rundstedt, who were obviously prepared to act, were to use their troops against the SA and Hitler was to be forced to 'go along'. Tension was to be raised to boiling point by a major speech drafted by Edgar J. Jung, the Munich lawyer and 'young conservative', and actually delivered by Papen in Marburg on 17 June 1934; it was in fact an indictment of the whole course of events since January 1933. 42 Hopes centred on Fritsch; Major-General von Schleicher, Hitler's predecessor as Chancellor, considered that Fritsch must 'under all cir- cumstances strike' as soon as Hindenburg died. 43 Fritsch, however, had been utterly opposed to Schleicher's pre-1933 political activity and subsequently stated spontaneously: 'Politics pass me by totally.' 44 He did not adopt this blinkered attitude merely as a matter of duty; it was in line with his character and his lack of comprehension of the criminal nature of the entire Nazi move- ment, including its Fuhrer. At this time, therefore, before the bloodbath of 30 June 1934 carried out by the SS, no one 'struck', not even the SA leaders, who perhaps had planned to do so. Hitler was the one who struck and he had two generals shot in the process, 25 The Background an action accepted by the Reichswehr without noticeable protest. 45 'The Reichswehr' as such possibly had no objection to the murder of Rohm and his SA leaders; it was perhaps glad to see its competing army thus emasculated and the danger of its encroachment on the Reichswehr removed — it numbered, after all, well over three million, many of whom now proposed to enter the Reichswehr ranks. 46 It is certain, however, that Hammerstein and other senior Reichswehr commanders were pleased by the elimination of Rohm and his friends and, at least initially, raised no objection to the methods used. Hammerstein was only 'much affected' when he heard that Schleicher too had been murdered, saying: 'So they are now starting to murder gentlemen as well.' 47 He went to Blomberg, his immediate superior as Reichswehr Minister, in order 'through him to bring about some opposition on the part of the Reichswehr'. Even at this point, however, no one was really thinking of an attempt at a coup d'etat. Blomberg 'did nothing'; he could not even be persuaded to adopt a threatening attitude or make a serious protest. This is not surprising since he had prior knowledge of the planned action against the SA and was in agreement with it. 48 Lieutenant-General Walter von Reichenau, Head of the Ministerial Office in the Reichswehr Ministry from 1 February 1934, had also been informed beforehand of the planned preventive action against the SA; he placed no more credence than did Blomberg in the story that a putsch had been nipped in the bud. Both in fact knew perfectly well that the SA's attempts to arm itself and its readiness to take precautions were no more than defensive reactions to the military measures ordered by Hitler on pretext of a threatened SA revolt. 49 It may even be assumed that both, and particularly Reichenau who was the more adroit, were among the string-pullers working for an aggravation of the tense situation. 50 In fact, therefore, both Blomberg and Reichenau, and through them the senior officers of the Reichswehr, were indirectly involved, and a significant factor, in Hitler's success on 30 June 1934. Blomberg had given his agreement to the arrest of Schleicher and Reichenau drafted the text of the official an- nouncement saying that Schleicher had been shot when resisting arrest. 51 With hindsight it is easy to reproach the Reichswehr leaders for their at- titude on 30 June and thereafter. Undoubtedly, as Helmut Krausnick says, the circumstances and the Reichswehr's position must be taken into account in their entirety. 52 Krausnick is equally correct, however, when he says: 'In fact 30 June faced the army leaders for the first time with the stark choice between obedience and acceptance of partial responsibility, between compliance with orders and their conscience.' 53 General von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Ludwig Beck, can hardly have realized beforehand what Hitler's real intentions were. 54 But later - ? The murders lasted two days and it may be taken as certain that Fritsch and Beck were accurately informed. Even taking account of all the circumstances it is difficult to see any satisfac- tory explanation for the absence of some determined reaction, not only to these arbitrary murders in general, but to the shooting of Major-Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow in particular. 26 Forms of Resistance On the afternoon of 30 June Erwin Planck, the former State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery, went to Fritsch and urged him to act in view of Blomberg's failure to do so. Others, including Major-General von Witzleben, his Chief of Staff Colonel von Lewinski (alias von Manstein), General Ritter von Leeb and General von Rundstedt, demanded that Blomberg institute a military inquiry. Blomberg, however, declared that an inquiry was impossible and thus matters remained. Krausnick says: 'Not even at this point could people muster the courage to take action of political significance, still less with a political objec- tive, as was called for by the monstrous nature of the proceedings.' 55 So the 'non-political army' in reality renounced its neutrality and became both a part and a servant of the National-Socialist system of domination. At the same time 30 June 1934 put an end to the potential bourgeois conspiracy against Hitler. Not until 1937-38 did any real insurrectionist movement reconstitute itself. 56 The way was now open for a typical coup d'etat by Hitler himself. Only one prerequisite was still lacking — the death of old President von Hindenburg which was expected daily. It occurred on 2 August 1934 when the President died at his country seat in Neudeck. On the previous day the government had passed a law whereby, on Hindenburg's death, the offices of Reich President and Reich Chancellor were to be combined. So by unconstitutional methods Hitler obtained constitutional authority over the Reichswehr. 51 A 'law' had been passed in January enabling the government to 'lay down fresh con- stitutional legislation'. 58 The Reichswehr had been relieved of the threat of the SA, but it was also brought more fully under the control of Hitler and the Nazi Party. On the very day of Hindenburg's death Hitler took a further step in the con- solidation of his authority over the armed forces of the Reich. On 2 August he ordered the entire Reichswehr to be sworn in afresh, taking an oath not to the people, the country or the constitution but solely to him by name. Under a law promulgated by the Nazis only a few months before (1 December 1933) the oath read: 'I swear by Almighty God this sacred oath: I will at all times loyally and honestly serve my people and my country and, as a brave soldier, will be ready at any time to stake my life for this my oath.' 59 Now, however, the oath ran: 'I swear by Almighty God this sacred oath: I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuhrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, Supreme Commander of the IVehrmacht, and, as a brave soldier, I will be ready at any time to stake my life for this oath.' 60 For soldiers, therefore, loyal- ty to the constitution or the country no longer existed; there was only loyalty to the 'Fuhrer'. Henceforth the only valid order or channel of command was that approved by the 'Fuhrer'; this was now the law. The new legislation met with no opposition of any significance, and Hitler had succeeded in releasing the Reichswehr from all previous traditional obligations and in attaching it to himself personally. This new hurriedly organized oath-taking process was more than a mere coup by Hitler, analogous to a coup d'etat, designed to take the Reichswehr by surprise as in the Fritsch crisis of 1938; it was also intended as a powerful 27 The Background obstacle to any form of resistance to the deified 'command'. Of course, many of the generals subsequently took refuge behind their oath when asked to cooperate in an attempt to overthrow the regime. In fact they knew perfectly well that such an oath is only valid if it presupposes some moral and political obligation and loyalty on the part of the man to whom it is sworn; they also knew that this man, Hitler, was guilty of a thousandfold contravention of his obligation to the German people and a thousandfold misuse of his followers pledged to him by oath. For many others, however, this oath constituted a real problem; they still felt themselves bound by it, even when the immorality and illegality of the whole system had long since become clear. Many maintained that its content must be valid, since the form existed and persisted. Form was given precedence over meaning, the meaning being thereby destroyed. Recipients of orders, however, were not permitted to harbour such thoughts; they must think solely on the lines of the 'leadership'. Having thus laid hands on all important positions of power in the Reich (he did not observe till later that the army was unwilling to be his complete tool and he dealt with this situation by removing its Commander-in-Chief), Hitler was able to announce complacently that the National-Socialist revolution was at an end. In a proclamation read by Gauleiter Adolf Wagner at the Party Rally in Nuremberg on 5 September 1934 it was stated: 'The violent phase of the National-Socialist revolution is now at an end. As a revolution it has fully accomplished all that could be hoped from it.' 61 All subsequent difficulties could be dealt with as problems concerning personalities. The expected harmony between Party and Reichswehr, however, did not materialize. Hitler had promised the Reichswehr that it would be the nation's sole bearer of arms, but from and immediately after 30 June 1934 the SS was further expanded; friction continued between the Reichswehr on one side and the Party and SA on the other. Finally the realization that 30 June 1934 had not been an isolated instance of revolutionary over-enthusiasm but could be repeated at any moment helped to clarify the minds of many soldiers. A further factor was the increasingly obvious trend towards a purposeless war which, in the light of Germany's foreign policy successes, was clearly 'unnecessary'. It took four years, 1934 to 1938, before the true conscientious opponents of Nazism had emerged from the ranks of the fellow-travellers, the indifferent and the undecided. In the administration, in the judiciary, in the teaching profession, in the churches, in factories and offices, in the Reichswehr, among the educated, among artists and authors, in other words in all conceivable walks of life, the like-minded formed groups and circles; gradually they learnt not to disclose their views at once but nevertheless to be recognizable to other opponents of the regime. All this required time and the process occupied the years preceding 1938. Greater activity on the part of all these various groupings could obviously only be expected if the impulse was strong enough. The general atmosphere of oppression did not suffice; the anti-Jewish atrocities of November 1938 and Hitler's aggressive war policy during the Sudeten crisis were required to evoke more intensive efforts to overthrow the 28 Forms of Resistance regime. In addition to the misgivings in military circles already mentioned, however, a number of sincere attempts were made prior to 1938. Among these must be counted the activities of Edgar J. Jung, the Munich lawyer already referred to; he is usually described as a member of the 'Young Conservatives' group and even before 1933 was an uncompromising opponent of Nazism. 62 After Hitler's appointment as Chancellor he seized every con- ceivable opportunity to bring about the fall of the regime. In November 1933, together with Herbert von Bose, Vice-Chancellor von Papen's Press Officer, he proposed to use Papen's and Hindenburg's influence to put forward eighty non-Nazi candidates for the next Reichstag, the object being to undermine the position of the National-Socialists. When this attempt failed he made feverish attempts to concentrate and coordinate various opposition circles. 63 Jung is generally thought to have been the principal author of the famous speech made by Papen in the University of Marburg on 17 June 1934; it was intended as the signal for a rising and general upheaval, hopes being centred on Hinden- burg, Papen and the Reichszvehr. 64 In his speech Papen pleaded for religious freedom, rejecting any 'unnatural totalitarian aspirations' in the field of religion; he warned against the use of force and regimentation of the life of the people outside the political sphere, in other words against any attempt to set up a totalitarian state. 65 This warning was not lost on Hitler; publication of the speech was banned, but a number of clandestine copies circulated and it did in fact create a sensation both at home and abroad. 66 Papen protested and offered his resignation, but then allowed himself to be pacified by Hitler. A few days later there followed the murders of 30 June, 1 and 2 July. Ad- mittedly the SA had been eliminated as a possible competitor of the Reichswehr; admittedly violent social upheaval on the lines of Rohm's 'second revolution' had been prevented. 67 At the same time, however, it had been made plain in unmistakable terms to every German what fate awaited him, should he in any way oppose the 'National-Socialist revival'. The warning was dear; in addition to the SA leaders one hundred or more actual and potential oppositionists had been shot, including Jung and Bose. Papen himself was also possibly due to be murdered. 68 Apart from his speech, however, he had not been willing to take part in plans for a coup 69 and he came to terms with the Nazis once more. When Jung was arrested on 25 June, he had again protested and again allowed himself to be pacified; 70 when Jung and Bose were murdered, he protested yet again, but nevertheless went off to Vienna as Hitler's special representative. Even in 1938, when Freiherr von Ketteler, his personal assistant, was murdered by the Gestapo, he once more allowed himself to be pacified (if indeed he had ever been indignant) and settled with his Fuhrer for the post of Ambassador in Ankara. 71 From a man such as this it was clearly futile to expect opposition or even any display of character when confronted with Hitler. Jung and Bose were the victims of their illusions about Papen. Despite the brutally naked totalitarian threat to which, as a result of these murders, all those in any way displeased with the ruling regime were exposed, 29 The Background many continued to work against the system and the government. In the following year, on 16 April 1935, the poet Ernst Wiechert made a speech against government policy in the Great Hall of Munich University; he protested against the government's attitude to the visual and other arts, against production of poets in 'Poets' Training Camps', which he characterized as equivalent to 'spiritual murder', and against politically- motivated art criticism; he pleaded for truth, freedom, the law, compassion, love and respect. Youth, he said, should not allow itself to be seduced into silence when its conscience commanded it to speak; nothing was more cor- rosive of the essence of man or of a people than pusillanimity. 72 Wiechert was taken forthwith to Dachau concentration camp. Eight years later, in 1943 the Scholls (brother and sister), Professor Huber and their friends met their deaths for these same ideals. In the mid-1930s, however, the voices raised were primarily those of the older generation. Ernst Niekisch was still active. He was in touch with Otto Strasser, who was one of Hitler's most dangerous adversaries in the 1930s; working from Vienna, Strasser directed a 'Black Front' with adherents inside Germany; primarily, however, he was trying to sabotage Hitler's policy from outside. 73 Rudolf Pechel refers to a 'Markwitz Circle', composed primarily of Social-Democrats, which distributed forbidden literature and assisted in escapes by opponents of the regime threatened with arrest. The entire circle was arrested by the Gestapo in May 1935 after an informer had infiltrated himself into its courier service. Some of its members were done to death, others escaped or succeeded in ob- taining release by means of adroit defence before a court. One of these was Dr Mischler, who was arrested but acquitted owing to lack of evidence; he was expelled and emigrated to Prague, where he was again arrested in 1938; once more he was acquitted but was nevertheless confined in a concentration camp until 1942. No sooner was he released than, via the Social-Democratic journalist Theodor Haubach, he made contact with Wilhelm Leuschner and so eventually was one of those involved in the conspiracy of 20 July 1944. 74 Another group was led by Dr Joseph ('Beppo') Romer, a First World War warrior and commander of the Free Corps 'Oberland'. 75 This man's activities are to some extent, and very understandably, obscure; only a few details are known. Romer was arrested on several occasions, the first time in 1933 and then again after 30 June 1934 when he was held in Dachau concentration camp. 76 On his release in July 1939, which he owed to his regimental fellow- officer General Robert Ritter von Greim, his thoughts immediately turned once more to a coup and attempted assassination. 77 Romer was finally arrested on 4 February 1942 and executed on 25 September. 78 The overlapping which occurred both before and during the war between the Romer group and other resistance organizations was almost incredible. Some 150 other people were involved in Romer's trial before the People's Court, the majority belonging to communist or other working-class-based groups. 79 The most important was that run in the Osram Works by Robert Uhrig, a Berlin worker; it was known as the 'Robby Group'. Uhrig had been expecting war since 1938, and he had prepared his group for communist 30 Forms of Resistance propaganda activity and for espionage for the Soviet Union through con- spiratorial methods. 80 From the summer of 1941 his group was active as a regular part of the war organization of Soviet military intelligence. This in- volved the group not only in the gathering of military and war-production in- formation, but also in infiltration preparatory to forming governmental struc- tures that were to cooperate closely with the Soviet Union after the defeat or collapse of Hitler's regime. 81 Romer also worked towards this end. With this purpose in mind, he resumed his connections with his friends of the former Free Corps 'Oberland', many of whom favoured national-bolshevist tenden- cies. Romer also told his communist friends of his good connections with Wehrmacht circles, and early in the summer of 1941 he impressed Willy Sachse by his correct prediction of Hitler's attack on the USSR , 82 The 'Robby Group' eventually combined with the Romer circle and another workers' group led by Walter Budeus, an engine fitter; it was broken up by the Gestapo in 1942 and 1943 after being infiltrated by informers. Its remnants joined the communist group under Anton Saefkow, Franz Jacob and Bernhard Bastlein, which was directed from the Soviet Union. 83 Romer was also in contact with a group in the Foreign Ministry, with an in- dustrialist, with the famous 'Solf Circle' and, from 1941, with leading army circles. 84 These people included Nikolaus Christoph von Halem, a business- man and industrialist, who had been in touch with Niekisch via Schlabren- dorff even before 1937; he was able to obtain many foreign contacts for the resistance movement and was also largely responsible for turning Josef Wagner, the Gauleiter of Silesia, against Hitler. 85 Far to the Right a group had formed around the former industrial entrepreneur, leader of the Party of the Radical Middle Class, and editor, since 1930, of the weekly Die Parole der radikalen Staats- und Wirtschaftsreform, Dr Helmuth Mylius. The group was joined by members of Jungdeutscher Orden, Schwarze Front, Stahlhelm, the group of the former SA leader Walther Stennes, by one of the murderers of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, First Lieutenant von Rittgen, and by Captain Ehrhardt. They all agreed that Hitler must go. Ehrhardt and Mylius arranged in 1935 to infiltrate former members of Brigade Ehrhardt into the SS and then to organize a putsch. Approximately 160 men were thus organized and armed, and information was collected on Hitler's habits and on conditions in the Reich Chancellery. But the plan to arrest or assassinate Hitler was never carried out, mainly because the loyalty of the infiltrators seemed dubious to Mylius, and because they were in turn infiltrated by Gestapo informers. A friend of Mylius, Oskar von Arnim, was arrested and sentenced to a term in a penitentiary. Mylius himself escaped arrest only narrowly; when the war broke out, he managed to 'emigrate' into the Army, with Manstein's assistance, and ended up as Quartermaster II to General Busch in the rank of a Major on the reserve. Also far to the Right there were groups of the Schwarze Reichswehr and of the Stahlhelm such as the Stahlhelm University group in Konigsberg led by Arnold Bistrick. Bistrick was arrested in 1935 and afterwards only managed to turn over part of his group to Major Wilhelm Heinz in 1938. Heinz had a 31 The Background special plan for the assassination of Hitler during the Sudeten crisis. Bistrick's group also had connections with Dr Goerdeler, who later, in 1943 and together with Count Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, helped Bistrick to join the Abwehr regiment 'Brandenburg' which was to be used in the occupation of Berlin during a planned coup. This became impossible when most of the regi- ment was sent into action against the Yugoslav guerrillas early in 1944. Romer also had contacts with Field Marshal von Bock, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Karl Ludwig Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg; he was later in touch with Catholic circles, Justus Delbriick and during the war, via SchlabrendorfF, with the group in Headquarters Army Group Centre. 86 During the war Halem worked in the Ballestrem coal concern in Upper Silesia and was able to give Romer cover in the firm's Berlin office. 87 Through Gertrud von Heimerdinger Romer was also in touch with the Headquarters of the Commandant of Berlin, through which he obtained information on Hitler's travels and movements in 1939 and 1940. His source was Lieutenant-Colonel Holm Erttel, aide to the Commandant, Lieutenant-General Ernst Seifert. 88 Equally, through Gertrud von Heimerdinger, Romer had a link with the Foreign Ministry. His contacts here included Dr Richard Kuenzer, a Counsellor (Legationsrat), who was arrested after 20 July 1944 and murdered by the SS in April 1945.89 Through Kuenzer the links ran to Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff, a retired Senior Counsellor (Botschaftsrat), murdered at the same time as Kuenzer, and to the 'Solf Circle'. 90 Bernstorff was one of the most courageous opponents of Hitler; he concentrated mainly on helping 6migr6s and Jews to escape and saving their belongings. For this purpose after 1933 he joined an ex-Jewish bank, A. E. Wassermann. 91 The 'Solf Circle' consisted of a group of like-minded people who simply wished to oppose and counter the oppression, persecution, humiliation and degradation of human beings by the regime. It included Halem, Graf von Bernstorff, Kuenzer, Fanny von Kurowsky, Irmgard Zarden, Dr Herbert Mumm von Schwarzenstein (retired Legation Counsellor), Dr Otto Kiep (Minister in the Foreign Service), Dr Hilger van Scherpenberg (Legation Counsellor) and Elisabeth von Thadden. They used to meet in the house of Frau Hanna Solf, widow of Dr Wilhelm Solf who had been German Am- bassador in Tokyo and had died in 1936. They were all arrested in 1944, some as having been present at a tea party given by Fraulein von Thadden on 10 September 1943 when certain statements hostile to the regime had been made, some merely because they were members of the circle. Certain of them were subsequently executed, simply because they had stood up for humanity. 92 Owing to continual postponement of proceedings against them Frau Solf, her daughter Lagi Grafin von Ballestrem, Dr van Scherpenberg (Schacht's son-in-law) and Irmgard Zarden survived the war; Fraulein von Thadden, Kiep, Mumm and Halem were executed; Kuenzer, Bernstorff and Guttenberg were murdered by the SS. 93 Helped by a recommendation given in all good faith, a Gestapo spy, presenting himself as Dr Reckzeh of the Berlin Charite, had wormed his way into the tea party. 94 From this circle, which was in no way really subversive, link s ran to the remaining opponents of Nazism in 32 Forms of Resistance the Foreign Ministry and to other centres of power in the Third Reich. Kiep, who was a Major on the reserve, was Foreign Policy Desk Officer in OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht — High Command of the Armed Forces) from 1939. 95 He was therefore one of the most important links to the Foreign Ministry and the resistance existing there. It included Ernst Freiherr von Weizsacker, the State Secretary (Permanent Secretary) and Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, together with Dr Fritz von Twardowski, Drs Theo and Erich Kordt, Dr Hasso von Etzdorf, Bernhard von Bu'low and Dr Paul Schmidt. 96 Others were Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier, Georg Federer, Gottfried von Nostitz, Albrecht von Kessel, Hans-Bernd von Haeften and Adam von Trott zu Solz — even this by no means completes the list. Further contacts led to the so-called 'Kreisau Circle' which had been in existence, at least as a social group, since 1937; it included Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Horst von Einsiedel, Carl Dietrich von Trotha, Adolf Reichwein, Hans Peters, Hans Lukaschek, Carlo Mierendorff, Theodor Steltzer, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, Harald Poelchau, the Jesuit Fathers Augustin Rosch, Alfred Delp and Lothar Konig, and Theo Haubach, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Paulus von Husen, Julius Leber, Hans Schonfeld and many others on a less intimate and permanent basis. 97 There were further cross-connections to many socialists and trade unionists. The name of Albrecht Haushofer is also coupled with that of the Foreign Ministry; being in close contact with Rudolf Hess, Hitler's 'Deputy', he was able to alleviate or stop many things. 98 He was a conservative, in many respects more closely allied to the group centred on Popitz and Langbehn; via his pupil Horst Heilmann he was in contact with 'Red Orchestra', a primarily communist-orientated group which had been built up as a Soviet wartime in- telligence service under Harro Schulze-Boysen, a Lieutenant in the Ministry of Aviation, and Dr Arvid Harnack, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Economics. It went into action on the outbreak of war with Russia in June 1941 and by the time it was destroyed in 1942 included numerous groups and cells scattered all over Western Europe. This organization passed its in- telligence to Russia by radio; its finds included Hitler's decision to pursue the offensive in Southern Russia in the spring of 1942. 99 It is not possible to quote all the names but it is dear that, starting in the second half of the 1930s, a complex and widespread conspiracy was gathering. Whether their names have been quoted or not, all these people 'did' something to sabotage the government and assist in bringing about the fall of the regime. It must also be remembered that many of the subsequent par- ticipants in the various plots spent years in prisons or concentration camps- as representatives of those still at large, so to speak. Between 1933 and June 1934 Wilhelm Leuschner was detained for months either by the police or in a concentration camp; his last place of confinement was Borgermoor concentra- tion camp. Immediately on his release he began to work with Jakob Kaiser, the former leader of the Christian trade unions. Their object was to remove Hitler and then form a united trade union, thus eliminating the cleavage between the Marxist and Christian trade unions. Max Habermann, leader of 33 The Background the German White-collar Workers Union, joined them and together they drafted memoranda in 1936 and 1937 addressed to General von Fritsch stressing the degrading and brutal treatment meted out to workers and Jews. Leuschner was executed on 29 September 1944 as a participant in the 20 July plot and died with the call 'Unity' on his lips. Habermann was also executed. Kaiser, who became the focus of many opposition circles and one of Goerdeler's most valuable partners, succeeded in hiding in Berlin after 20 July. He played an important political role in 1945 in connection with the forma- tion of the Christian-Democratic Union and subsequently in discussion with the Russian and their German satellites, finally becoming Federal Minister for All-German Questions. 100 Carlo Mierendorff was arrested in 1933 and then held in a concentration camp until 1938. l01 Theodor Haubach was arrested time and again between 1933 and 1939 and spent two years in Esterwegen concentration camp. 102 Dr Julius Leber, the former Social-Democrat Reichstag deputy, was arrested, ill- treated and released; then, on 23 March 1933, he was once more arrested at the entrance to the Reichstag and handcuffed on the spot. 103 He spent many miserable years in prisons or concentration camps between 1933 and 1937. 'Out in the open', however, various groups and individuals such as those referred to above did everything possible to undermine the Nazi tyranny. Pechel refers to a 'Stuermer Group' under Dr Paul Joseph Stuermer, which was active against Hitler from 1932, was then in dose touch with the circles centred on Edgar Jung and Dr Romer, and was even an accessory to their plans for an assassination. The group included members of the Stahlhelm, a university professor, a Jesuit Father, a Social-Democrat and a number of officers; it had connections in southern Germany where its contacts were Dr Arnulf Klett, Theodor Bauerle, a government architect named Albrecht Fischer, and the industrialist Robert Bosch. 104 Admittedly in many cases these people did no more than 'merely' express their abhorrence of the regime and talk about ways and means of dealing with it. According to their rulers, however, even this was tantamount to con- spiracy; under the notorious 'Treachery Law' it was a punishable offence, meriting even the death sentence. 105 To understand the courage required, one must always bear in mind what it meant to live under a dictatorship, where the individual had no rights in practice and lived permanently under threat of mental and physical ill-treatment, officially sanctioned and practised, of blackmail, loss of liberty and livelihood and an agonizing death. It is of course unreasonable today to require every opponent of the regime and of Nazism to have been a potential fanatical assassin, if he is to be accepted as a member of the opposition. Only a few possess the capability to translate convictions into action of such intensity. Finally, although before 1938 there were many of the conspirators who regarded the physical elimination of Hitler as the only effec- tive solution, the majority still hoped to bring about his fall by less violent methods, by gradual erosion of the Nazi tyranny, by blunting its edge or stealthily drawing its teeth. Slowly, however, a single colossal danger began to loom — war. So the forces of the resistance became increasingly concentrated 34 Forms of Resistance on preventing the threatened war and later on ending it. Naturally, therefore, in the first instance those anti-Nazis active in the field of foreign policy played the most important role. Even before the outbreak of war, however, the military element could not long remain aloof from developments. 35 3 Top-Level Crisis In 1937 far-reaching changes were under way in Germany, and in the succeeding years they were destined to convulse the world. Hitler's single- minded determination to go to war can be proved with convincing clarity from his own utterances between 1920 and 1945.' The important point here is that towards the end of 1937 Hitler made concrete statements showing that he was set on a course of aggressive and violent foreign policy; he actually laid down the stages leading to war; he set the immediate objectives and the methods to be employed to attain them, and these, as he himself explicitly emphasized, led inevitably to war. On 5 November 1937 Hitler held a conference with the senior Wehrmacht leaders in the Reich Chancellery; it lasted from 4.15 to 8.30 p.m.; Freiherr von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, was also present. Of the military those present were Field Marshal von Blomberg, Minister of War, and the Commanders-in- Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Colonel-General Werner Freiherr von Fritsch, Admiral Erich Raeder and Colonel-General Hermann Goring; in ad- dition Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, the 'Fuhrer's and Chancellor's Wehr- macht Aide', who was also head of the Coordinating Section (Personnel Branch) of the Army General Staff, was there. During the meeting Colonel Hossbach had made notes and these he reduced to writing five days later; they were incorporated in the War Ministry files. 2 During his first five years in office it had not been Hitler's habit to expatiate on his day-dreams or fantastic ideas in front of his military entourage or even in personal interviews with Commanders-in-Chief of the Services. On military matters he had shown great reticence when faced with experts. In conferences or discussions he had only rarely expressed his own views and had generally confined himself to listening and giving more or less silent agreement. 3 Up to 1937 he had seldom taken important decisions on military matters without previous discussion with his advisers. Now, however, he had summoned the most senior Wehr- macht leaders in order to tell them that he would shortly be leading the Ger- man Reich into war. The German people's Lebensraum, Hitler said, was too small; in certain im- portant aspects, particularly that of food, self-sufficiency could not be achieved. The German Lebensraum must consequently be expanded and this was best done 'in areas immediately contiguous to the Reich in Europe and not overseas'. This expansion of territory could only be achieved by 'breaking 36 Top-Level Crisis resistance'; since untenanted areas did not exist, the attacker would always be confronted by those in possession. Such intentions would be opposed by Bri- tain and France; a moment for action must therefore be chosen when Britain and France would be prevented from intervening by other - internal or exter- nal — difficulties. In no case, however, should one wait longer than until about 1943 to 1945 since thereafter the potential enemies would have perceived Ger- man intentions and would also have armed themselves to resist. If one could be ready by about 1943, Austria and Czechoslovakia must be eliminated with extreme rapidity in order then to be able to face the most dangerous enemy, France, without the flanks being threatened. Should France, however, be paralyzed by something like a civil war, the situation must be exploited at any time in order to 'strike against Czechoslovakia'. It was naturally not possible to say with any certainty how the other powers - particularly Poland, Russia and Britain — would react to such action on the part of Germany. Hitler tried to suggest, however, that they would not intervene before Germany was ready to strike them down also. According to Hossbach's minutes the reaction of the Commanders-in-Chief to Hitler's disquisition was antipathetic and cold. Blomberg and Fritsch stressed that Britain and France should not be turned into enemies of the Reich since, at this point, Germany was in no position to deal with them, not even with France alone; they also emphasized the strength of the Czech for- tifications. Hitler countered these objections by expressing his conviction that Britain would not intervene, also with the comment that he did not anticipate tension increasing before about summer 1938. The argument, Hossbach recalls, was 'at times very sharp', primarily between Blomberg and Fritsch on one side and Goring on the other; Hitler listened attentively and was visibly impressed. He saw that 'instead of being met with acclamation and agree- ment, his political ideas encountered sober, factual objections. He also now knew full well that the two generals were opposed to any warlike development instigated from our side.' 4 No one, however, refused to implement Hitler's plans; no one characterized them as unlawful or criminal. No doubt the soldiers felt that they were not called upon to express an opinion on such matters. 5 On at least two subsequent occasions Hitler revealed his plans for assaults on Germany's neighbours to a similar, but even larger, military assemblage — on 23 May 1939 in the new Reich Chancellery, Berlin, and on 22 August 1939 in the 'Berghof' near Berchtesgaden. 6 He was as explicit as on 5 November 1937. On 23 May 1939, for instance, sentences such as these were to be heard: 'Further successes can no longer be won without bloodshed.' 'It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our Lebensraum in the east.' 'No stock can be taken of declarations of neutrality.' 'Everybody's armed forces or government must strive for a short war. The leadership of the state must, however, also prepare itself for a war of ten to fifteen years' duration.' 'We shall not be forced into a war but we shall not be able to avoid it.' And on 22 August: 'A showdown which one cannot be sure of postponing for four to five years, had better take place now.' 'The moment is now favourable for a 37 The Background solution [of the Polish Question], so strike 1' 'Object: Destruction of Poland.. . Start: Method a matter of indifference. The victor will not be questioned afterwards whether his reasons were just. What matters is not to have right on our side, but simply to win.' 'Execution: Harsh and ruthless! Close your hearts to pity!' In face of such monstrous self-revelations no objection was raised, still less were resignations offered or compliance refused. Apart from the audiences at these conferences only a few knew of the ideas and intentions revealed by Hitler. Considering it to be his duty, however, Colonel Hossbach had shown his memorandum on the meeting of 5 November 1937 to Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, Chief of Staff of the Army, and had also reported verbally on the course of the discussion. Hossbach records that the effect of his report on Beck was shattering. 7 Beck followed his usual habit on such occasions; he seized his pen and wrote to clarify his thoughts. On 12 November he noted that Germany did in fact have a territorial problem, particularly from the strategic point of view; 'minor changes' seemed possible, certain revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, for in- stance; for the sake of these changes, however, 'the homogeneity of the Ger- man people, of the German racial core, must not be jeopardized afresh'. 8 Looking at the situation realistically, Beck then demolished Hitler's reasons and arguments, saying that his conclusion regarding the necessity of solving the German territorial problem by 1943 to 1945 at the latest was 'shattering in its lack of sound reasoning'; France would always have adequate defensive forces facing Germany; from the point of view of food imports, the economy, the military and the political situation Germany's position would not be noticeably improved by the incorporation of Austria or Czechoslovakia. Then: 'The expediency of dealing with the Czech problem (possibly also the Austrian) when opportunity offers, of planning therefore and making such preparations as may be possible is not contested'; but a more thorough and comprehensive examination must be made of the conditions giving rise to such an opportunity. In Beck's view as given above, however, such 'con- ditions' would not obtain. As early as 3 May 1935 he had written to Fritsch offering to resign should preparations be made for an offensive war against Czechoslovakia. 9 Meanwhile the fall both of Blomberg and of Fritsch was being engineered; it was caused primarily by their negative attitude to Hitler's disquisition of 5 November 1937. 10 Intrigues against Fritsch had long been in progress, as he observed in a memorandum dated 1 February 1938, looking back over just four years in office as successor to Colonel-General Freiherr von Hammerstein." Goring's ambition to become Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht was well known. 12 The War Minister (Blomberg) had too in- dependent a position, liable to impede Hitler's progress; moreover he had just raised objections to Hitler's policy. Hitler subsequently made an oblique reference to the reason for his action: 13 a political leader, he said, could not do with a Commander-in-Chief who raised not only military but also political objections to all proposals and so failed to serve the leaders of the State. 14 Both an occasion and an opportunity to replace by more pliable men the 38 Top-Level Crisis military leaders who had proved so sceptical about Hitler's plans were soon available. During the funeral ceremonies for General Ludendorff on 22 December 1937 Blomberg asked Hitler casually for his permission to marry. Hitler gave his agreement and, together with Goring, appeared as a witness at the wedding on 12 January 1938. Simultaneously, however, rumours began to circulate and eventually documents were found: Eva Gruhn, now the wife of Field Marshal von Blomberg, had a disreputable past; she had been a prostitute and a model for lewd photographs; she was known to the vice squad. 15 Goring played a particularly shady role in this affair; knowing the facts and fully aware of the probable consequences, he had done his utmost to bring about Blomberg's marriage. 16 Immediately after the wedding rumours about Blomberg's wife were circulating in Wehrmacht circles; mysterious telephone calls to the Wehrmacht Adjutant's Office made action essential; Blomberg himself sought an audience with Hitler. The dictator pretended to be disillusioned and to feel that he had been duped. Perhaps he actually had; in any case he acted accordingly. Blomberg had to go and here was an opportuni- ty to remove Fritsch at the same time. Hitler may merely have seized his moment and used the refurbished evidence against Fritsch provided by Goring and Himmler as a handy instru- ment — he had known about it for some time since it was already two years old and, when first produced, he had himself given orders for its destruction. 17 It is not possible to say how far he had simply been searching for an occasion of this nature. False evidence was now to prove that Fritsch was a homosexual and therefore unacceptable as head of the Army or as a candidate for the succession to Blomberg. The 'witness' against Fritsch was a professional criminal drop-out named Otto Schmidt. He was head of a group of blackmailers and had made his living for years by starting affairs with homosexuals so that he could blackmail them later. On 28 December 1936 he had been sentenced to seven years imprison- ment and ten years loss of civil rights for fourteen cases of blackmail and nine cases of contravention of paragraph 175 of the legal code (on homosexuality). He was finally executed in the summer of 1942 while an inmate of Sachsen- hausen concentration camp; on 29 July 1942, at the end of a report on Schmidt, Himmler wrote to Goring: 'I request your agreement, dear Reich Marshal, that I should submit Schmidt's case to the Fuhrer for his authoriza- tion to execute'; Goring's marginal comment was : 'Ought to have been shot long ago'. 18 Hitler's early relationships with Rohm, whose homosexuality was notorious long before 1934, his nomination of Dr Walter Funk, another notorious homosexual, as Reich Minister of Economics on 5 February 1938 (no less), his indifference when the first accusations against Fritsch were made and his order at that time for the destruction of the files — all this was clear proof that Hitler was quite unmoved by the presence or absence of homosexuals among his adherents. 19 Now, however, he had a comparatively convenient opportunity to rid himself, admittedly by the use of extremely un- derhand methods to which he was not averse, of two subordinates who were primarily desirous of serving their country rather than him; Hitler knew that 39 The Background he had no hope of overcoming Fritsch's opposition to his plans. 20 Moreover he also had an opportunity, which he seized at once, of appointing as successor to the Ministry of War not some more faithful follower but himself and thus very considerably increasing and consolidating his control over the military. During the course of 1938 and 1939 certain successes in the exercise of military command confirmed Hitler in his growing conviction that he knew how to use the armed forces as an instrument of power as well as, if not better than, the experts. So, on 4 February 1938, the great changing of the guard took place. Blomberg and Fritsch were relieved of their posts, in both cases 'for health reasons'; the Retch War Ministry was in effect turned into the Oberkomman- do der Wehrmacht (OKW) which henceforth served as Hitler's military staff under the 'Chief of OKW' who ranked as a Minister of the Reich. Hitler himself took over supreme command of the entire Wehrmacht; as Commander-in- Chief of the Army he nominated General Walther von Brauchitsch, who was promoted Colonel-General. Goring, already a Colonel-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was promoted Field Marshal. General Wilhelm Keitel became Chief of OKW. 21 During February, March and April changes were made in more than forty senior command positions; some four- teen generals found themselves summarily retired. 22 In this way the monstrosity of the proceedings was largely camouflaged. Finally, a number of German ambassadors were recalled — Ribbentrop from London, Hassell from Rome, Dirksen from Tokyo and Papen from Vienna. Ribbentrop was ap- pointed Foreign Minister in succession to Freiherr von Neurath who was relieved of his office. This change of Foreign Minister was a particularly striking illustration of the switch from willing assistants to sheer minions; in this sphere Hitler knew his personalities better than he did in the military. It will rightly be asked why the Army accepted almost without comment the insult administered to its Commander-in-Chief. The main essential for any counter-action was absent, however — the necessary unanimity in the officer corps. 23 Its numbers had increased enormously since 1933; in 1932 there had been forty-four officers of the rank of major-general and upwards; in 1938 (1 October) there were 275, not counting 22 medical and 8 veterinary officers of general's rank. By May 1943 there were over a thousand officers of general's rank. 24 Only one method of opposition seemed possible, the simultaneous resignation of all generals — there was no other legal method; but the necessary conditions simply were not present; the officer corps had not the requisite internal solidarity. Without unanimity, without the participation of at least the majority of senior officers, any measure of protest would have been ineffective and might even have represented a form of mutiny. Ever since the end of the First World War naval officers had been suffering from a sort of trauma; the Luftwaffe had been built up by Goring and under the Nazi regime; it was unlikely, therefore, that any significant number of naval or Air Force officers would have joined those of the Army. 25 All this presupposes that the officer corps, and particularly that of the Army, was adequately informed of these happenings, of the accusations made against its Commander-in-Chief 40 Top-Level Crisis and of the scurvy treatment meted out to him. There was, however, an almost complete lack of such information; even senior officers and their staffs had to rely on supposition and such occasional news or rumour as filtered through. 26 By 18 March 1938, when a Court of Honour under the presidency of Goring had pronounced on Fritsch's complete innocence and the mendacity of the evidence against him, Austria had been occupied and an ostensibly major success had therefore been scored with the assistance of the Wehrmacht. How, at such a moment, could anyone mutiny against his supreme warlord, to whom moreover he had sworn a personal oath? Concepts of honour, loyalty and morality were blurred and ambiguous, corrupted by an un- scrupulous but successful and scintillating government. Fritsch himself thought long and hard how he might defend himself- in the interests of the Army and the honour both of the officer corps and of himself. But against whom was he, perhaps in concert with senior officers of the Army, to take action ? Goring and Himmler worked in the background and were un- assailable so long as Hitler covered them and refused to make up his mind. It was, of course, both possible and conceivable that Hitler would realize the ab- surdity of the case against Fritsch, with its elementary slovenly emen- dations. 27 But on his own admission to Hossbach on 25 January 1938 he had long known about the file. The point was not whether he did or did not believe Goring, Himmler and the documents, but whether he should be so ready to believe them just at this moment - the opportunity to be rid of a tiresome Army Commander-in-Chief being a favourable one. Fritsch probably felt this but was unable fully to appreciate it. He believed in the Fuhrer and his sinceri- ty - 'until this case', as he put it. 28 This was not mere well-bred reticence; it was naivete. Only considerably later did he realize that Hitler had been con- sciously and deliberately determined to remove him, using the most despicable methods. Even so, however, the foreboding remained that the use of force to defend his honour and that of the Army might lead to bloodshed and civil war — and that Fritsch did not want. 29 It was a long time before Fritsch really grasped Hitler's villainy, although the latter's refusal to accept his word of honour as even provisional proof of his innocence against a state- ment by the criminal Schmidt should have been warning enough; it was even longer before he realized that in this crisis his personal fate was largely iden- tical with that of the Army and of Germany. He did realize this at the end of February but then it was too late. On 13 June 1938, on Barth airfield near Stralsund, Hitler addressed the same assemblage of officers to which he had revealed Fritsch's 'shortcomings' on 4 February. Now he declared Fritsch rehabilitated and both Fritsch and himself to have been victims of a tragic error. Naturally, he said, he could not reinstate Fritsch since he, Hitler, could not expect Fritsch to have further con- fidence in him; moreover as Fuhrer he could not recant before the nation. 30 On 15 June, therefore, Fritsch was simply nominated 'Chief of No. 12 Artillery Regiment. 31 In September 1939 he took his regiment to Poland, where he was killed in action. 32 In certain places efforts were indeed made to set in motion some counter- 41 The Background action to the intrigue against Fritsch, but those principally involved were not prepared to act with the necessary energy. Admittedly Fritsch did challenge Himmler, who was suspected of being the main string-puller behind the whole dirty business, to a duel with pistols but the challenge never even reached Himmler. Fritsch was persuaded to withdraw it, since it might have done the Army more damage than all the preceding crisis. 33 After the war General Wilhelm Ulex, who was commanding XI Army Corps at the time, told of a meeting in May 1938 with Viktor Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA; Lutze had promised the full support of the SA in the event of action by the Army against Himmler and the SS; should Hitler side with Himmler his life must if possible (but not under all circumstances) be spared. Ulex had asked for concrete proof that Schmidt, the 'witness', had been forced to give false evidence by Himmler; without this, Ulex, said, he could do nothing. Lutze had produced the proof a fortnight later and Ulex had gone to Achterberg to see Fritsch; the latter, however, had refused to do anything, saying that Hitler knew the whole story and so any action against Himmler would be futile. Ulex finally went to Brauchitsch, who merely advised him that 'if these gentlemen want this, then they must do it on their own'. 34 After the completely inadequate rehabilitation of Fritsch by Hitler in June 1938 a number of generals wished to tender their resignation. At Brauchitsch's request, however, they did not do so; Brauchitsch said that there would inevitably be war over the Sudeten question in the next few weeks and a man could not therefore leave his post. As might be expected, according to Ulex, Fritsch was also of the same opinion. Rumour was rife and news of the crisis in the higher levels of the Wehr- macht filtered through by various channels - via Canaris and Oster in the OKW office 'Ausland/Abwehr* (Military Intelligence), via Nebe, Director of the Reich Criminal Police Office, via Dr Gisevius who had been with the Gestapo and was now working in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and via Dr Hans von Dohnanyi, a senior civil servant (Oberregierungsrat); as a result several of those who later became resistance leaders attempted to initiate some counter-action, but without success. They all now felt that nothing could be achieved except 'from outside', since at this time (end January 1938) no real leadership existed in the Army any more. Goerdeler, together with Schacht, accordingly visited General Wilhelm List, commanding IV Army Corps in Dresden, Chief of Staff of which was Major-General Friedrich Olbricht; after a brief description of events in Berlin Goerdeler urged List to act at once. 35 The Gestapo, he said, must be 'smoked out' and Hitler be faced with SL fait accompli; this must include the removal of Goring, Himmler and Heydrich to ensure that Hitler was no longer under the influence or even con- trol of these dangerous paladins. Lieutenant-Colonel Oster, who was in touch with Goerdeler either direct or via Gisevius and equally considered that the 'smoking out' of the Gestapo and the elimination of Himmler were the first es- sential measures, thought that Hitler would be most likely to recognize and accept a fait accompli', after all, he said, the Gauleiter were doing what they liked and getting away with it. 36 42 Top-Level Crisis Goerdeler really thought it possible that IV Army Corps would act. In some ways, as with all his subsequent efforts until summer 1944, he was not entirely wrong; a military putsch was not quite so difficult as most of the generals ap- proached invariably made it out to be. Wielding an instrument like the Army, however, was not quite so simple as the impetuous Dr Goerdeler thought. For both personal and practical reasons any action from Leipzig was more than unlikely; Olbricht was no go-getter; on the contrary, although those who knew him invariably stressed his extreme intelligence, he tended to be at a loss if rapid and exceptional decisions were demanded of him. 37 General List did not feel able to decide, still less to take revolutionary action, on the basis solely of Goerdeler's report, which in any case was second-hand. When Goerdeler again urged the 'smoking out' of the Gestapo, Olbricht replied that in the first instance only the troops around Berlin, in Potsdam, Spandau and Doberitz, could be of any use. To this Goerdeler could only reply that at the time there was no leadership in Berlin. General von Witzleben, who commanded the troops around Berlin (III Army Corps), was sick in Dresden. 38 In fact it was almost inconceivable that the Gestapo in Berlin could have been attacked from Dresden, even if General List had been prepared to do it. The Army was no longer a homogeneous, united and reliable instrument; it had been diluted and permeated by reserve, ex-police and so-called replacement (Erg'dnzung) officers and the junior ranks had come from the Hitler Youth. Moreover troops could not in practice be moved to Berlin without the whole affair becoming known. As Lieutenant-Colonel Rohricht, Operations Officer of IV Army Corps, said, the move of a division by rail would take at least three days and in any case it had first to be reported to and approved by Berlin. 39 Finally List decided to go to Berlin with his Operations Officer and there obtain first-hand information. 40 This produced nothing more definite and all agreed that they were working 'completely in the dark'. Fritsch had of course demanded legal proceedings; the whole affair was obviously a dirty trick. Beck, however, found their suspicions 'incomprehensible'; back-stage work by Goring and Himmler was only a supposition; Hitler's attitude was un- known and no motive could be seen for him to participate in an attack on Fritsch. List and his staff officer therefore returned to Dresden. In those days following 25 January 1938 other parallel efforts to initiate counter-action were being made. According to Gisevius, Schacht, Goerdeler, Nebe, Graf von Helldorf, the Police President of Berlin, and Gisevius himself were involved together with Beck, Canaris and Oster on the military side. Of this small group only Schacht and Gisevius escaped execution or, in Beck's case, suicide. Again according to Gisevius and a statement by Schacht recorded by Colonel Jodl, head of the OKW Operations Staff, all were quite clear what game was being played and what should happen: the SS was trying to lay hands on the Army; the Wehrmacht must therefore forestall the Gestapo and occupy its headquarters at No. 8 Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin. 41 But how was this to be done? One can only guess who of all these was primarily responsible for bringing pressure to bear on Brauchitsch. Gisevius made at least one of the many 43 The Background attempts. 42 At times it was said that Brauchitsch was ready to act if backed by a memorandum from the Minister of Justice. As later experience showed, he invariably had some good reason for wishing to 'make sure first*. Nothing, of course, came of it. According to Gisevius, Schacht tried to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to act but he said that this was outside his competence; Schacht then enquired of General Gerd von Rundstedt, C-in-C of No. 1 Group Headquarters (Berlin), but all he would say was that everyone knew what he had to do. Again according to Gisevius, people gradually gained the impression that the Wehrmacht leaders were allowing the moment for ac- tion to slip by. Yet Goerdeler had made the approach to List already referred to; Gisevius himself had gone to Miinster to see General Gunther von Kluge, commanding VI Army Corps, and Ferdinand Freiherr von Liininck, the Governor (Oberprasident) of Westphalia. He had urged both the latter and Carl Christian Schmid, the senior government official (Regierungsprasident) in Diisseldorf, to bring pressure to bear on Kluge. 43 The object was to bring about a combined demarche by commanders of Military Districts (Wehrkrets)* 4 Nothing came of all these attempts and all these efforts. They hardly merit use of the term 'plans for a coup', although the Gestapo refers to them as such in its interrogation reports following 20 July 1944. 45 In February 1938 Fritz- Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, then Vice-President of Police in Berlin, negotiated with Witzleben for some intervention on the part of the Wehr- macht.^ Major-General Paul von Hase, then commanding No. 50 Infantry Regiment in Landsberg on Warthe, was prepared to use his regiment against the government in Berlin or at least against the Gestapo and SS. 47 Practical realistic plans were in fact out of the question; none of those in- volved could be sure what was fact and what was slander; no explanations were given even of the little that was known and Fritsch was guilty of much ineptitude in his handling of the matter. When, on 4 February 1938, Hitler was the one to produce the fait accompli, Brauchitsch, the C-in-C of the Ar- my, said that Fritsch's court-martial must now be awaited for the affair to be cleared up. Brauchitsch proved completely inaccessible to the conspirators. 48 He came with the reputation of being a determined 'strong' man, 49 but all the hopes placed in him by the opposition were doomed to disappointment-this should have been realized. Both by his fellow-officers and by historians he has been accused of lack of determination, weakness, instability and corruption. 50 Brauchitsch may perhaps have succeeded Fritsch 'with mixed feelings' but he did so willingly and, at least at the outset, without any attempt to reject the proposal indignantly or make his decision dependent on the outcome of the proceedings against Fritsch. On 29 January 1938 Jodl noted in his diary that Brauchitsch had told Hitler that he was 'ready for anything'. 51 He allowed Goring and Hitler to help him persuade his wife to agree to a divorce so that he could marry Frau Charlotte Schmidt, an ardent Nazi. 52 During the critical days from 24 January to 4 February the Wehrmacht, particularly the Army, was to some extent leaderless. General Beck, the Chief 44 Top-Level Crisis of Staff, was still firmly in the saddle and still occupied a key position. His at- titude was potentially significant. What Beck did in this situation, however, is characteristic both of the state of uncertainty in which senior Army officers found themselves on the subject of their Commander-in-Chief and also of the personality of the Chief of Staff himself. After Fritsch, at his interview on 26 January, had failed to convince Hitler of his innocence, with Hitler's permission Hossbach had informed Beck during the night and had asked him to come to the Reich Chancellery from his house in Lichterfelde. 53 There Beck was told by Hitler of what he (Hitler) regarded as proved and which seemed to Beck highly improbable. Beck thereupon went to Fritsch who indignantly denied all the accusations. Beck returned to the Chancellery the same night and informed Hitler. Hitler remained unconvinced and told Beck that he wished to appoint him to succeed Fritsch. Beck refused and insisted on court-martial proceedings to take place under all circumstances before Fritsch's removal from office. 54 It was not Beck's habit to act on emotion. Naturally he was now extremely suspicious of Hitler and even more of Goring, Himmler and Heydrich. Yet however strong his inclination to believe Fritsch's protestations -the concept of honour characteristic of the officer corps left him no choice but to do so — he found it equally difficult to believe that men could be capable of so dirty a trick as that constituted by the intrigue against Fritsch. Moreover at the time neither Hossbach nor Fritsch, and perhaps not even Hitler himself, knew the full details of the intrigue or of the web of falsehood woven with the assistance and knowledge of the Gestapo. It was therefore all the more difficult for Beck to construct an accurate picture of events. Since his habit was to draw con- clusions only after due consideration and exercising great caution on the basis of the available evidence, it was utterly impossible for him to conclude that the whole affair was a trumped-up racket without the smallest basis of truth. In the light of Fritsch's undoubted honesty and Hitler's inconceivable dishonesty he was literally forced to the conclusion that there must be some mis- understanding. Even later, when he had realized the role played by Goring and Himmler, he was still prepared to concede that Hitler had acted in good faith. 55 This was really the sum total of Beck's attempts to intervene in connection with the Fritsch crisis. In the succeeding weeks he kept himself in the background and concentrated on the initiation of court-martial proceedings, although his relationship with Canaris and particularly Oster became closer and closer. 56 At this time, however, there was no question of Beck considering plans for a coup d'etat. Lieutenant-General Franz Haider, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff I (Operations) in the Army General Staff, was urged by Oster and others to persuade Fritsch and Beck that, if catastrophe was to be avoided, Hitler and the Nazis must be dealt with by methods other than mere submission of realistic views followed by polite silence and trust in the force of argument and common sense. At the time of the Fritsch crisis Beck had clearly not grasped this. 57 Haider records that when, speaking in the name of his fellow-officers, he asked for an explanation of events during the crisis, Beck 45 The Background replied that people must wait and hold their tongues until informed by him. Haider objected and said that the senior officers of the Army must be assembled now and that it was Beck's duty to do so in place of Fritsch. The argument finally ended with a remark by Beck which has become famous: 'Mutiny and revolution are words not to be found in a German officer's dic- tionary.' 58 So at this time all efforts to move Beck or to form a group to act against Hitler or at least against Goring and Himmler, failed. Beck's attitude did not change until the start of the Sudeten crisis. 46 PART II/THE SUDETEN CRISIS AND THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1938 This page intentionally left blank 4 Operation 'Green' The court-martial of Fritsch took place almost simultaneously with the move of German troops into Austria. On 12 February 1938 Dr Kurt Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, visited Hitler on the Obersalzberg and, by means of threats, Hitler forced him to amnesty Austrian Nazis under sentence, to allow much greater freedom of action to National-Socialism in Austria and to ap- point a Nazi, Dr Artur Seyss-Inquart, as Minister of the Interior. 1 By this means Hitler thought that he would ensure an internal Nazi seizure of power in Austria. Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept Hitler's demands. Austria was in practice impotent in face of the German Wehrmachf, Britain had made up her mind in 1937 not to oppose an Austro-German union and France was torn by government crises. Despite this desperate situation, however, Schuschnigg attempted to pre- vent the annexation of Austria. Surprisingly and at short notice, on 9 March he announced a plebiscite in which Austrians were to decide in favour of an in- dependent, social and Christian Austria. Thus in the event of a 'seizure of power' or a German invasion, the rape of Austria would have been plain to all the world; there was no doubt that the result of the plebiscite would be in Schuschnigg's favour. Under renewed massive pressure, both internal and external, however, Schuschnigg abandoned the project. Austria could no longer be saved from annexation. On 11 March the Vienna government was presented with an ultimatum demanding the immediate nomination of Seyss-Inquart as head of govern- ment in place of Schuschnigg; otherwise German troops would march into Austria. Once more Schuschnigg was isolated. Italy, Austria's traditional enemy who had no wish to see an expansion of the German Reich, now led by an Austrian, was unwilling to act at this time; as a quid pro quo Italian sovereignty over German-speaking South Tyrol was later confirmed. Unless, therefore, Schuschnigg was willing to risk a hopeless war, he could only give way; many would have regarded such a war as an internecine struggle and conflicting loyalties would undoubtedly have led to terrible atrocities. Seyss- Inquart took over the government in Vienna that very evening; nevertheless, on pretext of a call for assistance from the new Austrian government, German troops moved in next day. 2 Mass jubilation greeted the German troops; a sense of community prevailed and ostensibly brought a happy ending to all external and internal difficulties. 49 The Sudeten Crisis Union of the two countries was announced on 14 March and confirmed by a plebiscite held in both Germany and Austria on 10 April. For Austria dis- illusionment soon came but it was too late. Hitler had gained an unparalleled success and the Wehrmacht had played an important part in this international coup. Who was therefore likely to draw any conclusions from the exoneration of Fritsch, which finally took place on 18 March? Hitler had long had his eye on a 'solution' of the Czech question. Czechoslovakia was a product of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Peace Conference of 1919. As a result of the Austrian Anschluss the problem was now acute; the Sudeten Germans and the Sudeten German Party under Konrad Henlein were demanding the Anschluss of the Sudetenland, which was primarily German-speaking. 3 All Europe was expec- ting Hitler to press for a solution of this question and none of the great powers could or would come to the assistance of the hard-pressed Czechoslovak State. Britain in particular was largely sympathetic to German demands for a revi- sion of the Treaty of Versailles and for other reasons — economic, political, military and strategic — was not prepared to go to war to preserve intact a multi-nation state which had never worked harmoniously. France was Czechoslovakia's ally but, without British support, was in no position to fulfil the obligations of her alliance. If Germany infringed the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, France had no other course but to attack Germany and for this she felt herself too weak; moreover she was far too disunited politically and in practice incapable of acting. In 1935 the Soviet Union also had con- cluded an assistance pact with Czechoslovakia but subject to the condition that France fulfilled her obligations. Poland wanted to extract from Czechoslovakia the Polish minority together with a sizeable piece of territory; in addition she was by no means willing to allow the Red Army, against which she had fought in 1920, to move across Polish territory. Czechoslovakia was therefore just as isolated as Austria had been before the Anschluss and in addi- tion was surrounded by hostile neighbours. Immediately after the occupation and incorporation of Austria Hitler started preparations for the destruction of the Czechoslovak state. He was not particularly interested in the Sudeten Germans, but their distress (which was real) and the agitation by their extreme nationalist elements provided him with a convenient pretext. On 28 March Hitler personally instructed Konrad Henlein to make unacceptable demands on the Czechoslovak government. 4 On 24 April in its 'Karlsbad Programme' the Sudeten German Party demanded full autonomy for the Sudetenland, removal of all obstacles to agitation and compensation for economic losses suffered since 1919. Shortly thereafter the Czechoslovak government thought, wrongly, that a German attack was imminent and on 20 May it mobilized its army. Hitler was furious and the world at large thought that the Czechs were in the wrong. Hitler may well have regarded the Czech measures as a challenge or alter- natively merely as an extra argument presented to him as a windfall; the fact remains, however, that concrete planning for 'Operation Green', a surprise at- tack on Czechoslovakia, had started long before 20 May. The main lines of the 50 Operation 'Green' operation had been laid down with complete clarity and in writing on 22 April 1938, and on 20 May General Keitel submitted to Hitler a fully prepared draft of the strategic directives to be issued. 5 The Czech government's information was therefore to some extent correct. Finally on 30 May Hitler informed the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force in writing that: 'It is my unalterable decision to destroy Czechoslovakia by military action within a foreseeable time.' The time factor was given as 'a suitable moment from the political and military points of view'. All preparations were to be ready by 1 October 1938 at the latest. 6 Throughout the summer the crisis deepened. In late June Hitler was pre- sent at manoeuvres in the Grafenwohr training area in Franconia, near the Czechoslovak frontier. 7 Construction of fortifications in the west was accelerated and on 22 June compulsory civil defence service was introduced; the press devoted itself to whipping up a war fever. 8 On 10 August, having taken note of a memorandum from Beck opposing the war plan, Hitler held a further conference with his senior military commanders, this time in the 'Berghof , 9 When Hitler again made known his intentions, certain generals were bold enough to voice doubts about the Wehrmacht's capacity to with- stand the anticipated attack from France and even Britain, but this was ill received by Hitler. His answer was an outburst of rage against the 'pusillanimity' of which he accused the General Staff. Jodl's explanation was that the General Staff did not 'in the last analysis believe in the genius of the Fuhrer'.™ Between 21 and 26 August Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, paid a state visit to Germany with Kania von Kanya, his Foreign Minister, and Rdcz von Nagylak, his Defence Minister. They were told that in no case would Ger- many accept another provocation from Czechoslovakia and that 'if it should happen tomorrow, it was for them to decide whether they wished to par- ticipate or not'. 11 At the end of August further details of 'Operation Green' were fixed, in some cases under cover of exercises and manoeuvres. 12 For military reasons it seemed advisable that the 'incident' which was to 'give Germany cause for military intervention* should take place on the day before invasion and 'be officially known here by midday on D-l'. On 26 August Jodl noted in his diary: 'If on technical grounds it is desirable that the incident should occur in the evening, the following day could not be D-Day; it would have to be the day after that.' This, however, would dangerously reduce the level of surprise. In any case, the note concludes, the Wehrmacht must learn of iheFuhrer's inten- tions in good time - 'if the Intelligence Section [of OKW] is not entrusted with organizing the incident'. 13 On the next day Beck handed in his resignation. But such setbacks were not enough to deter Hitler, particularly seeing that the other generals were carrying out his orders with the utmost alacrity. On 3 September he held a further conference with Brauchitsch and Keitel in the 'Berghof and again laid down the timing of the attack as end September or early October. During the night of 9-10 September a further discussion was held in Nuremberg; those present were Hitler, Brauchitsch, Haider, Keitel 51 The Sudeten Crisis and the aides, Schmundt, Engel and Below. Haider, the new Chief of Staff, explained the plan for 'Operation Green* and expressed confidence in its success. 14 Numerous military measures were then taken, so that foreign in- telligence services could have been in no doubt of Hitler's determination. On 15 September the Labour Service was placed under orders of the Wehrmacht', the railways were instructed to 'hold large quantities of empty rolling stock available'; a Sudeten German Free Corps was formed under Konrad Henlein to 'protect Sudeten Germans and maintain the series of disturbances and clashes'. 15 During September Hitler made a number of inflammatory speeches, referring to battle more frequently than usual; finally on 12 September he announced to the Nuremberg Party Rally that Germany would no longer tolerate 'the oppression and persecution of three-and-a-half million Germans' in Czechoslovakia; statesmen of other European countries should note that in the case of the Sudeten Germans 'the free right of self- determination' should take the place of oppression by the Czechs. 16 In a speech in the Sports Palace in Berlin on 26 September he emphasized his determination in an intemperate outburst of hate, coupling it, however, with the statement that his claim for the Sudeten area constituted 'the last territorial demand which I have to make to Europe'. 17 In the light of this growing crisis Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, took the lead and made every conceivable effort to bring about a peaceful solu- tion. At short notice he proposed that Hitler receive him for a discussion on 15 September, and in fact it took place on the Obersalzberg on that day. 18 The Sudeten Germans' right of self-determination, or to be more precise the Ger- man Reich's right to annex the Sudetenland, was recognized by Chamberlain in general terms; France, Czechoslovakia's ally, supported the British proposal. What could the Czechs do other than submit? From 22 to 24 September Chamberlain was in Germany again to settle the problem com- pletely; the Czechs were prepared for far-reaching concessions. The Godesberg conference, however, ended without agreement, since Hitler an- nounced his determination to march in at once, a plebiscite to follow in an area yet to be decided; a German ultimatum in this sense was despatched on 28 September. The Czechs mobilized; France called up reservists; Britain put her fleet on a war footing. World war was at the door. Finally, however, came the Munich conference of 29 September. At this Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier accepted a 'mediation proposal' by Mussolini whereby German troops would move into the claimed area by stages between 1 and 10 October. The Czech delegation was simply told of the result of the discussions. Relief at the preservation of peace was everywhere great, in Germany as much as in Britain and France. The majority failed to perceive that this was no peaceful settlement on a basis of mutual compromise but international blackmail of the first order. In addition to Czechoslovakia, Britain and France were in fact also victims of blackmail, because they did not feel able to arrest the course of events, because to a large degree they had not the means to do so and because they did not possess the will to resist — a will which they were ul- 52 Operation 'Green* timately forced to acquire when they realized that 'the last territorial demand' would always be followed by another one, that their turn would come one day and that Hitler was bent on making himself dictator of Europe. Those in Germany who raised warning voices against Hitler's policy of brinkmanship in the early days were 'proven wrong'. But they could see further than Hitler either could or would see and in the long term they were proved horrifyingly right. The next point in Hitler's programme was the 'disposal of the remainder of Czechoslovakia', to use his own expression, and thereafter he proposed to demand even more extensive Lebensraum. 19 The great war had only been postponed. 53 5 Foreign Policy and Resistance It was the threat of war, a war unnecessarily initiated or provoked by Hitler with the object of overthrowing the European order and so inevitably leading to world war, which produced a German resistance movement whose object was to overthrow the regime by coup d'etat or revolutionary measures and then face the leaders of the regime with responsibility for their crimes. 1 There were a number of politicians, senior officials in various ministries and in numerous other positions, senior army officers and captains of industry who used their influence to curb and restrain Hitler's foreign policy, working both from within and indirectly from outside; resistance to Hitler's internal policy of course continued. It goes without saying that, in Hitler's SS State, all such efforts entailed the greatest danger to life and limb. The most intensive and extensive activity was displayed by Dr Carl Goerdeler, who subsequently, during the war, was largely recognized as the leader of the resistance movement. He came of a civil service family; his original home was in West Prussia, ceded to Poland in 1919. Goerdeler became a lawyer and administrative civil servant; in 1930 he was appointed Burgomaster of Leipzig. 2 In December 1931 Briining, the Chancellor, per- suaded Goerdeler to become Reich Prices Commissioner and, since the Ger- man National People's Party, to which Goerdeler belonged, continued to op- pose Briining and refused to support his essential measures aimed at im- proving the economic situation, Goerdeler publicly resigned from Hugenberg's party. In May 1932 Goerdeler was asked to join the Papen cabinet as Minister of Economics and Labour but he refused; he was incensed by the fall of Briining and indignant with those backing Papen; Papen himself he regarded as a diplomatic failure without support, competence or political merit. When, therefore, Hitler became Chancellor Goerdeler was soon in con- flict with the Nazis; he refused, for instance, to hoist the swastika flag on Leipzig City Hall when it was not yet the national emblem; he personally protected Jewish businessmen against looting by the SA. 3 Nevertheless it still seemed possible to differentiate between Hitler himself and his followers; many still contrived to believe that various of the regime's manifestations, later proved to reflect its real nature, were no more than aberrations which Hitler would by no means wish to condone. Goerdeler was 54 Foreign Policy and Resistance one of such people; he possessed not only inexhaustible energy but an almost ineradicable optimism, bordering on inability to grasp the evil and depravity of Nazism. Always, until the very day of his execution, he believed himself capable of changing everything, or at least many things, for the better by means of commonsense, argument and explanation. 4 This pronounced characteristic is a possible explanation for the fact that in November 1934, after the murders of 30 June, he was willing to be reappointed Reich Prices Commissioner, a position in which he remained until 1 July 1935. 5 In personal interviews with Hitler, Goerdeler did in fact succeed on several occasions in asserting his views against those of the Party bosses and even of Hitler himself and in gaining Hitler's support for them. 6 To the very end these experiences seemed to Goerdeler to provide some rational justification for his optimism; in his later years he even went so far as to think that he could persuade Hitler not to continue with the war. In practice cooperation with the Nazis soon proved to be impossible. In 1936, on the expiry of his first term of office as Burgomaster, Goerdeler was re-elected for a further twelve years and, since he had had the support of the Nazi Party, he thought that sensible logical ideas would prevail. 7 In his absence, however, behind his back and against his explicit instructions Haake, his deputy, had the Mendelssohn memorial in front of the Leipzig Ge- wandhaus removed; this was done at the demand of the Nazi Party which refused to rescind the measure despite a threat of resignation by Goerdeler. He accordingly took his leave and retired on 1 April 1937. 8 Goerdeler now devoted all his efforts to the prevention of war, initially in concert with South German industrialists and opponents of the regime led by Robert Bosch. 9 From this source he drew the financial support without which he could not have undertaken the numerous journeys which were of such im- portance for his role in the opposition. He left on one such trip as early as June 1937; it took him to Belgium and Britain, back to Berlin and then to Holland, France, Canada and the United States. In March and April 1938 he travelled again to France and Britain, in late summer and autumn to Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. Then in 1939 he visited France, Algeria, Britain, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and returned through Switzerland. 10 In all these journeys Goerdeler was at pains to explain to the ruling statesmen of the West the dangers which threatened and his ideas for averting them. He preferred to use economic arguments since these best illustrated the 'natural' conditions, in other words the commonsense reasons in which he placed so much confidence. But he had no success. In Germany his reports served to convince the converted even more firmly that their views were right and they provided ammunition for some of their in- itiatives. But these had no influence at all on the government in power. An astonishing number of foreign statesmen received and listened to Goerdeler. In the years before the outbreak of war he talked in Paris to Daladier and Reynaud, in London to Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Robert 55 The Sudeten Crisis Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, a counsellor in the Foreign Office and head of the Economic Department, also to Lord Halifax and Winston Churchill. In the United States he had conversations with Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, Henry A. Wallace, Secretary for Agriculture, Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, G. S. Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, the former President, Henry Lewis Stimson, later Secretary for War, Henry Morgenthau Jr, Secretary of the Treasury, and Owen D. Young, the in- dustrialist; in Canada he talked with the Prime Minister, William Mackenzie King. 11 Goerdeler was never regarded as representing a realistic, probable or even desirable policy. The French, British and American governments felt unable to follow up his proposals in any way. Goerdeler's reception in Paris in the spring of 1938 is a good illustration. 12 Dr Reinhold Schairer, a German jurist who had been active in affairs of academic education at an international level and who had been living in London since 1933 and had many connections in France and Switzerland, arranged Goerdeler's most important contacts in Paris. He recommended Goerdeler to Pierre Bertaux, Professor for German Studies, who was at that time Chef de Cabinet in the section Education Nationale of the French Ministry of Culture. Together with Schairer, Goerdeler was invited to Bertaux's house in Paris early in March. 13 Bertaux listened to Goerdeler's explanation of the reasons why the French government should adopt a firm unyielding attitude on the Czechoslovak question and on all questions involving German territorial demands; he could hold out no hope, however, that such an attitude would be adopted, still less that Goerdeler's warnings would be taken seriously. Apart from this the two were entirely agreed on the dangers threatening Europe. On 5 April Goerdeler reappeared in Bertaux's office, this time completely unexpectedly, and begged to be put in touch with French government circles. The same day Bertaux obtained for him an interview with the most senior official of the French Foreign Ministry, Alexis L6ger the Secretary-General (known as a poet under the name Saint-John Perse); Bertaux was present and the conversation lasted two hours. Goerdeler again urged as unyielding an at- titude to Hitler as possible. He stated that he might perhaps exert some in- fluence on German policy, but only provided that he had support and backing from abroad. L6ger, however, committed himself in no way; he spoke, Ber- taux recalls, like a Radical Socialist from the Midi, without bluster but only in general non-committal terms. Goerdeler was given not the smallest assurance. Bertaux and L6ger had no doubts of Schairer's good faith but they knew very little indeed about Goerdeler. It might well be that he belonged to the German resistance movement, but it equally well could be that he merely wished to pump the French government and would immediately report everything he was told to the German government. In addition there was the problem of whether anyone was prepared to take responsibility for initiating a major war in Europe; although France was relatively better prepared in 1938 than in 1939, she was hoping to overhaul Germany shortly in the arms race. 56 Foreign Policy and Resistance On 7 April Goerdeler and Bertaux dined together and Goerdeler reiterated his urgent request for a firm attitude on the Czech question. Next day, however, Leon Blum's government, which had only been in office since 13 March, resigned and on 10 April Edouard Daladier formed a government; Bertaux went to Toulouse University. Goerdeler's contact with the French government, never very effective anyway, was now severed. Goerdeler did little better in London. Here at least the ground had been prepared in that Vansittart had not the smallest confidence in the Hitler government's policy. He also placed much trust in Goerdeler, whom he regarded as reliable, honest and patriotic, in fact the sole genuine opponent of Hitler among the many who presented themselves as such. 14 In April 1938, however, talking to Vansittart, Goerdeler demanded the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany, just after Austria had been incorporated in a somewhat unseemly manner; at the same time he urged the British govern- ment to adopt a clear consistent policy, since otherwise Hitler's appetite for other people's territory would only be increased. Thus he was involuntarily working contrary to the efforts of the resistance and giving rise to even greater mistrust of the 'other Germany' than was anyway felt by foreign governments. 15 The British gained the impression that Goerdeler might well be advancing the ideas of leading circles in the German opposition, not merely his own. The various emissaries who appeared during the Sudeten crisis all showed similar revisionist tendencies and their views seemed to tally with those of Goerdeler. 16 Faced with conservatives, Prussians and monarchists on the one hand and on the other with memories of the Wilhelmine era (particularly 1900-14), the invasion of Belgium and the First World War, all now com- pounded by Hitler's 'neo-Prussianism', views about Germany held in leading influential circles in Britain could differentiate only vaguely between the unat- tractive alternatives. Such considerations must be remembered. 17 Finally Goerdeler's demand for cession of the Sudetenland underlined another weakness in the position of the German opposition vis-d-vis the French and British governments; they were not vitally interested in the territorial integrity of the Sudetenland or indeed of Czechoslovakia as such; Hitler, on the other hand, might be satisfied with the German-speaking Sudetenland; after all, he was making no demand for colonies, participation in world policy or maintenance of a large fleet. Why, therefore, should France and Britain resurrect the spectre of imperial Germany and '1914' ? To many Western statesmen in fact Hitler seemed the lesser of the two evils. If con- cessions were to be made, they thought, why not to Hitler? Why help overthrow his government and then grant the concessions demanded to another German government ? This seemed both complicated and senseless. The British Ambassador in Berlin, who was obviously highly credible as an informant, contributed largely to these ideas about Germany and Hitler in London. 18 Quite apart from this, the suggestion that Britain, working from outside and in time of peace, should attempt to overthrow the government of a major 57 The Sudeten Crisis European country was extraordinary. However determined Britain might have been, she would hardly have ventured on so foolhardy a policy; freedom of choice for other people in their own form of government was firmly rooted in British tradition. 19 In international dealings, even with dictators, good faith was assumed. A government which negotiated and communicated with another on a basis of mutual recognition could not at the same time secretly pursue the overthrow of its partner without itself losing all credibility and confidence. In London people were only too well aware of this. 20 From this point of view it was entirely understandable that Vansittart should have said in reply to Goerdeler that what he was proposing amounted to treason. 21 This basically disregarded the ethical motive, the subordination to humanity of loyalty to one's country. Nevertheless Goerdeler's revisionist demands, however well meant, raised an insuperable obstacle to any meeting of minds. When Chamberlain compared the German opposition to the Jacobites (sup- porters of James II, exiled in 1688, who were trying to overthrow William of Orange and restore James to the throne by stirring up France against England), he was, of course, missing the point entirely. 22 The German opposi- tion was not primarily interested in its own power or position but in the maintenance of peace. For this purpose they made such proposals as seemed to them effective: they wanted Britain to give an unequivocal 'No' to Hitler's plans for conquest by blackmail. Both sides were agreed on the inadmissibility of Hitler's procedures; British military preparedness was not substantially in- ferior to that of Germany; equally both were agreed that Germany could not conduct a successful war on two fronts or even a successful war against Britain and France. From the point of view of the German opposition they were by no means calling upon Britain to risk a world war, which commonsense and a readiness to compromise might well avert, but this might be the impression which they created in Britain. People there did not realize as clearly as did many in Ger- many that, consistently from the beginning, Hitler was demoniacally headed for war. In any case London could see no vast difference between the Nazi government and one that might possibly be formed by the opposition. Both would be 'nationalist' and revisionist; the British government, therefore, had no wish to deal with the German opposition; they wanted to reach some agreement with the legitimate German government. 23 The British and French, therefore, failed to appreciate the position in which German opposition politicians were placed if they were to avoid being accused of pursuing a Versailles Peace Treaty policy and betraying their national in- terests. Goerdeler was fully and painfully aware of this dilemma; on 11 October 1938, after the occupation of the Sudetenland, he wrote to an American friend: 'For myself I could say now: the power and Lebensraum of my country constantly increases. As a German I ought to rejoice at this. But I know that these dictators are criminals and that their economic policy leads to bolshevism; Hitlerism is poison for the German soul; Hitler is determined to root out Christianity ... It will not be justice, reason and decency that will determine the world's future but naked force'. 24 Such an attitude was difficult 58 Foreign Policy and Resistance to understand for those in foreign countries, where people were not habitually involved in a conflict between their ethical principles and their patriotism. The fact remains, however, that Vansittart did advise the British govern- ment to adopt a firm attitude towards Hitler, as he had been doing ever since 1930; he referred to previous conversations with Goerdeler in 1937, to memoranda by the German Heavy Industry Association and by Colonel Thomas, head of the War Economy Section in Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH). 25 He prepared a report for the cabinet stressing the weakness of the German economic and military potential, the failure of the Four-Year Plan, the shortage of raw materials and the desire for peace in Hitler's military en- tourage which merited support from outside. But Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister of the time, and his cabinet, which had only come to office at the end of May 1937, a few days before Goerdeler's first visit to London, never even received the report. When the draft was submitted to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister, he suppressed it and prevented its finalization and submis- sion to the cabinet. 26 Chamberlain was already determined on a policy of com- promise as regards Austria and Czechoslovakia and he was confirmed in his view by memoranda from the British Chiefs of Staff pointing out that Britain was in no way prepared for war with Germany. 27 He did not appreciate dis- cussion on British foreign policy before taking his decision; he wished to be solely responsible for deciding what happened. 28 Vansittart's warnings, which gave a very accurate appreciation of the Hitler government, were accordingly disregarded. 29 Despite all these obstacles to an understanding by either side of the position of the other, many still saw value in warning the British government against Hitler's intentions as often and as emphatically as possible in the hope that an unyielding attitude might still prevent war. Through their own channels, par- ticularly from their Embassy in Berlin and their intelligence services, the British government received a continuous stream of information and war- ning. 30 There were also numerous contacts with German emissaries. In July 1938 Captain Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler's personal aide, travelled to London with Hitler's knowledge and talked to Lord Halifax. Through Wiedemann Halifax gave Hitler to understand that a solution of the Sudeten German question by force would not be calmly accepted by the British people. According to his own report Wiedemann indicated that the latest possible date for a solution was March 1939 - he had had the timing laid down by Hitler confirmed by OKW. 31 On his return from London Wiedemann did not even manage to report in detail to Hitler. Accordingly in August he let the British government know 'through a third party' that Hitler was now determined to solve the Sudeten question 'by force in the immediate future'. During August 1938 further approaches to London were made by a jour- nalist, Captain (retd.) Victor von Koerber. 32 On at least three occasions, the first time on 6 August, he contacted the British Military Attache^ who reported to his superiors. 33 Koerber said that the colours black-white-red were the only revolutionary colours and spoke about a restoration of the 59 The Sudeten Crisis monarchy; he indicated that the overthrow of the regime must of course be brought about from within but could be supported from outside. In his report the Military Attach^ opposed these ideas, saying that, should an attempt fail, everything would be worse than before and Hitler's position would merely be strengthened. Moreover Koerber was proposing the Crown Prince as can- didate for the throne; he had supported Hitler at the presidential elections of 1932 and did not have a good press abroad. 34 As a member of the exclusive Casino Club in Berlin, Ian Colvin, a British journalist, had made the acquaintance of Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, land- owner and conservative monarchist politician. At the end of March or early April 1938 (soon after the German invasion of Austria) Kleist spoke to Colvin, begging him to warn the British government of Hitler's plans for conquest. Hitler would not be satisfied with Austria, he said; he was aiming at world domination; he was mad of course but in full possession of his mental powers. Kleist could see only one possibility of stopping the next planned move against Czechoslovakia — a clear firm 'No' from Britain. For the moment Hitler did not possess the resources to fight Britain; he knew this and had ad- mitted as much himself; the Army General Staff also wished to prevent war but needed a 'sheet anchor', some effective resistance from outside, if they were to restrain Hitler. In May Colvin passed on Kleist's warning to Ogilvie-Forbes, Counsellor in the British Embassy, and he is convinced that Vansittart received it before mid-May. 35 In late July 1938 Colvin received word through an intermediary 'from one of the three highest generals in the German High Command' that military ac- tion against Czechoslovakia would begin on 28 September. 36 In a letter dated 3 August he reported this to his friend Lord Lloyd, Chairman of the British Council, who on many matters had the ear of Chamberlain and Lord Halifax; Lord Lloyd is said to have passed Colvin's report to Vansittart and certain members of the cabinet. 37 In a covering letter Colvin also announced that Kleist would be visiting London and doing so on behalf of the Abvoehr with the object, if possible, of obtaining British agreement to intervene against Germany in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Kleist did in fact travel to London with the blessing and support of Canaris and Oster. 38 On 16 August even Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Am- bassador, himself recommended Kleist as an emissary of'the moderates in the German General Staff. 39 As Kleist told Colvin in November 1938, the specific purpose of his mission was given him by General Beck in these words: 'Bring me certain proof that Britain will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked and I will make an end of this regime.' 40 The 'proofs' visualized were a public declara- tion of British support for Czechoslovakia and a military demonstration. On 18 August, therefore, Kleist flew to London, where he stayed in the Park Lane Hotel. 41 Late that afternoon he had a talk with Vansittart and told him that war was a certainty unless Britain, the only country able to do so, stopped it. 42 As Vansittart stated with great clarity in his report to the Foreign Minister, according to Kleist the problem now was not the threat of war but 60 Foreign Policy and Resistance its complete certainty, since Hitler was totally determined to have it. When Vansittart asked for the planned timing of the attack, Kleist laughed and said that the British government had known that for a long time. He knew of course of Cfllvin's report to Lord Lloyd through Ogilvie-Forbes and therefore of the information which the British government had, part of which came from him. 43 Kleist then said to Vansittart that after 27 September it would be too late and in his report to Lord Halifax Vansittart referred to the letter which he (Halifax) had received from Lord Lloyd and in which 28 September was given as the final date. 44 Asa method of deterring Hitler Kleist proposed some proof which would convince him that Britain and France were not bluffing, if possible a public speech by a leading British statesman including an appeal to all Germans who did not want war. In his report Vansittart added that, as Lord Halifax already knew, this was a proposal which had frequently been made to him in recent weeks by Germans opposed to war; the general political ideas put forward by Kleist were sensible; in Kleist's view, however, no reasonable German policy was to be expected while Hitler was in power; if Hitler suffered a defeat, this would be the prelude to the downfall of his regime — a view also supported by the British Military Attach6 in Berlin. 45 Halifax sent Vansittart's report on to Chamberlain, and the Prime Minister commented upon it in writing on 19 August: 4 6 That very morning, he said, he had been informed by German military circles through Major-General Lord Hutchinson of Montrose that this time Hitler was not bluffing and must be restrained from taking extreme measures by some form of compromise; this view, he said, ought to be compared with what Kleist proposed 1 The Prime Minister, therefore, who either could not or would not see the reality, had to struggle hard to resist the obviously great impression made by Kleist's mis- sion, emphasized by the enormous risk to Kleist himself—Kleist had said that he had left practically with a noose round his neck. As already mentioned, Chamberlain then compared Kleist and his friends to the supporters of James II, saying that Kleist was clearly anxious to stir up his friends in Germany to attempt to overthrow Hitler, that he was therefore prejudiced and that a good deal of what he said must be discounted. The most that Chamberlain eventually declared himself ready to do was to make the gesture of summoning Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Am- bassador in Berlin, to London for talks on the Sudeten question. In short Kleist's approach to Chamberlain had achieved nothing. Henderson, however, whose duty it should have been to report to his government with unvarnished realism, was more of an admirer of the Nazis and of their remarkable organizational achievements than a cautious sceptic. 47 It is true that on 19 August 1938 he wrote to his superiors in London that, if Britain saw any utility in war, now would be the moment to make it rather than later. 48 He knew Chamberlain's views, however, and was certainly not prepared to advise determination and firmness. Telephoning from Berlin to his Foreign Minister on the afternoon of 19 August he urged him not to irritate Hitler unnecessarily or force him to yield further to the 'extremists' in 61 The Sudeten Crisis his own ranks; in conclusion he said that objectively the Germans had 'a strong case' over the Sudetenland. 49 After the war he said: 'Nothing but the direct and immediate threat of war would have stopped Hitler at that stage.' 50 War, however, was what people were trying to avoid. On the evening of 18 August Kleist saw Lord Lloyd again and on the next day Winston Churchill. The meeting with Lord Lloyd does not seem to have led to the anticipated unanimity of view. Kleist was quite frank with Churchill about his own views and those of his friends - restoration of the monarchy and elimination of the Polish Corridor. Churchill did not think it opportune to deal with the Corridor problem, since Hitler himself had shelved it. He promised, however, to send a letter to Kleist giving his views — unofficial of course - on the risk of war which would result from the threatened German attack on Czechoslovakia. 51 As an opposition leader Churchill could naturally make no binding agreements. In his letter he said that it was difficult for democracies like Britain to commit themselves in advance to a specific policy and on the basis of hypothetical situations. One must consider, Churchill continued, not what might happen in the first few months of a conflict, but where we should all be in the third or fourth year. It would be a great mistake to imagine that even the slaughter of the civilian population through air raids would prevent the British Empire from developing its full war power. All the major nations in- volved in such a war - and a crossing of the Czech frontier by German troops would undoubtedly entail a new world war — would fight it to the bitter end and Britain would have the support of the greater part of the world. For the moment the attitude of the British government, as Lord Halifax had recently confirmed to Churchill, was that set out by Chamberlain in his speech of 24 March. With the best will in the world Churchill could not say more. Vansittart, however, was authorized to say that, should the situation deteriorate, Britain would make a naval demonstration and in any case Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would make a minatory speech in the next few days. (It was made on 27 August and reiterated that the content of Chamberlain's speech of 24 March was still valid.) 52 Taken as a whole, therefore, Kleist's mission was unsuccessful and he himself confirmed this. 53 Canaris and Oster, to whom Kleist reported on his return on 24 August, 54 could hardly hope that this would persuade the generals of Britain's will to fight, though Churchill's toughness was convin- cing enough. The letter found its way into Hitler's immediate entourage and so, whether via Canaris or the Foreign Ministry, reached its destination. 55 Without mentioning the recipient but specifying the author, Weizsacker in- cluded an extract from it in a memorandum dated 6 September on foreign reactions to a possible conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile the opposition renewed its attempts to persuade Britain to adopt a firm attitude. On 18 August, as a protest against Hitler's policy, General Beck, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, had handed in his re- signation, which was accepted by Hitler on 21 August. 56 General Haider, his 62 Foreign Policy and Resistance successor, however, continued the efforts to prevent war. Haider assumed office on 1 September and as early as 2 September (the idea seems to have originated about 15 August while Beck was still in office) Lieutenant-Colonel (retd.) Hans Bohm-Tettelbach went to London in a further attempt to in- fluence the British government. 57 His mission, as given him by Haider and Oster, was to press the British government with all urgency to stand firm in face of further demands by Hitler. Haider and Oster visualized Vansittart as the immediate recipient of this message. Bohm-Tettelbach knew nothing of Kleist's mission. 58 As one of the most elementary security precautions members of the opposition seldom knew of any initiative other than their own. In London Bohm-Tettelbach did not succeed in penetrating into any leading influential circle. All he could do was to talk to Julian Piggott, whom he had known after the First World War and who was now in business, and with a Major of the Intelligence Service. Piggott had been Inter-Allied High Commissioner at Cologne in 1920 and still had some important contacts, but Bohm-Tettelbach's message, which was basically similar to that of Kleist, eventually reached Vansittart via the Major. 59 Naturally this 'warning* was no more effective than its predecessors or successors; Chamberlain's attitude and views were more or less fixed. On his return Bohm-Tettelbach reported to Oster, whom he met in Wuppertal, and Oster passed the report on to Haider. 60 Hardly had Bohm-Tettelbach returned than a fresh approach was made to London, this time from the Foreign Ministry but once more in collusion with the group centred on Canaris and Oster. Haider seems to have known nothing of it. 61 As in the Abwehr, there existed in the Foreign Ministry a group of all ages whose conspiratorial activity was tolerated and to a great extent sup- ported by their superiors, Canaris and Weizsacker respectively. 62 The Foreign Ministry group included Adam von Trott zu Solz, Otto Kiep, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, Eduard Briicklmeier, Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff, Albrecht von Kessel and the Kordt brothers. Dr Erich Kordt, a counsellor (Legationsrat), was on Ribbentrop's staff, first in the 'Ribbentrop Bureau' and then in the Embassy in London; since the spring of 1938 he had been in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin as head of the 'Ministerial Bureau'. 63 He worked closely with Freiherr von Weizsacker, the State Secretary, both officially and because their views on Hitler and his policy of brinkmanship tallied; Weizsacker was also in touch with Beck, after the latter's retirement, with Haider and also with Canaris. 64 Theo Kordt was Counsellor at the Embassy in London, where for a time he was acting as Charg6 d'Affaires. As a result of numerous deliberations, contacts and discussions the idea emerged that the Foreign Ministry's influence should be utilized to prevent the outbreak of war. Two possibilities were envisaged: action from within and the exertion of influence from outside. The first thought was to bring influence to bear on Hitler via Colonel- General von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At the end of August Oster asked Erich Kordt to seek an interview with Brauchitsch and give him a picture of the external political situation; Brauchitsch, he said, was not politically-minded but he might perhaps be impressed by the views of an 63 The Sudeten Crisis expert. 65 Weizsacker, whom Kordt asked for advice, agreed that he should talk to Brauchitsch. He (Weizsacker) could no longer do this himself, he said, since in these tense days such action might give rise to the most dangerous and possibly well-founded suspicions on the part of the rulers and also of the public. Kordt accordingly went to the War Ministry on the Tirpitzufer, where Oster had clearly taken precautions to ensure that no entry should appear in the visitors' book; Kordt was received at the entrance by someone he knew and conducted inside. He told the Commander-in-Chief of the Army that Ger- many was entirely isolated; there was no justification for the idea that Britain and France would not intervene if the Wehrmacht invaded Czechoslovakia. He knew the theory well, he said, and he was aware of its source, but he knew the material on which it was ostensibly founded and on the basis of that material he was forced to the opposite conclusion. He showed certain documents to Brauchitsch, who asked a number of questions; in particular he wanted to know on what Hitler and Ribbentrop based their hopes of victory. Kordt thereupon quoted a circular of Ribbentrop's which said that, should the Western Powers be so deluded as to intervene, seventy-five million Germans would fall upon them as one man and annihilate them. On Oster's advice, Kordt volunteered no opinion; he simply set out the situation and left it to Brauchitsch to draw his own conclusions. When Brauchitsch asked what Kordt hoped to gain from his visit, he merely said that the fate of the Army and of Germany, and therefore entire responsibility, now lay with Brauchitsch. The General was taken aback. The Foreign Ministry group considered that the second possibility of preventing war lay in massive pressure from outside and that this would best take the form of unequivocal threats and warnings from Britain. Many ap- proaches had already been made to London for such warnings to be issued. Despite previous negative reactions, however, efforts were pursued. On 1 September Professor Carl Jacob Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, passing through Berlin on his way to Berne, visited Weizsacker to report and discuss the situation with him. Weizsacker told Burckhardt of the proposal to send Theo Kordt secretly to Chamberlain and Lord Halifax and asked him urgently to act on the same lines as soon as he could. In his memoirs Burckhardt recalls that he was to contact the Foreign Office in London from Switzerland and say that 'with Hitler unambiguous language must be used since only this would deter him. He [Weizsacker] was thinking some "uninhibited undiplomatic Englishman like some general with his hunting crop" might suddenly confront Hitler; only thus would the latter perhaps listen.' Burckhardt stresses that in so doing Weizsacker was 'conspiring with a potential enemy for the purpose of preserving the peace - a double game of the utmost peril ... Even as early as this, Weizsacker was making no secret of his view that the preservation of peace and the salvation of Germany were only possible if the one ruinous figure, in whose hands all power was concentrated, should disappear.' 66 Burckhardt drove straight to Karlsruhe via the autobahn and on to Berne, 64 Foreign Policy and Resistance where the same morning he visited Sir George Warner, the British Minister, and spoke on the telephone to Lord Halifax's Parliamentary Secretary, passing on Weizsacker's request. A few days later Burckhardt was able to explain it all in detail to Ralph Stevenson, specialist for League of Nations questions in the Foreign Office, and the latter passed it on to Sir William Strang, Head of the Central Department, in a letter dated 8 September. 67 This said that the only method of bringing Hitler to see the truth was a letter from the British Prime Minister which should be handed direct to Hitler by a courier; 68 care must be taken to ensure that Hitler was given an accurate translation. In his proposal Weizsacker had said that he could not, of course, make such a request to the British Ambassador in Berlin and had therefore asked Burckhardt to act as intermediary; it was of the utmost importance that this letter reach Hitler as soon as possible, before the end of the Nuremberg Party Rally. Finally, in his letter to Strang, Stevenson passed on Burckhardt's impres- sion of the whole affair. Weizsacker, he said, had undoubtedly told Burckhardt many things which, under normal circumstances, he would have kept secret out of loyalty to his superiors. Burckhardt had been so impressed by his inter- view that he had driven the 550 miles from Berlin to Berne without stopping in order to report at once to Sir George Warner. At the conclusion of his report and transmission of Weizsacker's message Burckhardt added that senior officers of the German Wehrmacht and all members of the government to whom he had talked, including Goring, were opposed to war against Czechoslovakia. Admittedly the Army would march at Hitler's order, but the first set-back would lead to the collapse of the regime. Before, however, action through Burckhardt could take effect, the men of the Foreign Ministry had initiated another approach on similar lines. Once more senior officials of the Foreign Ministry warned a potential enemy against their own government's policy and took the risk of divulging information which might produce an unyielding attitude on the part of that enemy to their own government's aggressive demands. Lieutenant-Colonel Oster urged Dr Erich Kordt somehow to obtain from the British some unequivocal statement, not using the niceties of diplomatic language, but couched in terms which would impress even a semi-educated dictator who thought in terms only of force. 69 If this could be obtained, the military opposition would be in a position to prevent the outbreak of war - 'Then there will no longer be any Hitler. Do you understand me ?' Rordt, of course, knew the position of the British government; he knew that the British were inclined, rather than to use brave words, to act at the right moment, never too early; he knew that Britain's attitude was basically pacific and defensive; finally he knew that a government dependent upon parliament and the will of the electorate could not easily stipulate anything. Kordt and Oster, on the other hand, believed that Haider and his fellow-conspirators were ready for a coup d'etat: at least they were convinced that Haider would act. Did the British government not know the mood of Germany and the Wehrmacht leaders, they argued? Did it not know how weak the Siegfried 65 The Sudeten Crisis Line was ? Did it not know that that there could be no more than six to eight divisions facing some fifty French? 70 In 1938, therefore, the German generals had no choice but to lose the war and sink in terrible defeat or, in their own in- terests, overthrow Hitler. Could one therefore rely upon the generals being prepared for a coup d'etat ? The answer must be 'Yes', the opposition argued, since the generals had no other choice. Kordt wished to remain as near as possible to the centre of affairs in order to provide a guiding hand if necessary. He therefore asked his cousin Susanne Simonis to learn by heart the message destined for the British government and transmit it verbally to his brother Theo in London. 71 She arrived there on the evening of 5 September. Previously, on 23 August, in the house of Philip Conwell Evans, Kordt had met Sir Horace Wilson, chief industrial adviser to the British government and actually one of Chamberlain's most important advisers on foreign policy; on that occasion Kordt had implored Wilson to urge Chamberlain to adopt a con- sistent policy towards Germany as the only method of preventing the out- break of the war at which Hitler was aiming so ruthlessly. 72 Conwell Evans, who had worked at Konigsberg University, had certain leanings towards the Nazi regime but nevertheless played an important intermediary role between the German resistance movement and British government circles. 73 Kordt now turned at once to Wilson again and they agreed on a meeting which took place on the following day, 6 September. What Kordt had to say seemed to Wilson of sufficient importance for him to ask that it be repeated next day to the Foreign Secretary himself. To avoid attracting unnecessary attention this discussion, at which only Kordt and Halifax were present (Wilson left after having made the arrangements), took place not in the Foreign Office but in Wilson's office in 10 Downing Street. Kordt entered un- observed by the garden entrance. 74 Kordt told Halifax that he was the delegate of an influential group in Ger- man military and political circles which wished to prevent the war with Czechoslovakia planned by Hitler and, subject to certain conditions, had the power to do so. 73 Hitler was planning his attack on the assumption that France would not meet the obligations of her treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia of 25 January 1924. If Hitler was now allowed to play fast and loose with his policy of force, then no further sensible international European relationships based on trust and good faith would be possible. The group for which he was speaking, Kordt continued, believed that in July 1914 the inter- national situation would not have been so impossible had Sir Edward Grey stated clearly at the time that Britain would not stand aside in the event of a Franco-German war. If this was really the Prime Minister's view, then he must state it publicly and unequivocally so that everyone would realize Britain's determination. It must be made totally clear that war with Czechoslovakia would mean war with Britain. If, in spite of this, Hitler con- tinued with his policy, then the German Army leaders would intervene by force of arms; German patriots saw no other method of stopping the crime of war. The prerequisite for such a step was a foreign policy defeat for Hitler, 66 Foreign Policy and Resistance which the declaration requested would imply; this would in practice signify the end of the Nazi regime. 76 Halifax promised to inform the Prime Minister and one or two of his cabinet colleagues; the request would be considered, he said, with the greatest care and discretion. Kordt left 10 Downing Street, again through the garden gate, feeling that an unequivocal British declaration would shortly be made. Even when Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden on 15 September, Kordt still thought that he was going to tell Hitler some home truths. After the Munich conference, however, Halifax said to Theo Kordt: 'We were not in a position to be as frank with you as you were with us. When you passed your message to us, we were already considering Chamberlain's mission to Germany.' 77 In the light of all these and other initiatives, including a further warning from Goerdeler whose efforts to oppose Hitler's policy were acknowledged by Vansittart in 1948, 78 what claim can the British government make to have offered resistance when it so definitely cold-shouldered the Kordt brothers? The British did in fact issue a warning in unmistakable language. Late in the evening of 9 September a British government message to the German Foreign Minister arrived in the Berlin Embassy; it was to be passed im- mediately to Nuremberg. There the great Party Rally was taking place and Sir Nevile Henderson, who was also in Nuremberg, was instructed beforehand to seek an audience with Ribbentrop. 79 He was to say that, should force be used to solve the Sudeten question and should France, at Czech request, fulfil her duties as an ally, a general conflict must ensue, from which Great Britain could not stand aloof. Ribbentrop was to be asked to pass this message forthwith to Hitler. Henderson received the message but, in a despatch to Halifax, advised strongly against its delivery, saying that it would not restrain Hitler but mere- ly drive him to ill-considered measures. 80 He stated that he had already spoken to Goring, Goebbels and Ribbentrop and had pointed out the inevitability of British involvement in a general conflict; under no circumstances, however, did he wish to deliver a formal warning which might be reminiscent to Hitler of the demarche of 21 May. Halifax accepted this; if Henderson, he replied, had already represented the British viewpoint so unequivocally to Ribben- trop, there was no need for him to deliver the warning of 9 September. 81 On 10 September, in a statement to the press, the British government even denied all reports of an intention to despatch a diplomatic note to the German government. 82 There was occasional talk of a secret letter from Chamberlain to Hitler, but this never materialized. The British 'warning' to the German government eventually consisted merely of a statement by Chamberlain to the press, which he explicitly described as unofficial. 83 Having thus reduced its effect, the Prime Minister then expressed his great confidence in the method of negotia- tion and in the discussion of differences; he referred to the British warning of 24 March, reiterated in Simon's speech in Lanark on 27 August: if Czechoslovakia were attacked and France, in fulfilment of the obligations of her alliance, were involved in war with Germany, Britain would not be able to 67 The Sudeten Crisis stand aloof from a general conflict. British security was closely linked with that of France. Erich Kordt was at the Party Rally in Nuremberg when, on 12 September, he received Chamberlain's press statement. He immediately had a translation and copies prepared, also of the much sharper-toned comments by a Foreign Office press officer. Copies of both these documents were immediately dis- tributed to the Party dignitaries staying in the Grand Hotel. Even in the general confusion, however, a Foreign Ministry official remarked on the un- official character of the press statement and pointed this out to those present. Hitler himself dismissed the whole manoeuvre as sheer bluff. 84 In his closing speech to the Party Rally he was as aggressive as ever, although he avoided totally committing himself. 85 The British government remained conciliatory and, as already indicated above, continuously made fresh concessions. On 15 September Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden; Britain and France volunteered to force Czecho- slovakia to cede the Sudetenland, whereupon Hitler raised his demands and insisted on agreement to an immediate move of the Wehrmacht into the dis- puted area. Chamberlain then went to Germany once more - to the Godesberg conference of 22 to 24 September, which ended without result. The Western Powers would now be satisfied if Hitler marched into the Sudetenland, not against their will but with their agreement, and if the Czechs gave up the idea of resistance — so that there should be no war. 68 6 Beck's Plans While the members of the German opposition, both inside and outside government service, were attempting to create the external political con- ditions conducive to the fall of Hitler, the military conspirators were developing plans for a coup d'etat. Thoughts on this subject went back a long way. During the Fritsch crisis the idea had germinated in the minds of Oster, Gisevius, Schacht, Witzleben, Haider and others. Without the cooperation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff, however, no military coup seemed practicable, and without the military, no coup at all. Brauchitsch's ambiguous position has already been mentioned; hopes that he would cooperate were not great. Beck, however, continued to try to prevent war, at least by means of memoranda. Apart from a chance conversation lasting five minutes in March 1938, he had never had an opportunity to present his views to Hitler in per- son. 1 Hitler was not willing to receive Beck even to say farewell on his retirement. 2 The first series of memoranda setting out the reasons why a war would in- evitably lead to catastrophe for Germany and all Europe was handed by Beck on 5 May 1938 to his Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch. To understand these and subsequent memoranda a short explanation of their antecedents must be given. Beck initially hoped that he could influence Hitler and persuade him to moderate his views and this he might be able to do as Chief of the General Staff but not as a private citizen. For this reason he did not resign during the Fritsch crisis despite the fact that Brauchitsch willingly took over Fritsch's post and so became Beck's superior, when all the time unfounded accusations were being made against his former Commander-in-Chief. As we have seen, Brauchitsch made no conditions regarding the reinstatement of Fritsch after the latter's rehabilitation; it would have been mere loyalty had Beck handed in his resignation at that time. On the other hand Fritsch's rehabilitation could only be achieved from inside, not from outside; moreover Beck was convinced that he must remain in order to prevent further Nazi encroachments on the Army. Finally he stayed so that, in so far as lay in his power, he could stop the war announced by Hitler on 5 November 1937. 3 Beck's attitude was, of course, largely dictated by his character. His custom was to reflect, to check, to consider and finally to take a carefully thought-out 69 The Sudeten Crisis decision. His extremely poised and deliberate manner had even earned him the nickname of'Cunctator'. 4 This is incorrect if taken to mean that he lacked energy, but rapid decision and unorthodox action were not in Beck's make-up. During the Fritsch crisis Graf von der Goltz, Fritsch's defence counsel, said of Beck: 'As regards readiness to act everyone who knew him realized that he could not be persuaded into a "cavalry charge".' 5 A word should be said here about the position of senior military com- manders as such. Particularly during the Nuremberg trials senior officers of the Wehrmacht have been accused of failure to use their troops to sweep away the Nazi regime or at least of failure to disobey. This accusation, however, presupposes that there was a clear legal and moral antithesis between the leadership of the state and that of the army and only a few individuals really thought that this situation obtained; in fact this accusation presupposes, not merely a legal and moral, but also a formal and ostensibly insuperable divergence between the leadership of the state and that of the army. In 1938, during the Sudeten crisis, Beck considered that such divergence existed but his superior officer, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, did not. Brauchitsch wanted no strike by the generals; for this reason and because of the manner in which he evaded Beck's request, Beck accused him of weakness of character. Brauchitsch was not, in fact, a strong character but refusal to consider a strike by the military is only secondarily a question of character. 6 A strike of all commanding generals was a practicable method of stopping the war, at least temporarily. But there would not have been a strike of all commanding generals. There was no question of the Navy and Air Force par- ticipating in such a step and 'the leadership' of the Army was not sufficiently monolithic to make it a practicable possibility at this time. Had the 'strike' not been unanimous, Hitler could easily have replaced the refractory com- manders. There were plenty of ambitious, efficient candidates not over- burdened with scruple; men like Reichenau and Jodl would have been glad of promotion. Moreover in January 1938 Brauchitsch had declared himself ready to accept another Chief of Staff if necessary. 7 Beck and generals who thought as he did were regarded as expendable from the outset; they knew this and were forced to take account of the fact. Even had the necessary conditions existed, mere refusal to obey could have been no better than a half-measure. At the Nuremberg trial Field Marshal von Manstein said very aptly that a dictator could not allow himself to be coerced since otherwise his dictatorship was at an end. 8 Opinions may vary regarding the methods Hitler might have used to free himself from coercion by the generals but he was not squeamish in his choice of methods and the Army leaders would have had to visualize their own '30 June'. Under all cir- cumstances, therefore, the generals had to be ready for more than a strike, in other words for a coup d'etat. A collective initiative by the military leaders was sensible only as the signal for the overthrow of the regime. Since, within the Army, the prerequisites for a coup d'etat did not exist, this whole method was impracticable. The question why the necessary conditions for a military strike were not 70 Beck's Plans present leads on to that of the political and moral responsibility of soldiers. Undoubtedly there is a duty to refuse to obey if soldiers are required to carry out illegal or criminal orders such as the shooting of prisoners of war protected by the Geneva Convention. In this case, for anyone with knowledge of the cir- cumstances, the illegality is clear and unequivocal. Were the generals, however, to assume the right to judge the political leadership ? Were they to decide what was legal and what was not in matters of foreign policy, what was a just and what an unjust war? No officer could be expected to rebel merely on a vague feeling that Hitler was in the wrong. Anyone without an overall view had no choice but to obey - assuming that he recognized the existence of military power and military resources as sensible and necessary in themselves. Those generals who could see matters clearly and had some insight into all the factors involved admittedly carried a responsibility in the sense in which Beck considered that he did himself. Even in this conflict between obedience and moral responsibility, however, generals did not necessarily display lack of character if they opted for obedience. Discipline is the foundation of any military organization and for the relationship between a modern government and its army. 9 Over centuries of history Europe has made up its mind that policy shall be decided, not by generals or insurrectionists, but by the government of the state. If the military are not subordinate to the government, there can only be chaos internally and impotence externally. This is equally valid both for the democratically organized and for the authoritarian states. This is not to pretend that the German Army contained no opportunist, irresponsible or characterless generals. The post-war trials showed clearly enough that there were plenty of them. Human qualities and human weakness are presumably to be found in the same proportions among military men as in other walks of human society. Too much should not be expected of the so- called 'corps of generals'. In 1938 it was not as obvious as it was in 1944 that the path chosen would inevitably lead to catastrophe; it was by no means clear that every step forward would squander thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions of human lives. Nevertheless it was clear that the threat of war with Britain and France and, if they were in difficulties, with the United States also, was great; it was also clear that Germany was militarily incapable of dealing with such an even- tuality. The danger could be averted by political means, but not by military. The duty of the military leaders was to point this out, and this they did. Hitler complained with astonishment and irritation about the pacifism of the General Staff. 10 Beck was not the only one to emphasize the hopelessness of war against the Western Powers; he received support from many quarters. Having dutifully made their reservations, however, Brauchitsch and the other senior commanders left it to the politicians to draw their conclusions, whereas Beck felt himself compelled to go further. In his memorandum dated 5 May 1938 Beck pointed out that, owing to the progressive weakening of Japan as a result of her Far Eastern campaigns, Britain and Russia had an increasingly free hand in Europe, that Britain and 71 The Sudeten Crisis Italy were cooperating on many subjects and that Britain and France had come to political and military agreement and were already visualizing the possibility of world war; they were in the process of accelerating their rear- mament. 1 ' Germany was therefore surrounded almost exclusively by potential enemies. However averse Britain and France might be to a new war and however great the efforts they might make to avoid it, they would not tolerate a further shift of power in Europe in Germany's favour. Germany lacked the resources necessary to sustain a prolonged war: the Wehrmacht would not be ready for years; the continental foundation for a prolonged war was lacking; raw materials and food were only available, or could only be obtained, in in- adequate quantities. A military solution of the Czech question was therefore a bad one; the only acceptable solution was one with which Britain would agree. Brauchitsch received Beck's memorandum on the afternoon of 7 May. He discussed it with Keitel and, on the latter's advice, submitted to Hitler only the third (military) section. Hitler rejected it indignantly as far too pessimistic. 12 On 28 May Hitler announced to the leaders of the Wehrmacht (including Beck), the Party and the State his 'unalterable decision to destroy Czechoslovakia by military action within a foreseeable time'. 13 He spoke of Lebensraum and did not even exclude war with the West in order to expand Germany's coastline. Beck reacted at once with a further memorandum to Brauchitsch on 29 May. 14 He still did not wish to push matters to an open breach; he still hoped to convince Hitler and make him change his mind. Beck's campaign was still for Hitler (for his comprehension), not against Hitler; he therefore went a long way with the dictator in order to make his arguments, which were essentially military, credible. Wolfgang Foerster, Beck's biographer, has aptly said that Beck was trying 'to throw the weight of military judgment into the scales of political decision*making'. ls Beck himself read his new memorandum to Brauchitsch on 30 May. In it he said that it was correct that Germany required further Lebensraum, both in Europe (as Hitler had said on the previous day) and in colonial areas. In Europe Germany could only acquire additional territory by war. It was also correct that Czechoslovakia in its present form was intolerable for Germany and should be eliminated as a source of danger to Germany, 'if necessary by a military solution'. In this event (solution by war), however, 'the anticipated success must justify the stake'. 16 It was not correct, however, that, as Hitler had maintained, Germany was stronger today than in 1914 or that she could sustain a struggle against France - a certain opponent of any expansion of German power - and against Britain. Compared to the 1914 army the Wehr- macht was inferior in 'personnel, equipment and morale'; territory available was inadequate for a war on several fronts; as regards finance, foodstuffs and raw materials the position was worse even than that of 1917-18; the people were opposed to any war not obviously unavoidable. Internally, therefore, Germany was not very strong and externally she faced a coalition of Czechoslovakia, France, Britain and the United States. In this situation Ger- many might well win the Czech campaign, but she would lose the war. Even in 1914 Britain and France had been underestimated, though not by the General 72 Beck's Plans Staff. A soldier knew that France and Britain had avast hinterland available — colonies, dominions, maritime communications, fleet bases and in emergency even the United States; Germany had no comparable operational base. Initial 'blitz' victories might be won, but they should not be regarded as decisive for the war as a whole. These considerations showed that the Supreme Com- mander of the Wehrmacht lacked realistic advice and, if this situation per- sisted, the fate of the Wehrmacht 'and therefore the fate of Germany too' could only be painted in the blackest colours. On this same day, 30 May, Hitler notified the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services in writing of his unalterable decision to destroy Czecho- slovakia ; he instructed them to prepare to carry out this decision by the end of September, so that action could be taken at any time thereafter. 17 Beck immediately drafted yet another memorandum. In this he confined himself primarily to technical military arguments designed to show that the Supreme Commander's military directive could not be implemented. 18 Brauchitsch received the document on 3 June. In it Beck complained that Hitler's directive had been issued without consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army and he showed that action against Czechoslovakia based on this directive could only lead to disaster. The Army General Staff, he said, must refuse to take any responsiblity for measures based on these principles. This was clear enough. It concerned matters on which Beck was the expert and with which his position entitled him to deal; he had no need to fear being told to mind his own business and so finding his protest brushed aside. Beck now took a step designed to bring home to the entire top level of the Army what Hitler's intentions were and to prove that they were both dangerous and impracticable. Instead of the annual General Staff tour he ordered an indoor war game to study the course of a German attack on Czechoslovakia on the assumption that France intervened. 19 In his summing up Beck showed that, although Czechoslovakia had been crushed by German troops, the French Army had meanwhile advanced deep into German territory and that defeat could no longer be averted. 20 Beck's conclusion from this was that the political leadership must be guided in its decisions by military and economic capabilities, otherwise the country would slide into catastrophe. Brauchitsch did not contradict Beck, but neither did he explicitly agree with him. 21 During the dinner in the 'Esplanade' Hotel, Berlin, given by Beck to his audience at the closing conference, it was clear that his views did not have un- animous support. In particular Major Schmundt, the Fuhrer's Wehrmacht aide in succession to Hossbach, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Jeschonnek, later Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, described Beck's views as antiquated and obsolete, saying that, like Graf von Schlieffen, he had not kept pace with technical progress. 22 The warning voices, however, seem to have been in the majority; people pointed out that the world would never permit German con- tinental hegemony, that Russia represented a vast and grossly under- estimated threat and that, because he talked sense, Beck would probably soon share the fate of Fritsch. 23 On 15 July Beck took up his pen once more. In a further memorandum to 73 The Sudeten Crisis Brauchitsch (the final draft carries the date of 16 July) Beck insisted with even greater emphasis than before on the dangers of a general European, and probably worldwide, war. 24 Daladier's latest speech on 12 July, he said, must have convinced all the sceptics of France's determination. All available infor- mation showed that the people did not want war and did not understand its purpose; the Army was once more a people's army and would have no con- fidence in leaders prepared to risk another general war. Even before the out- break of war this popular mood might have dangerous consequences for the fighting value and morale of the troops. Moreover, once Britain and France had intervened to defend Czechoslovakia, they would no longer be satisfied with mere restoration of Czech territory; it would be 'a life and death war with Germany 1 . Germany lacked the resources for effective defence in the West. Beck concluded his politico-military arguments with these words: 'In the light of my previous statements I regard it as my duty today — in full knowledge of the significance of such a step but conscious of the responsibility laid upon me by my official assignment for the preparation and conduct of a war - to put forward the following urgent request: the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht must be induced to halt the war preparations which he has ordered and to postpone his proposed solution of the Czech question by force until the military conditions therefor have radically changed. At present I can see no prospects of success and this my view is shared by all my subordinate Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff and heads of General Staff sections, in so far as they are concerned with preparation for and conduct of war against Czechoslovakia.' 25 Beck's deep-rooted sense of ethical responsibility emerges clearly from these sentences. Admittedly it was not officially his province to judge the moral rectitude of strategic plans and military operations; for this reason he invariably confined himself to military arguments. This was why he said that 'at present' Germany was not yet ready for war. His estimate of the military forces, however, was based upon a political estimate, which was strictly not his province, as he himself recognized when he said that he was conscious of the significance of his step: Beck assumed that Britain and France, probably also the United States, would intervene. Under such conditions Germany would never be 'ready' for war, since her defeat would be certain from the outset. 26 Finally Beck urged upon his Commander-in-Chief the production of a sober unanimous appreciation of the situation resulting from discussions with and incorporating the views of Commanders-in-Chief and commanding generals of the Army and of the Commanders-in-chief of the other two Services. Then Hitler should hold a conference with commanding generals, who must be agreed beforehand on the views which they would put forward. This would be the famous 'collective step' - the generals should tell Hitler that they were op- posed to war. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of the General Staff could not, by themselves, hope to gain the ear of their Supreme Commander. In Hitler's eyes they were expendable. Would he not, however, 74 Beck's Plans be forced to abandon his plans, if he found that the vast majority of the military commanders were also opposed to war? This memorandum was submitted to Brauchitsch on 16 July and on the same day Beck discussed it with him; this enabled Beck to set out his proposal for a collective initiative with much greater clarity: the senior commanders of the Wehrmacht, he said, should force Hitler to halt his war preparations and, if he would not be coerced, they should resign from their posts in a body. Beck's papers include a record of his discussion with Brauchitsch. 27 He explained the moral responsibility of the high-ranking soldier in even sharper and clearer terms: 'Vital decisions for the future of the nation are at stake. History will indict these commanders of blood guilt if, in the light of their professional and political knowledge, they do not obey the dictates of their conscience. The soldier's duty to obey ends when his knowledge, his conscience and his sense of responsibility forbid him to carry out a certain order. ' 28 If, he continued, the military commanders' warnings and advice were not heeded, then they had both the right and the duty before their nation and before history to resign from their posts. If they did this as a body war would be im- possible and the Fatherland would be saved from ruin. High-ranking soldiers should not confine themselves to their purely military task but must be con- scious of their supreme responsibility to the people as a whole - 'Exceptional times demand exceptional measures. 1 Beck was well aware that, even if successful, the proposed collective step must have internal political repercussions. He thought that there would be 'serious internal political strains 1 ', Hitler, he knew, intended in any case to rid himself as soon as he could of the old generals, in other words those so far im- mune to Nazi ideology — he is supposed to have said that he would conduct the war against the Czechs with these people, but would have a new breed of com- manders for that against France and Britain. Beck therefore concluded that 'we must make up our minds that simultaneously with or immediately after this protest there must be a thorough-going showdown between the Wehr- macht and the SS. In other words the collective protest could only be successful if simultaneously or immediately thereafter the Nazis were deprived of their own instrument of power, and that implied a coup d'etat. Even if he remained Chancellor, Hitler would not be a dictator if the Wehr- macht no longer obeyed him and his Party army had been disarmed. 29 On 19 July Beck reiterated his proposal for a collective protest even more emphatically. Again he stressed the 'consequences' of such a step and the op- portunity for a 'showdown with the SS and the Party bosses' which he described as essential for the 'reestablishment of the rule of law'. In the record of this particular discussion with Brauchitsch which Beck drafted, however, appears the sentence: 'There can and must be no doubt that this struggle is conducted for the Fuhrer.' 30 Perhaps for the last time, he continued, destiny was offering an opportunity 'to the German people and the Fuhrer himself to liberate themselves from the nightmare of a Cheka and domination by Party bosses who, by influencing the attitude of the people, will destroy both the existence and welfare of the Reich and enable communism to revive'. 75 The Sudeten Crisis The key to this phrase lies in the reference to communism, which was by no means reviving at the time, and in Beck's situation when making these statements. Undoubtedly he knew that Hitler was not the tool of some devil's advocate. He had to remember, however, that all soldiers had sworn a per- sonal oath to Hitler as Supreme Commander and he knew that the majority, including Brauchitsch, were not prepared to brush this oath aside. If Brauchitsch was to be persuaded to act, this could only be done through the fiction of liberating Hitler from the evil influences of the SS and corrupt Party bosses. The references to the Party bosses, whom the military hated, the arrogant competing army of the SS and the spectre of communism were calculated to influence Brauchitsch's military mind. It is easy to say now that nothing could be achieved by such arguments; today we know that to be true. At the time, however, no other course was open to a man like Beck who, as Chief of Staff, had no troops under his command. Beck knew his Army officers well. He knew that, however much they might dislike the man and his actions, they were not to be persuaded to revolt against the Head of State: 'There must not be even the smallest suspicion of a plot.' 31 Nevertheless Beck visualized the situation in which Hitler would be placed if faced with a collective protest by the generals: therefore 'the most senior military commanders must stand united behind this step under all cir- cumstances'. These last words applied to the foreseeable eventuality that Hitler might not simply give way. In that event it was necessary to look further and visualize the situation once the spark had been lit. Consequently: 'Short, clear slogans: For the Fuhrer - against war - against the tyranny of the Party bosses — peace with the church — freedom of expression — away with Cheka methods — back to the rule of law in the Reich — reduction of all levies by half — no more building of palaces — housing for the people — Prussian honesty and simplicity I' 3 2 That was his programme. It implied nothing less than the removal of the Nazi tyranny with everything characteristic of it. 33 Remarkably enough another memorandum or minute exists, the back- ground to which is still unexplained. It is dated 17 July and was written by Vice-Admiral Gunther Guse, Chief of the Naval Staff. It puts forward entirely similar thoughts: In a war of European proportions Germany must inevitably be defeated and it was to be feared that such a conflict might develop from an attack on Czechoslovakia; it was therefore the duty of Hitler's responsible ad- visers, not merely to carry out his orders, 'but also to exert the full force of their personality, accepting all the consequences, in order to arrest a develop- ment threatening the existence of the Reich while there is still time'. 34 As the means of doing this Guse proposed 'combined representations by the heads of the three Services' or at least by those of the Army and Navy if Goring would not participate. Like Beck, Guse proposed to battle not against but for and about the Fuhrer, and to prevent advisers closer to the Fuhrer than the Commanders-in-Chief calling the tune entirely. Like Beck, however, he wished to 'go to the limit', in other words not merely to protest but, if necessary, to take resolute action against Hitler. Captain Helmut Heye, Guse's senior Operations Officer, also gave vent to 76 Beck's Plans similar ideas; again paralleling Beck, he urged reestablishment of the rule of law at home and stoppage of the persecution of the churches and the Jews. There was now a crusading spirit abroad in Europe, he said, or at least an an- tipathy to Germany. An attack on Czechoslovakia would inevitably act as the spark, and intervention by the Western powers would mean loss of the war by Germany. 35 Only gradually did the would-be struggle for Hitler turn into open struggle against him. For Beck the turning point seems to have been 28 July, on which day he received detailed information on Hitler's reaction to Wiedemann's report on his London mission. 36 As he recorded in a note on that day, Beck's conclusion from Hitler's persistent determination to use warlike methods was this: 'The moment seems to have passed, or at least it has become con- siderably more difficult, to wean him away from these ideas by reasoned argu- ment and warnings.' 37 On the following day, 29 July, Beck had a further interview with Brauchitsch and pressed him even harder than before. It was now urgent, he said, to consider 'whether and at what moment the Commander-in-Chief of the Army with the Army generals solid behind him should present himself to the Fuhrer*. Brauchitsch should say to Hitler, he continued: 'The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, together with his most senior commanding generals, regret that they cannot assume responsibility for the conduct of a war of this nature without carrying a share of the guilt for it in face of the peo- ple and of history. Should the Fuhrer, therefore, insist on the prosecution of this war, they hereby resign from their posts. n% This statement, he said, should be made in the sternest and most brutal terms and the most suitable moment was probably the latter half of September. 39 The intoxication of the forthcoming Party Rally would have evaporated by that time; the anticipated notes from the French and British governments would have arrived and they should 'make the situation far clearer'. At about this time the financial situa- tion would compel the Finance Minister to protest to Hitler against continua- tion of his policy. 40 A few days later, however, Beck had become convinced that there was no more time to lose and that action must be taken before the Party Rally, the best opportunity being 15 August when Hitler had ordered a gathering of senior generals in the Jiiterbog training area. 41 Beck was now equally clear on the 'internal strains' to be expected. These must be anticipated 'in any case', no matter whether Hitler gave way or not. Clearly, therefore, he appreciated realistically the situation which would arise as a result of a strike threat by the generals. He set out its sequel quite plainly: 'It will thereafter be necessary for the Army to be prepared, not only for pos- sible war, but also for upheaval at home which it should be possible to confine to Berlin. Issue orders accordingly. Get Witzleben together with Helldorf.' No further proof is therefore required of Beck's readiness to initiate a coup d'etat 'in any case'. At this time Witzleben was commanding III Army Corps and Military District III (Berlin); Graf von Helldorf was Police President of Berlin. These two together had sufficient force to occupy all key positions in Berlin. The transition had therefore been made from mere protest, even 77 The Sudeten Crisis though that included a threat of resignation, to concrete planning for a coup d'etat. On Beck's instructions and in collaboration with Witzleben, Lieutenant-General Karl-Heinrich von Stiilpnagel, Deputy Chief of Staff 11 in the Army General Staff, was already busy working out detailed plans. 42 About this time Beck wrote a draft of the speech to be made by Brauchitsch to group commanders and commanding generals giving them the background and urging them to participate in the protest. 43 In essence it consisted of the arguments and opinions already put forward by Beck in his memoranda and his interviews with Brauchitsch. On 15 August Hitler was proposing to assemble army group commanders-in-chief, commanding generals and others of similar rank in Jiiterbog. There Beck hoped that, when Hitler explained his ideas, the generals would support Brauchitsch; they were also to give the necessary information and instructions to such other officers under their com- mand as might be invited by Hitler in the next few weeks to the Obersalzberg or on board the yacht 'Grille'. 44 Now it was for Brauchitsch to make up his mind. But the Commander-in- Chief of the Army could not bring himself to take up a definite attitude. He thought that both Hitler and Beck were right. He knew that Beck's views were correct in the long term but he was incapable of drawing the necessary con- clusions from that knowledge. At Beck's suggestion Brauchitsch summoned army group and corps com- manders to a conference in Berlin on 4 August. 45 Beck's major memorandum of July was read to the meeting. 46 Invited by Brauchitsch, General Adam then described the totally inadequate condition, defensive capability and manning of the Siegfried Line. Brauchitsch agreed and instructed Adam to say precise- ly the same to Hitler. 47 The other generals were then invited to put forward any differing views. There was almost unanimous agreement with the appreciation prepared by the Army High Command. Only two people, General von Reichenau com- manding Army Group 4, and General Ernst Busch, commanding VIII Army Corps, struck a divergent note; the F'uhrer would do the right thing, they said; one must have confidence in him and maintain discipline. Opposition was so small that, at the end of the conference, Brauchitsch announced unanimity. He had not, however, delivered the speech drafted by Beck. The assembled generals heard not a word about the collective protest and its probable con- sequences; no one was asked to declare his readiness to 'fight for Hitler'. Nevertheless a few days after the 4 August conference Brauchitsch sub- mitted Beck's memorandum to Hitler; subsequently, moreover, when the crisis was at its height about mid-September, Brauchitsch asked corps com- manders to 'support him in opening the Fuhrer's eyes to the adventure into which he has decided to plunge', saying that he himself no longer had any in- fluence with Hitler — as Jodl noted in his diary on 13 September. 48 Even before Beck's resignation, however, Brauchitsch had begun to work more and more with General Haider, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and less and less with Beck. Finally he remained placidly at his post when General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff of the Army and his principal adviser, resigned. 49 78 Beck's Plans On 10 August Hitler convened group commanders, their chiefs of staff and other high-ranking officers at the 'Berghof, and addressed them for several hours after lunch, talking about his unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia, and about other ideas he had for the future. When Generals von Wietersheim and Adam voiced misgivings about the inadequacy of defences in the West, Hitler began to scream and said the position there would not merely be held for three weeks but for three years. 50 On the whole, however, Hitler remained calm and polite, and finally concluded his remarks by saying he knew that his soldiers would not let him down and he hoped that neither would the generals and the General Staff. Hitler sent word to Beck through Brauchitsch that he refused to accept political disquisitions; he alone knew what he had to do. This and Brauchitsch's insincere vacillating attitude inevitably left Beck feeling that he had been disowned; he had no other choice, therefore, but to resign. 'Brauchitsch left me in the lurch 1', he would often say later in tones of anger and indignation. His proposals and preparations for measures following the collective protest, his advocacy of collective action and finally his utterances after his ultimate resignation show that Beck placed little hope in the possibility of his resignation preventing war. 51 He was now determined not to carry a share of the responsibility; he could no longer stop anything. His fellow-officers and collaborators such as Weizsacker advised him to remain - but in vain. Having heard Hitler's speech in Juterbog on 15 August, which included a reiteration of his announcement that he would solve the Sudeten German question by force that autumn, on 18 August Beck applied to his Commander- in-Chief to be relieved of his office. Three days later, on 21 August, he was told that Hitler had approved. 52 On 24 and 26 August Beck had further talks with Brauchitsch and the latter told him that, for foreign policy reasons, Hitler did not wish his retirement publicized for the time being. Beck complied. On 27 August he handed over his duties to his successor, General Haider, saying farewell only to his immediate staff, the deputy chiefs of staff and heads of section. Initially Beck was appointed to command First Army which was to concen- trate in the West in the event of war. On 19 October, when the crisis was over, on Hitler's instructions he asked to retire, which he did on 31 October, being simultaneously promoted Colonel-General. 53 During the crisis he was not closely involved in Haider's, Witzleben's and Oster's plans for a coup. Beck did not allow himself to be deluded by Hitler's success over the Sudeten question; he was still convinced that pursuance of Hitler's policy would inevitably lead to war with the Western Powers. In November, at greater leisure now since his retirement, he once more reduced his thoughts to writing. Since 1914, he said, great wars were total wars, in other words wars absorbing the entire resources of a people - men, raw materials, in- dustry, labour, research, pertinacity and moral conviction. 'The defensive capacity of a people stems from a combination of spiritual, physical and in- dustrial strength. The armed forces are only a component of this strength 79 The Sudeten Crisis which will carry them to victory over the enemy. Representatives of the new- born Wehrmacht must recognize the relationship between defensive capacity and the armed forces and be as solicitous for the one as they are for the other. This summarizes the great lesson of the World War.' 54 This was written to Beck by Ludendorff in 1935; it was Beck's view also. Beck's thoughts led him to the conclusion — precisely as before — that, comparing Germany's total resources with those of her certain enemies, she had no prospect of winning a war. The requisite foundations must first be laid by a judicious economic and alliance policy so that both strategy and war economy rested on secure foun- dations. This had to take place in peacetime. On the other hand, with her new Wehrmacht, Germany was now so strong that no attack need be feared; an aggressor would be taking too great a risk. 55 As a soldier Beck did not believe that war could be avoided for ever. There would always be enemies, he said; a people and its leaders must insist on a policy which served its vital (and accepted) interests and, if all other methods failed, war remained as the final arbiter. Moltke, for instance, held war to be part of the divine world order but, even in victory, he thought it a national mis- fortune. 56 'We cannot abolish war,' Beck wrote. 'Whenever one reflects on the imperfection of mankind as decreed by God, one invariably reaches this con- clusion.' 57 But he went on: 'Although it must be assumed that the goal of eter- nal peace can never be fully reached', a new moral idealism 'should make possible never-ending progress, bringing us nearer and nearer to it.' 58 Basic- ally Beck was an opponent of war in any form. 80 7 Haider*s Plans Beck's successor was the former Deputy Chief of Staff I in the Army General Staff, General Franz Haider. Those who knew him describe him almost un- animously as religious, conservative, an outstanding staff officer in the best tradition with an 'inexhaustible capacity for work', correct, sober but sen- sitive too, with a pronounced sense of responsibility and rooted in the tradi- tion of military discipline. 1 Though no one is prepared to eulogize Haider in the same terms as Beck, no one has voiced serious doubts about his antipathy to Hitler. Nevertheless his attitude as regards resistance is the subject of con- troversy and will remain so. Haider succeeded Beck with the latter's agreement and he left Brauchitsch in no doubt that he was firmly determined to continue to oppose Hitler's war policy. 2 Nevertheless events cast a shadow over Haider. Why did he remain after the abortive attempt at a coup in autumn 1938 and after Hitler's breach of treaty by the invasion of the 'remainder of Czecho- slovakia'? Why did he still remain when he must have known that Hitler would attack Poland ? Why did he help prepare Hitler's war? There is no clear answer to these questions. 3 After the Sudeten crisis Haider must have known that Britain, though not yet prepared militarily, was ready to fight if agree- ment could not be reached; he must also have known that Hitler's bloodless victories were at an end, seeing that he was not prepared to change his methods. Haider was well informed at all times about conditions at home, about the tyranny of the Gestapo, later about the murders in Poland and fin- ally about Hitler's crazy strategic ideas; his own diary proves as much. 4 No one seriously pretends that Hitler was not in the habit of implementing his threats; at the latest by the time of the move into Prague it was clear that the opposite was the case. To a soldier the honest conviction must be conceded that resignation in wartime is a form of desertion and dereliction of duty. Haider, however, can hardly be credited with the intention, which kept Weiz- sacker in office, of remaining in order to prevent and restrain as much as he could. Haider could neither foresee nor stop the 'liquidations' in Poland and Russia nor the strategic and tactical blunders coupled with the name Stalingrad. Beck's fate shows what prospects of success a protest had and, once the guns were firing, there was little more that could be stopped. 5 This is not to say that in 1938 Haider's opposition was not serious. He allowed himself to become so deeply involved in preparations for a coup that 81 The Sudeten Crisis there can be no doubt of his sincerity and courage. The reasons for his failure are only partially to be found in his character. Even before becoming Chief of Staff Haider was in dose touch with Weiz- sacker, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry; Beck had introduced them and paved the way; from end August 1938 Haider kept in closer touch than ever, despite the fact that direct correspondence between the two offices was explicitly forbidden. 6 The exchange of information, communications and agreements between Haider and Weizsacker was largely channelled through the OKW officeAusland/Abwehr (Military Intelligence) under Admiral Canaris. This excited no comment since it was as natural that the Foreign Ministry and Canaris' office should correspond as it was that Canaris and the Army Chief of Staff should do likewise. During Canaris' frequent absences his place was taken by Oster, whom Haider knew already from the time when he had been Chief of Staff of Wehrkreis VI in Munster and Oster had been one of his staff officers. 7 The central and most active role between all the various groups was played by Oster; he was the driving force and at the same time the intermediary. 8 Gisevius was also actively involved in preparations for a coup\ Dr Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank, took part in vital discussions and was available for political tasks. 9 The first discussions on details of a coup seem to have taken place at the very end of August; it is not possible to establish a precise date. Beck's and Haider's efforts overlapped; those of Oster and his immediate associates, together with Gisevius' probings, ran in parallel. 10 When Haider assumed office on 27 August (a Saturday), he already knew of Beck's intentions. As before, Oster continued to make every effort to prevent war. At the end of August Schacht and Gisevius met in their quest for men with military power of command who were also prepared to 'act'. At the same time, on Beck's ad- vice, Haider turned to Oster, asking him what technical and political preparations for a coup had been made. 11 At that time Oster could only refer in general terms to the readiness of certain personalities such as Schacht and Goerdeler to collaborate and participate on the political level. 12 Haider had no wish to be in contact with Goerdeler; he did not know him and Goerdeler had too great a reputation as an 'and'. Schacht, on the other hand, seemed more balanced; he was still in office and highly respected; con- tact with him seemed less perilous and prejudicial. Haider had already met Schacht at a Reichsbank reception in the winter of 1937-38, to which he had been taken apparently by Colonel Eduard Wagner, head of Section 6 (Quarter- master section) of the Army General Staff. 13 Shortly after his first talk with Oster, Haider visited Schacht in his house. 14 Haider was insistent that a coup must not lead to chaos or civil war, but must result in the quickest possible reestablishment of stable political con- ditions. Accordingly at this very first encounter he asked Schacht — and it was nothing less than high treason - whether he would be prepared to play a leading part in a new government to be formed after the regime had been overthrown by the Army. A coup, he said, was unavoidable if Hitler pushed 82 Haider's Plans matters as far as war. 15 Schacht gave general consent but no political programme was discussed in detail. 16 To settle questions concerning use of the police in the event of ^putsch, first Oster and then Schacht referred the Chief of Staff to Dr Gisevius. He was a Regierungsrat (counsellor) in the Ministry of the Interior; between 1933 and 1936 he had been in turn - with the Gestapo, in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in Reich Criminal Police headquarters and finally, until May 1937 on the staff of the Regierungsprasi- dent in Miinster dealing with price control; since then he had been on unpaid leave but had remained in somewhat nebulous touch with the Abwehr. 17 It was arranged that Gisevius should visit Haider in the latter's apartment in Berlin-Zehlendorf, and this meeting took place shortly after Haider's talk with Schacht. 18 At the meeting Haider was totally frank about his antagonism to Hitler; he was a blood-sucker and a criminal, he said, and should be done away with. It was hard, however, extremely hard, he continued, to explain to other generals in plausible terms this and Hitler's patent intention to initiate war. 19 The widespread view among the generals was that Hitler was merely preparing a colossal bluff, but not war. Hitler knew perfectly well, they thought, how dangerous war would be for the success of German policy and perhaps even for the existence of the Reich; they believed that some form of arrangement existed between the Western Powers and Hitler leaving him a free hand in the east. 20 One could not be sure of the mass of the people either. So long as it was not made tangibly clear to them that continuation of the present policy was bound to lead to bloodshed, so long they and the mass of the Army would sup- port Hitler; should a coup be attempted, therefore, one must reckon with civil war. The best remedy for this situation was perhaps to wait until the actual outbreak of hostilities or at least until declaration of war by the Western Powers. 21 Haider was sceptical on this point too. No one could say with complete cer- tainty at what point the Western Powers would proceed to war, though the probability was verging on certainty that this would happen as soon as some country was occupied by warlike as opposed to 'peaceful' methods — as in Austria's case. It could, however, be said with certainty that they would very quickly counter any further expansion of German power or conquest by Hitler. Haider, however, wanted to know this for sure and the most certain knowledge would come with the outbreak of war. As Schacht put it, Haider was searching among those around him for the assurance which he could not find within himself. He realized what had to be done and he did not lack deter- mination, but his weakness and lack of self-assurance prevented him taking the step from decision to action. 22 Haider himself must have realized the enor- mous peril of such procrastination. As did Gisevius he visualized that on the outbreak of war there would be immediate air raids on industrial areas and he also thought, like Beck, that the Western Powers would achieve a strategic break-through. 23 Anyone who remembered the First World War and who, like Beck and Haider, thought the British and French armies to be superior to the 83 The Sudeten Crisis German, could not foresee the 'phoney war' of 1939. Understandably Gisevius did not exactly gain the impression that Haider was a go-getter. One could hardly rely, Gisevius reported, on this pedantic, over-cautious, though very clever, man. On his side Haider had not been par- ticularly attracted by Gisevius. 24 One reason for this was the proposals which Gisevius put to the Chief of Staff and which he considered foolhardy, not without some justification. Gisevius had said that the regime must be at- tacked as criminal, in other words that indictment should be based on the Gestapo, the SS in general and the concentration camps. The criminal nature of these institutions was in fact obvious and action against them required no special justification. In this way Hitler could, to some extent, be kept out of the affair. Anyone so minded, Gisevius said, might think that Hitler was being protected against the worst of his thugs and the great advantage was that this would circumvent the problem of the oath sworn by the soldiers to their Supreme Commander. This would create a situation in which the Wehrmacht would have to reestablish order. 25 Such a procedure Haider regarded as dubious. What would happen if the Wehrmacht were subsequently accused of having broken the law when its whole ethic was exactly the opposite? Gisevius knew a way out of this too: within a few hours of the occupation of Gestapo headquarters, he said, he would have secured evidence and proof of the crimes of Heydrich, Himmler and Goring; this would demonstrate the legality of the purge. 26 These documents could not, of course, be obtained beforehand. Haider was not sure about this either; he preferred that there should first be some foreign policy or even military set-back. The fact remained that Haider was not willing to use the Army against the regime - at least that was the impression which he gave Gisevius during this visit. According to Gisevius' report he was thinking of a bomb attack on Hitler's train which could be represented as an enemy bombing raid. 27 Haider had certain scruples about an assassination attempt which might be ascribed to the Army. 28 The same night, after this unsatisfactory evening talk, Gisevius met Oster and gave him his somewhat unflattering impressions of Haider. Oster was taken aback. The next day, however, there was cause for fresh hope: Haider instructed Oster to cooperate with Gisevius in preparing all police measures for the coup d'etat. 29 Gisevius, Oster and Schacht were now confronted by four main tasks. In the first place a plan for the coup d'etat must be worked out at once and in full detail; secondly an immediate attempt must be made to win over other senior officers, particularly formation commanders; thirdly every effort must be made to persuade Haider that the code-word which he intended to issue only in the event of war, should in fact be broadcast much earlier; finally, in order to provide Haider with some basis for his decision other than an invasion order by Hitler, he must be kept continuously informed of all foreign policy developments. This last was done primarily by Oster with occasional help from Schacht and Weizsacker. Haider's instruction to work with Gisevius on 84 Haider's Plans police matters gave Oster the office to proceed on the first point. A number of days passed before progress could be made on the other two points. On 5 September the Party Rally opened in Nuremberg; its motto was 'Greater Germany'. For a week everyone waited tensely for Hitler's closing speech scheduled for 12 September, when he proposed to 'square the account' with Czechoslovakia. 30 In fact Hitler did threaten to intervene in Czecho- slovakia to enforce his demands and those of the Sudeten Germans 'by hook or by crook'. 31 But he did not commit himself. Some time passed before preparations for the coup really got under way. Schacht and Gisevius were uneasy and impatient. They wanted to establish whether Haider would keep his word and whether he was making the necessary preparations; primarily, however, now that war seemed increas- ingly probable, they wished to press him to issue the signal for the putsch before the outbreak of hostilities. Schacht accordingly expressed a wish to visit Haider and this was arranged by Oster. Gisevius accompanied him, unin- vited and unannounced, which did not please Haider very much. 32 In fact, when Schacht and Gisevius appeared in Haider's house, they found him no longer as resolute as before. 33 Oster also could only tell his co- conspirators that Haider was 'nearly decided'. 34 Haider was apparently hoping that, despite everyone's fears, the Western Powers would allow Hitler a free hand to annex the Sudetenland provided that this could be done peace- fully, in other words without bloodshed. 35 On the other hand Haider did now seem ready to stop a war and to do so before the outbreak of hostilities. He was prepared to give the signal for a rising as soon as Hitler issued the order to march. 36 Haider was also able to reassure Schacht and Gisevius on another impor- tant point: Hitler could not make a surprise move leaving the opposition no time to act. The military plans, Haider said, were so designed that the Chief of Staff 'would know whether he [Hitler] was planning something' at least seventy-two hours before an attack. 37 An irrevocable order must be issued twenty-four hours before H hour, after which an attack could no longer be halted. 38 On 8 September Lieutenant-General Karl-Heinrich von Stiilpnagel, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff I who knew of the plans for a coup and had taken part in working them out, asked OKW in writing for an assurance that OKH would be told five days beforehand if'an action' was to take place. 39 Colonel Jodl, head of the OKW Operations Staff, gave this assurance with the proviso that any major change in the weather might lead to alteration in the intention and issuance of the order to march up to two days before the time of move- ment, in other words up to D-2. During the night 9/10 September Haider had an interview with Hitler in Nuremberg about preparations for mobilization. The discussion was evidently stormy and a few days later General Keitel told Jodl of his disappointment with the attitude of certain generals. There had been reports from the Abwehr and a memorandum from the Economic Defence staff on the great strength of the British arms industry, lack of con- fidence in the Luftwaffe, doubts voiced by Brauchitsch and Haider owing to 85 The Sudeten Crisis the danger of the overall strategic situation, particularly if the Western Powers intervened. Though Jodl himself shared these doubts at the time, all this must have enraged Hitler. 40 Hitler was especially unwilling to have his hands tied by military arguments about the time interval between D Day for the assault and issue of the final order. Though previously he had apparently accepted Haider's reasoning, on 28 September he laid down that decision on the final order must be taken 'by midday on the previous day'. Schacht was opposed to this insistence on waiting until the last moment for the coup d'etat, but Haider was adamant. Schacht and Gisevius increasingly gained the impression that no reliance could be placed on Haider, 41 This disillusioning realization decided Gisevius and Schacht, together with Oster to whom they reported, that greater efforts must be made to win over other military personalities. The obvious course was to turn first to the com- mander primarily responsible for carrying out the orders which it was hoped that Haider would issue; this was General von Witzleben, commanding Military District III. 42 He had been Oster's commanding officer for a time and was now commanding III Army Corps (Military District III) with headquarters at No 144 Hohenzollerndamm, Berlin. 43 He was not interested in politics and frequently said that he understood nothing about them. It was enough for him to know that the time had come to do away with Hitler's il- legal regime and that he could make a major contribution to this. Witzleben has been described as typical of the honest, unbureaucratic, uncomplicated, energetic commander, rooted in the best military traditions — a straight- forward person who invariably kept his word. 44 In the first half of September Oster approached Witzleben, asking him whether he would be prepared to participate in a coup if necessary and Witzleben agreed at once, not without certain conditions, however. In the first place Witzleben wished to know whether there would really be war if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia; he was sufficiently politically-minded to realize that he could hardly oppose Hitler if the latter was in process of winning another major bloodless victory on the lines of the invasion of Austria. 45 Some risk was unavoidable, he said, but foolhardiness was not and the troops should not be expected to do the impossible. Oster and Gisevius said that Schacht was the politician best qualified to give information on the foreign political situation. The result was a visit by Witzleben to Schacht in his country house at Guhlen. 46 Witzleben was accompanied by Major-General Walter Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, Commander of 23 (Potsdam) Division, and Gisevius was also present. As far as can be established this meeting took place between Haider's visit to Schacht and the latter's return visit, in other words between 4 and 14 September. 47 Schacht and the generals quickly reached agreement; Schacht spoke most convincingly on the external political situation and the imminent intervention of the Western Powers; Witzleben and Brockdorff agreed that all methods must be used to prevent war. Witzleben gave his word that he would act with, or if necessary without, Haider's agreement. 48 Preparation of detailed measures now forged ahead. Schacht was to think 86 Haider's Plans out a list of members of the political directorate to be formed; Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt was to work out and prepare the military measures; Gisevius was to draft detailed plans for the use of the Berlin police and the neutralization of police and SS units elsewhere in the country. 49 Ideas on what was to be done after a successful putsch were naturally vague and varied. No one could know precisely what political forces would emerge after a putsch, how quickly trade unions and political parties would re-form, who would be prepared to cooperate and on what conditions, which of the previous functionaries might have to be accepted. Haider and many other generals after him have complained bitterly about this uncertainty. Haider later maintained that he was always being urged to act but had never been given 'a clear plan or satisfactory idea' of what was to happen after a coup either by Goerdeler or by Beck, Canaris, Oster or Schacht. 50 After the war Haider tried to ascribe the failure of the resistance movement to this alleged shortcoming: 'The putsch, the assassination of Hitler, is only the negative side. Anyone interested in the fate of his people must look at the positive side. What was to happen afterwards? I was never given a glimpse of this positive side. The soldiers were asked to "clean the place up" like housemaids, but no one, neither Beck nor Goerdeler, told me what was then to be served up. Herein lies the overriding weakness of this entire resistance movement.' 51 This was true only in so far as no one could know whether or not there would be civil war; Haider, of course, knew perfectly well what the aims of the coup were. On certain things people were agreed in September 1938: in the first place a military dictatorship or military state of emergency of the shortest possible duration would be declared. 52 Thereafter a provisional civil government would be formed, fresh elections being called based on the old Weimar con- stitution. 53 Schacht even mentions a form of preliminary parliament elected from 'shop foremen'. There was no agreement on the question whether certain of the Nazi func- tionaries could be used, at least initially. Many senior officers, however, and many ordinary people thought that they could see in Goring a conservative moderate who could somehow be utilized as mediator or to facilitate the transition. 54 Though many people were fascinated by Goring's highly colourful personality, Gisevius thought any participation by him to be particularly dangerous; he also thought that in the early stages tactics vis-d-vis Hitler should be flexible. In his view the correct course was to create a confused political situation with, for instance, the slogan 'An SSputsch; the Wehrmacht is reestablishing order'; this would avoid any conflict of conscience about the removal of Hitler while at the same time clear military orders could be issued. 55 Moreover, he thought, it would not be difficult to fill senior posts in the administration with fresh uncompromised people. This was in any case a matter which could be left to the future government. 56 Availability of the necessary military forces and preparation for their use constituted a considerably more difficult problem. In the first place it became clear that, contrary to current ideas, by no means every general was in a posi- 87 The Sudeten Crisis tion to issue marching orders to teeth-arm units. Even the Chief of the General Staff could not do so without the authority and backing of his Commander-in-Chief — he was not a 'commander' but merely adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. 57 Should a genuine 'commander' be found, it must be made easy for him to take the planned action: he must receive no counter-orders from the other side; he must not be confronted with resistance from units similar to his own, in other words Army units as opposed to the SS and SA; there must be no clash with the police. In any other event the action might all too soon wear an air of illegality, something regarded with much ap- prehension by many officers and capable of affecting the loyalty of the troops before the aim had been achieved. It was bad enough that in all probability an occasional clash with uniformed 'dignitaries' could not be avoided. Effective military and moral authority was essential to see the matter through and by no means every general could lay claim to this. 58 Under these circumstances all action obviously had to be very rapid to deprive the other side of any possi- bility of issuing counter-orders. There was no hope that the majority of the Army could be persuaded to act against the regime; not even a single division could be prepared for movement unnoticed. Unless the War Ministry was on their side the leaders of the military putsch could not even hope to proceed un- disturbed during the first few hours, 59 According to Gisevius' report, however, Witzleben was determined to act at the correct moment even without a signal from Haider, should the latter refuse to give one; he was prepared, if necessary, to occupy the War Ministry and have the top-level Army leaders arrested. 60 At the latest by early September, therefore, Witzleben was ready to act by force. He could rely totally on Major-General Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, commanding the Potsdam division. 61 Early in September Witzleben went to Haider to tell him that he was planning a coup which, so he assured the Chief of Staff, would only be initiated by the C-in-C or Chief of Staff of the Army. 62 The role to be played by Brauchitsch in issuing the 'starting orders' and during the subsequent upheaval remained obscure until the very end. No one could tell how he would decide at the vital moment. 63 Apart from a few hints Haider had not even informed his Commander-in-Chief. Later he said that he had wished 'to leave the Commander-in-Chief personally' out of the 'business in hand' 64 — 'One can risk one's own neck but not that of someone else'. 65 Haider only wished to 'bring in' Brauchitsch at the very last moment - but how and for what purpose remained obscure. 66 In cooperation with Schacht, Witzleben, Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt and Gisevius now began detailed planning; Nebe, the director of the Reich Criminal Police Office and Lieutenant-Colonel Oster provided them with the necessary material. 67 Gisevius was allotted a conference room adjoining Witzleben's office in Wehrkreis headquarters as a place of work; the General told his aide that Gisevius was a relative who was arranging family papers. 68 Gisevius first worked out where SS units were located all over Germany, Nebe and Oster providing the information. It emerged that, not only were they concealed and camouflaged in a most sophisticated manner, but that the 88 Haider's Plans regular police (Schutzpoltzei) and the criminal police were not in general housed with the Gestapo. 69 It was of importance to lay hands on all police offices as rapidly and as completely as possible. It was also vital to occupy at once radio transmitters and telephone and telegraph installations together with the Post Office repeater stations through which the police telephone and teleprinter circuits were routed. 70 Thereafter, if possible simultaneously, the Reich Chancellery, the most important ministries and what Haider called 'the more important Berlin agencies run by Party people' could be occupied. 71 At the same time the provinces had to be brought under control. Every Wehrkreis commander was to be told what offices to occupy and whom to arrest; martial law regulations had to be issued to implement the state of emergency. 72 In the process Gisevius made an astounding discovery: since 1934 there had been no valid regulations for the introduction and implementa- tion of a state of siege. 73 Every individual order had to be drafted afresh. Once Haider had been won over to the idea of a coup, it was possible to pre- plan for the use of troops other than BrockdorfFs division. No 1 Light Divi- sion under Lieutenant-General Erich Hoepner was to be placed under Witzleben on orders from Haider. 74 The division had been on the move since 5 September, ostensibly on autumn manoeuvres lasting until 23 September but in fact with the object of positioning it in the area Greiz-Plauen-Chemnitz for an attack on Czechoslovakia. 75 From this position it would, if necessary, be able to bar the Berlin road to the elements of the 'SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler' stationed in Grafenwohr training grounds. 76 In the course of the various moves Haider proposed to bring certain other units nearer to Berlin so that they could intervene there. 77 Haider felt sure of support from the group and corps commanders of the formations concentrating in the south-east and west. Colonel-General Fedor von Bock was commanding Eighth Army in the Bayerischer Wald, Colonel- General Gerd von Rundstedt was in Silesia with Second Army and in the west General Adam was C-in-C of Army Group 2 with headquarters in Frankfurt; it included First Army commanded by General Beck who took part in dis- cussions on 2 September, only a few days after his resignation. 78 Haider was convinced that he could count upon support from all these as soon as the coup d'etat began; as a precaution, however, he had not let them into the secret beforehand. 79 In addition to Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt, Witzleben had special reasons for con- fidence in Major-General von Hase, commanding 50 Infantry Regiment in Landsberg on Warthe. Witzleben summoned him during September and, since Hase had already been prepared to take armed action against the regime during the Fritsch crisis, he needed little persuasion to participate in siputsch; henceforth he held himself in readiness. 80 The majority of the measures planned for Berlin were the responsibility of Major-General von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt. Early in September he drove with Gisevius to the Wilhelmstrasse, Goring's palace, the 'Leibstandarte's' barracks in Berlin-Lichterfelde, Sachsenhausen concentration camp and the main radio transmitter in Konigswusterhausen to obtain a precise idea of the 89 The Sudeten Crisis troops required to occupy these various objectives. 81 To avoid attracting attention they were driven in her private car by Frau Strunck, whose husband worked in the Abwehr during the war. Witzleben told Hossbach before 15 September that military preparation for the coup was complete. 82 The attitude of the Berlin police was a particularly thorny problem. Gisevius had many police contacts but of course no authority. Even Nebe, Director of the Reich Criminal Police Office, had influence only over his own force, not over the regular police or the Gestapo. Since summer 1937, however, Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg had been Vice-President of Police in Berlin. 83 Schulenburg had joined the National-Socialist Party in 1933 while still a Landrat in East Prussia; he had hoped that the word 'Socialist' implied a fresh revolutionary start and rallying of forces and he had believed in the ideals of National-Socialism. Subsequently, however, he had turned against all that he regarded as signs of degeneracy in the movement 84 and in February 1938, under the impact of the Fritsch crisis, he had finally broken with Nazism and joined the fight against the regime. 85 He was now in contact with opposi- tion members such as his old friend Casar von Hofacker, Graf von Uxku'll, Yorck von Wartenburg, Berthold Graf Stauffenberg and Ulrich Wilhelm Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld; he was also in touch with Albrecht von Kessel, the counsellor who was personal assistant to Weizsacker, with the group centred on Haider and Witzleben and with Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz and H ans O ster in the OKWoffice Ausland/Abwehr.™ The goodwill of Schulenburg, however, was not enough if the Police Presi- dent himself, Wolf Heinrich Graf von Helldorf, did not participate, but a few days before the proposed initiation of the putsch he too was won over to the conspiracy. Helldorf and Schulenburg proposed to ensure that, at the very least, the police in Berlin remained neutral. 87 The next point to be considered was what to do with Hitler himself. Gisevius proposed that, at least in the early stages of the coup, tactics vis-a-vis Hitler personally be kept flexible; Goring, he considered, must go under all cir- cumstances. If necessary, Gisevius said, Hitler might be declared misguided which would be the course most acceptable to public opinion. 88 As soon as Hitler could be secured, however, he should be killed. In the circumstances tyrannicide was a moral necessity. Haider was opposed to assassination pure and simple but not opposed to the elimination of Hitler. He preferred to have him murdered by some unob- trusive method rather than arrest him, since this would conceal the part which he and the Army might play in overthrowing Hitler and would prevent the birth of a dangerous Hitler myth, which he feared so much. 89 He thought it best to blow up Hitler's train and then give out that he had been killed in an air raid, but this of course meant waiting until the outbreak of hostilities. 90 There is no evidence that any concrete planning was done on this subject. Many of the conspirators, Beck in particular, were convinced that Hitler must be taken alive and brought to trial so that his crimes could be made clear to the entire people. This, they hoped, would prevent the birth of a new 'stab- 90 Haider's Plans in-the-back' legend. Dr Hans von Dohnanyi, a Judge Advocate involved in the conspiracy, and Oster wished to arrest Hitler and then have him declared in- sane by a panel of doctors. The chairman of the panel had already been found in the person of Dohnanyi's father-in-law, Professor Karl Bonhoeffer, the psy- chiatrist; Dohnanyi was also preparing a trial of Hitler, for which he had been collecting evidence in a special secret file ever since 1933. 91 There was, however, a group of younger conspirators who were by no means willing to 'by-pass' Hitler in the first instance, to declare him insane or to adopt flexible tactics in so far as he was concerned. The driving force behind this group and the source of its ideas was Major Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, an ex-Stahlhelm commander. 92 In deliberate opposition to Beck, Canaris and even Witzleben he and certain officers of the Abwehr developed an assassination plan - as far as is known the first to issue from those circles which later gave birth to the conspiracy of 20 July 1944. For some time, but particularly since early August, a group of anti-Nazis in- cluding Heinz, Oster, Schulenburg and temporarily also Goerdeler, had been occupied with planning a constitution and thinking about the formation of a new government after the fall of Hitler. They had been opponents of Hitler from the outset, long before the danger of war appeared imminent; they were working for the fall of Hitler from fundamental political conviction. The threat of war acted as a spur but it was not their primary motive. They were prepared for far-reaching changes and they had their own particular ideas on the reconstitution of Germany. They thought that a new government must acquire some outward expression of greater strength than would be provided merely by the reinstatement of a President and Chancellor in a reestablished parliamentary democracy on Weimar lines. Like other groups, they were bent on learning and drawing the consequences from the errors and weaknesses of the pre-1933 period. Instead of emblems, mass organizations, mass parades, seas of flags and other demonstrations of authority, they wanted to found a modern democracy organically linked to the forces of tradition, in other words 'a clear-cut democracy under a monarchical Head of State standing above party' on the British model. 93 According to Heinz, Goerdeler knew of this idea and agreed with it - he had told John Wheeler-Bennett in 1937 that he favoured a monarchist restoration. 94 As candidate for the throne, however, he proposed Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, second son of the former Crown Prince; Heinz and his friends preferred the elder son Prince Wilhelm of Prussia. They thought Prince Louis Ferdinand too similar in character to his grandfather, the former Kaiser Wilhelm II, whereas Prince Wilhelm had precisely the personality which Germany required to lead her - just, dis- tinguished, amiable, humane, disinclined to adventure and prepared to allow free rein to democracy. Under no circumstances was this group (SchmidNoerr - Liedig - Heinz) prepared to see an empire reestablished on 1871-1918 lines. 95 Goerdeler was eventually persuaded by the arguments adduced in favour of Prince Wilhelm — greater attraction as a symbol and deep roots in the Army - and did not insist on his own candidate, who nevertheless repeatedly figured in later discussions. With the outbreak of war Prince 91 The Sudeten Crisis Wilhelm ceased to believe in the possibility of a restoration and in 1940 he was killed on active service. 96 In mid-September or a few days later (about the 20th), there took place a discussion in Osier's house at which Heinz, Lieutenant-Commander Liedig, General von Witzleben and also Goerdeler were present. 97 Witzleben declared his intention to go to the Reich Chancellery surrounded by officers of his headquarters and with a further escort of reliable officers seek out Hitler and demand that he resign. At the same time units of III Army Corps, which would have been previously alerted, would occupy Berlin and crush the an- ticipated resistance from the SS. Since Witzleben would not readily be able to gain access to Hitler, the purpose of his escort was clear. There would be scuffles, he said, possibly shooting; all sorts of unforeseen things might occur. Witzleben and Goerdeler supported by Canaris insisted that Hitler should be arrested; Heinz, however, thought this naive and quietly continued to prepare more drastic measures. Witzleben and Oster commissioned Heinz to form a raiding party as escort for General von Witzleben. Heinz had been a member of the Ehrhardt (Free Corps) Brigade and also a Stahlhelm commander; he still had good contacts with the so-called Young Stahlhelm, the former Stahlhelm's youth organiza- tion, and to its 'Langemarck Student Circle'. 98 His task was not, therefore, difficult, particularly since the Abwehr could assemble members of the Wehr- macht unobtrusively on pretext of'special training courses'. Twenty to thirty young officers were collected, but in addition there were some workers and anti-Hitler students. The trade union leaders Wilhelm Leuschner and Her- mann Maass were, at the very least, involved in the discussions; Heinz had in- troduced them to Oster after the Fritsch crisis. 99 From this point onwards contact was also established with circles only indirectly involved in the plan- ning and discussion of autumn 1938; they included Gustav Noske, the ex- Reichswehr Minister, Julius Leber, Klaus Bonhoeffer, Otto John, Richard Kiinzer of the Foreign Ministry and Ernst von Harnack. 100 Among the leaders of the raiding party was Lieutenant Hans-Albrecht Herzner; later, at the start of the Polish campaign, he led an Abwehr 'commando', the task of which was to seize the Jablunka Pass and hold it open for the advancing Ger- man troops. Another was Wolfgang Knaak, also from the Abwehr; he was killed in 1941 during a raid on a bridge over the Duna. Finally there was Lieutenant-Commander Liedig already mentioned. 101 Preparations for the formation of the raiding party were begun in the first half of September; it was assembled after 15 September and held ready in certain Berlin apartments, one of which was No 118 Eisenachstrasse. 102 The formation of this raiding party and the preceding constitutional discus- sion showed that certain tendencies existed which were by no means in accord with the ideas of Beck, Schacht and Goerdeler; Heinz's and Liedig's ideas on the actual operation also differed from Witzleben's. As Heinz aptly remarks, therefore, there was a conspiracy within the conspiracy. 103 The raiding party was in fact intended not merely to 'escort' Witzleben for his vital approach to Hitler and force an entry into the Reich Chancellery if necessary, after which 92 Haider's Plans Witzleben would confront Hitler with his demand for resignation. Instead its members were determined to provoke an incident and shoot Hitler in the process. Even Oster had been won over to this plan. Admiral Canaris com- missioned an Abwehr officer, Major Groscurth, to obtain and hold ready weapons and explosives. 104 The word went round that Hitler was to be shot, come what might, even if, contrary to expectations, the SS offered no resistance. 105 This was the only method of producing a clear-cut situation at the outset and thereafter no one need worry about any oath sworn to the Head of State. On this point Heinz's and Liedig's group undoubtedly thought more realistically than the older, more highly-placed, conspirators who were in- clined to conservatism. Preparations were more thorough and prospects of success greater than at any subsequent period. The members of the raiding party had been provided with weapons by theAbzvehr and were on call in their quarters; proclamations were ready; provision had been made for the occupation of radio stations. 106 Witzleben, Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt and Gisevius had worked out military and police precautions to ensure that the capital was brought under control. Haider reserved to himself the issue of the 'starting order' 107 - he, after all, would inevitably be the first to know of Hitler's order to march against Czechoslovakia and this order would be followed by declarations of war from France and Britain. Everyone now waited for these conditions to become ac- tual — for the moment in fact when war would be inevitable unless Hitler fell. Chamberlain's surprise visit to Hitler in Berchtesgaden on 15 September, in effect an open admission that Britain was backing down, produced confusion and in some cases consternation among the conspirators. 108 In their view the British statesman had been doing homage to a gangster and so, subjectively, they felt that he had let them down. In this they were right in so far as they ascribed his action to overestimation of the German war potential and failure to recognize the nature of Hitler's policy; they were wrong, however, in so far as they thought that the British government was in any way obligated to act on proposals and assurances from the German opposition. 109 It now looked as if the conditions for a coup were not going to obtain. (10 Then, however, it proved that tension did not relax but in fact increased considerably, for, instead of showing moderation now that satisfaction of his allegedly last territorial requirements was imminent, Hitler became ever more demanding." 1 He still wished to seize the whole of Czechoslovakia and he wanted to do so now. 112 When Chamberlain, after consulting his cabinet and the French, returned to Bad Godesberg from 22 to 24 September to settle the details, Hitler raised his demands: he would not agree that there should first be a plebiscite in the Sudetenland and areas of mixed population; he would not agree that there should first be negotiations on the line of the future frontier; he insisted, as the first and immediate step, on the move of the Wehrmacht into the areas demanded. If this was not conceded, he said, war against Czechoslovakia would begin on 1 October. 113 At last people in France and Britain began to grasp the fact that Hitler clearly wanted much more than the fulfilment of his 'last territorial demand'. 93 The Sudeten Crisis The attitudes of the British and French governments stiffened; mobilization measures were ordered; France recalled reservists; on 25 September Britain placed her fleet on a war footing; Czechoslovakia also mobilized. 114 Hitler became increasingly aggressive, the Western Powers increasingly unyielding. Finally came the development for which the German opposition had striven so long: on 26 September the British government issued a press statement to the effect that if, despite satisfaction of his original demands on Czechoslovakia, Hitler should start a war, France would fulfil the obligations of her alliance and Britain and Russia would assuredly side with her. 115 Here at last was the 'firm attitude'. Hitler, however, pursued his warlike measures. Much points to the fact that, at this moment, he was not seriously trying to avoid war with France and Britain. Much gives one to suspect, however, that he gradually weakened in his resolve and finally gave way. In the first place he realized that the people were totally unprepared for war — a propaganda march by motorized troops through the government quarter of Berlin on the evening of 27 September was received in glacial silence; 116 secondly, about midday on 27 September Sir Horace Wilson told him that, unless he abandoned his warlike intentions, France and Britain would open active hostilities; 117 thirdly, on the morning of 28 September he received news that the British fleet had mobilized; 118 finally Mussolini intervened and advised conciliation. 119 Many regard Mussolini's in- tervention as the decisive factor in dissuading Hitler from war — temporarily; many ascribe the change to the effect of the Franco-British threats. The vital point, however, is whether the prospect was war against Czechoslovakia alone, for which Hitler was fully prepared, or a simultaneous war against the Western Powers. 120 In the light of Hitler's statement on 22 August 1939 that he hoped that some swine would not appear again with a proposal for mediation, there is much to be said for the theory that Hitler's about-turn was caused by Mussolini's refusal to go to war. 121 The remark, however, throws no light on Hitler's mental and emotional processes: why should a mediation proposal cause him to waver and raise doubts in his mind which had not been provoked by tangible, and on this occasion obviously genuine, threats? Rational explanation may not, of course, be applicable to Hitler's mental processes. It is possible that after his weeks of bluster he began to waver, that at that moment a series of obstacles appeared and that he seized upon the one most likely to give him a way out, save his face and allow him to register a triumph at the same time. The opposition was working on the assumption that Hitler would not recoil even from the threat of world war and until midday on 28 September they knew nothing of any tendency to yield on Hitler's part; all they knew was that military preparations were continuing. 122 They were convinced that the final order to march would be issued on 28 September. 123 At 13.20on 27 September Jodl noted in his diary: 'Fuhrer approves the forward move of the first attacking wave so that it can be in its assembly areas on 30.9'; 124 and at 13.30: 'Passed to General Haider by telephone.' That evening Hitler approved mobilization of 94 Haider's Plans the 'five active divisions in the West (26, 34, 36, 33, 35) and the fourteen Landwehr divisions'. 125 Announcement of general mobilization was an- ticipated for 2 p.m. on 28 September. 126 The extent to which, in his heart of hearts, Hitler regarded all this as bluff, one can only surmise. It is barely conceivable that he, the First World War veteran, did not have some anxieties concerning the shortcomings in German preparations as compared to the potentialities of the Western Powers. On many subsequent occasions, however, Hitler was to show indifference about the prospects of success of his policy. Be that as it may, Haider and the opposi- tion assumed that Hitler would not recoil from war with the Western Powers. When visiting Colonel-General von Hammerstein on his sixtieth birthday on 26 September Haider said: 'There will now be action unless Hitler abandons his plans.' Even at this stage Hammerstein had doubts of Haider's determination. 127 Late on the evening of 27 September Oster succeeded in obtaining a copy of Hitler's reply, given that afternoon, to Chamberlain's last mediation proposal; 128 it had been drafted by Weizsacker, who had tempered its language somewhat, but it was a rejection. On the morning of 28 September Gisevius took the copy to Witzleben in Wehrkreis headquarters on the Hohenzollerndamm; Witzleben went forthwith to Haider in Army Headquarters on the Tirpitzufer and showed him the paper as 'proof of Hitler's determination to make war. Haider seemed to be convinced; he hurried off to Brauchitsch with the paper while Witzleben waited in Haider's office. After a few minutes Haider returned and said that Brauchitsch was per- suaded; he too now advocated an 'action'. 129 The partial British mobilization had in fact made Brauchitsch most un- easy. 130 His remark that the moment for an 'action' had now arrived did not, however, mean much. As he admitted after the war, he had never made up his mind to issue the order for a coup himself. 131 Witzleben had telephoned him from Haider's office, had told him that everything was ready and had begged him for God's sake to issue the order now. But Brauchitsch wanted to reassure himself first that Haider and Witzleben were right, that the decision for war had been taken. To find out he went to the Reich Chancellery. 132 In addition Schulenburg was despatched to the Foreign Ministry to obtain a report on the foreign political situation for Brauchitsch. 133 Meanwhile the raiding party was all ready for its assault on the Reich Chancellery. With Schulenburg's assistance Kordt proposed to ensure that the great double doors behind the sentry at the entrance were open, thus paving the way for the raiding party; he had also obtained a plan of the Reich Chancellery for Oster. No extraordinary security precautions had apparently been taken, as might have been expected in the light of the situation. 134 Haider was merely waiting for Brauchitsch's return; Witzleben had hurried back to his headquarters, where Gisevius was still waiting. 135 Any moment now, everyone thought. That afternoon arrived the news that Mussolini had intervened and that a conference had been called for the next day in Munich at which both Daladier 95 The Sudeten Crisis and Chamberlain proposed to be present in person. 136 Both the Western Powers and Hitler made concessions. The Western Powers conceded to Hitler his brutal demand for military invasion; Hitler, however, temporarily renounced his intention to seize any opportunity offered him by Czech resistance or engineered incidents 137 to 'destroy' the whole of Czechoslovakia. The danger of war had been averted for the moment. So the ground was cut from under the feet of the most promising attempt to overthrow Hitler; the measures prepared could not be carried out. On 6 October 1938 Henderson, the British Ambassador, wrote to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary:'... by keeping the peace, we have saved Hitler and his regime .. ,' 138 This, of course, does not imply that the Western Powers had stabbed the German resistance movement in the back, although subjectively this was the way things looked to those involved. 139 96 PART HI/PLANS FOR A COUP 1939-1940 This page intentionally left blank 8 Before the Outbreak of War The Munich Conference and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by the Western Powers administered to the anti-Hitler opposition a blow from which it could not recover. The public at large did not know what had really gone on and, from their position, it was hard for the resistance leaders to judge realistically on this point. Hitler had been proved right: the Western Powers had no wish to fight - any other view of the situation inevitably seemed un- realistic. Could he not similarly be proved right in the future ? Who could deny that, thanks to his perspicacity and sleight of hand in foreign policy and politico-military matters, he had been successful? Today we know when the Western Powers finally lost patience but at the time no one could know. For the moment Hitler proceeded almost unchecked on his career of con- quest. Britain accelerated her rearmament but Hitler could nevertheless carry on with what he cynically termed 'dealing with the rump of Czechoslovakia'. He ordered military preparation for this action as early as 21 October 1938. In the spring of 1939 the Czechoslovak state, sapped by its own weaknesses and the separatist tendencies of the Slovaks, collapsed under Hitler's pressure. Threatened with transfer to Hungary should Slovakia fail to divorce itself from Prague, on 14 March 1939 the Slovak provincial parliament declared the sovereignty of Slovakia and placed the country under the protection of the German Reich. 1 The very same day Emil Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, was summoned to Berlin. He arrived late on 15 March to be told that German troops were already moving on Prague and that the city would be bombed, should the Czech army resist. Like Schuschnigg a year earlier, Hdcha was now faced with the choice between honourable but bloody defeat and the passive surrender of his country, blackmailed by a mighty enemy and abandoned by its friends but at least preserved physically. He chose the latter alternative. On 16 March, from the Hradshin in Prague, Hitler announced the forma- tion of the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia'. After less than six months he had broken the Munich Agreement. Apart from protests the Western Powers took no action. Poland would be the next victim. On 31 March 1939, however, the British government promised unrestricted support to Poland, should she have to defend her national integrity and in- dependence. Similar assurances were given to Greece, Rumania and Turkey. 2 Hitler was given to understand that his next step would meet armed 99 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 resistance from Britain. Had he any reason to believe this, however? After all in the autumn of 1938 Britain, in her weakness, had bought him off his real purpose, the conquest of Czechoslovakia, at the price of a bloodless invasion of the Sudetenland and the partial disarmament of Czechoslovakia through the loss of her western fortifications. In any case, as Hitler well knew, months would pass before Britain could help Poland militarily; it was hardly con- ceivable that a British expeditionary force could be shipped through the Baltic to Poland; without an Anglo-Russian alliance effective aid to Poland was not possible. Subsequently, in autumn 1939, France and Britain did not even launch a diversionary attack in the west, still less produce effective support. The Western Powers realized the key position of the Soviet Union as well as did Hitler and he set about neutralizing Russia. Meanwhile in May 1939 Germany signed a formal alliance with Italy; in March the Rumanian economy was brought largely under German control by means of a trade treaty; Denmark, Esthonia and Latvia were neutralized by non-aggression pacts. On the other side the Western Powers opened negotiations with Moscow in April; the main obstacle to agreement proved to be the Polish refusal to allow Soviet troops to move across Polish territory. In the light of Poland's history and her relations with Russia this attitude was entirely com- prehensible. Poland clearly had to choose between possible neutrality vis-a-vis the two blocs or holding her western frontier against Germany assisted by an Anglo—French offensive in the west. Russian 'assistance' would almost cer- tainly entail loss of independence. On 23 August 1939 the world was told that a pact between Hitler and Stalin had been concluded and signed by Ribbentrop in Moscow. Ever since April Stalin had been negotiating simultaneously with the Western Powers and with Hitler. Hitler had no scruples in paying the price demanded by the Soviet Union: in addition to the official non-aggression pact a secret supplementary protocol was signed in which the partition of Poland between the two states and the delineation of 'spheres of interest' in the Baltic were agreed. Hitler could now proceed to attack Poland, which he did on 1 September 1939, after a postponement of a few days as a result of intervention by Mussolini. Britain and France now entered the lists and declared war on Germany on 3 September. The Second World War had begun. After the Munich Agreement and the occupation of the Sudetenland Hitler felt himself so strong that he let loose a vast anti-Jewish pogrom such as had not been seen since the Middle Ages; thousands of Jewish businesses and syn- agogues were looted, demolished or set on fire. The resistance movement was a well-nigh helpless spectator of all this. Many members of the opposition did all in their power to help Jews and victims of the regime in general; they assisted them to emigrate; they protected property; they provided shelter and refuge — moral and material assistance of all sorts in fact. 3 But none of this provided a basis for the overthrow of Hitler. The Western Powers had been regarded as natural allies in the struggle against Hitler. Now his opponents felt — wrongly from the objective point of view - that they had been betrayed. The opposition crumbled; the ties 100 Before the Outbreak of War between the civil and military resistance groups loosened or were severed. 4 Admittedly the core of the opposition remained — Beck, Oster, Schulenburg, Gisevius, Witzleben, Schacht, Haider, Goerdeler, to name only a few, had not abandoned their aim of overthrowing Hitler. But in the atmosphere and situa- tion following Munich they could see no possibility. Without resources of power any attempt was hopeless; no one at that time thought that the dic- tator's authority was in any way shaky; any attempt to overthrow him, therefore, would lead to an upheaval verging on civil war; consequently the removal of Hitler would not of itself solve the problem. After Munich, moreover, the military could no longer be persuaded into a coup d'etat. None of the opposition leaders believed that an occasion such as the occupation of Prague would produce adequate support in the Army for a further attempt at a coup. The 'destruction of the rump of Czechoslovakia' did not even give rise to a real crisis, let alone a situation as dangerous as that of the Sudeten affair. Hitler had used force with impunity and his further 'bloodless victory' merely aggravated the paralysis of the opposition. 5 Even had the key figures involved in the preparations of September 1938 still been in their old positions in the spring of 1939, most of them would hardly have been able to concoct fresh plans since there was no acute danger of war. But many of the key figures were either not available at all or at least not in Berlin. In November 1938 General von Witzleben, the most important commander, had left Berlin to assume command of Group Headquarters No 2 (Frankfurt on Main) in the west. 6 Major-General von Sodenstern was ap- pointed as his Chief of Staff in December. After only a few conversations both were agreed that Hitler's policies, despite all temporary successes, could in the end only lead to a world war greater even than that of 1914, and finally to the destruction of Germany. 7 They also agreed that, this being so, they had come to the limits of military obedience and that whoever continued to obey shared responsibility for the consequences. They did not think that they should con- sider resigning and escaping into private life. This left only one alternative: to fight Hitler. It was clear that other determined officers and civilians who could assume administrative responsibilities were needed; the forces working against the regime had to be consolidated. Witzleben had kept up his connec- tions with Dr Goerdeler and Lieutenant-Colonel Oster; in his own staff Colonel Vinzenz Miiller was taken into confidence. Witzleben and Sodenstern thought there was ample time; a war was inevitable if Hitler continued his policies, but it was not expected to come before 1940. In June or July 1939, Witzleben and Sodenstern agreed on a long-term programme: No generals' putsch, no putsch at all as long as the socialist masses were marching solidly behind the swastika flag and a general strike could paralyse a coup d'etat com- pletely (the Kapp Putsch was obviously in Witzleben's and Sodenstern's minds); formation of reliable conspiratorial groups in all Gau capitals so that all Gauleiter might be arrested at once, all radio transmitters be seized, and the press be tightly controlled; Dr Goerdeler hoped to win over the former trade-union leaders and through their influence to prevent a general strike in the event of the coup d'etat (he too hoped to have accomplished this by spring 101 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 of 1940); then, early in 1940, the conspirators were to meet again to agree dates and first steps for the coup. But in late summer of 1939 the war broke out; Witzleben and Sodenstern were completely taken by surprise. They had been so isolated that during the peak of tension before the attack on Poland, Witzleben had asked Oster to send him Gisevius to fill him in on what was happening in Berlin. 8 The most basic preconditions for any action against the regime obviously did not exist. Other commanders who had been ready to act during the Sudeten crisis were similarly isolated or unavailable. Lieutenant-General Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt was still commanding the Potsdam division but he did not think that he could carry out a coup alone. 9 General Curt Haase (not to be confused with Lieutenant-General Paul von Hase, later Commandant of Berlin), Witzleben's successor as commander of Wehrkreis III in Berlin, was regarded by Haider as 'incapable of conspiracy'. 10 Lieutenant-General Fritz Fromm, head of \heAllgemeines Heeresamt (AHA), who was destined to play a fateful role on 20 July 1944, was approached by Haider to see whether he might be willing to participate in preparations for a coup, but he refused." Haider himself was in favour of waiting; early in 1939 it was not even possible to extract vague promises from him. 12 Shortly before the move into Prague, which many of the initiated knew was coming, he was not even prepared to discuss contingency measures since he was convinced - rightly - that the Western Powers had long since abandoned Czechoslovakia. 13 He was not to be persuaded into any conspiratorial activity, however hard Gisevius, Oster, Beck and Canaris pressed him. 14 Production of the so-called timetables towards the end of 1938 created further difficulties in planning for any future coup. 15 Hitler had ordered these tables to be drawn up so that at any time precise details could be given of the moment at which orders for movement or attack from a concentration area must be issued irrevocably. 16 Such minute preparations were necessitated by Hitler's strategy of surprise attack and sudden move, but even more by his habit of waiting until the very last moment before finally deciding on military measures. He did not hold with the traditional methods of mobilization and, if planning an attack for instance, wished to have German troops available at any time to move into the country he intended to occupy within twelve hours of the issue of his order. 17 The top-level military, of course, knew beforehand which units were to be used in any attack and which would remain located in Germany and where. This fact did not necessarily make the opposition's planning more difficult. But the interval between the issue of orders to move and the actual opening of major hostilities was now so short that it was increasingly difficult for the con- spiracy, working in secret, to assemble and move their forces. Not until 1943 did they discover a vehicle for unobtrusive but far-reaching planning. This was the famous Plan 'Valkyrie'. 18 In addition no one could be certain that a movement order from Hitler really meant war. On 25 August 1939 he issued the order at midday and cancelled it in the evening; by using every signal cir- cuit and with a vast expenditure of labour every unit on the move had to be stopped and turned round. Brauchitsch merely backed up Hitler in this; when 102 Before the Outbreak of War asked by Hitler what consequences cancellation of the movement order would have, he replied that it made no difference at all. Surprise effect would be lost, he said, but they would gain the advantage of more thorough preparations for mobilization. Brauchitsch could well have seized this opportunity to counsel moderation, using military arguments, but he did not do so. 19 So the interval between issue of the order for war and the actual start of the war was reduced practically to zero. 20 It was, in fact, conceivable that Hitler might cancel an order for attack only an hour or two before the first shot was fired. He could always excuse himself or offer compensation for isolated operations or frontier violations which it had been impossible to stop. His 'enemies', after all, were not particularly bellicose. At any rate, in so far as con- cerned the military element of the conspiracy, in other words the Army units which might have been persuaded to participate in a coup, this was the view of the situation taken in 1939 by the highest-ranking military conspirator, the Chief of Staff of the Army. After the end of the Polish campaign the opposition was no longer con- fronted by the question whether there would be war or not, but whether the offensive against France (which the General Staff considered suicidal) would actually take place or not. Basically, therefore, the problem remained the same. Hitler's convinced opponents had long ago recognized his demoniac thirst for destruction and felt sure that the war would continue. Searching for some fresh starting point, individual groups continued to foregather, but nothing positive could be achieved. One meeting during the winter 1938-39, however, is worth mentioning, since it was the start of a development which ended only with 20 July 1944. It took place in the house of Ernst von Harnack, the Social- Democrat government representative (Regierungsprastdeni) in Merseburg, dismissed in 1933, and there were present the socialists Leuschner, Leber and Noske together with Dr Richard Kiinzer, a Foreign Service counsellor, Klaus Bonhoeffer and Otto John. They discussed the possibilities of resistance ac- tivity with a view to overthrowing the regime and concluded that progress might be restarted by formation of a 'Unity Front' combining all opposition tendencies, both civil and military, without regard to party political background. 21 For such a group this was a significant step away from tradition; it implied a readiness to cooperate with forces which would otherwise have been labelled nationalist, conservative and reactionary. After prolonged hesitation Leuschner declared himself ready to cooperate in anything, provided that the generals made a concrete proposal. Accordingly in early autumn 1939 permanent contact was established between the Kaiser- Leu schner-Habermann group and Oster's in OKW Ausland/Abwehr via Dr Josef Winner, a lawyer who was a passionate anti-Nazi. Here was illustrated the great weakness of the early stages: there were no forces and the generals in key positions were not prepared to act against the regime. Albrecht von Kessel records an attempt which he made together with Adam von Trott zu Solz to persuade Lieutenant-General Alexander von Falkenhausen, later Commander-in-Chief Belgium and Northern France, to 103 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 act. 22 Falkenhausen was an old acquaintance of Trott's from his days in China where he had been Military Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek; on 1 September he was due to take over from Lieutenant-General von Schwedler as Commander of Wehrkreis IV. In July or August Kessel and Trott went to Dresden where Kessel explained his plan to the General: Hitler was to be invited to inspect the fortifications hurriedly constructed on the Bohemian frontier; he was to be separated from his entourage in a bunker and faced with the choice of commit- ting suicide or being killed forthwith; in the latter case Falkenhausen was to toss in a grenade. The General was somewhat astonished by this unusual proposition - 'so this is what comes from the Foreign Ministry nowadays', he remarked — but though he listened approvingly, he doubted that the thing could be done, and he does not seem to have made any move to try it. The reasons are all too obvious; even for the go-getting Witzleben, be it noted, the elimination of Hitler at the height of his success was too risky a proceeding. None of the generals wanted civil war. Accordingly the opposition devoted its initial efforts primarily to preven- tion of the outbreak of war. As already mentioned far fewer generals were prepared to participate than in 1938; there was no alternative, therefore, but to work primarily in the foreign policy field. In the first place efforts were made to obtain support for the internal movement by declarations of goodwill towards any non-Nazi government which might be formed; secondly it was hoped to persuade the Western Powers to give some clear proof of their deter- mination not to give way again, not to permit any further blackmail or con- quest by Hitler and to issue unmistakable threats should this take place. After his resignation as Burgomaster of Leipzig Goerdeler had become a part-time employee of the firm of Bosch. His real job was to hold the opposi- tion groups together, to expand and consolidate them and to provide financial support to some of the members. 23 Through an intermediary, he was at pains to explain to Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, that Hitler must be warned against war in the clearest possible terms; the United States would certainly be drawn in if a conflict should develop between Germany on one side and France and Britain on the other. 24 At the same time, based on infor- mation and impressions acquired during his journeys abroad, he attempted to influence Hitler's foreign policy through Goring, warning him that British patience would shortly be exhausted and that the might of Russia would un- doubtedly be allied to that of the Western Powers. 25 During the winter 1938-39 Goerdeler transmitted to his American friends a 'peace programme* visualizing international cooperation based on a liberal economic and social policy, tolerance and freedom of the individual under the rule of law, rejection of bolshevism, Marxism and fascism of all colours. 26 Being an incurable optimist, he inevitably thought that his peace proposals would have some effect and that Hitler would be subjected to adequate threats. Since the Munich Conference, however, even he realized that there was no real foundation for such an idea. Since war now seemed almost in- evitable, he hoped for a quick end to it as a result of Germany's inevitable exhaustion which he thought must come after, at the most, a year. Like Beck, 104 Before the Outbreak of War Goerdeler grossly over-estimated France's war potential and will to fight; he was also a victim of self-deception over the capacity of the Nazi government to mobilize the energies of the German people for their own purposes. The inactivity of the Western Powers after the occupation of the 'rump of Czechoslovakia' (Rest-Tschechei in Hitler's terminology) acted as a spur rather than a discouragement to Goerdeler; his activity was feverish and a veritable flood of memoranda from him descended on Paris, London, Rome and Washington. 27 Again and again he demanded that Hitler be publicly exposed and attacked on the international stage as the great disturber of the peace. The whole world, he said, must call upon the German nation to decide between the disturber of the peace and the forces of peace. He hoped that the Pope might open the campaign with a suitable call to the German and Italian peoples to overthrow their dictators. Simultaneously the dictators should be precluded from making war by an embargo on vital raw materials; until peace was assured Hitler should be diplomatically isolated and personally cold- shouldered by foreign ambassadors; no congratulations should be sent for his fiftieth birthday on 20 April 1939. 28 Goerdeler, the optimist, also believed that his own frankness and honesty would be realized and given their due weight. Only in this light is his con- tinuous repetition of demands for territorial revision comprehensible. He proposed settlement of the Polish Corridor question, cession of a large overseas colonial area to Germany, opportunities for German settlers to im- migrate into British and French colonial territories, reestablishment and neutralization of Czechoslovakia but without the Sudetenland; all this was in- tended to contribute to a relaxation of tension. Removal of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles, he thought, would take the wind out of the sails of Ger- man revisionism and nationalism and eliminate smouldering antipathies. 29 Such concessions, however, must be made to a law-abiding peaceful German government, not to the blackmailer Hitler; only in that case would they serve the cause of peace — this was the purpose of Goerdeler's demands. As a quid pro quo Germany would abandon her drive for hegemony in South-East Europe, become a co-guarantor of the status quo in the Mediterranean, use her military, economic and political resources to help the Western Powers reestablish their influence in the Far East and participate in an international stabilization of currencies, limitation of armaments and a disarmament agree- ment under international control. This would bring about an alliance between Germany and France and constitute a first step towards the later formation of a general federation of European states. War should be banned for all time as a result of voluntary cooperation. 30 Within the opposition attempts were made to arrive at an agreed definition of their views for the benefit of the Western Powers, but Schacht in particular was at odds with Goerdeler's ideas which he regarded as illusory. 31 Schacht proposed to persuade the Western Powers to stand firm, not by telling them of the weaknesses of the German economy and German Army but, on the con- trary, by warning them of the dangers of growing German strength. 32 The lack of unanimity in the opposition's views undoubtedly did not increase its 105 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 standing abroad; equally certainly, it did nothing to change the well-known attitude of the Western Powers. 33 Shortly after the German move into Prague Schacht, Gisevius and Goerdeler met Dr Reinhold Schairer in Ouchy near Geneva. Schairer must be regarded as one of the principal middlemen between London and Paris on one side and the ideas of the Schacht-Goerdeler circle on the other; he had already arranged for Goerdeler to meet Bertaux and L6ger. 34 The talk turned around the old question: not how to overthrow Hitler (they had long known that) but how finally to persuade 'the generals' to do it. 35 Once more they reached the conclusion that a revolt in Germany was only possible if it was made crystal clear from abroad that Hitler's next attempt at conquest would be the prelude to major war. 36 Much optimism was required to believe this possible after the experiences of Munich and Prague. An increasing number of people in Germany thought that Hitler had luck on his side or was intuitively right and that he would con- tinue to succeed. Abroad, however, Hitler's 'successes' had the opposite effect: each additional 'success' filled the cup fuller and brought nearer the time when it would overflow. In fact the situation was hopeless; even the sternest threats had little prospect of penetrating, although they did give many Germans and some of the generals food for thought. 37 Efforts to influence matters were nevertheless pursued. In Switzerland Schacht met his friend Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England who was also a close friend of Chamberlain, and urged that some warning be sent to Hitler. 38 Schairer finally went to London and probably also to Paris with a general commission to sound a warning against the unbridled ambition and bellicosity of the dictator; his objective was not merely Danzig and the Corridor but the whole of Poland and more. 39 In May 1939 Goerdeler himself went to London where he had an interview with Churchill but their talk was of little significance. 40 This was hardly sur- prising since Goerdeler had nothing to offer apart from his own honest opi- nion. Until signature of the Russo—German pact a continuous stream of anxious conspirators warned the British government of Hitler's nefarious in- tentions and tried to persuade it to take suitable counter-measures. 41 The next emissary was Adam von Trott zu Solz. 42 Even before the Sudeten crisis he had tried to work for coexistence between ideologies, hoping that the totalitarian system in Germany might be changed without a new world war. His idea was that Britain should make clear to Hitler that there could be no second Munich. He was in London from 1 to 8 June. Officially he had been commissioned by the Foreign Ministry to use his private contacts as an ex- Rhodes scholar to find out the British attitude to Germany. Trott had talks with Lord Astor, proprietor of the Observer and Chairman of the Royal Institute of International Affairs whom he had known since his student days in Oxford, also with Lord Halifax, Lord Lothian and Neville Chamberlain. At this time Trott was wondering whether he should leave Germany for the duration of the Nazi regime which he loathed, or whether he could fight the 106 Before the Outbreak of War regime in some way. The latter he could only do, he thought, if he could obtain for himself some suitable position within the system. Foreign policy he regarded as his calling and so, in 1940, he joined the Foreign Ministry per- manently in order to work for the resistance movement. In 1938 he had already written to his friend, David Astor, that he wished to return to Ger- many (from a trip he was taking at the time) with the single purpose of devoting himself entirely to working against Hitler. Outwardly, of course, he had to obey his superiors' instructions and try to appear to them as a man with useful contacts. When in London in June 1939 Trott was already playing this dual role - this much is clear from the tone of his official report. The report is full of warnings aimed at Hitler about determination to fight and about Anglo—American community of interests and solidarity; the report includes explicit references to the absolute British rejection of the use offeree against other nations and of the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914. Lord Lothian had said that the British regarded both events — Belgium 1914 and Prague 1939 — as equally significant and undoubtedly he was right. On the other hand, in a special confidential interview Lord Lothian had also said that reestablish- ment of Bohemian and Moravian independence would disarm the British totally; this should not be too difficult for Hitler, he said, since he had achieved his strategic and undoubtedly essential purpose of destroying Czechoslovakia; moreover it could not be disputed that economically Germany's Lebensraum already extended far outside her present frontiers. If this principle were generally recognized in Eastern and South-eastern Europe and supported by Great Britain, then solutions would also be found for the problems of Danzig and die Corridor. Chamberlain expressed himself similarly to Trott at an in- terview on 8 June. In his report, therefore, Trott did the exact opposite of what he was later ac- cused of doing by certain circles. He did not try to soothe and pacify Britain; in fact he used every conceivable argument to dissuade Hitler from further conquests. In the hope of taking the right psychological line with Hitler, Trott even explained that as a result of the German action in March, of which Britain had had to be an inactive spectator, she now felt so humiliated that she was ready to fight; the real way to humiliate Britain, however, was to give the Czechs back their national independence since then the role of protector assumed by Britain would end in pitiable collapse. Naturally Trott's mission did not have the success intended. It did not produce the desired effect on Hitler nor did it lead to any readiness on the part of the British government to cooperate with the German resistance move- ment. Efforts were nevertheless continued. During the summer the two lawyers Fabian von Schlabrendorff and Helmuth James Graf von Moltke also visited London; their background was similar to that of Trott. 43 Talking to Lord Lloyd, Schlabrendorff advised that the British make their determination to fight abundantly clear and he warned of the imminent conclusion of a pact between Hitler and Stalin. With SchlabrendorfFs agreement Lord Lloyd passed this on to Halifax. At about the same time Schlabrendorff visited Churchill at his country house near Lon- 107 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 don and told him of the existence of a German opposition, of the imminence of war with Poland and the almost certain conclusion of a Hitler—Stalin pact. Churchill had long known that a German resistance movement existed, at least since summer 1938, but he did not think much of the conspiracy since 'it had shown neither the will to act nor the courage to come into the open'. 44 To Churchill's question whether Schlabrendorff could guarantee a successful coup by the opposition, 45 he naturally had to reply in the negative. In such matters there can be no guarantee of success. Moltke fared no better than Schlabrendorff. He warned his British friends of Hitler's immediate intentions but he was hardly in a position to make proposals for collaboration. Wheeler-Bennett, with some justification, asks what these emissaries really thought that they could achieve. 46 He answers the question himself: they hoped, by means of British and French declarations and actions, to make clear to the generals something that Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler already knew - that there could be no repetition of Munich. If this could be done, they thought, there was still perhaps some hope of a coup before it was too late. This was the object of all the conspirators with contacts abroad; they included Rudolf Pechel who went to London in March, April and May 1939 to warn against Hitler's depredations, Gerhard Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, who was in London on 6 July, and Ulrich von Hassell who drafted a penetrating article on Nazism for publication in a Swiss newspaper; he hoped that the world would listen while there was still time, but no Swiss paper was willing to print it. 47 In the summer of 1939 Erich Kordt also went to London to try to stop the Hitler—Stalin pact. This he did with the backing of Weizsacker who throughout July and August was trying to sabotage Hitler's and Ribbentrop's foreign policy by warnings and procrastination. In August, among other things, he reiterated his request of summer 1938 to the British government that a general be despatched to Hitler who could talk to him privately 'man to man', in other words issue a threat which would be unmistakable and credible even to Hitler. 48 At the same time the Kordt brothers were hoping to give the generals proof that this time there really would be world war and that the prior overthrow of Hitler was therefore essential. Kordt flew to London in the se- cond half of June and was met by his brother at the airport. Next day they both met Robert Vansittart in the house of Philip Conwell Evans. To the conster- nation of the German opposition, for which the Kordt brothers were specifically authorized to speak, Vansittart's news was placatory. London was counselling moderation in Warsaw, he said; there was no risk that the Poles, relying on the British promise of assistance, would overcall their hand; there was no need to worry about Russia; the Western Powers, not Hitler, would conclude a pact with Stalin. Weizsacker and the Kordt brothers, however, took a different view of the situation and they continued their warnings. On his return from a visit to Berlin in August Theo Kordt again met Vansittart in Conwell Evans' house and again urged him to accelerate the Franco-British negotiations in Moscow and persuade the Italians to intervene with Hitler. 49 Both Hitler and 108 Before the Outbreak of War Mussolini, he said, were still not clear that war with Poland could not be localized but that this time the Western Powers would assuredly intervene. 50 Then, however, Hitler did conclude his pact with Stalin. From 23 August he could be certain that, if he attacked Poland, no other power would directly stand in his way. Hitler now only had to defeat Poland quickly and then calmly await developments; France and Britain would not attack immediately even if, contrary to expectations, they formally declared war. It was now no longer possible to talk of immediate danger to the Reich in the event of war with Poland. 51 Though some people were still seriously con- sidering and urging a military putsch, in such a situation it was out of the question. 52 Oster had hoped that the situation would develop similarly to that of September 1938 and, as a precaution, had told the members of the raiding party formed at that time to hold themselves in readiness. In Frankfurt Witzleben and Major-General von Sodenstern, his Chief of Staff, had drawn up a plan for a coup; Goerdeler had assisted them and the plan was to be ready for execution by the spring of 1940. It included: formation of reliable activist groups within the Army with numerous resistance cells and representatives in every Wehrkreis; support from a wide section of the workers arranged by Goerdeler with the assistance of Christian and socialist trade union leaders; simultaneous arrest of all Gauleiter at the start of the coup; occupation of radio stations and control of the press; formation of reliable groups of con- spirators in the capital of each Gau. 53 After the conclusion of the Russo—Ger- man pact, however, not even Oster thought it possible to stop the outbreak of war. 54 On 20 August 1939 Leuschner wrote to a friend abroad: 'I fear that there will be war this autumn and that it will last for years... Tell our friends over there, particularly Walter Citrine [Secretary-General of the T.U.C.] that we are still what we were. But we are completely incapable of preventing the catastrophe. We are inmates of a great prison. To rebel would be as suicidal as if prisoners were to rise against their heavily armed gaolers.' 55 Despite this desperate situation efforts continued, primarily aimed at the preservation of peace. In order to warn the Western Powers and the world in general against Hitler - the real demoniac Hitler capable of any madness - Beck passed to Louis Lochner, Associated Press correspondent in Berlin, a copy of the in- temperate speech delivered by Hitler on 22 August. It was transmitted by Hermann Maass who had frequently been used as a channel since 1936. 56 Lochner took the copy to Kirk, the American Charg6 d'Affaires, but he did not want to have anything to do with it, saying: 'Oh, take this out of here. That is dynamite .. . We have had so many troubles already, I don't want to get in- volved.' The copy finally landed in the British Embassy whence it reached London on 25 August. Before conclusion of the Russo—German pact Weizsacker warned Hender- son, the British Ambassador, advising that the British negotiations be accelerated. Even the Nuremberg Court, which condemned him as a war criminal, admitted that, after conclusion of the pact, he did not abandon his efforts to preserve peace. 57 Assisted by Theo Kordt he attempted to persuade 109 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 the Italians to divorce themselves from Hitler's war policy. This, together with the conclusion of the Anglo—Polish treaty of alliance, had the desired effect but, owing to Hitler's irrationality and propensity for brinkmanship, it was only temporary; shortly before 6 p.m. on 25 August, after a report from Schmundt, Hitler's chief aide, Jodl noted in his diary that Hitler was 'no longer quite sure whether Britain was not in earnest this time; but he does not want a showdown with Britain'. 58 Even after conclusion of the Russo-German pact Theo Kordt continued to talk to Vansittart, on some occasions in the latter's house. Even as late as 31 August Kordt and Vansittart were still concerting their efforts, but in vain; they agreed, however, to remain in touch. Theo Kordt was, if possible, to ob- tain a transfer to some neutral country - which should be possible with Weiz- sacker's help - whence he would send a prearranged innocent postcard as a signal of his arrival and availability for secret discussions. 59 Meanwhile Oster's group had not remained inactive. They had found an important and influential ally - at least any sensible person would have thought that, in his position, he would have had some influence - in Major- General Georg Thomas, head of the 'Economics and Supply' Group in OKW (rechristened Economics and Armaments Office in November 1939). 60 They now approached Thomas asking him to do all he could think of to prevent war. Gisevius even refers to Thomas as the spokesman of the group at this time; Thomas himself says that the members of the group were Popitz, Goerdeler, Beck, Hassell, Schacht, Erwin Planck (retired State Secretary), Oster, Wittke (senior civil servant) and Gisevius. 61 After exhaustive discussions the conclusion was reached that, primarily for the reasons given above, there could be no question of action by force at this time; on the other hand there still seemed to be slight hope that if the absence of the economic conditions necessary for war against the Western Powers could be demonstrated, Hitler might be dissuaded from running so great a risk. As we now know, Hitler thought on quite different lines. He considered that war itself would create for him the necessary economic basis for war, primarily in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. This was the object of the trade treaties of recent months. Thomas knew that commonsense arguments did not achieve much with Hitler. Nevertheless it was essential to try. With Schacht's assistance, therefore, Thomas drafted a memorandum in which he explained that an attack on Poland would inevitably lead to world war, in other words a long war of attrition, and that without strong allies Ger- many could not sustain it owing to her inadequate reserves of raw materials and food. In mid-August Thomas submitted this memorandum to Colonel- General Keitel, his superior officer as Chief of OKW. Keitel, however, cut Thomas short, saying that there was no danger at all of a world war; the French were a degenerate pacifist people and the British too decadent to help the Poles; the United States would not send a single man to Europe to fight for Britain, still less Poland. This was Hitler's view and anyone who did not share it was blind to Hitler's greatness. The memorandum never got further than Keitel. 110 Before the Outbreak of War A second attempt made by Thomas after he had heard from Canaris that the date for the invasion of Poland had been postponed was somewhat more successful, at least procedurally. Thomas drew up tables and comparative graphs illustrating the economic warfare capacity of Germany and the other great powers, from which Germany's inferiority clearly emerged. Schacht and also Goerdeler had assisted in their production. Thomas submitted his tables and graphs to Keitel on Sunday 27 August. 62 This time Keitel took them to Hitler but Hitler sent Thomas word that, since Russia was now on Germany's side, there was no need to fear world war and his warnings were therefore groundless. Attempts were then made to bring Keitel together with Schacht or Goerdeler; Schacht also wished to speak to Brauchitsch or Haider; first Thomas and then Canaris were to arrange these meeetings — but all without success. 63 Since conclusion of the Russo—German pact the order for attack on Poland might be expected any day, in fact at any moment. Brauchitsch and Haider, who of course knew this well, remained unapproachable. Meanwhile Schacht and Gisevius together with Thomas and Oster decided to try once more in what Gisevius calls 'one last desperate step'. 64 During the interval between issue of the order for attack and the actual start of the shooting Schacht, Gisevius, Thomas and Canaris proposed to drive to Army Headquarters in Zossen and demand to see Haider and Brauchitsch. Schacht was still a Minister of the Reich and it was thought unlikely that his car would be stopped. Late on the afternoon of 25 August the conspirators met in the Abwehr's offices on the Tirpitzufer. They proposed to confront Haider and Brauchitsch with an ultimatum: the decision to go to war was unconstitutional since it had not been discussed in cabinet (of which Schacht was a member); either, therefore, troops were to be placed at Schacht's disposal to preserve the rights of the Retch government or Brauchitsch and Haider should have all those pre- sent arrested; they were to be deterred from adopting the second course by threat of disclosure of all previous conspiratorial agreements, plans and dis- cussions. 65 While Schacht, Gisevius and Thomas, however, were waiting for Canaris, Oster arrived instead with the news that Hitler had lost his nerve and called off the war. Now, they thought, Hitler would have forfeited the generals' respect and no war would be possible for decades. Peace seemed assured, Canaris said, for at least twenty years, but not as a result of the efforts of the opposition or even of the 'moderates' in Hitler's en- tourage, not because of Mussolini's refusal to participate, still less because of any threat exerted by the Anglo—Polish alliance, but simply because of the failure of the dictator's nerve. 66 Gisevius thought that this was just the mo- ment for the opposition to overthrow Hitler, but Canaris was convinced that Hitler was more or less 'finished' and that everything else would happen automatically; by acting now, he said, they might only make the generals stubborn once more and spoil everything. Oster and Hassell supported this view. 67 So when, six days later, the order to attack was reissued and war ac- tually began on 1 September, hardly anyone was expecting it. Surprise and, 111 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 until the start of shooting, uncertainty as to whether this was really now the actual thing, in general condemned the opposition to inactivity. On the after- noon of 31 August Canaris said to Gisevius with tears in his eyes: 'This means the end of Germany.' 68 112 9 Plans, Probings and Memoranda Once more, on 31 August, Weizsacker and Hassell attempted to save the peace, making representations to Goring, Henderson and Josef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador. 1 During the last few days before the French and British declarations of war Schlabrendorff too was indefatigable in maintaining con- tact between the opposition and the few British diplomats still in Berlin. 2 These last-minute efforts proved to the civilians something which the soldiers had often heard from Hitler himself but had never quite believed: that Hitler, Ribbentrop and some of the other hangers-on actually wanted war. There were perfectly genuine possibilities of satisfying Hitler's demands by peaceful means, in other words without bloodshed; not only did he fail to seize them, but he purposely and deliberately rejected and sabotaged them. Haider was busy with the war against Poland and the other generals in- volved lacked either the opportunity, the time or the will to do anything. Meanwhile, however, an unexpected opportunity presented itself with the ap- pointment of Colonel-General von Hammerstein-Equord to command Army Detachment A in the west. When questioned by Rudolf Pechel early in the summer of 1939 he said: 'Just give me some troops and I won't fail you.' 3 Schlabrendorff had always been convinced that Hammerstein would be given a command on the outbreak of war and then, provided opportunity offered, would be prepared to arrest Hitler. On 3 September he said as much to Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes whom he met preparing to return to England. 4 Hammerstein certainly made his mistakes but he had been an opponent of Hitler from the outset and he was a man of whom even so severe a critic as Wheeler-Bennett could say with confidence that, if Hitler had ever come within range of him, he would have struck him down quickly and without more ado. 5 When subsequently told that none of the generals approached by the conspirators could be persuaded to participate in an attempt at a coup even when given descriptions and documents on the terrible mass murders in Poland, he said to his friend Rudolf Pechel: 'Doctor Pechel, I am an old soldier but these people [his fellow-officers] have turned me into an anti-militarist.' 6 Hammerstein was appointed to command Army Detachment A on 9 September; it was stationed on the Lower Rhine with headquarters in 113 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Cologne and planning started immediately. Contact between SchlabrendorfFs friends in Berlin and Hammerstein was maintained by Colonel Stern von Gwiazdowski and Nikolaus von Halem. The idea was that, if it were possible to do away with Hitler, major war might perhaps still be avoided; a new Ger- man government would restore Poland and Czechoslovakia and, though in- sisting on certain demands for revision, would only seek to obtain these by negotiation. Hammerstein tried to persuade Hitler to visit his Army Detachment, arguing that German defence preparedness in the west must be demonstrated during the Polish campaign. Hitler contemplated a visit but then called it off, so that Hammerstein was unable to carry out his plan. Shortly thereafter Hammerstein was relieved of his command and placed on the retired list once more. In the autumn of 1939 Hitler did make several visits to the Polish front; in the west, however, he did not show his face until the end of the year when he inspected front-line troops in the Hunsriick and Saarbriicken areas from 23 to 25 December. 7 No action against Hitler could therefore be taken during the period of un- certainty before the Polish war had been won and while the danger of French intervention across the Rhine was still acute. After Hitler's victory over Poland, however, the opposition was really at its wits' end. 8 No one knew what to do now. The generals were rejoicing in victory so would certainly not participate in a putsch', many of those who were ready to do so or who realized the necessity of a coup in the light of the terrible mass murders in Poland by the SS or police Einsatzgruppen (task forces) thought it too bold a step, first because of their concepts of loyalty and commitment to their oath, to which particularly strict standards applied in wartime, and also because of the uncertainties of the strategic situation. 9 It had to be assumed that any internal upheaval would be exploited by the Western Powers to launch an offensive; anyone who thought otherwise was naive. The opposi- tion accordingly devoted its efforts to obtaining the necessary assurances from the British government (without these the French would be unlikely to do anything) and exploring possibilities of halting the war. The soundings made by Adam von Trott zu Solz in London and Washington were primarily designed to serve this second purpose. With some justification it was expected that, quite apart from other motives and weighty reasons, President Roosevelt would not be averse to playing the role of saviour of world peace. Accordingly in September 1939 Trott set off for the United States, well camouflaged by an invitation to the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Virginia Beach and a mission for the Foreign Ministry. Officially the purpose of his journey was to deliver an address to the con- ference, thus assuring Germany of a place among the countries represented in the Institute - tantamount to a considerable prestige victory for the German government. 10 The British maritime blockade created difficulties but, after an adventurous journey, Trott reached New York towards the end of October. There he met and talked on several occasions with Paul Scheffer, the former editor of the Berliner Tageblatt who had emigrated. Scheffer had been told of 114 Plans, Probings and Memoranda Trott's official mission and initially, therefore, was cautious. At their second meeting, however, the truth came out and they then discussed exhaustively the prospects of exploiting the present fluid situation between the end of the Polish war and the anticipated opening of hostilities in the west. Scheffer explained his ideas and Trott asked him to put them down on paper. 11 A draft was quickly available in the form of an article written by Scheffer for the Atlantic Monthly but it was never published. On reading it Trott was im- pressed ; he agreed with it all, apart from one point dealing with the question whether the opposition would prefer a military defeat of Germany to con- tinuance of a victorious Nazi regime. 12 Although, apart from one or two final comments added by Trott, Scheffer was the sole author, it was agreed that the paper should be presented as stem- ming primarily from Trott, since a journalist's ideas would not have carried so much weight. Support and signatures were to be canvassed from prominent German emigres including Dr Briining, Hans Simons, Kurt Riezler (formerly secretary to Bethmann Hollweg) and Dr Hans Muhle. 13 This seems to have taken place; in any case consultations on the paper were held. On 13 November the memorandum reached G. S. Messersmith, Assistant Secretary of State in the State Department, via W. T. Stone, a member of the Washington Foreign Policy Association. The same day Messersmith passed a copy to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and the next day told Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, of Trott's arrival and of the gist of the memorandum. Welles had already seen it, however. 14 Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, also received a copy. Undoubtedly the memorandum was given an unfortunately wide distribution; Scheffer recalls that it was duplicated in twenty-four copies. 15 The memorandum took as its starting point the well-known dictum by President Woodrow Wilson in 1917 that after the war there should neither be victors nor vanquished and that men must learn not to regard military victory as the basis of a lasting peace. 16 It was absolutely necessary, the memorandum continued, that the Allied war aims should now be announced clearly and publicly; before deciding on these war aims, however, there must be definition of the historical role to be played by Germany. If Germany was regarded as the perpetual and incorrigible disturber of the peace, then there was no alter- native but to dismember and finally disarm the country. Those who thought this way presumably regarded the Treaty of Versailles as insufficiently severe rather than too severe. Announcement of war aims on this basis, however, could only do harm since practically every German would support even the present regime if the alternative was the total destruction of Germany. If, however, the present German state were considered to be, not the natural manifestation of the German national character, but an unnatural aberration caused by extraordinary crisis conditions stemming from the Versailles Trea- ty, in other words if the purpose was not to destroy and dismember Germany but to integrate her into a new European order as soon as she was liberated from the present tyranny, then the earliest possible announcement of the Allied war aims would be of decisive significance. The establishment and an- 115 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 nouncement of moderate war aims would encourage and strengthen the op- position and so contribute to the overthrow of Nazi domination. The memorandum stressed that there was already widespread opposition among all classes of people; only the middle and lower-middle classes would follow any violent mass movement more or less unthinkingly. The upper classes, on the other hand, placed their hopes on the Army officers and they did not think that Germany could sustain a major European war; they must be convinced that Hitler alone was standing in the way of an honourable and acceptable solution. The Germans might well liberate themselves from the Nazi tyranny if the necessary psychological conditions could thus be created. To produce an effect the Allied peace demands must be precise. Naturally every detail could not be laid down but in no case should Germany be confined to an area smaller than in 1933. To achieve all this the United States Govern- ment should throw into the scales the great respect in which it was held and bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Britain and France to announce reasonable war aims. When Trott visited Messersmith on the morning of 20 November, 17 he modified the ideas in the memorandum to some extent, saying that it was perhaps too early for a public announcement of Allied peace conditions; the worst that could happen would be some premature agreement leaving the pre- sent German regime in power. This would be a catastrophe not only for Ger- many but for the rest of the world and would mean the end of all prospects for the German resistance movement. The danger of compromise was real enough, Trott said, since there was still a powerful group in Britain desirous of some such settlement. Nevertheless it was highly important for the 'conser- vative elements' in Germany, in other words that section of the opposition which he represented, to be informed of the Allied war aims as soon as pos- sible. Their efforts were hampered by uncertainty. Messersmith regarded the memorandum as important; Scheffer even recalls that he was enthusiastic and urgently recommended Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State, to read it. During the following weeks, however, doubts about the credibility and reliability of Trott began to grow. On 20 November Messersmith did write to Sumner Welles saying that Trott had been strongly recommended to him by Bruning as a thoroughly 'honest man' who could be regarded as spokesman for those circles in Germany from which a non-Nazi government would have to be formed; when Trott had visited him in the State Department, Messersmith said, he had made a very good impres- sion and he thought Briining's estimate was correct. A few days later, however, he was saying that anyone who could leave Germany and return could hardly be a free agent; in addition the FBI had established that, while in the United States, Trott had had contact with 'certain persons here who are acting directly or indirectly for the present German government'. This may have been the price, he said, which Trott had to pay for the freedom of move- ment permitted him. On 8 December Trott was able to see Messersmith once more, 18 but suspicion was in the air. He was shadowed by FBI agents and a file was opened on him entitled: 'Subject: Espionage Activities, Adam von Trott 116 Plans, Probings and Memoranda in US' (Case No 862.20211). 19 This man was thought to be a spy. During his interview Trott asked Messersmith to treat both his memoran- dum and his statements as confidential since in effect they put a noose round his neck. Nevertheless the memorandum was duplicated (Paul Scheffer recalls twenty-four copies) and one of them reached Felix Frankfurter, a member of the United States Supreme Court whom Trott had known at Oxford. Frankfurter had been highly suspicious of Trott from the outset; he had been warned of Trott and, according to Messersmith's report to Sumner Welles, he took care to spread this suspicion. The meeting with Frankfurter, at any rate, was a catastrophic failure. 20 Trott himself knew that certain Oxford circles had denounced him as an 'appeaser', in other words one of those who would really like to bring about a compromise with Hitler. 21 This was certainly not his purpose now. This reproach is justified only insofar as in 1938 Trott had pleaded for a firm but non-aggressive attitude on the part of the Western Powers, thinking that an external conflict would prevent any solution of what he called the social and economic crisis in Germany. 22 An external conflict would force the Germans on to the defensive, he believed, and therefore on to the side of the Nazi system. Trott also hoped to avoid an armed conflict between the ideological camps, believing that a bloody victory of one over the other was unnecessary. 23 American officialdom was apparently unable to follow the somewhat com- plicated process of thought which could lead a German patriot to refuse to accept any form of solution leaving Hitler and his regime in power. Through his American contacts Trott wished to prevent the Allies committing themselves to a war of annihilation against Hitler—Germany and so forcing on to Hitler's side all those elements which were beginning to coalesce to overthrow him; this was the argument Trott put forward to the chief editor of the Washington Post on 19 November. 24 It would have been of importance for the opposition to have some indication of the conditions which the Allies would guarantee to a Germany liberated from Hitler. It would have been stupid, however, at this point publicly to announce peace terms which might have seemed acceptable to Hitler. That might well have made his overthrow impossible. About the same time (November or December 1939) a further memoran- dum from Trott reached Lord Halifax via Charles Bosanquet, one of Trott's British relatives. 25 In this Trott stressed, much on the lines of Scheffer's paper, the conditions regarded as important for any success by the anti-Hitler opposition: the largest possible number of Germans must be convinced that this time Britain did not want a Versailles or something worse; otherwise de- cent Germans would be forced to defend Nazism in order to save Germany from destruction. British propaganda, he said, must go deeper and wider; non-Nazi (and therefore silent) opinion in Germany must be convinced that Britain aimed at peace and justice in Europe. The most respected and un- assailable personalities in all the countries concerned must work in this direc- tion; anything which was 'sheer propaganda' should be avoided; only honesty would convince. 117 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 At the end of December 1939 or early in January 1940 yet another memorandum reached London, this time from and through Wheeler-Bennett, who was in New York at the time and had been present at many of Trott's dis- cussions with his German and American friends. At the end of December 1939 Trott wrote to his friend David Astor that Wheeler-Bennett understood many aspects of the German situation better than anyone else in Britain and that he should be listened to carefully; he had asked Wheeler-Bennett, he said, to pass to Astor his memorandum of 28 December 1939. 26 In this Wheeler-Bennett had produced almost the same ideas as Trott: as Chamberlain himself had said, Britain was fighting, not the German people but its tyrannical regime; in some sense, therefore, the war was one for the liberation of the Germans. In this struggle the democratic powers had allies inside Germany whose aim was equally the destruction of the Nazi regime and reestablishment of a state based on the rule of law. These elements must be so far strengthened and en- couraged that they could take the initiative themselves. This they could only do, however, if they could be sure that a new Germany would be treated with justice and generosity by the democratic powers. It was therefore essential, not to establish and announce the Allied war aims in detail now, but to give more definite assurances which would seem to the German opposition to justify action against Hitler. A declaration should be made as soon as possible by Britain, France, Poland and the British Dominions at war with Germany guaranteeing: no political division or dismemberment of Germany; collabora- tion with a new Germany; large-scale trading facilities, access to raw materials, economic agreements and limitation of armaments. Trott returned to Germany via Japan early in 1940, having achieved no vis- ible success from his mission as a whole. His messages had almost certainly reached their addressees in Britain; that they did so in America can be proved from the files. But the Allied announcements urged by Trott and his friends were never made nor did any form of cooperation with the internal German opposition take place via Trott. The fronts solidified; men were set in their well-worn ways. The human and material sacrifices claimed by the war were indescribable. Yet paradoxically it was easier to accept them than to make the necessary mental and political efforts to cooperate with the German resistance movement. The only meagre result of all Trott's efforts, for which he was risking his life, was an instruction from the State Department to Alexander Kirk, American Charg6 d'Affaires in Berlin, telling him to listen to what Trott might have to say and report thereon to Washington. 27 The suspicions not only remained, but were more intense, and reached the highest levels. 28 From San Francisco, before he left the North American continent, Trott wrote to Justice Frankfurter on 9 January 1940: 'Dear Justice Frankfurter, I cannot leave this country without at least sending you a brief note of farewell. I understand and respect the reasons why it has not this time been possible to reestablish more than a purely human contact. You will not, I hope, consider my feeling of its continued existence presumptuous — since, I am afraid, there is now no more opportunity left to confirm it.' 29 There are a number of likely and plausible reasons for Trott's lack of success. Trott himself believed he had 118 Plans, Probings and Memoranda made a serious mistake by suggesting to the sensitive Justice Frankfurter that it would be better if American Jews did not engage in anti-National-Socialist propaganda too prominently. 30 Apart from this, misunderstandings and suspicions assumed almost grotesque proportions, and appearances were against Trott who was formally a part of the National-Socialist bureaucracy. On 17 January 1940, the President of the United States wrote to Justice Frankfurter: 'For Heaven's sake! Surely you did not let your Trott friend get trotted out of the country without having him searched by Edgar Hoover. Think of the battleship plans and other secrets he may be carrying back. This is the height of indiscretion and carelessness on your part!' 31 Whereupon Frankfurter wrote acidly he had been under the impression that someone other than himself was Hoover's boss but now he saw great opportunities opening up. 32 Trott foresaw the tragic consequences of his failure. Casablanca and the de- mand for unconditional surrender proved him right. Nevertheless he did not cease trying till the very end. His subsequent efforts will be referred to later. After the Polish campaign and while Trott was busy in New York and Washington, the resistance movement took up the threads again through other channels. With the help of Weizsacker, Dr Theo Kordt had arranged to be transferred to Berne and from there he regained contact with London, his primary object being to find out what the British attitude would be in the event of an internal German coup. 33 Contact was not established until the end of October when Conwell Evans brought over a document containing statements by Chamberlain. 34 In his broadcast of 4 September 1939 Chamberlain had already said that the fight was not against the German people but solely against the tyrannical regime which had betrayed its own people and the whole western civilization. 35 This sounded encouraging to the opposition; Chamberlain knew of its existence and aims and so its members felt that his words were ad- dressed to them. All the other prerequisites for a coup, however, were lacking; the generals were unlikely to be satisfied with such vague statements. Then, on 6 October, Hitler delivered his Reichstag speech with its peculiar peace offer - possible reestablishment of a truncated Poland but settlement of all questions connected with Poland solely between Germany and Russia, the partitioning powers. He did not seriously believe that Russia would relinquish, in order to create a 'rump-Poland', that part of Polish territory which she had seized, and he would not make territory available alone; at least this seemed to be the implication when he continued that such an arrange- ment would best suit the existing situation. There was therefore really no object, he said, in carrying on war in the west in order to revise this situation. Instead people should recognize that the Treaty of Versailles was finished and abolished and should return the German colonies. Based on a new territorial division of Europe and 'creation of a Retch frontier which — as already stressed - is in line with historical, ethnographic and economic conditions', a new system of peace and security should be possible. 36 Creation of SL Reich frontier corresponding to economic conditions was merely another way of expressing 119 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 the brutal policy of conquest which Hitler was clearly proposing to continue, not so much in the West as in the East. The Western Powers did not react in the manner expected or desired by Hitler and so the dictator lost patience. In his 'Directive No 6 for the Conduct of the War' dated 9 October 1939 he announced his decision to take the offen- sive in the west unless it became evident in the near future that Britain and France were disposed to bring the war to an end. 37 OKH had known of Hitler's intention to go over to the offensive ever since 25 September and in a discus- sion with Haider and Brauchitsch on 27 September he had said that im- mediate preparation for an attack on France was necessary. 38 Directive No 6 was the formal order. Twelve days later, on 21 October, he told the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter assembled in the Reich Chancellery that in a fort- night's time he would be ready to open a major offensive in the west; once France and Britain had been forced to their knees, then he would turn east again and put matters in order there. 39 In a further speech on the next day he made another peace offer - not seriously meant. Meanwhile the Wehrmacht leaders were debating the pros and cons of a western offensive in general and an autumn offensive in par- ticular. 40 These discussions became academic, however, when on 27 October Hitler assembled the Wehrmacht leaders and laid down the date of the offen- sive in the west — 12 November. 41 So the well-known situation had arisen again: the outbreak of real war with the Western Powers was imminent. Since it could not be won, its outbreak must be prevented by a coup.* 2 At least the conspirators could now put this argument forward with some conviction. Preparations for a coup were restarted with renewed energy. Meanwhile, in a speech in the Commons on 12 October, Chamberlain had answered Hitler's peace offer. 43 He had spoken of his conviction that, like all other European peoples, the German people were longing for peace; British policy, he said, had no vindictive purpose but was simply in defence of freedom. Peace could only be assured, however, if account was taken of the just claims and needs of all countries. This was the situation when contact was finally reestablished between Theo Kordt and Conwell Evans. Evans brought over a copy of a statement by Chamberlain; it was in fact the relevant extract from the speech mentioned above but Kordt and his friends took it as a message from Chamberlain explicitly addressed to the opposition. Conwell Evans described the document as a solemn commitment by Chamberlain which would be honoured in dealings with any trustworthy non-Nazi German government. 44 In addition Conwell Evans brought a message from Sir Robert Vansittart sent on behalf of Chamberlain and Halifax; it said that the British government could not enter into any form of negotiation 'with Hitler or his like'; 'it was the job of the German opposition to produce a German government capable of negotiating and on whose word the British could rely.' 45 Admittedly this did not amount to much; for the conspirators, who un- doubtedly already knew of Chamberlain's speech, it contained nothing new. 120 Plans, Probings and Memoranda Owing to the circumstances, however — war, coup preparations, conspiratorial activity, danger — and the secrecy surrounding their transmission, both the documents and the statements they contained came to be regarded as something special and were given greater weight than their contents justified. There was not even a hint of an armistice or strategic standstill during an in- ternal German coup. In addition the 'message' apparently never reached Haider, the most important addressee at the time. The conspirators could not persuade the generals to act without guarantees and the Western Powers were not willing to give guarantees without prior assurance, by actual deeds, that the conspirators were in earnest. Their suspicions were reinforced rather than aroused by the famous Venlo Incident. At the end of September 1939 Captain S. Payne Best and Major R. H. Stevens, two members of the British Intelligence Service working in The Hague, contacted a German emigre who told them that he was in touch with German officers belonging to a military anti-Hitler conspiracy. This seemed plausible, particularly in the light of the many reports reaching Britain. After checking with London the two were authorized to meet the German. The meeting took place on 21 October, on Dutch territory and in the presence of a Dutch secret service officer, but it proved that the German was only of junior rank. On condition that a more senior officer in a more important position would appear a further meeting was agreed for 30 October in The Hague. 46 Three further meetings took place with the Germans who were in reality members of the SS Sicherheitsdienst (SD - security service) and the Gestapo — on 7, 8 and 9 November, on each occasion in Backhus near Venlo. Ostensibly a senior officer representing the German opposition was to appear but in fact the German representative was Walter Schellenberg, head of Section IV E (Gestapo Counter Intelligence) in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA, Central Security Office). At the last meeting on 9 November the two Englishmen and the Dutchman were lured close to the German—Dutch fron- tier and, with the assistance of a few SS men, they were kidnapped. Hitler and Himmler apparently assumed at once that the British Secret Ser- vice, which had shown itself so willing to contact an alleged resistance move- ment designed to overthrow Hitler and his regime, was also behind the assassination attempt made in theBurgerbraukeller. This was anyway a good propaganda point in such a favourable concatenation of circumstances. Any previous willingness on the part of British agents and their superiors in Lon- don to contact the German opposition, however, was inevitably markedly reduced after the Venlo incident. Meanwhile efforts continued in Germany to build up an internal opposition front. On 10 October Hassell and Goerdeler discussed matters in Munich. 47 They agreed on minimum external demands which included annexation of the German parts of Poland, reestablishment of the rest of Poland as an indepen- dent state, reorganization of Czechoslovakia and armaments agreements; such demands are of course only comprehensible in the light of the situation at the time, though they appear most immoderate today. It was taken for granted by most Germans that Germany had not started an unnecessary war 121 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 in 1914 but had merely defended vital interests that were being threatened, and that consequently the Versailles Treaty constituted an injustice and the rape of a nation not only in form but in content, too. Now, in autumn 1939, Germany was in fact the strongest military power on the continent and she ac- tually controlled the territories whose disposal might have been discussed, and which could not be wrested from Germany without a long war and huge sacrifices in blood. However, a European concert and community could hardly be founded on the basis of possession through use of sheer force, and even if Germany had had better legal claims to the acquired territories, the method of acquisition would appear to have reduced the validity of the claim. There is no indication in Hassell's diary, moreover, that he and Goerdeler considered the method an obstacle to rightful possession. The idea that Goring might have a seat in a government to be formed after the fall of Hitler is also only explicable in the light of the situation at the time. Nazism was strong and had scored great successes both at home and abroad. A coup, even if conceivable at all, could only take place on grounds of the threatened expansion of the war which was generally considered, even by many Party members, to constitute an immense danger to everything so far achieved. At the end of October Goring himself, admittedly with Hitler's knowledge, had held conversations with a Swedish emissary who wished to act as intermediary for peace negotiations with Britain. 48 Having heard that even Beck would be prepared to go along, Hassell told Goerdeler that he would agree to the retention or inclusion of Goring; they were agreed, however, that this could only be a transitional solution. There was no satisfac- tory basis for action, however; Hassell referred to the whole affair as 'still somewhat unmatured'. The necessary forces were not even on the horizon. During this autumn following the Polish campaign Hassell held further talks with Goerdeler, Beck, Hammerstein, Weizsacker and even with Grand Admiral Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, also with Popitz, in- directly with Schacht and again on several occasions with Goerdeler. 49 But what good was it all ? Hassell and Popitz were both equally clear: nothing was to be done so long as 'the main factor still failed them - the general prepared to act'. 50 Witzleben was thought to be the most capable but he had really no opportunity since he was now located in Bad Kreuznach, far away from Berlin. 51 Towards the end of October it became increasingly clear that Hitler was determined to seize the military initiative and order a move through Belgium and Holland; opposition activity reached a feverish pitch. 52 After the Polish campaign Klaus Bonhoeffer, Otto John and Hans von Dohnanyi had reestablished contact with Ernst von Harnack, Leber, Jakob Kaiser, Haber- mann, Winner and Leuschner. Dohnanyi had been Personal Assistant to Gurtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, until 25 August 1939, then judge of the Reich court in Leipzig and was now a Sonderfuhrer (approximately equivalent to major) in OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr under Admiral Canaris and Colonel Oster; owing to his central position he played a key role in the reestablishment of these contacts. The object was to win Brauchitsch, Haider 122 Plans, Probings and Memoranda and other commanders over to the idea of a coup before the western offensive. 53 Though basically the generals who were approached held the view that the western offensive would result in catastrophe and must be stopped, most of them thought that there would be inadequate support for a coup among the people and that it could, therefore, easily lead to civil war. It would then hard- ly be surprising, they said, if Germany's enemies exploited the situation to score some military victory or propose unacceptable peace conditions. The idea of the 'stab-in-the-back' and their oath to Hitler also figured largely in the commanders' counter-arguments. The group referred to above accordingly tried to demonstrate to the generals the real attitude of mind of the workers - like other sections of the population they wanted to have nothing to do with the war. In fact since the Polish campaign and particularly since Hitler's speech of 6 October a rumour was going round, which people were only too glad to believe, that peace negotiations were under way and the war was really at an end. 54 To provide Beck, the leading conspirator, with the necessary arguments and also to promote cooperation both before and after the coup, after much effort the group referred to, in particular Ernst von Harnack, Klaus Bonhoeffer, Otto John and Dohnanyi, arranged a meeting between Beck and Leuschner. 55 Leuschner and his friends promised that, in the event of a military putsch, they would call a general strike. As a precaution emissaries were despatched to the more important headquarters of the workers' underground movement to prepare the ground for the planned action. 56 It was also thought possible that the public might be convinced of the necessity and justification for a coup. For months Dohnanyi and Oster had been collecting material and evidence on the crimes of the Party, the SS and the Nazi leaders, on corruption in Party organizations, on criminal and immoral practices in the Hitler Youth and the SA, on profiteering, infringements of the law, brutalities, cases of rape, ill-treatment of prisoners, atrocities in Poland and anti-Jewish pogroms. The evidence was intended to be used, not only to open the eyes of the generals but also subsequently for legal pro- ceedings against the culprits and to show the people what their leaders were like. 57 The opposition's arguments were only some of those with which 'the generals' were assailed. From all interested quarters arrived memoranda explaining what a catastrophe would result from a western offensive and how it could be stopped. The spectre arose once more of a static war of attrition lasting for years with vast useless battles. The unfavourable state of the weather and ground in the autumn — mist, rain and mud — it was argued, would make it all even more catastrophic; the Navy could not operate prop- erly in fog; the Luftwaffe would be practically paralysed and the advantage of the Army's motorization, the major step forward since the First World War, in particular of the tanks, would largely be lost. 58 Moreover its own com- manders regarded the German Army as inferior to the French. 59 From all points of view, it was said, preparations were totally inadequate; a western 123 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 offensive now would be a completely irresponsible project, doomed to failure from the outset. Beck had already, at the end of September, written a memorandum headed 'On the war situation after conclusion of the Polish campaign'; it was intended for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff. 60 Beck warned against any underestimation of the Western Powers' determination after the German victory over Poland. A war with Great Britain must always be conducted as a world war since the British operational base consisted, not of the British Isles alone but of India, Canada, Africa and Australia as well. Germany would in any case be facing the economic might of the United States in the form of economic and material support to France and Britain. This could easily be followed by military support. The French and British, the memorandum continued, had not attacked because they were preparing a vast war of attrition which would be characterized by enormous 'gun-power and ammunition expenditure, barrages of incalculable duration and infantry assaults conducted on the principle: "the artillery gains the ground, the infan- try occupies it".' The war would be conducted by the Western Powers with the object of wearing Germany down and starving her out; a defensive battle of unlimited duration must be visualized; no possibility of a military decision in the west was to be seen. There were only two possibilities of forcing a deci- sion and turning the anticipated position warfare into a war of movement: either by abandoning the Siegfried Line and possibly larger areas of Germany (endangering the Ruhr area) — which was too risky; alternatively by violating neutral territory, when the disadvantages (an increase in the number and bitterness of Germany's enemies) would outweigh the advantages. No one should count on a 'miracle' such as had saved Frederick II in 1762. In a further memorandum of 10 October entitled 'The German peace offer of 6 October 1939 and the possible future course of the war' 6 ' Beck developed the ideas on length of war, attrition and the nature of real world war at which he had only hinted in his previous paper. World war, he said, would not be decided on land or even on a single continent and it had not yet even begun. To judge by all expert experience a German victory in the west was improbable, no matter whether an offensive or defensive strategy was adopted. During this period, however, serving soldiers too were to be heard voicing the same doubts as Beck. Since 1 September 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C in the West had been Colonel-General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, of whom Etzdorf said to Hassell on 27 January 1940 that of all the senior commanders he was 'the only one with whom something might be done'. 62 On 7 October 1939, with Hitler's speech of the 6th fresh in his mind, Leeb noted: 'All instructions... in- dicate that it is proposed to launch this crazy offensive, violating the neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg. Hitler's speech... was therefore merely a sop to the German people.'On 11 October hedespatched to the Commander-in- Chief of the Army a comprehensive 'Memorandum on the Prospects and Effects of an Attack on France and Britain violating the Neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg.' A copy went to Haider and the paper was shown to Colonel- 124 Plans, Probings and Memoranda General Fedor von Bock, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B. 63 In a covering letter to Brauchitsch Leeb said that in his anxiety for the future of Ger- many 'in this grave hour which will perhaps decide on the fate of our people for decades', he must address himself once more to his Commander-in-Chief with a summary of his views, since an attack on France through neutral countries was clearly in course of preparation. In general the views put forward by Leeb were similar to those of Beck. The traditional object of any war, a favourable peace, he said, was not attainable. Militarily it was impossible to inflict such a defeat on France and Britain that they would be ready to sue for peace. There followed detailed arguments and evidence to show why, in the circumstances, an offensive in the west must fail in face of French and Belgian defensive measures. The result would be exhaustion and at the best position warfare. The availability of tanks would not alter this situation; the French and British were also well provided with tanks and anti- tank guns. Ultimately the side to hold out the longest would be that possessing the greater reserves of men and material — and that was the Western Powers. Leeb then turned to the political consequences of an offensive in the west. He reached the same conclusions as Beck: the offensive could only lead to cata- strophe since Germany would place herself in the wrong by the planned viola- tion of B elgian neutrality and all those not yet ready to do so would be prepared to fight. Germany would be isolated, without allies and surrounded by enemies. Evil effects were also to be feared at home. The majority of the German people were confident that the Fuhrer wanted peace and so would be sadly disillusion- ed by the offensive and the consequential casualties. The people wanted peace, not offensives, and at any time this mood could quickly spread to the Army. Against these weighty disadvantages of the offensive, Leeb continued, the immeasurable advantages of the defensive should be considered. If the German Army in the west remained on the defensive, it was unassailable. The enemy could only attack at the price of enormous casualties and even then would not achieve his minimum objective, the destruction of the German defence capabili- ty. The economic advantages were also important. Production could continue undisturbed and thus Germany would be equipped for a long war, for which she must now be prepared. The great political advantage, however, was that the people would realize that only the unyielding attitude of Britain was keeping Germany in a state of war. People would therefore understand the purpose of the war effort and support it accordingly. On 31 October Leeb wrote once more to Brauchitsch. 64 The military posi- tion was dear, he said — German forces were totally inadequate. Much of the artillery was so badly trained that it constituted 'a greater menace to its own troops than to the enemy'. It was impossible at present to annihilate the British, the French and the Belgians militarily but there was no other military method of achieving peace. Moreover there was no necessity to attack. Ger- many already held Poland as a bargaining counter and could calmly await an enemy attack; this equally had no prospects of success; the enemy could not achieve his object by an offensive. From the bottom of their hearts the people were longing for peace. If Hitler were now to conclude peace on more or less 125 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 acceptable terms, such as reestablishment of an autonomous Czech state and a truncated Poland, no one would regard this as a sign of weakness; he would be hailed as a prince of peace. Leeb had begun his letter with the emphatic war- ning that 'in the next few days the fate of the entire German people' possibly depended on Brauchitsch. He concluded with the significant sentence: 'In these coming days I am prepared personally to range myself solidly behind you, accepting any consequences which may be desirable and necessary.' Even before Leeb Colonel-General von Bock had sent to Brauchitsch a memorandum of his own, in which, using military arguments, he warned against violation of Belgian, Luxemburg and Dutch neutrality. 65 Bock dis- cussed his views with Haider on 9 October. 66 Equally on 31 October Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander- in-Chief of Army Group A, also located in the west, handed in a memoran- dum. All the senior commanders in the west had now therefore protested against the offensive which they were to conduct. 67 Like Bock, Rundstedt deliberately avoided any political arguments and confined himself entirely to 'the soldier's sphere of responsibility'. He hoped, justifiably, that he would thereby have better prospects of making an impression on Hitler. Numerical- ly, he said the strength ratio between the German forces and those of the French, British and possibly also Belgian and Dutch was unfavourable to Ger- many and would become critical in the event of a costly offensive. The Polish campaign had shown how greatly the troops were dependent upon their com- manders in the attack since they lacked the necessary impetus on their own; losses in officers must therefore be expected to be very high and this again would reduce efficiency. 68 In the long term, therefore, superior leadership could not compensate for the strength ratio. The advantage of surprise had long since been lost. Finally Rundstedt was unable altogether to forego adducing political reasons. Germany had already miscalculated once, he said, in assuming that France and Britain would not enter the war. Since this had now happened she must be prepared for a long war and conserve her strength until the decisive moment. It was therefore better to leave the onus of attacking to the enemy; particularly in the case of the French, this would submit their determination to a test which it would not be able to withstand. Moreover, if their offensive was to have any prospect of success, the Western Powers would also have to move through Belgium. If they did so, they could be met there with the advan- tage that Germany would not have put herself in the wrong. Admittedly one could not wait for ever, otherwise Britain would have time to complete her preparations to an undesirable level. If necessary, therefore, the enemy must be forced to attack; this would assure Germany the advantages of the defen- sive and offer the best prospects of separating France and Britain. The Army having defeated Poland, it was now the task of the Navy and the Luftwaffe to take the necessary steps against Britain. On 14 October Haider noted in his diary: 'Exhaustive discussion with C-in- C on overall situation. C-in-C three possibilities: Offensive, wait, fundamen- tal changes. No overriding prospects of success for any of these, particularly 126 Plans, Probings and Memoranda not for the last since it is basically negative and produces moments of weakness. Apart from above, duty to present military views realistically and support any peace possibility.' 69 Haider had discussed the two courses of ac- tion with his Commander-in-Chief and also the anxieties voiced by Rundstedt, Bock and Leeb, the three Army Group commanders, about the western offensive, now set for November. They had discussed possible alter- natives. They did not like any of the three possibilities but they thought that the third offered the least prospects of all. 'Offensive' offered practically no prospect of success; 'wait' until Britain and France attacked entailed great risk. 'Fundamental change', however - and in this context they cannot have meant external change — they regarded as 'basically negative' and productive of 'moments of weakness'. The word 'negative' here means 'not conservative' or 'revolutionary'. They feared a vacuum, the destruction of the existing order. Haider had always been afraid of civil war and it was highly improbable that the Western Powers would fail to exploit the internal situation in Ger- many during a coup and launch an offensive. So, as soldiers, they decided to do their military duty, invariably to present the military situation realistically and, as far as possible, work for peace. 70 Bock, Rundstedt and Leeb continued their efforts to stop the western offen- sive. Bock reiterated his objections in a personal interview with Hitler on 25 October. 71 Even Colonel-General von Reichenau, reputed to be a Hitler follower and now commanding Sixth Army in Army Group B, tried to talk Hitler out of his plans. 72 He told Haider on 15 October that he had been com- missioned to do so by Brauchitsch. 73 When he first heard of the plan for the offensive on taking over his command on 10 October, Reichenau had described it as 'downright criminal'. 74 Reichenau was thought to have in- fluence with Hitler and he did in fact try to use it. In an interview with Hitler on 25 October (the same at which Bock was present) Hitler maintained that, if they did not strike now, the British would secretly move into Belgium and so prevent any possible German victory; Reichenau's reply was that he would prefer that; it was better that, if it must be, the British rather than the Ger- mans should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. This naturally made no impression on Hitler. Reichenau was so convinced of the necessity of stopping the offensive through Belgium and Holland, however, that he did something which no one would have expected of him: he had recourse to the same method as Oster and warned the Belgians of the German attack. 75 At the end of October Leeb also made further urgent representations. Brauchitsch seems to have made one attempt, perhaps only half-hearted, to dissuade Hitler from his intentions. In an interview on 16 October he put forward reasons against the offensive, but Hitler had an answer to everything. Haider did what he could but his scope was limited by his temperament, his character and his political views. Perhaps his conspiratorial activity was no more than the normal action of a General Staff officer in producing a con- tingency plan which was then pigeonholed when no executive order arrived - one can only speculate. 127 10 Haider's New Plan Since August 1939 Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Groscurth had been working in OKH as liaison officer from Ausland/Abwehr of OKW. At the same time he formed the main link between the circle of conspirators in the Abwehr and the anti-Hitler officers in OKH; he also worked closely with Weizsacker's liaison officer in OKH, Counsellor and Captain (Reserve) Dr Hasso von Etzdorf. On 20 October, writing in his office diary about attempts then under way to bring about a peace settlement through Swedish or Vatican in- termediaries, he noted: 'In all peace negotiations one is confronted by the categoric demand for the removal of Hitler and the reestablishment of Czecho in some form.' 1 This must therefore be the object. The removal of Hitler from power was as important as stopping the western offensive. The one would follow from the other. Haider knew perfectly well the role being played by Groscurth, his two staff officers Major Werner Schrader and Captain Fiedler, by Etzdorf and also General von Stiilpnagel, Deputy Chief of Staff I and Haider's official deputy. Others already involved in the conspiracy by this time were Major-General Fellgiebel, Colonel Eduard Wagner and Lieutenant-Colonel Henning von Tresckow, head of the Army Operations Section. 2 Haider agreed with what his fellow-officers were doing and encouraged them; he did not wish, however, to play an active part himself unless 'the Fatherland was in danger', a general phrase never more precisely defined. On one occasion when Haider objected that the psychological climate was unfavourable, Beck replied that, according to information from Leuschner and Kaiser, the workers were extremely opposed to the war and in favour of a coup; a general strike was being prepared in support of it. Haider answered ill-humouredly that, if that were so, then the workers should initiate the coup from below. 3 Nevertheless Haider continued to plan and prepare for a coup t risking his neck in the process, as he well knew. He was convinced, however, that it could not be carried out without his Commander-in-Chief. In this, the events of 20 July 1944 proved Haider partially right. Stauffenberg was then Chief of Staff of the Replacement Army and his orders were not carried out because they lacked the backing of his Commander-in-Chief; a Chief of Staff alone had no command authority over the troops. If Brauchitsch would cooperate, well and good; plans were ready and could be carried out. The murder of Hitler might pave the way both for the coup itself and for Brauchitsch's participation but, if 128 Haider's New Plan Brauchitsch refused, he, Haider, could do nothing. As Chief of Staff only some outstanding personality of exceptional energy and authority could possibly have by-passed his Commander-in-Chief and himself seized command authority. Haider was no such personality. He deserves credit rather than blame for recognizing the fact. In autumn 1939 and on many occasions until summer 1942 Haider wondered whether he should murder Hitler. 4 For weeks, during his visits to the Reich Chancellery, he carried a loaded revolver in his pocket in order to shoot Hitler. He told Groscurth so at the time and confirmed it later, though only when confronted with Groscurth's diaries. Groscurth wrote in his private diary on 1 November 1939: 'With tears in his eyes H[alder] said he had been going to see Emil [Hitler] with a pistol in his pocket for weeks in order possibly to shoot him down/ Yet he was never even near making up his mind to use his weapon - this is characteristic of Haider's whole attitude during all coup d'etat preparations. In his heart he was against assassination but he knew perfectly well that it could not be done any other way. He carried a loaded revolver around with him but never fired it. He complained to Oster that someone should have murdered Hitler long ago but equally that this should not be regarded as the duty of a man in a senior official capacity; in other countries, he said, some private individual or desperado would have been commissioned to do it. In 1942 Haider told Etzdorf that, to assassinate Hitler, one had to be born to be an assassin, and he had not been born to be one. 5 Such was his dilemma — and his tragic inconsistency. During the weeks following 14 October Haider became increasingly con- vinced of the necessity of a coup involving use of force. Finally, certainly no later than 31 October or 2 November, Haider and Stiilpnagel gave Groscurth and his group the go-ahead for preparation of a coup. 6 They revived the 1938 plans and modified them to suit the changed circumstances. As in 1938, the capital was to be surrounded and occupied by troops; Party, Gestapo and SS headquarters were to be raided; radio transmitters and studios and all telegraph offices were to be occupied. General Hoepner was to move a Panzer division to Berlin. 7 General von Falkenhausen, who had been in command of Military District IV (Dresden) since the end of August, had agreed to par- ticipate with the forces he could control. 8 Guderian, commanding XIX Corps, was also to participate. 9 Haider himself later recalled having held two or three Panzer divisions back east of the Elbe so that they could be used for the coup. 10 Among the plans kept in a safe in Army Headquarters, Zossen, was a 'study' by Oster. 11 It was a plan of action for the revolt and included lists of leading personalities and officials of the regime who were to be done away with, together with names for the new government to be formed. 12 Hitler, Ribbentrop, Himmler, Heydrich, Goring, Goebbels and 'Dietrich' (presumably Sepp Dietrich, commander of the 'SS Leibstandarte') were to be arrested; provisional governmental authority was to be exercised by a trium- virate led by Beck. 13 Among those involved were listed the following: Witzleben, Hoepner, 'Geyer' (probably Lieutenant-General Geyr von Schweppenburg, commanding a Panzer division), Falkenhausen, Reichenau, 129 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Schacht, Goerdeler, Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, Josef Wagner the Gauleiter and Helldorf. Troops to be used consisted of 9 Infantry Regi- ment (Potsdam), 3 Artillery Regiment (Frankfurt on Oder) and 15 Panzer Regiment stationed in Sagan. 14 Concentration of these units was far more difficult and far less certain than in 1938. Dohnanyi prepared proclamations, approved and redrafted by Beck and Oster, for the information of the public. 15 They said that Hitler had ordered an offensive in the west involving violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality and this could only bring enormous misery to Germany. To prevent this Colonel- General (retd) Ludwig Beck had decided to resume active service and he had taken over the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, offered him by Brauchitsch, and also command of the entire WehrmachL The F'uhrer was ill and had been badly advised by his staff; he would temporarily withdraw from official business. Ribbentrop, Himmler and Goring had been arrested because they had themselves attempted to arrest the officers responsible for the pre- sent measures. Goring had embezzled millions out of the taxes paid by workers; Himmler had imprisoned thousands of innocent people; proofs were available and would be published shortly. The Gestapo and Propaganda Ministry were to be abolished; Beck would shortly call fresh elections; as proof of the genuine efforts being made for peace, the black-out was to be lifted. Oster had also compiled a list of people who were to be involved from the outset; it included: Goerdeler, Hassell, Schacht, Gisevius, Nebe, Helldorf, Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, Liedig, Heinz, Witzleben, Hoepner, Olbricht and Reichenau. One of the drafts (in Canaris' handwriting) emphasized that the coup should not be declared too soon as being directed against Hitler and the story should be spread that criminal and corrupt elements in the Party had formed a conspiracy which had now been frustrated by the Wehrmacht. Despite all these preparations and, indeed, explicit commitments Haider and Brauchitsch remained the major doubtful factors in the conspiracy. In October Canaris noted in his diary that he saw no further possibility of in- fluencing Haider; he invariably listened to everything and then produced threadbare reasons for doing nothing. 16 Other members of the conspiracy were equally sceptical. 17 Meanwhile the indications multiplied that Hitler would insist on his western offensive. Rapid action was therefore necessary. The question was: what action, so long as the military would not cooperate. This wait-and-see attitude seemed to the civilians both impractical and irresponsible, so they used the only weapon available to them and drafted memoranda. Ernst von Harnack and Otto John drafted one, intended for Brauchitsch, setting out the real opinion among the people. 18 It was in effect a manifesto from Popitz and Goerdeler for the conservative Right, from Josef Wirmer and Jakob Kaiser for the Catholic bourgeoisie, from Bernhard Letterhaus for the Catholic working class, Ernst von Harnack and Julius Leber for the underground socialist party and Wilhelm Leuschner for the trade unionists showing that they were all united behind Beck. In a letter to Beck Prince Louis Ferdinand declared that he was ready, if called upon. Like 130 Haider's New Plan Haider, however, Brauchitsch maintained that if the workers were really so anti-Hitler, then they should overthrow him by means of a general strike. When Leuschner heard this from Dohnanyi he was furious and said that these gentlemen, the officers, would then, of course, open fire on the workers - they had always fired on the Left but never on the Right. About this time Kordt and Etzdorf together with Groscurth drafted an im- pressive memorandum entitled 'The threatening calamity." 9 It said that if Hitler clung to his decision to attack in the west and invade Belgium, this would mean the end of Germany. The offensive would be halted owing to the weather and the strength of the enemy; if German troops invaded French territory, the French will to fight would increase rather than decrease; the United States and countries now still neutral would enter the war; Italy would move over to the enemy side; Russia would help herself in areas where no one could stop her. Neither the German war economy nor morale could withstand such a coalition; the results would be the collapse and bolshevization of Ger- many or at best her dismemberment. Consequently: 'Steps must be taken to stop the invasion order reaching the execution phase. This can only be done by an early overthrow of the Hitler government. Experience has shown that it will neither adjust its plans nor give way as a result of argument, protest or threat of resignation from the military leaders alone.' It was not a valid objection, the memorandum continued, that Hitler had scored many successes so far. They were spurious successes or alternatively the result of some natural development which would have taken place sooner or later without Hitler. This applied to Germany's recovery of her sovereignty in military matters, to the Austrian Anschluss and to the 'inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the German sphere of influence'. The occupation by force of the rump of Czechoslovakia had brought severe disadvantages to Germany. Had this not happened, the Polish campaign could have been conducted without provoking the Western Powers to support the Poles - a remark clear- ly intended for military ears. Hitler's prognostications had proved wrong. Bri- tain and France had entered the war and Italy had revoked. Hitler's internal political successes should also not be adduced as an argu- ment against his overthrow. In 1929—32 unemployment had been a problem common to all industrial states; similarly the post-1932 recovery had not been confined to Germany; most other countries, however, had achieved it without the enormous mortgaging and dissipation of the national assets which had oc- curred in Germany. It was equally useless to say that all was now in order and petty quarrels of the political parties had disappeared. Instead of a single national authority there were now numerous semi-independent rulers; alongside the Wehrmacht there were several defence formations neither con- trolled nor influenced by the national armed forces; instead of a unified ad- ministration there was now dispersion of authority as a result of duplication of authority between Party and State and the chaos of semi-independent local potentates; instead of good order there was demoralization, indiscipline and corruption; instead of the rule of law, arbitrary action. In reality, therefore, Germany had never been so close to bolshevism as she was now; she had even 131 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 been prepared to hand over twenty million men in Eastern Europe to Russian domination. Equally it should not be argued that neither the people nor the Army nor officialdom 'up to stupidity level' would understand a coup because of the Fuhrer's successes and consequent great hopes for the future. Time-honoured experience showed that a debacle was only recognized when it happened — 'Then admittedly a coup would be popular but it would be too late to avert the calamity into which, with our fine Polish laurels, we should all be plunged, whether with Hitler or without him. Once loosed from its cage, the Fury of war cannot be tempted back again by reason. War obeys its own inexorable laws and every army primarily wants to win, in other words in present-day terms to annihilate.' The indisputable fact had to be faced that the con- spirators were engaged in overthrowing a government which was at present victorious — 'The comparative unpopularity of the venture must therefore be faced with the necessary degree of civil courage. 1 After the fall of Hitler the public would be so clearly informed of the crimes which he had committed and was planning that they would accept the coup. 20 Finally the objection that a soldier must abide by his oath was entirely fallacious. The soldier's oath had long since lapsed since Hitler had not observed his own obligations but was in process of sacrificing Germany to his own crazy purposes. A soldier's loyalty could therefore only be given to his country. An example of a German patriot placing his conscience and his duty to his country above the formal requirements of his oath was that of General Yorck at Tauroggen in 1812 when he concluded a treaty of neutrality with a Russian general, although his King was still at war with Russia. If, therefore, people wished to work towards the conclusion of peace, action must be taken soon. An acceptable and honourable peace could only be con- cluded while Germany still possessed some weight militarily. 'Action by those desirous of preserving the country', in other words a conservative coup, only had prospects of success provided military defeat could be avoided. Thereafter it would be too late; a successor government to a defeated one could no longer obtain good terms. An honourable peace was still obtainable on the basis of the Munich Conference, establishment of overland com- munications between the Reich and East Prussia and incorporation of the eastern Upper Silesian industrial area. Therefore it was not necessary to forego the fruits of the Polish victory. By such a solution, on the other hand, Germany would not be 'burdened with foreign nationalities' and at the same time would retain 'overriding influence in the rump of Czecho and the rump of Poland'. The victories won with the sword need not therefore be marred by the pen-pushing of the diplomats. Moderation in the conclusion of peace was at least as important as military victory in the campaign, as Bismarck had shown at Nikolsburg in 1866. The situation was therefore clear and the necessity of a coup had been proved. The only remaining question was how to carry it out. The programme for this was only given in outline in the memorandum: 21 Conclusion of an honourable peace; reestablishment of the rule of law primarily by 132 Haider's New Plan guaranteeing personal liberties and the disbandment of the Gestapo; honest administration on traditional Prussian lines; popular participation in the determination of political aims; measures for 'just and genuinely German (Prussian) socialism' and for 'Christian moral regeneration'. To implement this programme local military commanders were to assume executive authori- ty, news media such as the radio and press to be controlled, telephone in- stallations and power stations to be occupied and 'purges' carried out. With its perilously frank speaking this memorandum was a rousing docu- ment. It was submitted to a number of generals including Haider, Brauchitsch and Witzleben. 22 But what effect did it have ? Haider had known since 22 October that Hitler proposed to order the offen- sive in the west for Sunday 12 November; so for the first time there was a definite date. 23 Two days later Haider was told by senior Army commanders that the date was unacceptable. Brauchitsch made every effort to explain the obstacles and difficulties to Hitler. 24 Naturally the conspirators also quickly learnt of the date; Oster in particular was an official recipient of such informa- tion and on 25 October he discussed it in Zossen with Stiilpnagel, Deputy Chief of Staff I in OKH. 25 On 25 October Hitler interviewed Haider and Brauchitsch in the Reich Chancellery and details of the opening situation for the offensive and the lines of attack were discussed. 26 There was apparently no argument but at a sub- sequent meeting with Hitler that afternoon Bock and Reichenau raised objec- tion on the grounds of inadequate preparation and the weather. About 1 p.m. on 27 October, a Friday, Brauchitsch, Haider, ten generals, one colonel, one lieutenant and one 2nd lieutenant were received by Hitler in the Reich Chancellery and all were decorated with the Knight's Cross. 27 After lunch Brauchitsch and Haider held a discussion with Hitler when they un- successfully attempted to dissuade him from the date ordered. Hitler insisted on 12 November. Brauchitsch was 'exhausted and downcast'. 28 At 10 a.m. next morning Haider attended on Hitler once more and explained all kinds of difficulties, but Hitler adhered to his viewpoint. 29 That afternoon Haider discussed with Stiilpnagel the results of his inter- views with Hitler and on the 29th he decided to send Stiilpnagel on a tour of front-line units. 30 Stiilpnagel had asked Haider simply to lock Brauchitsch up and act on his own, should Brauchitsch refuse to cooperate; his task now was to establish whether 'people like von Bock.. . Manstein and Rundstedt' would obey Haider, should he appeal to them. 31 Haider did not think they would, but Stiilpnagel wished to see what might eventuate. The official purpose of the journey was to inform senior commanders of changes in the concentration plans and intentions in the west. 32 On Haider's own admission the result was negative. 33 Rundstedt and Bock, the Commanders-in-Chief of Army Groups A and B, were admittedly against the western offensive but they were a long way from cooperating in a coup d'etat. Rundstedt was afraid that his officers would not follow him, or at least not as a whole, and that the instrument with which he had been entrusted would break in his hand. 34 133 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Colonel-General von Leeb, commanding Army Group C, on the other hand, declared himself unreservedly ready to participate and explicitly reiterated this statement later. Witzleben, whose First Army belonged to Army Group C, was also ready. 35 But this was not enough for Haider. It was still conceivable that some of Leeb's troops could be sent to Berlin or possibly that the coup could be attempted solely with troops available in the vicinity of the city. This, however, would have necessitated the support of General Fromm, Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army, or at least his cooperation in authorizing the necessary movements. He had already replied in the negative to a similar question, however, in 1938. Now during one of his regular visits to Zossen on 31 October or in the first few days of November Haider specifically drew Fromm's attention to the necessity of stopping the western offensive. 36 He, Haider, he said, was proposing, with the assistance of a reliable division, to arrest Hitler and the Retch government and remove them in order to bring about a peaceful settlement. Fromm gave him no answer and returned to Berlin. He asked Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt Haseloff, his Chief of Staff, what he made of Haider's remarks; Haseloff replied that Haider had evidently at last made up his mind to initiate a coup and was ready to commit treason. Fromm nodded and told Haseloff to note the matter in his office diary. A few days later Fromm told Brauchitsch of the incident and thenceforth considered the affair ended as far as he was con- cerned. 37 So Fromm held aloof, covered up both ways but still did not betray his fellow-officer. He was entitled to assume that Haider would not have made such proposals without the knowledge of his superior. Brauchitsch never men- tioned the matter to Haider. 38 Fromm's refusal to participate in a coup, however, showed Brauchitsch and Haider what the prospects were, for without the agreement, in fact the cooperation, of the Replacement Army troop movements inside Germany were scarcely conceivable in wartime. All this merely reinforced Brauchitsch in his attitude of non-cooperation or caution. Another of Haider's fears could neither be dissipated nor refuted. What would be the reaction of the people, particularly the workers, to a coup ? Beck and others were telling him that the people would understand; Dohnanyi and Oster had assembled material from which they could produce rapid and effec- tive propaganda. Their information was certainly still applicable in autumn 1939. Haider, however, as he later admitted, preferred to believe his chauffeur's father and others not directly involved in the conspiracy. They told him that the people were not yet ready. 39 Admittedly it might be too late when they finally were. What Haider found so disturbing in connection with the entire enterprise, however, was its incalculability. In the General Staff one could plan, calculate and make the necessary forces and resources available. If an operation went wrong, one could calmly examine the mistakes and perhaps avoid them next time. But with a coup d'etat there would be no next time; one was risking one's neck. And if one was not sure of a thing, was not one risking too much ? Civil war - unpreparedness of the masses - these were simply phrases expressing uncertainty. 134 Haider's New Plan Haider was not, of course, totally wrong when he said that no one could know whether the Western Powers would not exploit the momentary weakness caused by a coup to carry out an offensive, also when he maintained that he had no assurances of any sort. Dr Miiller's negotiations in Rome had so far produced no result. 40 He had adequate reasons for thinking the coup im- practical. But — and herein lay the inconsistency stemming from his character and the highly ambiguous situation as viewed by an officer — he did not aban- don all idea of some 'action'. 41 Meanwhile the planned date for the offensive drew nearer. Brauchitsch and Haider were due to leave for a tour of inspection of the front but before this Beck came up with a further memorandum dated 31 October and entitled 'Breathing space after the failure of the German peace offer.' 42 It is hardly like- ly that either Haider or Brauchitsch had read it before they left. 43 In any case they probably regarded this stream of memoranda more as unwelcome in- terference in their official business than as a reinforcement of their views. Once more Beck attempted to show, with all possible emphasis, what catastrophic effects continuation of the war must have. Though this state- ment had often been made before, he said, highly important, in fact decisive proof of its accuracy had meanwhile appeared: on 27 October the United States Senate had followed the House of Representatives in lifting the arms embargo imposed as a result of the US declaration of neutrality on the outbreak of war. 44 France and Britain could now be supplied. For political, economic and strategic reasons (the blockade), however, Germany was barred from deliveries of arms and war material. The accuracy of another forecast was also daily becoming clearer - the isolation of Germany in Europe. The Franco—Anglo—Turkish pact of 19 October 45 was proof of that. The pact would tie Italy's hands in the eastern Mediterranean, reinforce the position of the Western Powers in the Middle East and encourage the peoples of South- eastern Europe to resist Russian expansionist policy with the result that all these countries would be lost to Germany as partners. Finally by abandoning the Baltic States and Finland Germany had forfeited both these and the Scan- dinavian countries. Germany now stood alone in Europe while the threat of a European anti-German coalition was growing all the time. All this was followed once more by thoughts on the prospects of a German offensive in the west leading to the well-known negative conclusions. Beck concluded with an unequivocal demand: 'It becomes daily more urgent to draw the political conclusions from such a situation'; if this was not done, he said, and if'the military instrument' should suffer a reverse, it would be threatened with demoralization. Whether or not Brauchitsch and Haider had read Beck's memorandum they basically reached the same conclusions as a result of their tour of inspection. They left on the evening of 1 November; they spent 2 November in Army Group B's area, the morning with Sixth Army in Dusseldorf and the afternoon with Fourth and Second Armies in Cologne; the next morning they were in Army Group A's area with Twelfth Army in Mayen and in the afternoon with Sixteenth Army in Bad Bertrich. 46 Result: 'An offensive with extensive objec- 135 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 lives cannot be carried out at this time ... None of the senior headquarters regard the offensive ordered by OKW as likely to succeed. From the point of view of land warfare a decisive victory cannot be anticipated.' 47 On 4 November Haider discussed 'future measures' with Brauchitsch. 48 On the afternoon of that day he interviewed General Thomas who submitted data showing the great risk to the supply of war material and food in the event of attack in the west. Thomas also showed Haider a memorandum containing far-reaching warnings, in the compilation of which Oster, Dohnanyi and Gisevius had been involved. It also dealt with the initial optimistic reports from Dr Josef Mu'ller on his soundings in the Vatican. 49 Haider agreed with Thomas and referred to the murder of Hitler as the most practical solution. On 31 October Haider had already passed a form of codeword to Oster through Groscurth; Goerdeler and Beck were asked to hold themselves in readiness. To Groscurth Haider expressed the hope that arrangements could be made for Hitler, Goring and Ribbentrop to meet with 'fatal accidents'. 50 Groscurth said to Haider and Etzdorf, if only some Macedonians could be found and a hatred of Hitler could be generated in them through some Macedonian gravamina, some money and alcohol added and the belief in a 10 per cent chance of survival - then the assassination of Hitler would be a foregone conclusion. 51 Groscurth, Oster, Etzdorf, Fiedler and other conspirators at once set to work on the immediate preparations; they assumed that Haider had at last made up his mind since he had told his deputy Stiilpnagel, who had also just returned from a tour in the west, that preparations should now proceed. On return from his own tour Haider seemed even more determined than before and on 4 November he reiterated his instructions, this time to Oster as well, that the previous year's plans should be refurbished and completed. In addi- tion to Beck and Goerdeler, Schacht was also asked (through Colonel Eduard Wagner) to hold himself in readiness. All sorts of rumours were circulating, including one to the effect that Hitler was to be arrested on 7 or 8 November while reviewing troops in the neighbourhood of Berlin. 52 Meanwhile, without Haider's direct knowledge, an assassination attempt on Hitler was being planned. Erich Kordt had made up his mind to do it, having reached the conclusion with Oster that, if the support of the generals was to be obtained for a coup, they must be freed from the in- hibitions associated with their oath and from their fascination with the dic- tator's sleepwalking sureness of touch. Kordt was to be given the necessary explosive by Oster on 11 November but the project came to nothing since, after the assassination attempt in the Biirgerbrdukeller on 8 November, the material could no longer be obtained. 53 At midday on 5 November, shortly after his return from his tour of the front, Brauchitsch had an interview with Hitler. This was a vital day for the opposition since everyone hoped that, if Hitler clung to his timing for the offensive, Brauchitsch would decide in favour of the coup. The decision had to be taken by 1 p.m. that day since the timetable was one still demanding seven days warning. 54 The interview lasted twenty minutes and was heated if not 136 Haider's New Plan stormy on both sides. 55 Brauchitsch once more put forward his view that owing to inadequate preparation and in view of the unfavourable conditions a western offensive at this time would not be successful but would probably be catastrophic. When he said that the attitude and morale of the troops left much to be desired and could not be compared with that of the men of 1914, Hitler began to rage and wanted evidence and proof forthwith showing units in which cases of indiscipline had occurred and the number of death sentences pronounced — as if morale could be expressed in figures. He wanted to fly to the front himself that very night and convince himself; he did not believe Brauchitsch (who had in fact exaggerated somewhat). Hitler equally refused to accept the Commander-in-Chiefs other arguments, rejecting them in insulting and humiliating terms. The Army just did not wish to fight, he said; this was why rearmament had progressed so lackadaisically; this was why they were not ready now. The weather would be just as unfavourable in the spring and in any case it rained not only on our own troops but on the enemy as well. As Haider noted on hearing Brauchitsch's ac- count, it was simply not possible to talk to Hitler on these matters. Finally Hitler simply left the General standing and went out of the room. Brauchitsch returned from the Reich Chancellery, his face white with anger and humiliation. 56 In his almost uncontrollable rage over the recalcitrance of his generals Hitler poured scorn on the 'spirit of Zossen' which he said was tantamount to cowardice. It almost looked as if he suspected the existence of a conspiracy and in fact a fairly large group of those planning the coup were located in OKH. Sweeping judgements were not unusual with Hitler but it was impossible to tell how much he knew and he must at least have realized that an attempt was being made to persuade him to avoid further bloodshed. 57 Hitler now immediately (1.30 p.m.) issued the order expected for 1 p.m. By the afternoon or early evening of 5 November it had reached Zossen in writing. Troop movements continued for two full days before they were once more called off. 58 Haider took to heart Hitler's threats against the 'spirit of Zossen'. No one had forgotten 30 June 1934 and Hitler was thought quite capable of repeating the procedure. Haider, however, seemed to forget that he himself was wanting to engineer a putsch precisely because such a thing was possible under the existing system. He was seized with panic. The most elementary precautions now seemed to demand the destruction of all evidence which might confirm Hitler's suspicion. The Gestapo might be in Zossen in a few hours, perhaps even sooner. Immediately on his return to Zossen Haider ordered the destruc- tion of all papers connected with the coup. 59 Much was destroyed but many papers were saved through the efforts of Dohnanyi and Groscurth. 60 Towards evening and during the next few days it became obvious that Hitler was in complete ignorance and the dreaded purge did not take place. 61 Shortly after 3 p.m. on 5 November, after Brauchitsch's 'initiative' had failed, Haider, now back in Zossen, told Groscurth of the outcome of the inter- view; the offensive in the west must now go forward, he said; there was 137 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 nothing to be done about it. 62 The coup could not take place. Groscurth recorded Haider's words: 'Thus the forces who had been counting on us are no longer under obligation. You understand what I mean.' The only explanations for the change in Haider's attitude are panic, inability to make up his mind, insincerity or the belated realization that he could not count on Brauchitsch, who had command authority over the troops. Conditions for the coup were favourable. Haider had in fact been deter- mined to strike if Hitler insisted on the offensive in the west and this had now happened. If for a time he felt that without some special protective force he was sitting in Zossen defenceless against an incursion by the SS, it soon proved that there was to be no such incursion. Moreover a guard unit could have been obtained, as subsequently became clear. By the afternoon Brauchitsch had more or less recovered his equanimity and he was still of the opinion that the offensive must be stopped. How this was to be done, however, he now expressly left to others; he told Haider that in any case he himself would not embark on anything, not even if someone else did so, but he, Brauchitsch, would not resist 'if someone else does it'. 63 Thereupon Haider plucked up courage once more. As already mentioned, one can only speculate why he did not at last initiate the coup\ all the conditions were favourable; the Gestapo and SS did not appear and Brauchitsch had explicitly given him freedom to act. Gisevius was proved right in his scep- ticism regarding Haider's determination. 64 Nevertheless at 5 p.m. Haider spoke to Groscurth once more and com- missioned him to tell Canaris of the state of affairs, asking him at the same time to have Hitler removed by assassination. Groscurth had fulfilled his mis- sion by 8 p.m. 65 Canaris was incensed at this buck-passing by Haider — rightly but to the detriment of the opposition. 66 He was a sensitive man and detested assassina- tion and suchlike methods; he wished to run his secret service 'decently'. 67 He accordingly sent word to Haider that the possibilities of a military putsch must first be explored and it was for Haider himself to assume both the in- itiative and the responsibility. 68 The following day, 6 November, Etzdorf went to Haider while Oster also visited Zossen to discuss with Stulpnagel and Wagner whether the old plans for action against the SS and Gestapo could not be revived on the pretext of an SS putsch against Hitler. Gisevius was already revising the relevant drafts. 69 Haider had recently stated that he would gladly engineer a coup d'etat but without Witzleben he was unfortunately powerless. 70 When Oster heard of this he put through a call from Zossen to Witzleben in Bad Kreuznach suggesting that he (Witzleben) ask for a visit from him (Oster) so that the matter might be discussed in more detail. 71 Witzleben accordingly called Groscurth in Zossen and asked him to get Canaris to send Oster down to him for a 'consultation'. 72 Oster was authorized by Canaris to go to Witzleben and take Gisevius with him. 73 They first went to General Thomas (after Oster had warned Sas, the Dutch Military Attache^ of the proposed date of attack) and discussed plans 138 Haider's New Plan with him. Thomas declared himself ready to go to the three Army Group Commanders in the hope of winning them also over to the project. 74 Finally Beck was also informed; he had heard of Brauchitsch's remark that he would not stand in the way of a coup and had declared himself ready to assume com- mand of the Army. 75 The journey to Bad Kreuznach had to be broken in Frankfurt. There Oster spoke to Lieutenant-Colonel Vincenz Mu'ller, Colonel-General von Leeb's Operations Officer, and tried to persuade him to participate but with only limited success. On 8 November Oster and Gisevius arrived at Witzleben's headquarters, explained the situation and put forward their proposals. 76 At almost the same time Witzleben had to halt the troop movements already in progress. Witzleben was very pessimistic over the prospects of a coup. No further hopes could be placed on Brauchitsch and Haider, he said; he had seen them during their tour of the west and there was no further object in talking to them about a coup. 11 Moreover the junior officers were far too prejudiced in favour of Hitler; no one could tell whose orders they would carry out. 78 If the Army Group Commanders refused to carry out the order to attack, then things might be got on the move again. This was the only conceivable solu- tion. Oster and Gisevius pressed Witzleben to go to Haider and talk to him, but he refused to do so on his own initiative. Finally, however, he said he was ready to do so, provided that Leeb, his Commander-in-Chief, agreed. Oster and Gisevius then drove back to Frankfurt where again they had to spend the night. On 14 November Haider received Witzleben's request for an interview but the meeting never took place. 79 Instead, on 13 November, Stiilpnagel arrived in Frankfurt and held a dis- cussion with Witzleben. Both were agreed that efforts must be pursued. Simultaneously Lieutenant-Colonel von Tresckow of the Operations Section in OKH was working on his uncle, Colonel-General von Bock, and Stiilpnagel on corps and divisional commanders such as Lieutenant-General Geyr von Schweppenburg — but without success. In addition ever since 5 November Haider had been systematically dismantling the preparatory measures for the coup, although he did not openly admit it. Later Haider told General Thomas it was not possible 'to act' against Hitler, firstly because it was against tradi- tion, secondly because there was no successor, thirdly because the younger officers were not 'reliable', fourthly because the mood among the population was not ripe for it, fifthly because Germany must not be a people of English helots, and sixthly that he, Haider, was not afraid of history's judgement con- cerning the forthcoming offensive, for Ludendorff, too, had conducted an offensive in 1918 against everyone's advice and the judgement of history was not against him. 80 Owing to unfavourable weather conditions the earliest date for the opening of the offensive was then postponed to 19 November. Hitler went off 'on tour' in order to deliver his annual speech in Munich on 8 November com- memorating the 1923 putsch; he therefore suddenly became inaccessible, par- ticularly to foreign diplomats. 81 He had no wish to be bothered by the peace mediation offer made on 7 November by the King of the Belgians and the 139 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Queen of the Netherlands, a development to which (without his knowledge) three of his officers had contributed — Reichenau, Oster and Colonel Warli- mont. Without knowing of Oster's contacts Reichenau and Warlimont had gained touch with certain Dutch, Belgian and Danish agencies; Oster had not only warned Sas, the Dutch Military Attache^ but on 6 November had despatched Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff to the Dutch Legation with news of the intended attack in the west. 82 On the evening of 8 November while, as the military say, there was 'nothing to report', Groscurth was sitting by his radio and listening to Hitler's speech in the Burgerbrduke Her on the Rosenheimer Strasse, Munich; it ended at 9.07 p.m. 83 What happened thirteen minutes later Groscurth only learnt at two minutes before midnight when he received a call from Section III (Counter- intelligence and Counter-espionage) of the OKVfAusland/Abwehr in Berlin: at 9.20 an attempt had been made to assassinate Hitler; he had escaped, apparent- ly by accident, because he had left the building immediately after his speech. 84 The assailant, a lone wolf named Georg Elser, had come so incredibly near to success that all sorts of extravagant rumours began to circulate. First a foreign secret service was said to be behind it, then some dissatisfied Party members and finally even the Gestapo was held responsible. One version was that the attempt stemmed in some way or other from within Hitler's own ranks but that he had been warned in time; it was therefore possible that it was a propaganda trick and on 9 November this was thought by theAbwehr in Berlin to be the most likely explanation. Groscurth heard of it on the afternoon of that day and noted it down in his diary. 85 There was vast confusion. Many of the conspirators thought that the attempt had come from resistance circles, from within their own ranks; for ob- vious reasons they seldom knew precisely what groups other than their own were doing. Many Germans, on the other hand, simply did an about-turn and Hitler became the object of a wave of sympathy; the atmosphere was one of irrational reaction. When, on 9 November, the British agents Stevens and Best were kidnapped on the Dutch frontier and taken into German custody, many people simply added two and two together. Everything fitted - the Dutch-Belgian offer of mediation, now exposed as a dishonest swindle by the capture of British agents working on Dutch soil with Dutch officers, the assassination attempt and now the arrest of the agents. For others, however, confusion became even greater. 86 Meanwhile the western offensive had merely been postponed (to 19 November from 9 November), not abandoned; efforts to stop it and end the war therefore had to continue. 87 On 10 November, via Groscurth, Gisevius submitted a thesis to Haider in which he explained that this was the moment for the Army to take Hitler under its 'protection'; the SS had dearly proved itself incapable of doing so, and in any case much connected with the assassination attempt pointed to murky machinations by Party circles; the opportunity for something on the lines of a coup d'etat was now particularly favourable. 88 Haider was naturally no more inclined towards adventures of this nature than before. When Groscurth submitted Gisevius' memorandum 140 Haider's New Plan to him on 12 November, he said that he would tear it up unread. When Groscurth saw it still lying on Haider's desk next morning, however, Haider gave him to understand that, not only had he read it but he agreed with Gisevius' ideas and had also shown the memorandum to Brauchitsch. The latter was basically in agreement with Gisevius' views but this did nothing to change his vacillating attitude. 89 Haider felt that he was being pestered by the conspirators. In addition, however, to his embarrassment at having left his fellow-conspirators in the lurch, he had further cause for vexation. He had heard that, when visiting Bad Kreuznach and Frankfurt, Oster had gone around somewhat imprudently with copies of the proclamations to be made by Beck after the coup. 90 Witzleben had been horrified that Oster should be carrying anything like that in his car; a traffic accident could have blown the whole conspiracy. Lieutenant-Colonel Mu'ller had been equally taken aback and, when shown a copy of the proclama- tion, had made Oster burn it in an ashtray before his eyes. Oster, however, had at least one other copy with him. When Oster and Gisevius had spent the night in Frankfurt on the return journey, that evening Oster had launched into such a tirade against the regime in the mess that his friends had had to push him into another room to avoid a major scandal. Such things did not redound to the credit of the conspiracy. Haider and Brauchitsch now had adequate reason (or excuse) to keep their distance from the opposition. Disillusionment grew. Colonel-General von Leeb too had made little progress with his efforts. Major-General von Sodernstern, his Chief of Staff, arranged a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of Army Groups A, B and C at the headquarters of Army Group A in Koblenz for 9 November. 91 Oster had some hope that this would result in a threat to Brauchitsch of concerted resignation by the Commanders-in-chief. In fact they merely agreed to continue to do what they could to postpone the opening of the offensive by means of arguments and objections in order to give the diplomats time to reach, by negotiation, the agreement which they hoped for and thought possible. 92 Rundstedt and Bock refused to agree to a more far-reaching proposal by Leeb that the three Com- manders-in-chief together should demand that Brauchitsch intervene once more with Hitler against the offensive and, if he refused, should all three resign. 93 On 7 November motorized movement was provisionally halted until the evening of 9 November; at the same time the earliest date for the offensive was laid down as the 15th and two days later as the 19th. 94 On 13 November Hitler's decision was again postponed to the 16th which meant that the attack could not start before the 22nd. On the 16th the decision was again postponed to the 20th, putting the earliest date of attack at 3 December. The generals tolerated without objection this senseless hithering and thithering, these announcements and cancellations of the offensive, and the disorderly procedure or the impatience of their Supreme Commander. Hitler, however, was sick of hearing continuous arguments against the offensive. Ac- cordingly, in the space of seven hours on 23 November, he delivered three ad- 141 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 dresses in the New Reich Chancellery to leaders of the Wehrmacht.^ Hitler made his first, and major, speech at midday to Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Luftwaffe, Army Groups, Armies and Air Fleets, Corps Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff and the corresponding ranks in the Navy and Luftwaffe together with a number of staff officers from OKH and OKW. In all 180 people were present. 96 He began by recounting his successes. From his exit from the League of Nations through to the Polish campaign the prophets had always croaked and warned, but nevertheless all had gone well. He drew the strength to make his decisions from the realization that the only purpose of the state was to serve the 'substance' of the people, in Germany's case that of 82 million men. Battle was the destiny of all creatures; no one could avoid it; he who did not fight was condemned to ruin beforehand. There could therefore be no thought of adapting the size of the population to its Lebensraum', that was cowardice, weakness, genocide and ruin. Instead Lebensraum must be adapted to the size of the population. Consequently there must be battle - 'I have long wondered whether I ought to strike first in the east and then in the west. I have not set up the Wehrmacht in order not to use it. The decision to strike has always been in my bones. Sooner or later I wished to solve the problem.' 97 At present, he continued, the situation was unique. Ever since 1870 Ger- many had had to reckon with a war on two fronts but now, for the first time since the foundation of the Reich, she could fight the West without having to fear an intervention from Russia. No man could tell how long this would con- tinue. In every respect time was working for the enemy who was accelerating his rearmament. Meanwhile, however, he (Hitler), who was irreplaceable, might fall victim to assassination. He had recent experience of the dangers of a statesman's life. The fate of the Reich depended on him alone; he would attack and never capitulate. Hitler was, of course, unable to advance really convincing foreign policy reasons for his views, since there were none. His arguments were those of the fiendish nihilist revolutionary. He had to have all or nothing - he would never capitulate — he would stand or fall in this struggle — he would not survive the defeat of his people - dark, threatening, sinister words which the Fuhrer was to repeat in April 1945 shortly before his suicide. It is striking how frequently he spoke of capitulation while initially he scored victory after victory and prophesied more. His road was the road to destruction, as he said himself - he would recoil from nothing - he would annihilate anyone who was against him — an internal revolution against his regime was as unthinkable as capitulation to the enemy. The warning was clear and the generals took it to heart. They were no weaklings and it would be unjust totally to condemn them. Nevertheless they were facing a man who was far ahead of them in determination, ruthlessness and cruelty. It was easier not to face up to the destruction of Germany to which Hitler had admitted, in so many words, that he was indifferent. There was their oath, command authority, military discipline in wartime, the exter- nal threat; with all this weighing in the balance, they did not perceive the ex- 142 Haider's New Plan tent to which they were taking refuge in argument to avoid facing the apocalyptic threat which they did not comprehend. On the afternoon of the same day Hitler addressed a number of senior Army officers in his study. He partly repeated his warnings and exhortations but he also went into detail of the planned operation. 98 Brauchitsch and Haider had meanwhile returned to Zossen but hardly had they arrived before they were summoned to Hitler once more. At 6 p.m. the dictator gave them a piece of his mind again." Many generals, he said, were left-overs from a rotten upper class and had not grasped the spirit of the times. He, Hitler, knew of the spirit of resistance in the Army, the 'spirit of Zossen', and he would annihilate it. In face of this accusation of pusillanimity Brauchitsch asked to resign - but Hitler refused and Brauchitsch complied. There was no follow-up to Hitler's monstrous statement that he was in- terested only in conquest and to hell with the justification for it. Rundstedt, Reichenau and other generals were incensed but nothing happened. Haider simply accepted the accusation of pusillanimity 100 and Brauchitsch allowed himself to be insulted by Hitler but did not insist on resigning. Although officially 3 December was now the next date for the offensive, hardly anyone thought that it would take place that year. In October represen- tatives of OKW had been deliberately conducted over ice-covered roads in the Eifel, littered with abandoned vehicles. There was now no longer any need for special efforts to point out that it was winter. 101 Haider himself considered that 23 November 1939 marked, at least provisionally, the end of both official and unofficial efforts to postpone the western offensive. 102 It had to be assumed that Hitler knew something about the unofficial efforts. Nevertheless on 27 November General Thomas made another urgent request to Haider for an interview. 103 He expounded the views of his friends and besought Haider to press Brauchitsch to prevent a world war and arrest Hitler. Haider replied that that was impossible. He later explained that he had to obey and also that there was no great man capable of carrying out a coup d'etat. In an office minute he noted that the German Army and in particular the officer corps would not participate in a coup. Hugo Stinnes, the in- dustrialist, had received a similar reply (also recorded in an office minute) when he had visited Brauchitsch in the first half of November. 104 The conspirators did not realize at the time that Haider was not sincere in his negotiations with them. When asked by Peter Bor after the war whether the possibility of a coup had been discussed subsequent to the Sudeten crisis, Haider replied: 'It was discussed over and over again. I had long been clear, however, that it was no longer possible to embark on anything decisive without calling the existence of the Fatherland in question as the result of a war at home.' 105 What could be done ? No coup was possible without the Army but the Army would not march without orders. Only Brauchitsch could give the order; sub- ordinate commanders' forces were located where they could be of no use to the conspiracy, in other words at the front. Quite apart from this, they would not act without orders from Brauchitsch. None of them were adventurers; they 143 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 had to have some 'assurance' that the Western Powers would not stab the con- spiracy in the back or refuse favourable peace terms after a coup. In the light of such apparently insuperable obstacles only those who had joined the con- spiracy out of the deepest moral and religious convictions pursued their efforts. Hassell, for instance, went round making every conceivable effort to rouse 'the generals' from their lethargy but even Goerdeler, the incurable op- timist, began to give up hope. On 30 November Hassell went to Canaris and talked very straight to him, but Canaris placed no further hopes in resistance from the generals and said that there was nothing further to be done and attempts were useless. On the evening of the same day Hassell visited Beck; he could only say that everything possible had been done but unfortunately without result. 106 144 11 Further Efforts On 20 November Beck had submitted a further memorandum designed to win Brauchitsch over to the conspiracy. 1 He said that since the end of the Polish campaign the situation had changed greatly to Germany's disadvantage. The victory over Poland had been nullified by Russia's advance westwards; the an- ticipated Russian military support for Germany had not been forthcoming and Russia was merely pursuing her own interests; German methods of con- ducting war in Poland had had a devastating effect on world public opinion; relations between Germany on the one hand and Spain, Japan and Italy on the other had cooled visibly and Italy in particular would ultimately divorce herself from Germany altogether. The barrier formed in the south-east by the Anglo—Franco—Turkish pact was a set-back. The smaller countries of South- east and Northern Europe would be forced increasingly on to the Allied side, the former to protect themselves against Russia and the latter from fear of a German invasion. In France and Britain determination to fight was increasing and the anti-German attitude of the United States was becoming more and more obvious. Even more than before therefore, Beck continued, Germany now stood alone; the number of her enemies was increasing. The Western Powers were pursuing their preparations and so the prospects of the offensive, now almost inconceivable anyway, were deteriorating. The requirement 'to liquidate, and the sooner the better, a world war which had always been hopeless', was therefore increasingly attractive. Responsible military leaders now faced the duty of 'exerting intellectual self-discipline and pursuing their path to its logical conclusion .. . of doing what commonsense dictated'. He himself, Beck continued, had said as much in a speech in October 1935 2 and had been 'conspicuously applauded by the Fuhrer\ If, therefore, this requirement was still justified, the path of duty for the military leaders was clear: 'At a time of grave crisis the limits of their responsibility, particularly that of the most senior military commanders, are set solely by their own conscience, by their sense of responsibility towards the Army and the people and by the judgement which history may be expected to pronounce.' On 2 January 1940 Beck set out his views once more. 3 Germany could never win a world war, he said, but even the German press was now talking of world war and the Fuhrer was speaking of a life and death struggle for the German people. What levity, what nihilism were evidenced by such words, since there 145 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 was no compulsion either to begin or continue the war. Since Germany could not now defeat her principal opponents, self-preservation was the only war aim remaining to her and it was more than doubtful whether even this could be achieved; the final result would therefore be 'a Germany bled white, doomed to surrender unconditionally'. To prevent this was both the right and the duty of those possessing responsibility and knowledge. All other con- siderations must be subordinated to the preservation of the nation. Early in December another memorandum reached OKH stemming from very different circles from those of Beck. It was headed 'Implications of the Russo—Finnish conflict on Germany's present Situation' and it came from Captain (Navy) Liedig. 4 In it Liedig declaimed against Hitler's opportunism and his betrayal of his own ideological aims. Hitler had always wanted to reach agreement with Britain, Liedig said, and to save Europe from her enemy Number One, Red Russia; on both counts he was now doing exactly the op- posite. Russia was in process of carrying out a vast expansion and was being largely assisted therein by the nihilist policy of the Nazis. Germany, however, was heading for a disaster of unparalleled proportions as a result of Hitler's unprincipled policy. Britain was still waiting but Russia was not; she had already begun her march westwards. Now was the great opportunity for Ger- many to obtain from Britain a just and generous peace, confirmation of her present frontiers in so far as they were co-terminous with areas of German settlement and recognition of her predominance as a continental power. The prerequisite for this was for Germany to place her armed forces at the disposal of Finland and of Europe, both of which were threatened (Finland had been attacked by Russia at the end of November 1939), and, together with Britain, turn against the bolshevist danger. Both the Reich and Christian Europe could still be saved; the die was cast only for Hitler and his followers; their fate was irrevocable but not that of Germany. There could be no mistaking Liedig's call for a coup as the only alternative to the frightful chaos resulting from Russia's penetration into the heart of Europe. His ideas bore a close relationship to those of the circle centred on Heinz and SchmidNoerr; they included certain romantic imperialist notions. Liedig's proposal for combined Anglo-German action against Russia was fantastic but his prophecies proved true, not because he had correctly ap- preciated the Russian communist menace but as a result of Hitler's limitless thirst for conquest. Brauchitsch, however, was not to be convinced either by Liedig's political arguments or by the expert appreciation of the situation by his fellow-officer Beck. His attitude was dictated by his personality — he did not lack the necessary knowledge. The opposition group centred on Beck and Oster con- tinued to lose ground both with Brauchitsch and with Haider. Both were too weak to follow matters to their logical conclusion and adopt a definitive at- titude. They could not make up their minds either to fulfil their military duty in the true sense of the word or to do their ethical and moral duty. They really wanted to do both but then again they wanted neither. It was all too uncertain and too risky. 146 Further Efforts In view of this weakness and vacillation the opposition attempted once more to bring influence and pressure to bear from another quarter. The idea of combined action by the Commanders-in-Chief in the west was revived, as so often in subsequent years right through until summer 1944. This time Groscurth made the journey to the west. He left on 18 December, on 19 and 20 December he visited the headquarters of Army Group C (Leeb) in Frankfurt am Main and Witzleben in Bad Kreuznach; on the 21st he went to Army Group A (Rundstedt) and Army Group B (Bock). 5 The only reaction in any way favourable came from Leeb. He was con- cerned over the 'difficulties of the internal situation' as he put it in his diary, and wrote a letter to Haider. 6 At the time there was widespread indignation over the actions of the SS and police Einsatzgruppen in Poland. Colonel- General Johannes Blaskowitz, Commander-in-Chief East (Oberost), had protested energetically. 7 During his tour of the west Groscurth had made a special point of the atrocities committed in Poland in order to persuade the generals to revolt; he had with him the necessary evidence, including a detailed, highly secret report from Blaskowitz, from which certain of the Chiefs of Staff took excerpts. 8 Groscurth wrote in his private diary on 21 December: 'So now we have aroused the most important sections of the western front. Successfully, it is to be hoped 1 - It will be continued I' But it was all of no avail. Even in the light of these crimes committed on the orders of their Supreme Commander the Commanders-in-chief were not to be per- suaded to take concerted action against him. The stream of memoranda urging some action never entirely dried up. The warnings, however, increasingly came to be considered as tiresome and un- realistic. On 1 January 1940 Dr Etscheit, a Berlin lawyer who had been working with theAbwehr and Admiral Canaris ever since autumn 1939, sub- mitted via Groscurth a memorandum to Major-General Kurt von Tippelskirch, Deputy Chief of Staff IV; it was entitled 'The external and in- ternal situation'; Tippelskirch read it on 3 January and then passed it back to Groscurth. 9 In it Etscheit protested against collaboration with Soviet Russia, the hereditary enemy; he also showed how the atrocities committed by the SS and police in Poland reinforced the impression that people under the power of the present German regime were treated as serfs just as much as those under the Soviet regime. Admittedly, the memorandum continued, 'the parliamentary democratic institutions of other countries did not represent a system of government suited to the German people'; on the other hand it had also been shown that dictatorship was not the solution. People were now increasingly beginning to recognize the necessity of 'conservative institutions and methods capable of preserving the country'; stern methods would be accepted if they guaranteed justice. I0 Power carried with it responsibility but the present leadership had failed because it had not kept its promise to guarantee peace to Germany. As a result of the mighty victory in the Polish campaign the power of the military leaders had grown to such an extent that it was now their responsibility to 'solve the crisis which had arisen'. Meanwhile, by his continuous expansion of 147 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 the SS, Himmler was undermining the position of the Wehrmacht and its leaders. In the light of these considerations, the memorandum continued, external affairs were of significance. The German economy could not long withstand the British blockade; a military decision in Germany's favour leading to a peace treaty was not to be anticipated during the short period available before Germany's economic exhaustion. The internal German situation was in- separably bound up with the prospects for peace because the Allies would never conclude peace with Hitler unless Germany had been victorious. On the other hand they were entirely prepared to come to some agreement and had not closed their minds to the necessity for some suitable concessions: 'It is recognized abroad that the overthrow of the government would only be possi- ble and justifiable if those in power in Germany [after the overthrow] could rely on some guaranteed agreement with our enemies which would ensure, not only an honourable peace but also a combined effort to make good the damage meanwhile done in Europe.' There is here a clear reference to the talks being held at this time by Dr Josef Mu'ller in Rome. Only a few days later, on 8 January, Haider referred in his diary to conversations with the Pope reported to him by Etzdorf. On the same day he received information from Tippelskirch about Groscurth's and Goerdeler's activities and about peace feelers. 11 It could be anticipated therefore, Etscheit's memorandum continued, that Greater Germany would be preserved 'on condition that fresh provision be made for the Czechoslovak people and state* and that the errors and extravagances of Versailles would not be repeated. Particularly in Britain people were convinced that Germany was indispensable for the maintenance of the European economy and culture; they would certainly not object to a German economic hegemony over the smaller countries of eastern Europe. While for the moment there was still some possibility of agreement, time was working against Germany. Popular support for a coup was obviously desirable and this might come about as a result of hardships and set-backs; at the same time, however, these would reduce the other side's readiness to come to some accommodation and the great confidence at present felt in the military leadership. The readiness of the masses to accept resolute action should not be underestimated. 12 If action were taken now it was still possible to preserve the positive achievements of the National-Socialist State and prevent the destruc- tion of Europe. In this memorandum Dr Etscheit had said nothing but the patent truth. Too many people saw things this way at the time for the excuse to be valid that no one could know that things would turn out 'thus'. In his own handwriting, however, Tippelskirch noted on this memorandum: 'This treatise presents things too gloomily. It takes too much account of the views of the German intellectuals who have always been prophets of gloom. I very much doubt whether the British and French would treat us any more leniently if we acted as stupidly as in 1918. The threat of the destruction of Europe seems to me a method of pressure at least as effective in paving the way for the 148 Further Efforts conclusion of peace as an agreement predicating an internal upheaval. T.' What a gulf was fixed between the opposition and military men such as Tippelskirch! The implication of the final sentence is that the threat of the destruction of Europe could be used to force the enemy to conclude peace and end a war unnecessarily begun. This can be no alibi for Tippelskirch's loyalty to the regime. The mere fact that he participated in such considerations turned him into an accomplice in attempted treason. The continuous postponement of the date of the offensive, though not un- expected in knowledgeable circles, was a wearing process and it had now been going on since November; in the light of this and of the inertia of the top-level Army leaders the opposition took refuge in all sorts of fantastic plans. There was an idea that, with the assistance of certain divisions in transit from west to east, Witzleben should arrest Hitler in Berlin and have him declared in- capable of governing. Beck was then to go to Zossen and seize command of the Army from the flaccid hands of Brauchitsch. 13 Unfortunately no divisions were on the move eastwards; they were waiting in the west for the order to at- tack. Even had there been any on the move, they would certainly not have obeyed Witzleben's orders unless he had been properly appointed as their commander. Concentration of troops round Berlin was impossible without the assistance of the C-in-C of the Replacement Army (which had been explicitly refused). Bold though he was, Witzleben was no adventurer and, weak though he was, Brauchitsch would have resisted any attempt to seize command authority from him. The concocter of this plan, which Hassell noted in his diary on 30 December, was Popitz, the Finance Minister of Prussia; he was no military expert and clearly had only the haziest ideas of what was practicable in this field. 14 Despite this gloomy outlook efforts continued. Continuous attempts were made to arrange a meeting between Witzleben and Beck. At the end of December Goerdeler visited Witzleben and told Hassell that he thought he had succeeded - 'Witzleben would soon come to have a fina l tal k with Beck.' l5 Lacking a concrete basis to work on, the 'action', to which Beck also now referred with increasing frankness, never advanced beyond the discussion stage. Nothing could be done without troops and for the moment none were available. The more frequent the postponement of the offensive, the more marked became the absence of the vital prerequisite - the generals' conviction that at- tack in the west could lead to nothing other than colossal catastrophe. Militarily they were now far better prepared and who was to say whether the offensive would ever take place? Week by week it was postponed; how could anyone take it seriously? The period of comparative calm was unexpectedly prolonged as a result of the capture of two German airmen who force-landed at Mechelen in Belgium on 10 January 1940; they were carrying papers from which the German operational plans could be deduced. 16 Despite this unfortunate incident, on 11 January Hitler decided, in the light of a favourable weather forecast, that the offensive should take place on the 17th. On the 13th came an unfavourable 149 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 forecast and he postponed it once more. Then came alarming news of in- creased Belgian and Dutch defence preparation, demonstrating the impor- tance of the loss of the Mechelen documents, and this had its effect on Hitler. On 16 January he decided definitely to postpone the offensive to the spring and meanwhile to have the plans totally revised in order to recover both secrecy and surprise. The opposition now renewed its efforts to persuade Haider. On his return from a tour of the western front from 3 to 6 January he was shown reports of the Rome talks and about the middle of the month was at last persuaded to have a discussion with Beck; it took place on 16 January immediately after a conference with General Thomas. 17 Haider later recalled how he and Beck had paced the empty streets of Berlin-Dahlem in order to avoid the attention which would inevitably have been aroused had one visited the other. 18 Beck put forward to Haider his well-known viewpoint that Germany could not sustain a war against the West either from the military or economic points of view; America would not long remain aloof and no one should be deceived by possible initial victories. Hitler had lost all confidence abroad and this government, therefore, had no prospect of ending the conflict by diplomatic methods. 19 Haider recalled that, when he asked Beck how the people would react to a coup d'etat, Beck became impatient and told Haider that, as an experienced horseman, he should know that he had to throw his heart over the fence. Haider now became irritated. He was a long-standing and bitter opponent of Hitler, he said, but since he was in a responsible position, he had to consider the consequences of his action and could not simply charge on and carry out a putsch.™ Among the consequences might well be civil war and the collapse of the Army. 2 ' A month later (14 February) Haider saw Witzleben in Bad Kreuz- nach and Witzleben voiced his opinion with some violence on the necessity of resistance to Hitler; Haider's reaction to the moral argument was similar-he took refuge in formal excuses and finally ordered Witzleben kindly to do what he was told by OKH. 22 Haider therefore remained inactive. He could not even be roused by a letter from Goerdeler. Admittedly he replied to it at the end of March 23 but he merely repeated that the Wehrmacht could do nothing. The war must now run its course first, he said. During January Haider was increasingly evasive in face of opposition attempts to influence him. He remained irritated with Beck and Dr Muller's talks in Rome made little impression on him. Then clouds began to gather around the head of Lieutenant-Colonel Groscurth who occupied so vital a position in OKH. In fact Haider and Groscurth thought alike and, provided he was not pressed too hard, Haider was not basically opposed to Groscurth's activities - protection of people subjected to persecution and preparation for a coup. Even on 13 January Haider and Groscurth had held an hour-long discussion of a report by Helldorf describing among other things the conditions in Poland. 24 Haider told Groscurth that he was in favour of the necessary fight against 150 Further Efforts England which was forced upon Germany and sooner or later inevitable in any case. After the victory the Army would be strong enough to call the tune at home; before the fight there was 'no basis for attack [upon Hitler]; troops still believed in the Fuhrer'. Those who wanted to engineer a. putsch did not agree among themselves, and they were also reactionaries, said Haider, who wanted to turn back the wheel of history. The 'revolution was still in progress, however, and nothing could be gauged by the traditions that are sacred to us'. Apparently this last remark referred to the atrocities committed in Poland. Haider remarked, with regard to Groscurth's efforts to make them known to the military commanders at the western front, that 'one must not burden the front with unnecessary worries'. Thus Haider may well have acknowledged that Hitler's regime was illegal and immoral — but he was obviously not prepared to deny what he believed were the regime's successes. He also failed to enlighten Groscurth how Hitler could have fewer supporters among the troops after the expected success 'against England' (France was not men- tioned ; perhaps her position depended so clearly on that taken by Britain). What Haider was really saying was that he was going to run the war, and that he was not going to participate in any coup. On 5 January, however, when Haider was away on tour, Colonel-General Blaskowitz asked Brauchitsch 'why his report on the East had become known in the West'; he was referring, of course, to the report which Groscurth had used when visiting Army Group Commanders in December. 25 Groscurth had then been heavily involved in efforts to bring about cancella- tion of a decree issued on 28 October 1939 by Himmler with Hitler's explicit approval which had evoked much indignation and many protests in the Wehr- macht. 26 In this Himmler had urged SS men in particular but also all men 'of good blood' to mate with women 'of good blood', whether their own wives, someone else's wife or an unmarried girl, and produce as many children as possible in order to provide the population urgently required for the conquest of Lebensraum and the replacement of war casualties. Since no one either could or would do much about the horrible shootings in Poland - Blaskowitz complained bitterly that officers were too flabby and 'no one had the humanity to stand up for those subjected to unjust persecution' 27 — attention had turned to this immoral SS decree. Groscurth had made himself highly conspicuous in all this and the conflict with Himmler finally took a threatening turn. At the latest by 23 January 1940 Haider was trying to get rid of Groscurth and find a replacement for him. 28 Meanwhile, however, Groscurth refused to give way; he submitted a number of drafts to Haider commenting on the ss decree and tried to spread the news of SS crimes in Poland. 29 He knew, of course, that his position had become untenable; he regarded his draft on the SS decree as providing the occasion for his 'fall'. In a letter of 17 February to Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, Witzleben's aide who had tried to arrange a posting for him to 75 Division which was in Witzleben's Army, Groscurth said: 'People are still sore about my trip to the west. In this connection, however, conditions in the east have become far worse. I may not say more on this subject - and even this much is 151 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 forbidden.' 30 On 1 February Groscurth was told that he was to be relieved; Colonel Heim, his successor as head of the Special OKH Section under Haider, reported for duty on 20 February. 31 A vital post was lost to the opposition. Haider invariably gave as his main reasons for the impracticability of an army coup the fact that opinion among the population and the younger officers (major and below) was not 'ripe' and also the lack of assurances from abroad about the attitude of the enemy in the event of an internal German coup. 32 Nothing could be done about the 'unfavourable' public opinion. It would only become 'ripe' when Germany had already been plunged into catastrophe, by which time it would be too late for a coup to save the situation; public opinion would only change with major military defeats, which at the moment were not in prospect. The opposition therefore hoped to achieve more by obtaining 'assurances' in the form of binding agreements with the Western Powers. 152 12 Soundings Abroad Efforts to obtain assurances from abroad had been in progress ever since the Sudeten crisis of 1938 and they never entirely ceased until just before 20 July 1944. The probings of the Kordt brothers and Adam von Trott zu Solz, have already been referred to. Now, in the period when the western offensive was continually being postponed, efforts to this end were reintensified, though using very different methods. On 4 January 1940 Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin had a talk with the Swedish Minister in Berlin and gave him a detailed picture of the internal German situation. 1 In addition he said that the western offensive was at pre- sent scheduled for 15 January but might be further postponed at any time owing to the weather or for other reasons. In any case, he said, the majority of the generals regarded an attack in the west as hopeless. If it bogged down, this would create the conditions for the overthrow of Hitler by the senior military commanders. In this connection it was vital for the opposition to know whether, if necessary, it could count on peace mediation from some neutral quarter and whether this would be more likely to occur with a new German government than with the present one. In mid-January Eivind Berggrav, the Bishop of Oslo, travelled to Berlin and had discussions with Weizsacker. Weizsacker was in despair at the apparent futility of all efforts for peace, but he encouraged Berggrav and his colleagues in Britain, France and the Scandinavian countries to pursue their endeavours — during the ecclesiastical conference at Zilven in Holland early in January they had gone on record with peace proposals. 2 However hopeless it might seem, Weizsacker said, it was their responsibility to try everything possible and conceivable. On several occasions during the autumn of 1939 Goerdeler attempted to ob- tain assurances from Britain on the basis of the German 1914 eastern fron- tiers, but without tangible success. Early in March 1940 he had discussions in Berlin with Sumner Welles and probably also in the same month with the King of the Belgians. 3 The only result of these, however, was to establish that, although practical bases for peace existed, no one would consider further negotiations with Hitler. 4 At the same time the Beck-Goerdeler group made use of their contacts in Switzerland in order to gain touch with the British government; these produced some more concrete reaction and showed that the British government was extremely interested in the possibilities offered by 153 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 encouragement of the German opposition. Professor Siegmund-Schultze, for instance, who had emigrated to Zurich was in constant contact with the Ger- man resistance and Dr Josef Wirth, the German ex-Chancellor who also lived in Switzerland, was equally available as an intermediary. 5 Early in 1940 Dr Wirth wrote a letter to Chamberlain which was taken to London by Dr Schairer. In it Wirth pointed out that an opposition group of considerable strength existed in Germany and it would be greatly assisted if it knew that the Western Powers would not exploit a coup to the military detri- ment of Germany. 6 Thereupon, in mid-February, two representatives of the Foreign Office appeared in Switzerland; they were personal friends of Vansit- tart. A meeting in Lausanne-Ouchy was arranged with Dr Wirth and a certain gentleman accompanying him who was known to both the Englishmen. The meeting took place. 7 The British representatives put forward a number of proposals on behalf of the Prime Minister; they were said to be valid until the end of April 1940. The principal assurance was that 'the British government will not, by attacking in the west, use to Germany's military disadvantage any passing crisis which might be connected with action by the German opposition'. Moreover the British government was prepared to work with a German government in which it could have confidence, in order to ensure lasting peace. Further in- dividual assurances - the question of German frontiers was not mentioned but was undoubtedly meant — could only be given in agreement with the French government. Should the German opposition 'wish their action made easier through a diversion by the Western Powers,' the British government was ready to do this in so far as it was able. 8 To the question what sort of a German government would be regarded as trustworthy, the verbal reply was that no member of the present government should belong to it, not even Goring. 9 On 24 February Chamberlain expressed himself similarly in a speech in Bir- mingham. The implication was clear: if the Germans showed goodwill and were prepared to abandon the principle that might was right, they must be ready to give some proof of this and then they would be met with goodwill on the other side; under their present government, however, there could be no security for the future. 10 At last, therefore, there was now some concrete assurance, though not in writing. The opposition, however, could hardly expect an official British government document stating its attitude to a German government which did not yet exist and whose aims and ideas were not entirely above suspicion. 11 This being so, the 'proposals' handed to Dr Wirth must be considered far- reaching. Unfortunately, so far as is known, they never reached the Beck- Goerdeler resistance group. 12 The contact between the German opposition and the British government established through Theo Kordt and Philip Conwell Evans was maintained and utilized further. 13 On 15 November Groscurth noted in his diary: 'Halifax has sent word to Kordt that peace is still possible on the basis of the ethnographic frontiers.' 14 Kordt and Conwell Evans met in Berne on 18 154 Soundings Abroad December 1939 and 27 January 1940. People in London were losing patience, Conwell Evans said. Kordt thereupon went to Berlin to find out what was happening. On 16 February he met Conwell Evans once more in Berne; Evans said that, as proof of the new government's goodwill, it was expected that Poland be evacuated immediately on the fall of the Nazi regime. 15 Kordt handed over a letter to Vansittart. He could naturally give no firm assurances and, as far as Poland was concerned, he followed Beck's instruction that after a coup Poland would be evacuated as soon as there was no longer a threat from Russia (which had meanwhile attacked Finland). He said that his friends in Germany realized that there could be no negotiation with Hitler; they were therefore endeavouring 'with all the force at their command to provide a negotiator on the German side who could bring about the just peace they wanted'. 16 The British side, Kordt continued, had created the necessary con- ditions by the Prime Minister's promise not to exploit an upheaval to the military detriment of Germany. He and Jiis brother Erich 'had done all that was humanly possible to convince our friends of the absolute reliability of this promise'. He hoped that the coup might still take place before major operations opened in the west; if not, however, they must still continue to strive for peace. Under no circumstances must one allow oneself, as Vansittart had done when talking to Kordt a few days before the outbreak of war, to lapse into a mood like that of Samson in the Bible when he tore down the pillars of the palace and buried everything in the ruins. Possibly prospects for an inter- nal German coup might be even better after a German attack in the west. This did not amount to much and understandably it was not enough for the British; from their point of view they had more than sufficient reason to be cautious and suspicious vis-a-vis a German opposition which in their eyes was only nominal. On their side the opposition wanted, not only a guarantee that there would be no military action but written conditions on which the British government would be prepared to conclude peace. 17 Such demands could not be met. About this time, late autumn 1939 and early 1940, there was to be found in Rome an amateur diplomat and peripatetic adventurer named James Lonsdale Bryans; he had a contact to Lord Halifax and was on the look-out for an opportunity to play the part of mediator between the warring parties. 18 In November 1939 he happened to make the acquaintance of Dr Detalmo Pir- zio Biroli, who was later to become Hassell's son-in-law and whose German contacts seemed interesting. Lonsdale Bryans laid siege to Biroli and in the course of some forty conversations picked up hints about the existence and aims of the German opposition. This fired his ambition to arrange contact between the Germans and the British Foreign Minister. About the turn of the year, at Bryans' request, Biroli wrote a letter to Halifax vouching for the amateur diplomat and urging Halifax to make some overture. On 8 January Lonsdale Bryans passed the letter to Halifax, who was im- pressed. Unofficially he commissioned Bryans to pursue the matter but he gave him nothing in writing. 19 Bryans thereupon returned to Rome and told 155 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Biroli who, using the cover of family correspondence, arranged a meeting between Hassell and Bryans in Arosa, Switzerland. On 22 and 23 February discussions took place between these two represen- tatives. Hassell's pretext (naturally only a pretext) for his presence in Arosa was to visit his son who was ill in a sanatorium there. As a result of this con- tact Bryans proposed to obtain an official binding declaration from the British government about their attitude in the event of a possible internal German coup and the peace terms which they would regard as acceptable. Such was 'Mr XV aim and he had already set the wheels in motion in Rome. The proposal, of course, went much further than all previous requests by the op- position to the Western Powers but Hassell had not put it forward himself and he could naturally only express support for Lonsdale Bryans' hope that it would be successful. 20 To provide some basis for the British declaration Hassell drafted a state- ment which he gave to Lonsdale Bryans to pass to Halifax, adding verbally that the proposal was only valid provided that agreement could be reached before the opening of major military operations in the west. He could not give names of the other leaders of the conspiracy, he said, but Sir Nevile Henderson, the former British Ambassador in Berlin, was 'well-informed' on the circumstances and personalities; a change of regime and the resignation of certain persons in Germany were matters of purely German concern and should not be made the subject of demands from non-German quarters (to avoid any defiant patriotic reaction or an understandable revival of memories of 1918 - Wilson's demands and the jettisoning of the Kaiser). Should no authoritative British statement along these lines be forthcoming, Hassell con- cluded, there was no prospect of any change of regime in Germany which would help towards a compromise peace. In his 'Statement' Hassell said 21 that this mad war should be stopped as soon as possible, otherwise Europe was in danger of complete destruction and also of bolshevization (as a result of the advance of Russia now already under way and the social and political extremism to be anticipated following the war). Europe, he said, was 'for us' not a military arena or a base of power but a magnified form of Fatherland, in which a healthy Germany was an indispen- sable factor, particularly with an eye to Soviet Russia. The object must therefore be permanent pacification, reestablishment of Europe on a solid base and security against a renewal of warlike tendencies. The Austrian Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland should not be called in question; the German—Polish frontier should be 'more or less' that of 1914 and there should be no change in the 1937 status of Alsace-Lorraine, which should remain French. The following principles should be universally accepted as the basis of future peace: the principle of nationality with certain modifications deriving from history; reestablishment of an independent Poland and of 'a Czech Republic'; general reduction of armaments; reestablishment of free inter- national economic cooperation; recognition of the principles of Christian ethics, of justice and law as fundamental elements of public life, of social welfare as a ' l leitmotiv', of popular control of government, of liberty of 156 Soundings Abroad thought, conscience and intellectual activity. In the light of the situation of 1945 HasselTs principles and requirements sound fantastic, if not intemperate; they were largely in accord, however, with those of Liedig, Etzdorf and others, also trade union leaders such as Jakob Kaiser. 22 It must also be remembered that the union of Austria with Germany had not been seriously disputed and that the annexation of the Sudetenland had taken place with the help and explicit approval of the Western Powers, sealed by an agreement. As regards Poland and the 1914 frontier, the opposition's case rested solely on power, in other words on the fact that German armies were occupying Poland. In the areas primarily populated by Germans which had become Polish after 1918, the problem could perhaps have been settled by plebiscite but, apart from this, it was hard to justify the 1914 frontier. On the other hand reestablishment of the territorial position of August 1939 would not have been a satisfactory basis for lasting peace, since it would have left outstanding the problem of the Corridor and the question of minorities. It was highly questionable, moreover, whether Russia would relinquish her conquests made at Poland's expense and on the basis of the Russo-German pact. The Polish question therefore remained unsolved. There was thus a clear contradiction between the declared determination to reestablish the rule of law and a return to the paths of peaceful agreement, and the claim to retain at least part of Hitler's conquests. 23 Looking at the statement through British spectacles, Britain, having declared war on Germany specifically to preserve the integrity of Poland within her August 1939 frontiers, could derive but little encouragement. No commitment for the removal of Hitler was made; it was even demanded that the subject should not be raised; at the same time there was a clear desire to maintain Germany's predominant position in Eastern Europe and retain part of Hitler's conquests. How else could the demand for the 1914 frontiers and the offer of reestablishment of a 'Czech Republic', presumably still divorced from Slovakia, be interpreted ? 24 Admittedly Germany was still powerful and she had greatly extended her influence. The opposition's demands, however, seemed to place far too great reliance on that fact; they inevitably sounded like the demands of nationalism rather than nationality. The excuse that in no other way could 'the generals' be persuaded to act, only made the whole thing more suspect. 25 Those points in Hassell's programme which could not be im- plemented without the removal of Hitler did little to mitigate this. Lonsdale Bryans went back to London to fulfil the other half of his mission, procurement of an official British declaration. But he was not even received by Halifax and saw only Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Under-Secretary of State, who thanked him for his pains and allowed him to go to Switzerland once more, but only to take leave of Hassell and formally conclude his mission. 26 A written declaration was unobtainable. The venture had failed. Talking to Cadogan Lonsdale Bryans had stressed the German opposition's main requirement - a declaration that Britain would not make military use of a coup d'etat against Hitler and would embark forthwith on peace 157 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 negotiations with a non-Nazi Germany. Without such a declaration, he said, it was inconceivable that the military could be persuaded to act. Cadogan, however, refused to issue a British declaration of this nature. It had already been done a week earlier, he said, through another channel, by which he may have meant either the message to Dr Wirth or the assurance to Dr Miiller that the British standpoint was still the same as at end January 1940. 27 On 14 April Hassell and Lonsdale Bryans met again in Arosa. 28 Meanwhile, on 9 April, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway had begun; much was therefore now out of date and the overall situation had greatly changed. Lonsdale Bryans told Hassell (which on his own admission he was not authorized to do) 29 that he had passed Hassell's message to Halifax who had shown it to Chamberlain; Cadogan had also been informed. Halifax was most grateful and in agreement with the principles set forth; he could not, however, give a written assurance since such had been given through another channel just a week before. Hassell thought he knew what this channel was and said as much to Lonsdale Bryans. He knew Brauchitsch's and Haider's reaction to the Rome talks and he had little hope when he asked whether, after the latest developments, London was still prepared to conclude peace with a 'respec- table Germany'. Lonsdale Bryans replied in the affirmative but at a further meeting next morning Hassell gained the impression that 'Halifax and his group had no real faith in the possibility of attaining peace in this way, that is through a change of regime in Germany.' 30 In effect, as a payment on account without which they were unwilling to do anything, the generals wanted a firm statement of future British policy vis-a- vis a government which did not yet exist and of which practically nothing was known. They were afraid that they would be badly treated later. Even if assurances were given, it was hardly to be expected that the other side would be full of such goodwill that they would accord Germany generous treatment. In 1918—19 the hopes placed on such declarations, specifically on Wilson's Fourteen Points, had proved false. Political and military weight was what counted in the achievement of acceptable peace conditions; this was the criterion by which views were judged at the negotiating table. The example of France showed this clearly enough. Who ever asked about France ? Everyone turned to Britain. It was from Britain that the assurances and payment on ac- count were demanded, obviously on the assumption that French decisions would be dependent on those of Britain. Britain, on the other hand, with far greater justification was demanding first to see a coup, the removal of Hitler and his hangers-on from the government and the assumption of responsibility by the other 'respectable Germany'. 31 From the conspirators' point of view the only successful contact with the British government came about because an intermediary of the necessary in- fluence and reputation was available. This was the Vatican. As early as end September 1939 Dr Josef Miiller was commissioned on behalf of the military conspirators to gain contact with the British govern- ment using the Vatican as a channel. 32 As a strict Catholic Dr Miiller had belonged to the anti-Hitler opposition more or less from the outset. 33 Until the 158 Soundings Abroad outbreak of war he worked as a lawyer in Munich; he then agreed to be called up into the Army as a Second Lieutenant and was posted to the Abwehr Office in Munich. 34 In their very first conversation Oster had told him what his mis- sion was — to use his good relationships with the Vatican for the benefit of the German opposition. 35 Cover was provided by giving him an intelligence assignment - discovery of the intentions of the enemy and of the Italians. Although interrogated on over two hundred occasions by the Gestapo, Dr Muller stuck to this story: he had been introduced, he said, to Pacelli, formerly Cardinal Secretary of State and now Pope, and had the entree to the crypt of St Peter's in Rome; he had accordingly been officially commissioned by the Abwehr to exploit the Vatican sources of intelligence. 36 That he was doing so for the benefit of the opposition he did not of course reveal. Credibility was given to this cover by the reports sent to Berlin by Dr Muller on developments within the Italian government, on the Italian attitude to Germany, Britain and France, and on the question of Italian entry into the war. One of these reports (dealing with the period 6—12 November 1939) has survived among the Groscurth papers, and a considerable body of correspondence on the Vatican contacts between the German opposition and His Majesty's Government exists in the files of the Foreign Office in London. 37 Dr Midler's first task at the end of September 1939 was to establish the necessary contact and to find out whether, in general terms, the Vatican was prepared to mediate. 38 He accordingly went to Rome, where he stayed at the Hotel 'Flora'. 39 He gained contact with the Jesuit Father Leiber, the Pope's Private Secretary. Dr Muller never dealt with the Pope personally since this would have been far too conspicuous and dangerous and might well have spoilt the whole affair. 40 After a short time he received word that the Vatican was ready to provide the machinery for mediation. 41 He was regarded as a representative of Colonel-General Beck, clearly an important condition for the Pope's commitment since no one among the opposition leaders was so well known or so highly respected as Beck. 42 At the end of September or early October Muller reported to Berlin on his initial soundings. 43 With Beck's approval he was commissioned by Oster, Canaris and Dohnanyi to ask Pius XII to discover whether the British govern- ment might be prepared to enter into peace discussions with the German op- position which proposed to overthrow Hitler and form a new government. 44 He returned to Rome and regained contact with Father Leiber. Through Sir Francis d'Arcy Osborne, the British Minister, the Vatican sounded out the British government and was told that they were ready to negotiate with the German opposition's representative provided that he was vouched for by the Vatican. 45 Dr Muller carried this information to Berlin on 18 October. On 20 October Groscurth made a reference to it in his office diary. 46 The Pope now channelled questions and answers in both directions between Muller and Osborne, Father Leiber once more acting as intermediary between Muller and the Pope. 47 Information, messages and the results of the soundings were almost invariably transmitted verbally, but on several oc- casions Father Leiber left some missive for Muller in his hotel, if he had failed 159 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 to meet him or if the information was urgent. All these papers were im- mediately destroyed by Miiller with the exception of one of Father Leiber's visiting cards and a sheet of paper with the Vatican watermark, on which was set out a summary of the British negotiating conditions. Both these were used as proof for General Haider of the authenticity of the reports about the talks being conducted in Rome. The talks proceeded on the premise that while they were in progress no major military operations would take place in the west and furthermore that substantive negotiations would only be conducted with some responsible government which would have to replace the Hitler regime. 48 The talks took place in an atmosphere of tension, for the German offensive in the west might start any day; particularly on the British side they were conducted with extreme caution, as was only to be expected since the whole affair was con- spiratorial in character and dubious from the point of view of international law. The Venlo incident led to a six-week interruption and the fact that the British were prepared to resume talks at all was due primarily to the efforts of the Pope and the respect in which he was held. Chamberlain and Halifax set great store by the Pope's readiness to mediate. 49 On 27 January 1940 Bishop Berggrav visited Lord Halifax; this may well have influenced the British government to give a favourable reply to Miiller's soundings two days later. Dr Miiller's negotiations in Rome dragged on into February 1940. Pius XII summoned the British Minister, Osborne, on 11 January and related to him the position of the German military opposition. 50 This information reached the British Government in London: 'A grand German offensive [the Pope told Osborne] has been prepared down to the last detail for the middle of February, or possibly even earlier. It will be violent, bitter and utterly unscrupulous. But it need never be delivered. If the German generals could be assured of a peace with Great Britain (France was not mentioned) which would neither be another Compi£gne, i.e. like the Great War armistice, nor Wilsonian in nature, they were prepared to replace the present German Government by a " Verhandlungsfdhige Regierung" — a government with which it was possible to negotiate — and then to reach a settlement in eastern Europe with the British Government. This settlement would include a restoration in Poland [sic] and Czechoslovakia (no details given) and would also deal with Russia (this was even more enigmatic, but seemed to imply the fact or menace of action against Russia). There could, however, be no concession over the existing Anschluss with Austria.' Thus Osborne had reported to Halifax on 12 January 1940, and he had continued: the Pope had expressly not adopted these ideas, but indicated that his con- science forced him to transmit them to Osborne. Osborne had replied to Pius XII that the whole matter was hopelessly vague and dangerously reminiscent of the Venlo incident. The Pope was not at all comfortable in his role as mediator, but he did say in conclusion that the German principals were in no way connected with the NSDAP. Haider's remarks to Groscurth even in those days show how justified were the Pope's reservations. On 13 January, Haider told Groscurth that he agreed 160 Soundings Abroad that the fight against England was a necessary one and that the basis for a coup was lacking in Germany. 5 ' Osborne's doubts concerning the reliability of the German contacts and assurances, too, were not unfounded, and of course he did not hesitate to report his misgivings to Halifax. On 16 January the British War Cabinet discussed the matter and adopted Osborne's opinion that they could not take up such nebulous overtures. If the German opposition were serious, they might, as a first step, do away with the present government, and then talk of peace. It was further decided to inform the French Government. 52 It is not yet clear whether or not Osborne immediately transmitted the reply he received from London to the Pope nor even if Osborne had received such a reply at this time. On 6 February Pius XII summoned him for 7 February and Osborne reported on his conversation with the Pope to Halifax on the same day. The Pope had had in front of him about four typed pages in German and said the conspirators in Germany wanted to replace the present government by a democratic, conservative, moderate, decentralized and federal one. He had been asked to find out if the continued union of Austria with Germany could be guaranteed as a basis for peace negotiations; Poland and non-German Czechoslovakia were to be independent. Pius XII repeated that he felt uneasy about transmitting such information, but that his con- science forced him to pursue even the smallest chance of saving human lives, and once again Osborne made no secret of his own doubts as to the sincerity or genuineness of the German overtures. However, this time Chamberlain and Halifax decided to reply, and not to inform the French Cabinet. In the com- munication from London to Osborne of 17 February there were the following statements: 'It must be clear from the outset that His Majesty's Government can take no step in this matter except in conjunction with France. If His Majesty's Government were convinced that the intermediaries who ap- proached His Holiness represented principals in Germany who had both the intention and the power to perform what they promised, His Majesty's Government would be willing to consider with the French Government any enquiries that those principals might make. But His Majesty's Government could not broach this question with the French Government on the basis of ideas emanating from undisclosed sources and so vague in character as those which have been conveyed to you. If any progress is to be made, a definite programme must be submitted and authoritatively vouched for. In examining any such programme, and in framing their own conditions, what His Majesty's Government would look for above all, in addition to reparation of the wrongs done to Germany's smaller neighbours, would be security for the future In this connexion the suggestion of a decentralized and federal Ger- many is of interest, and might be held to go some way towards a solution of this problem.' A few days later, around 20 February, the Pope received a written com- munication from Osborne in which the position of the British Foreign Minister and Prime Minister was set forth. The Pope had the contents of Osborne's note communicated to Dr Miiller at once. 53 So far, nothing except 161 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Dr Miiller's own reports indicated that the Pope had said more to him than Halifax's instructions to Osborne contained. On the other hand the Pope, who knew the wishes and conditions of the opposition for the coup against Hitler's regime, seems to have counted on the coup as late as the middle of March 1940, as he told the French diplomatic envoy on 13 March, and the American envoy on 18 March. 54 But then hope began to fade quickly, the more so, as the Pope told Osborne on 30 March, since 'he feared that any prospect of favourable developments from the approaches made through himself were vitiated by the fact that other similar approaches had reached His Majesty's Government through other channels .. . He added that, according to his un- derstanding, His Majesty's Government were not very hopeful of any results from these communications nor enthusiastic about their receipt.' 55 Obviously the use of several channels at the same time reduced their relative value — even if the opposition had, as they certainly had not, presented the same programme and stated the same conditions for action on each occasion. Understandably, what Dr Miiller was able to report home earlier in the year was quite useful, and it must have sounded more favourable to the opposition than it would have had they seen Halifax's instructions to Osborne. 56 Still, it did not differ fundamentally from the British position in those details which may be regarded as confirmed on the basis of sources available to date. The German opposition were assured by the British Government that, should there be no German western offensive and should the German dictatorial regime be replaced by a democratic one within a reasonable time, the Western Powers would not take the offensive during the coup; further that in the peace settlement the Retch frontiers of 1937 would be left intact and the question of Austria's union with the Reich would be settled by a plebiscite in Austria. As Halifax put it to Osborne on 17 February 1940: 'Under any Federal plan [for the reorganization of Germany] it would be in our view right that Austria should be allowed to decide whether or not she wished to enter the Federation.' 57 On the retention of the Sudetenland by the Reich available sources are less clear. In contrast to Austria, on this point Dr Miiller and his principals could base their case on a formal international treaty, the Munich Agreement. Nevertheless the question was a difficult one and not even an outline solution emerged from the Rome soundings. Hitler had long since broken the agree- ment and the other signatories were no longer totally bound by it. Reporting on his talks in Rome between 6 and 12 November, Miiller was able to say that Noots, the (Belgian) Abbot of the Premonstratensian Order, who was always meeting diplomats, had told him that among Germany's enemies there was a general desire for a just peace, always provided that there was a change of regime. 58 Entente diplomats were always saying that it only needed the reestablishment of a Czech state, perhaps also of Slovakia and a 'Polish Poland' which was not more closely defined. Germany could keep everything else, possibly even Austria, although there was an increasing tendency in favour of a federal monarchy including both Germany and Austria. 59 As far as Dr Miiller remembers the terms transmitted to him and in- 162 Soundings Abroad tended solely for him and his principals were: Reestablishment of Poland, Germany not being responsible for the area occupied by Russia; subsequent negotiations on Danzig and frontier rectifications with Poland; other territorial questions in the east to be solved by plebiscite. 60 The Sudetenland does not seem to have been specifically mentioned in the communications received by Miiller. The German frontiers in the west were not even a subject of discussion. 61 The communications and assurances received in Rome appeared in Berlin as minutes and reports by Dr Miiller and notes by his principals and friends. Many of them simply repeated what Miiller had found out in Rome. Others, however, in particular one known as the 'X Report' because Miiller was referred to therein as *x', were intended to be used solely to influence 'the generals', in other words Haider and Brauchitsch. There were a number of drafts of the 'X Report' before it was finalized but none of these papers have been found since the war. 62 One may venture a cautious reconstruction of the contents of the 'X Report' based on certain evidence, such as diary entries and memoirs, which are not invariably accurate or reliable; it is possible, however, to establish the minimum concrete statements which the 'X Report' must have contained. 63 These were points which, in the light of Germany's actual situa- tion, had to be conceded and on which all those involved in the 'X Report', its preliminary drafts and supporting documents, were in agreement. These points included: No German offensive in the west; a change of regime; reestablishment of the rule of law; peace negotiations with a new non- Nazi government; settlement of the relationship between Germany and Austria by mutual agreement, possibly by a plebiscite in Austria; a settlement acceptable to Germany of problems in the East. 64 General Thomas, moreover, says that, while under interrogation after 20 July 1944, he was shown a minute showing that the 'report from Rome' in- cluded agreement to the settlement of all eastern questions in favour of Germany. 65 Haider goes even further than Thomas. From what he remembers the 'X Report' did not contain a specific demand for a change of regime but only for the removal of Hitler and 'if possible* of the entire National-Socialist regime. The Czech region 66 should remain in a German 'sphere of influence' and moreover, not only should the German eastern frontier of 1914 be reestablished but also the western 1914 frontiers. This is so ludicrous as to cast doubts on the authenticity of everything else. We shall never know whether this is perhaps the key to Haider's remarkable feats of memory. 67 In any case a document such as that described by Haider could never have produced the desired result. At the conclusion of the Rome talks, around 20 February 1940, Dr Miiller told his opposite number in Rome, Father Leiber (as Father Leiber later related), that his principals regarded the results as so favourable that they were now prepared to act; the coup d'etat was now scheduled for a date in February. 68 Father Leiber does not say on what authority Miiller made this pronouncement but in any case it proved over-optimistic. Haider did not 163 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 receive the 'X Report' and other papers about the Rome talks until 4 April. 69 Why had Beck, Oster and Dohnanyi let slip the rest of February and March ? No one can say. Possibly they were hoping for some diplomatic solu- tion, for which Sumner Welles' mission may have given grounds for hope. Possibly also, after the fruitless talk between Beck and Haider, the two opposi- tion centres were out of touch, not only technically but in identity of pur- pose. 70 Certainly Beck's group did not now think that the western offensive or the war situation in general need be taken any less seriously. On the contrary - the crimes committed in Poland, on which further reports had been reaching the opposition particularly since the end of January, continued to demonstrate that the overthrow of the regime was essential. 71 Admittedly people were wearied with waiting. It was difficult to penetrate to Haider; the continual visits must have been tiresome to him at a time when he was so preoccupied with preparations for the western offensive and when, moreover, he had neither the hope nor the desire to persuade his Commander- in-Chief to participate in a coup. When Hassell reached Berlin on 14 February, Goerdeler told him that Brauchitsch must be written off entirely. 72 Talking to Hassell the next day, Popitz, the Prussian Finance Minister, referred more op- timistically to 'the generals' but confirmed Goerdeler's opinion that there was little hope of a decision before the visit of Sumner Welles, the American Under-Secretary of State. 73 During the second half of February Hassell, at least, placed all his hopes on Sumner Welles' visit. Among others he spoke to Alexander C. Kirk, the American Charg6 d'Affaires in Berlin, and urged him to arrange for Sumner Welles to meet men like Planck and Popitz. 74 Hassell then went to Arosa for his second meeting with Lonsdale Bryans. He was back in Berlin in the second week of March. Sumner Welles' visit had taken place meanwhile (1—5 March) and, from the opposition's point of view, had produced nothing. It is un- derstandable, however, that hope revived when Sumner Welles postponed his departure from Europe on receipt of the news of Hitler's and Mussolini's meeting on the Brenner on 18 March. 75 The imminence of the western offensive now became a subject of discussion once more. From a cousin of Brauchitsch Hassell learnt that, if Hitler so in- structed, Brauchitsch would issue orders for the offensive and would conduct it in order to reach a 'military decision' - or in order thus to evade a decision. At heart, however, he was uncertain, the cousin said, and, although he would not undertake a coup himself, he would stand by if he was relieved of respon- sibility for it by someone else. 76 On 11 March Hassell was back in Ebenhausen, returning to Berlin on the 15th. 77 Again and again people tried to persuade Brauchitsch to play an active part in a coup. When Popitz visited him between 10 and 15 March, Brauchitsch gave the impression of 'an inwardly broken man'. Nevertheless he had asked whether there was any prospect of a 'decent peace'. Popitz, who was obviously not familiar with the details of the peace soundings, particularly of the Vatican talks, even if he knew of them at all, could only reply that he believed so. 78 There is so far nothing definite to show why Popitz had not been told of the 164 Soundings Abroad details and commissioned to deliver the 'X Report'. It was, of course, a par- ticularly hot potato, since, technically at any rate, it amounted to treason. Who had the courage to show these papers to Haider when he risked being arrested or thrown out? The ground had first to be tested. In addition the military situation had changed. The Army was now far better prepared than in the previous autumn and the people much less alarmed. The allegedly es- sential psychological basis was totally lacking. 79 Finally it had to be remembered that ever since November Haider had become unapproachable for the opposition; he had refused all requests; he was at cross purposes with Beck; Groscurth had been removed from his vital position — from every point of view the opposition had been losing ground with Haider all the time. Nevertheless the backers of Dr Miiller strove to get the 'X Report' to Haider and Brauchitsch. On 17 March Goerdeler succeeded in obtaining an interview with Haider but no one gave him the report to take with him. 80 On the other hand it was now decided to let Hassell into the secret and show him the results of the Rome talks. He was an experienced diplomat and an expert who, in ad- dition, had formerly been Ambassador in Rome. He was the man to give the necessary authenticity to these unsigned documents and lend weight to the background arguments which might be obscure to the uninitiated. On 16 March, therefore, Hassell was asked by Gottfried von Nostitz, a Counsellor in the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of Oster and Dohnanyi to meet Beck that afternoon at No 9 Goethestrasse, Berlin—Lichterfelde; Oster and Dohnanyi appeared there some time later. 81 They read to Hassell the papers prepared by Dr Miiller which showed that what was called a 'decent peace' was still perfectly obtainable, as the British government had explicitly stated. The main points were: a change of regime; 'acknowledgement of Christian morali- ty' (which could be taken to mean a return to the rule of law); decentralization in Germany and a plebiscite in Austria (an idea also ventilated in connection with a federal organization for the German—Austrian area). All this was now divulged to Hassell, firstly to have his opinion as a foreign policy expert and secondly to ask him to be the channel to Haider 'because no other in- termediary had much chance of success'. 82 Hassell was ready to act and on 18 March he discussed the matter again with Dohnanyi and Oster in the latter's house. It was decided first to see what news Goerdeler had. 83 He had seen Haider on Sunday 17 March and for two hours had discussed 'the necessity for peace before the start of a showdown by force' and 'the possibility of a favourable settlement', as Haider noted in his diary less laconically than usual. 84 Goerdeler had had to promise to tell no one about his talk. He therefore merely told Hassell that at the last moment Haider had been unable to receive him but that he had 'received from another source the assurance that understanding was growing in that quarter'. 85 Haider, he said, now wanted to talk to Hassell. When Goerdeler had besought him to in- itiate the coup Haider had given the well-known reply, difficult to refute, that he had neither the forces nor the necessary backing. 86 Goerdeler urged Hassell to hurry, saying that he must see Thomas the very next day and discuss with him preparations for his interview with Haider. 165 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 Hassell had not actually wanted to stay in Berlin so long but he postponed his departure and on 19 March went early to see Thomas and discussed with him the best arguments to use with Haider and the basic political proposals. 87 During their talk it emerged that Goerdeler had in fact seen Haider; Thomas confirmed that Haider wanted to talk to Hassell but not until after Easter, after 24 March in other words. 88 For the moment, therefore, Hassell was free to return to Ebenhausen. There he remained and heard nothing more until 2 April when, becoming uneasy, he returned to Berlin. There he was told by Goerdeler that Haider had 'got cold feet' and had called off the interview with Hassell. Goerdeler showed him a letter he had had from Haider. 89 Haider refused to take action at this time, using arguments which Hassell characterized as naive in the extreme. After all, Haider had said, Britain and France had declared war on Germany and the war must now be fought out. The Wehrmacht could not act on its own to overthrow the government or at least only in extreme emergency, in other words after severe defeats or in face of imminent defeat. This was in fact naive and worse — it was irresponsible. From what Goerdeler said Hassell drew the conclusion that it was now too late altogether; the invasion of Denmark and Norway was imminent; Haider and Brauchitsch had obviously decided to have nothing more to do with ideas about a coup d'etat and to carry out Hitler's orders instead. 90 Time was pressing. After three months of preparation, minute-writing and vacillation the date for the invasion of Denmark and Norway had been settled on 27 March; it was to take place on 9 or 10 April. 91 OKH had been at high pressure for weeks; there were tactical and technical questions to be dealt with; arms and ammunition production had to be raised; a 'bottleneck' in rubber production had to be overcome by an order against fast driving; there were tours of inspection and conferences of all sorts. According to the mid- February Order of Battle the field Army now numbered 3.3 million men. The mere administration of such a mass of men entailed a mountain of work quite apart from the preparation of two or three offensives at the same time. 92 On 12 March Haider went to a conference in Koblenz, from which he did not return until the morning of the 14th; on 15th and 16th he had conferences with Hitler. 93 After the excitement about Sumner Welles' visit had died down - it is mentioned several times in Haider's diary - came Hitler's meeting with Mussolini on the Brenner. It is astounding, therefore, that on 17 March Haider found the time to talk to Goerdeler for two-and-a-half hours. 94 When he made time to write to Goerdeler over Easter he was clearly hoping to be left in peace thereafter. His letter was obviously intended as a brush-off for the op- position. The opposition, however, could not leave him in peace while the Fuhrer monster was still there. On 27 March, in a long conference with Brauchitsch, Haider, Leeb, Witzleben, General Dollmann and Lieutenant-General Felber, Hitler an- nounced the date for 'Exercise Weser', the invasion of Norway. The state of preparations and the weather now no longer constituted obstacles as in the previous autumn and hardly anyone could doubt that this time it was the real 166 Soundings Abroad thing. Preparations were stepped up and completed; activity became even more hectic. On the evening of 30 March Haider went to Frankfurt to confer with Leeb; he did not return to Berlin until the morning of 1 April. On the afternoon of 2 April OKH issued the codeword 'W-7' - Exercise Weser minus seven. This meant that movement must now begin for the invasion of Den- mark and Norway in seven days' time. 95 Finally on 4 April, in the midst of this whirl of preparations, General Thomas penetrated to Haider with the 'X Report' and Dr Muller's assurance from Rome that the Allies were still firm in their views as set out therein. The entry in Haider's diary is buried among notes on shortages of vehicles, rear services including bakeries, the fuel situation, Hitler's field headquarters 'Felsennest' (Crag's Nest), the move of OKH on the afternoon preceding the offensive, a pioneer battalion and so on and so on; it merely says: 'Gen. Thomas: Glimpse of intelligence material.' 96 Small wonder if, so soon before the invasion, after so many preparations and war games, with everything so fully ready, when all this labour was at last about to come to fulfilment, Haider was seized by the soldier's thirst for battle. In April even the calm composed General Fromm was 'touched by the war fever'. 97 Haider read the 'X Report' and showed it to Brauchitsch that evening. Haider maintains that, as set out in these papers, the terms on which Britain was prepared to conclude peace included not only the retention of Austria and Czechoslovakia (sic) under German influence, but also reestablishment of the 1914 frontiers of Germany both in east and west. Hitler and 'if possible' his entire Nazi regime, however, must be removed. Later Haider recalled that, having read the papers, Brauchitsch said to him next morning: 'You should not have shown me this. What is happening here is sheer treason. Under no circumstances can we be involved in this. We are at war; in peacetime you can talk about contacts with a foreign power, but in wartime soldiers cannot do that. Moreover this is not a struggle between governments; we are concerned with a contest of ideologies [sic]. Removal of Hitler would therefore achieve nothing.' Brauchitsch expressed himself similarly to Dr Otto John after the war. 98 Brauchitsch then demanded to know who had brought the paper to Haider; he would have him arrested, whereupon Haider replied: 'If anyone is to be arrested, you had better arrest me.' Naturally that did not occur. In his diary Haider does not mention his Commander-in-Chiefs outburst of indignation; he merely records his actual objection — or pretext — which was also his own — this despite the fact that the papers had made so great an im- pression on him that he had submitted them to Brauchitsch, thereby showing that he took them seriously. The objection read: 'Where did material come from to be able to make use of it. (Thomas.)' 99 After the war Haider explained that the papers were unsigned and that one had to be suspicious of such extraordinary concessions as the 1914 frontier in the west. But would the reactions of Brauchitsch and Haider have been any different had the 'X Report' or the British terms been handed over on notepaper of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy to the Holy See, signed, sealed and perhaps with an official stamp ? Would they not then have suspected a simple forgery ? Who can blame 167 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 them for being suspicious about the contacts that had been made through such dark channels — of which Osborne, Halifax and Chamberlain were equal- ly suspicious ? 100 By the same token, however, who can blame them for the fear that Britain would use the moment of an internal upheaval in Germany for a military attack? After all, Britain and France had declared war on Germany, and such action would have been entirely appropriate and in fact what one would have expected. Why should Britain and France assume that new Ger- man leaders would be more conciliatory than the old ones? The success of a coup d'etat, in short, cannot be guaranteed any more than can that of a war. Haider and Brauchitsch had considered both and to a certain extent prepared both; they then implemented one of them, not because it offered more assured prospects of success but because it was more official. They carried the respon- sibility in any case but, if they executed 'lawful' orders, they were sticking to the generally recognized rules of the game, irrespective of the fact that the rules would multiply the loss of human life by millions. Everything had its proper place. The conspirators who were ready to embark on a coup to save human life could be labelled as traitors; the general who sent millions to their death was 'doing his duty' and so was honourable. Word was received from Haider that he hardly thought that Brauchitsch would change his attitude. 101 And so it proved. On 14 April Brauchitsch even urged on Hitler early issue of orders for 'Operation Yellow', the attack in the west, saying that nothing was to be gained by waiting longer. 102 Nine days later Haider referred angrily in his diary to the 'absence of planning' in the Reich Chancellery, saying: 'Operation Yellow apparently not urgent at the moment.' 103 He had tried everything, Haider said after the war, but he could understand why his Commander-in-Chief 'was not eager to tread on this thin ice'. That is a subtle way of putting it. Naturally, had the 'X Report' included that which Haider recalled later — agreement to the 1914 frontiers both in east and west — its effect would have been disillusioning and rightly so. But this was not the reason given by Brauchitsch. It is known that Haider wavered; he must be given credit for the fact that he was the victim of a severe conflict between formal military discipline and his duty on the one side and his ethical humanitarian duty on the other. In his letter to Goerdeler he is supposed to have summarized his attitude thus: 'The Army will do its duty to the country, even against Hitler's government if the situation so requires.' 104 When would it require ? On 5 November 1939 none of the conditions for the coup prescribed by Haider were lacking and Brauchitsch had explicitly given him a free hand. "The situation' was not, therefore, the real obstacle. Now victory and fame were beckoning and the war prospects were good. And thus it was. Haider's tragedy was characterized by weakness, devotion to military duty and for- malism - combined with simultaneous realization of the criminal nature of Hitler's orders. The group centred on Oster, Dohnanyi and Hassell still tried to persuade a number of army leaders, including Leeb, Witzleben, List and Kluge, to make a combined demarche to Brauchitsch and refuse to carry out the offensive. 105 Nothing came of it, however; the attack rolled forward and the occupation of 168 Soundings Abroad Denmark and Norway proved a brilliant military manoeuvre. No wonder that many of the conspirators, General Thomas for instance, were a prey to deep discouragement and considered that fate must now be allowed to run its course for a time. It is all the more astounding that others such as Beck, Hassell, Popitz and Goerdeler still felt that they should not relax their efforts for an instant. Inevitably the German opposition now fell into disrepute abroad. For so long it had roused hopes of an internal German coup and people had long waited for it in vain. Now, instead of overthrowing Hitler, 'the generals' had occupied Denmark and Norway and administered an ignominious defeat to the western Allies. Naturally it was not known in London how little OKH, still the only available centre of power for a coup, had had to do with the invasions nor that Norway was the first 'OKW Theatre' of the war. But this made little difference. There was nothing to show that Brauchitsch and Haider would not have carried out Hitler's orders with the same alacrity as Keitel and Jodl. To avoid losing all credibility, to keep the contact open and to demonstrate loyalty to their Rome opposite numbers who had risked themselves un- selfishly, Oster and his associates decided on a final mission for Dr Miiller. At the end of April, 106 as in November 1939, he was despatched to Rome to explain that the vital condition governing the British concessions, a coup in Germany, could no longer be fulfilled since the generals were unable to make up their minds to act. The western offensive was now certainly imminent. 107 The question will invariably be asked whether, either objectively or subjec- tively, this was treason. In the first place it should be observed that the western offensive had long since ceased to be a secret; everyone knew that preparations had been made. Secondly no one apart from Hitler, and perhaps not even he himself, could tell with any certainty what he would do. What was therefore being 'betrayed' ? Legally, on the other hand, an intent or deliberate act designed to damage one's own country constitutes treason. 108 Poland showed whither Germany's path was leading and men like Oster, Dohnanyi, Canaris, Miiller, Hassell, Beck and Goerdeler knew this only too well. In trying to prevent Hitler's offensives succeeding by warning the enemy, they were in fact trying to save not only the enemy but equally their own people from inconceivable suffering and bloodshed, in fact from their destruction as a nation. This is the antithesis of treason. Finally there is the right of self- defence, transcending nationality and common to all men. When so monstrous, devilish and erratic a criminal as Hitler appears, both willing and able to subjugate a whole continent, national boundaries in the strict and for- mal sense lose their significance; the interests of all peoples then become similar. In this spirit Oster took the ultimate and most extreme action open to anyone to prevent the western offensive taking place or at least succeeding. As soon as he knew it himself, he told the Dutch government of the date ordered by Hitler for the attack on Belgium and Holland. He did this from hatred of a regime which he regarded as criminal, from a realization of the monstrous in- justice about to be perpetrated and as the result of a particularly clear and 169 Plans for a Coup 1939-40 logical process of thought which the majority of other conspirators could not bring themselves to follow. 109 Moreover those patriots and opponents of Hitler who were determined to fight him to the end were not alone in their decision to take action technically classifiable as treason. Even General Reichenau, usually condemned as a careerist and Nazi general, who commanded first Tenth Army and then Sixth Army, had the courage not only to oppose Hitler openly but also to warn the Netherlands of Hitler's planned invasion. 110 On 6 November, in the house of Fritz Elsas, he met Goerdeler, whom he had known since 1934, and he told him of Hitler's plan, which he said was 'completely crazy'. The Dutch must be warned, he said, so that they could put their defences visibly in order, par- ticularly the dikes and canals; this would show that the advantage of surprise had already been lost. Elsas was in fact able to transmit Reichenau's message to London both via Copenhagen and Stockholm and via Switzerland, but the plan had already become known there through other channels. Reichenau's motives in doing this were undoubtedly honourable; that he, of all people, should be capable of it emphasizes the stress of conscience under which patriots such as Oster were acting who had fought against Hitler from the outset. Towards the end of the Polish campaign Major (later Colonel) G. J. Sas, the Dutch Military Attach.6 in Berlin, had himself come to the conclusion that Hitler would launch an offensive on France through Belgium and Holland. On 28 September 1939 he warned his government accordingly. In mid-October this was confirmed to him by Oster, whom he had known since 1932; they had been good friends since 1936. On 7 November Oster told Sas for the first time the date of the planned attack - 12 November. A few days later, about 12 November, Dr Miiller passed a similar warning to Belgium through his Rome contacts. Thereafter, as soon as he knew it himself, Oster told Sas on each oc- casion the date to which the offensive had been postponed. Hardly any of Sas' superiors put faith in his initial report; many of them regarded him as a joke. 111 The longer the series of announcements and cancellations, the less seriously was Sas taken by his government. The process in fact demonstrated Hitler's disorderly methods and his impatience; it produced, perhaps deliberately, an artificial state of permanent tension and hectic activity; it continuously threw the Wehrmacht into confusion but it was typical of Hitler's style of government. To the Dutch agencies in The Hague it was totally incomprehensible. In addition to this unintentional side-effect the repeated changes of date did something else: both Berlin and Zossen began to realize that German operational intentions were leaking. 112 Oster continued to pass information to Sas, thereby increasing the mortal danger in which he had placed himself in any case. But of this he took no account. On 3 April 1940, via Dr Miiller (the Vatican channel) and via Sas, Oster attempted to warn the Danish, Norwegian and British governments of the at- tack planned for 9 April. The warning reached the Danes but they were helpless in any case; it did not reach either the Norwegians or the British who 170 Soundings Abroad could have made better use of it. 113 Early in May Oster told the Dutch Military Attache^ as before, of the imminence of the western offensive; the date, however, had not been entirely fixed. When information reached The Hague from the Vatican and Sas was asked for confirmation by telegram, Oster ad- vised him to wait before saying anything further to his government. On Oster's advice Jonkheer H. M. van Haersma de With, the Dutch Minister in Berlin, gave the approximate date as 'the middle of next week', in other words about 8 May. On 9 May Hitler fixed the opening of the offensive for 10 May at 5.35 a.m. 114 At 7 p.m. on Thursday 9 May Oster met Sas and told him of the latest development; nothing could now be stopped failing a counter-order by about 9.30 p.m. Oster checked that no such order had been issued and shortly before 10 p.m. told Sas that the offensive would definitely open next morning. 115 Sas passed the message forthwith to The Hague and also to the Belgian Military Attach6 in Berlin whom, as a precaution, he had summoned to the Legation in the Rauchstrasse. About midnight Sas received a call from the Dutch Director of Military Intelligence who, with little attempt at concealment, asked whether there was now to be no change in arrangements for the 'operation on your wife'. People in The Hague were still doubtful whether the information was correct. Sas' reply was: 'It takes place tomorrow morning at daybreak.' 116 Oster's disclosures had no noticeable result. The Dutch did not really believe the news and were taken totally by surprise when the attack actually began; the Belgians alerted their troops at 3 a.m. on 10 May, far too late to be effective. 117 The well-worn statement, therefore, that Oster's treachery cost thousands of German soldiers their lives, is quite wrong; it is not of major significance, however, for any assessment of Oster's behaviour. Oster was well aware of the danger that his betrayal might result in the loss, not only of his own life but that of many other German soldiers. He calculated that, should the Wehrmacht suffer an initial defeat as a consequence of his warnings, casualties might amount to 40,000. Wrestling with his conscience, however, he concluded that such casualties must be accepted in face of the cer- tainty that, failing an initial defeat, the war, with its millions of victims and untold misery and destruction, would almost certainly be a long one. His reasoning, accepted with all its consequences by Beck, was as follows: 118 for- mal legal scruples could no longer carry weight in a fight against a demon of destruction like Hitler, to whom the word 'humanity' meant nothing; the object must be to prevent as much damage, misery and death as was possible. Membership of the military machine carried with it at least a share of the responsibility; every effort must be made to mitigate this load of guilt which no excuses put forward by those of feeble conscience could remove. Like Beck, Witzleben and, at least until early 1940, Brauchitsch and Haider also, Oster was convinced that the western offensive would fail and be brought to a halt with catastrophic losses; it should therefore be stopped and not merely be caused to fail after it had begun. The most effective method of preventing Hitler carrying out his plan was to 171 Plans for a Coup 1939-^0 demonstrate to him that the Dutch and Belgians had taken far-reaching counter-measures in good time; this would imply loss of the surprise factor and make a rapid advance impossible. Hitler always wanted quick success; patience and caution were not in his nature. 119 If, however, in spite of everything the offensive took place, and there was every indication that it would, then the anticipated defeat must be brought about as soon as possible and with the smallest number of casualties; otherwise the longer the war dragged on, the greater would be the casualties and destruction on both sides, the stronger and more unyielding would be the enemy front and the smaller the prospects of a reasonable peace. Oster's purpose was not to damage the Reich or his country. It was precisely the opposite. Neither actually nor theoretically can there therefore be any question of treachery. Hitler had begun and was pursuing a vast bloody war of conquest which according to the dictates of common sense and any realistic appreciation of the situation could only do damage to Germany; of this all knowledgeable experts were convinced and their conviction was con- firmed by events. Objectively, therefore, there can be no question of Oster's 'treachery' having done damage to Germany. Opinions about Oster will continue to range from condemnation to ap- proval. The question is one of a man's conscience and of assessing his action in a wider context than that of formal legality and the nation-state. After the war the Western Allies were only too ready to accuse the German people, in- cluding the military leaders, of lack of moral courage because they had done nothing to overthrow Hitler, had not emigrated abroad or had not fought against the regime; yet even the Allies regarded Oster as a morally despicable traitor. 120 General Winkelman, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, described Oster as a 'miserable fellow', whereupon Colonel Sas replied that he had never met so bold or courageous a character. 121 As these two remarks show clearly, the question is whether one is thinking in terms of men or organizations. Oster was only too well aware of this problem when he said to Sas: 'People may well say that I am a traitor but in reality I am not. I regard myself as a better Ger- man than all those who are trotting along behind Hitler. It is both my purpose and my duty to liberate Germany, and with her the world, from this plague." 22 172 PART IV/INTERNAL POLITICAL PLANS This page intentionally left blank 13 SchmidNoerr One of the earliest constitutional drafts came from the circle centred on Oster, Heinz and Liedig. It was produced in the summer of 1937 by Professor Friedrich Alfred SchmidNoerr. 1 Its centrepiece is the 'community of the peo- ple' (Volksgemeinschaft) — 'the community is above everything except the law of morality'. In the preamble alone Volksgemeinschaft appears more than for- ty times, practically in every sentence. The community, the draft says, is linked to the European Christian tradition and aims at peaceful coexistence with all peoples. Freedom for all forms of belief and thought is guaranteed but only 'in so far as it is compatible with the spirit and existence of the com- munity'. Anyone 'of German origin as to one quarter of his blood' belongs to the community but 'respect and a guarantee of their rights' is promised to 'resident minorities of foreign race or origin'. The German Reich is defined as the contiguous area inhabited by Germans; it should be divided into regions (Gaue) 'which would be largely self-administering'. The constitution was to be corporative in form, the Reich consisting of the independent Reich corporations* (ecclesiastical, administrative including legal, defence including the police) and the independent state corporations (farmers, workers, craftsmen, business and industry, commerce, education, science and the arts). Women, whether married or single, formed a corpora- tion of their own. All corporations possessed equal rights and were 'royal'; they were to be self-administering but were responsible to the community and the Reich. The corporations had 'limits' but these could be exceeded in any direction by the members provided certain regulations were observed. The right of all forms of association was explicitly guaranteed, but equally explicit- ly, political parties formed the exception to this. Formation of any association was to be under the supervision of legally established bodies representing the corporation and of overseers designated by them or of authorities appointed by the associations themselves. The three Reich corporations were represented only in the Reich House of corporations, the state corporations only in the Regional Chambers of Cor- porations; the latter, however, were to send ten representatives, at least one from each state corporation, to the Reich House of Corporations. The tasks both of the Regional Chambers and the Reich House were self-administration * In this Part the word 'corporation' has been used to translate the German word 'Stand 1 (pi. Stande). Its meaning is similar to that of the word 'estates' in its mediaeval sense. [Translator] 175 Internal Political Plans and 'advice to the Reich administration'. A sort of Upper House was to be formed from a 'meritocracy', a personal, not hereditary, aristocracy. Members of this aristocracy were to be elected for life by their corporations and, after a two-stage process of recommendation, confirmed in office by the 'People's King' (Volkskbnig). They constituted a Council of State which was 'the supreme supervisory authority of the Reich\ could act for the People's King and at the same time formed both the electoral college and source of can- didates for future Kings (the latter not necessarily). It was not, however, clear how the People's King was to be elected. The monarch was the 'incumbent of the supreme office in the State and ad- ministrator of the Reich'-, he was to be sworn in to the community (not to the constitution); 'since he carries responsibility for the administration of the Reich, he is, in this capacity, head of the community'. No corporation could therefore control him or call him to account; if, however, the Council of State raised objection to the actions of the monarch on three occasions, he became 'subject to the law of the community which elected him'. In principle he was elected for life but could be deposed. He must be over forty years of age on assuming office. Like the People's King the Reich Corporations owed their duty to the com- munity; they swore their oath to the community, never to an individual, not even the People's King. The oath could only be invalidated in one way - if a member of a Reich Corporation was expelled from the community, either with his consent or as a punishment. The community was the guardian of the law; it would permit no exceptional proceedings outside the law; it guaranteed work to all citizens and, so far as possible, freedom to make their way and prosper; corporations had no special prerogatives. Freedom of the press and public disputation were guaranteed but they must remain within the limits set 'by the spirit and continuance of the community and by the security provisions against treason towards the community evidenced by any attempt to disturb, reduce or otherwise weaken it'. Any attempt to form a party, for instance, would constitute treason; any form of extraordinary or secret association and any attempt to obtain special rights or privileges was foreign to the concept of the community of the people. The object therefore was to do away with the pluralist society, with the parliamentary system, in which special-interest groups could legally be represented or irresponsible demagogues come to power, with the system of 'party reaction', with disunity, and to substitute a community without con- flicts. 2 Absolutism at the top and egalitarianism in the community of the peo- ple — both were unrealistic, the draft said, and so rotten at the roots. Whither the ideal of majority rule had led, it continued, could be seen by all. The draft evidenced a clear aversion to anything inefficient, anything which did not function smoothly and well. It failed to explain, however, how the new arrangements to be set up in place of the old, could function. How were cor- porations to be prevented representing their own interests or even allying themselves with other corporations against third parties? This would be tan- tamount to formation of a party and that would be treason. Since the monarch 176 SchmidNoerr was not fully independent, the constitution would inevitably be enforced by the Council of State acting as a dictatorial body. The ideal of the community of the people in which there would be no majority, no conflict and no political parties remained an ideal and unattainable. This constitutional draft is a particularly glaring example of the political in- eptitude of many of Hitler's opponents. Nevertheless rejection of the past while retaining that which suited the German character, and the ideal of freedom from conflict were very widespread ideas. This should not surprise — pragmatists deal with each situation as it arises rather than planning for the future; their voice was hardly likely to be heard in this context. The draft also evidenced, however, the reliance which had to be placed on authoritarian procedures in order to achieve this absence of conflict, at least in theory. Ad- mittedly the rights of assembly and association were guaranteed but only in so far as they did not 'disturb' the community. In no other way could 'har- monious living' by the community of the people be substituted for party strife. 177 14 Hassell A draft prepared in January and February 1940 by the former Ambassador, Ulrich von Hassell, after discussion with Beck, Goerdeler and Popitz, is not quite so radical as that of Professor SchmidNoerr but its basic ideas are similar. 1 Others contributed at least as much as Hassell — Professor Johannes Popitz, the Prussian Finance Minister, Dr Jens Peter Jessen, Professor of Political Science (who worked in the Army General Staff during the war) and Dr Erwin Planck, former State Secretary and then director of a steel firm. The first point announced in HasselTs 'programme' was the determination of the (new) German government to continue the war until peace, the existence and independence of the German people and also 'the old Reich fron- tier' with Poland were assured. This is only comprehensible in the light of the situation of 1940 and against the background of the blitz victory over Poland - not welcomed by Hassell but a fact nevertheless. His other conditions for peace were freedom of the individual and his legitimate activities, integrity of justice and the law, a state based on the rule of law, observance by the ad- ministration and the police of the principles of morality, respect for human life in general and of minorities in particular. The positions and functions usurped by the Party bosses must return to the civil service; the State must cease squandering money; a sensible foreign policy must be adopted aimed at reduc- tion of armaments and cultural and economic exchanges. The idea of unity figured largely in HasselTs programme. Many Germans considered the unity of the 'community of the people' to be one of National- Socialism's main achievements; it was not merely for this reason, however, that Hassell wished to safeguard it but because it was desirable in itself. The Nazi Party with all its branches was to be dissolved and its property con- fiscated; the Labour Service, however, should continue in a different form and the Labour Front should be reorganized, not abolished. The various social groupings were by no means to be left free to organize cooperation between themselves. These were to be the guiding principles for the initial transitional period of regency; they were not, however, dictated by considerations of temporary expediency, as further study of the programme shows. The regency was to set up a constitutional council under the chairmanship of the Minister of the Interior; this was to work out organizational proposals based 'on the principle of a unified German state'. There must be 'cooperation by the people' in the 178 Hassell political life of the Reich and 'control of the state based on local and corporate self-government'. There was no mention of a parliamentary system nor any provision for universal, equal, secret and free elections in future. There could therefore be no question of democracy nor is there any mention of it. The draft does not reveal how future governments were to be brought into being; it merely says that, if dictatorship by a group or an individual is to be avoided, something like a 'meritocracy' must be created. 2 The emphasis placed on the professional civil service as opposed to political officialdom, which had turned into rule by Party bosses under the Nazi regime, seems to point in this direction. The liberties enshrined in all liberal constitutions are not explicitly guaranteed in Hassell's and Popitz's drafts; instead they refer to 'true freedom'. Admittedly they propose to reestablish at once a state based on the rule of law. The Wehrmacht, however, was to take its oath, not to the state nor even to the community but to the regency and regional commanders were to have full executive powers. With the best will in the world therefore, this amounted in practice to a military dictatorship. Science and teaching were declared free from restraint, as was also the press during the post-war period. The limits of freedom, however, were to be those imposed by the 'requirements of state security'; in the case of the written and printed word, the people's security was even invoked in addition to that of the state - 'after the war the security of the state and nation shall be protected by legislation against abuses in the literary field'. Moreover, as already pointed out, these are no emergency measures but plans and principles applicable to the period after the end of the emergency. However well meant these proposals, however sincerely men like Beck and Hassell must be credited with the determination to establish justice, the rule of law and humanity, they were certainly not liberal. So long as they themselves were in power, perhaps in association with Goerdeler, their regime might have been tolerable; but what might happen afterwards? Not even an attempt was made to provide assurances against abuses, though it is, of course, true to say that unless the people, the electors, the press and the public in general, are willing to exert some control any constitutional instrument given them, however good, is of little value. 179 15 Popitz A 'Provisional Basic Law' drafted primarily by Popitz and also originating about the turn of the year 1939-1940, followed somewhat similar lines. 1 Ac- cording to this 'the supreme law of action' was to consist of the 'rules of propriety and good morals'. In view of the appalling brutalization and the murderous perverted savagery of the Nazi regime, this was undoubtedly called for. But habits and ideas concerning what is 'proper* can change con- siderably. Who is to decide whether and when it is 'proper' to shoot a fugitive, to suppress an opposition campaign or marry a divorcee ? Would it be 'proper* to accuse the government of corruption or a mistaken foreign policy? If the rules of propriety and good morals were to constitute the 'supreme law of ac- tion', it may be useless promising in the next sentence 'independence of the judiciary and the protection of personal liberty, of the family and of property', quite apart from the potential contradiction between protection of the family and protection of personal liberty. There followed further 'laws of action': 'Every German must so comport himself that the good of the community is not affected and no damage done to the good name of Germany'. Every man had a right to 'a way of life worthy of a human being', to an old age pension, to 'sickness and unemployment benefits' and to housing permitting a decent family life — but all this only applied to those 'who did their duty to the people and the state*. The economy as a whole was to be state-directed; in the case of agriculture the object was a distribution of property conducive to 'the highest possible yield'; schools and other 'educational establishments of all grades' were charged with instilling into the younger generation destined 'for service to the state, the churches, the sciences, art and industry' the necessary knowledge combined with the prin- ciples of 'physical fitness, character and morals'; religious instruction in the schools was described as an 'indispensable method of education*. There was therefore no freedom either of learning or of conscience despite the dictum that 'research, teaching and art' were to be 'restricted only in so far as was necessary for external and internal security and as was required by the necessary respect for the spiritual and moral heritage of the people'. Even the wording threw the door wide open to arbitrary interpretation. On this point the courts might conceivably intervene but Popitz, the lawyer, says remarkably little on this subject, although he makes a point of stressing the independence of the administrative courts. Apart from this, however, the 180 Popitz judiciary is only mentioned in passing and in the same breath as the ad- ministration of, for instance, taxes, customs, railways and the post office. Naturally judges were civil servants; this was taken so much for granted that it is not even mentioned; they were to be appointed by the government, in other words by the head of state with the agreement of the Chancellor, or possibly merely by the minister responsible. There are numerous methods of bringing to heel judges who are too 'independent' — always assuming that the law allows them to be so. They can be moved frequently or passed over for promotion. Since there was to be no parliament, abuses would be difficult to deal with; alternatively their elimination would depend almost exclusively on the goodwill of the central 'authority'. This presages a strong, centralized system. The Lawyer (provinces) were to be regions of the Reich administratively and only secondarily 'local self- governing bodies'. 'At the head of the Land as an administrative region of the Reich is the Regent [Statthalter^ \ he was at the same time Reich Government Commissar 'supervising the Land in its capacity as a local body'. This puts an end to any question of independent self-government; the Statthalter or Reich Commissar, and through him the Reich government, had the last word on affairs in a Land. The Landeshauptmann (lit: Land headman — senior minister in a Land) as 'supreme self-government authority of the Land\ was in a miserable position compared with the Statthalter. Here again there was to be no elected parliament, so that self-government was a total illusion. The Lander, already designated as administrative regions of the Reich, were to be further combined into governmental regions, which again were ad- ministrative regions of the Reich. Subordinate districts and boroughs were to be both 'administrative areas and local self-governing bodies'. This ran counter to any idea of federalism. The Reich government and Reich ad- ministration were fully centralized and their unity explicitly emphasized. At the top level of the Reich distribution of power was little better. There was to be a provisional Head of State known as Regent of the German Reich; this left open the possibility of restoring the monarchy which, as Otto John says, at least between 1938 and 1941 formed part of Beck's, Popitz's, Goerdeler's, Oster's and Dohnanyi's programme and, subject to a plebiscite, was also accepted by Wilhelm Leuschner and Jakob Kaiser. 2 In practice the Head of State was to have the prerogatives of a monarch: he represented the Reich internationally; he was Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht', he could appoint or dismiss the Chancellor (no parliament had anything to do with this); he could appoint and dismiss civil servants and military officers; he had the right of pardon and bestowal of titles and decorations. It is not, therefore, clear what purpose was served by the provision that 'for all orders and instructions' the Head of State required the counter-signature of the Chancellor or relevant minister. Anyone who refused to counter-sign could be dismissed. In the exercise of his military command, moreover, apart from the appointment and dismissal of officers the Head of State did not even require a counter-signature. The Chancellor and government were therefore primarily executive agen- 181 Internal Political Plans cies of the Head of State. They promulgated laws after hearing the views of the Council of State and Head of State. The government's budget was con- trolled only by a Chamber of Accounts (whose officials were to be appointed by the Head of State). The Council of State was a body of notables since it consisted of'men who had shown themselves worthy of the people's confidence by their achievements, their ability and their personality'. They did not have actually to possess this confidence; they were not elected but appointed by the Head of State. Under this constitution no one was elected; the word election does not even appear. Apart from these 'worthies' all Reich ministers and Statthalter belonged to the Council of State (but not the senior ministers of the Lander - that would have smacked of federalism). The Council of State was to 'repre- sent the people in its entirety' but not by election; hopefully its motives were to be a sense of propriety, goodwill and the dictates of conscience. Only to a limited degree could the Council be said to represent the people's interests. Later a 'broad-based body representing the people' was to be instituted; here again, however, there was no mention of elections and it was distinguished from the Council of State only in the breadth of its base - whatever that may mean. As the logical sequel to all this, not only was the Nazi Party proscribed but the 'formation of new political associations' was flatly forbidden. Where elec- tions and representative bodies did not exist, parties were unnecessary. The general trend of the draft is therefore clear. Ritter has rightly described it as an expression of an enlightened absolutism, an instrument of 'dic- tatorship by senior officials remote from the people'. 3 Ritter maintains that, as a transitional solution, the draft was good, implying that a more democratic constitution would have been introduced later, but there can be little con- fidence in this. Admittedly, before the coup had even taken place, there was lit- tle purpose in drafting ideal constitutions; thought had to be concentrated on dealing with the immediate situation. When that had been done, since plan- ning was the order of the day, something could be drafted dealing with the more distant future. But Popitz did not do this. His draft contained no provisions or promises holding out hope of democracy in the future. He was not even prepared to cancel forthwith the anti-Jewish discriminatory legisla- tion and regulations, but only to suspend them 'until the final settlement'. Of course, Popitz did not have in mind what the Heydrichs and Himmlers referred to as the 'final solution'; but he seems to have wanted to expel at least a great number of Jews. 4 The picture of an authoritarian illiberal regime is completed by Popitz's 'Guidelines for application of the law on the state of siege' - the draft of the ac- tual law has been lost. 5 For the period of the state of siege plenary powers were granted to Wehrkreis (Military District) commanders, as was inevitable. To provide the necessary counter-weight, civil servants were to be attached to them. Gauleiter, Nazi District Leaders, senior SS and police commanders were to be arrested. The specious, discredited idea of 'protective custody', however, so misused by the Nazis, was not considered suitable for this pur- 182 Popitz pose especially since it was also to be employed for persons who were actually threatened. In late 1939 and early 1940 Popitz's draft came near to being implemented. It was not — for the reasons given in Part III above. Subsequently other drafts seemed more likely to provide the guidelines for German political developments. In 1943 and 1944 the plans of the so-called 'Kreisau Circle', in which many of the younger members of the opposition met, seemed quite as likely to provide the decisive influence as those of Dr Goerdeler, so long the undisputed civilian leader of the opposition. Initially, however, Goerdeler's plans were in the forefront of people's minds, although Popitz's draft still had much support in his own immediate circle. 183 16 Goerdeler Goerdeler's ideas are recorded in numerous memoranda and drafts. The two most important, 'The Aim' written late in 1941 and 'Thoughts in the con- demned cell — September 1944' have been fully or partially published and at least parts of many others are in print. 1 Goerdeler has frequently been accused of being a reactionary. To some extent this results from the vehemence with which differing points of view were often argued between the various political tendencies in the opposition. In Goerdeler's case the accusation is unjustified. Admittedly he, like Popitz, wished to avoid the pitfalls of mass democracy; he was concerned to form an 61ite (whereas Popitz simply assumed that an elite would exist); he looked for 'de-agglomeration' and some stable form of authority. This he wished to achieve, however, through liberalism and decen- tralization; his stable authority should be so constructed that it guaranteed rather than suppressed freedom. 2 In working out the ideas set out in 'The Aim' Goerdeler was in contact not only with Hassell and the 'Freiburg Circle' headed by Professors Constantin von Dietze, Adolf Lampe and Gerhard Ritter but also with Trott, Yorck and Moltke of the 'Kreisau Circle'; later, from the end of 1941 he was in touch with socialists like Leuschner, Kaiser and Habermann. Goerdeler was always ready to compromise and he adopted many of his friends' ideas. He had his own ideas too, however, and they were anything but reactionary, although the machinery for implementing his plans was not always entirely practical. Popitz together with Hassell and Jessen was violently opposed to Goerdeler's plans; the great difference between them and those of Popitz is clearly to be seen in 'The Aim*. Like Popitz, Goerdeler wishes to reestablish the rule of law and propriety, but he also wants freedom. In the early paragraphs on the principles of internal policy is to be found this: 'All restric- tions on freedom of intellect, conscience and research will be lifted forthwith.' 3 This is clear and unequivocal - no mere vague future paradise. Further: 'In principle the press and literature will be free. Failure to grant such freedom indicates a pusillanimous government or a stupid people.' The only exceptions to the grant of this freedom were 'the criminal and the good- for-nothing'. Under the provision for administration of the law, however, only the regular courts could decree who should be included in such categories. Similarly, in his 1944 draft, Goerdeler thought that the press should be entire- ly free, subject to a binding obligation to tell the truth. 184 Goerdeler Goerdeler placed great hopes in the educational value of the truth and of responsibility. Almost every sentence on the subject of education emphasizes this. Religious instruction is indispensable, he says; but it must be given by people — schoolmasters, clergy or the laity — who practise what they preach. Textbooks must forthwith be cleared of every form of untruth. In education the truth must take the place of propaganda and party indoctrination. In in- dustry hourly wages should be replaced by piecework; it was more 'genuine' and better calculated to produce responsibility and efficiency. Instead of the automatic sickness benefits and old age pensions paid for out of taxes as ad- vocated by Dr Robert Ley, Leader of the German Labour Front, there should be adequate insurance schemes which workers and employees should, at least partially, finance themselves. In addition to veracity and responsibility self-government was one of the basic concepts in Goerdeler's constitutional ideas. As far as possible, he con- sidered, parishes (Gemeinderi) and districts (Bezirke) should run themselves, not however without some supervision by the state; the same applied to colleges and student bodies and even the churches, which to this extent were to be divorced from the state and would have to fend for themselves, though they were still to retain the right to levy church taxes. In Goerdeler's view, however, they should be sparing in the use of this right to avoid large-scale walk-outs. He did not commit himself on the question whether the state should continue to collect taxes for the churches or not. Divorce of church and state would, of course, be neither possible nor complete so long as the official tax offices continued to support the church with their authority, the dread which they inspired and their punitive and executive powers more or less backed by the authority of the law. There are certain other deficiencies in Goerdeler's constitutional plans. The main point is, however, that they were liberal and attempted to avoid the errors of the Bismarckian and Weimar periods, as also of course those of the Nazi regime. Confidence in freedom, in educational precepts and in the effect of public dissemination of the truth is as essential as a good constitution. Ac- cording to the 1941 draft the Nazi Party with its affiliated organizations was to lose all its prerogatives including that of carrying arms, all its official func- tions and all its rights but was not to be banned - 'Opinion must and will soon make itself clear spontaneously.' This confidence is the hallmark of both con- stitutional drafts, that of late 1941 and of September 1944. Men, Goerdeler said, must want and actively seek to attain that which their constitution could hold out to them and give them; alternatively they must learn to want it - 'There is no such thing as a constitution which works automatically.' In Goerdeler's view the right people would only be found in the right places if the state were built up from below; this was to be achieved by a complicated electoral system, partly direct and partly indirect. At the lowest level only the direct system applied, since only in his own restricted circle did the elector 'know' his candidate well enough. Parishes (Gemeinderi) were to be divided into the smallest possible areas, in each of which four candidates should stand and the one who amassed the most votes be elected. Candidates must be at 185 Internal Political Plans least thirty years of age and be resident in their area; trade unions and profes- sional associations should each put forward one candidate and 'political move- ments' two. The candidate elected then became a councillor of the parish. After the parish council the next rung was the district (Kreis) council; its members were elected by parish councils. Members must live in the district but need not be members of the parish council. Members of district councils in turn elected their representatives for the Land (provincial) and Gau (regional) councils; to be eligible they must have been members of a parish or district council for five years 'to guarantee ad- ministrative experience'. Finally the regional council elected their chairman (Landeshauptmann)', as head of the administration in a region, however, he possessed little of the power wielded by either the present-day or previous minister-presidents. He had no cabinet, no seat on any Reich body and was under the supervision of a Reich Statthalter, a sort of centrally-appointed governor. He (the Landeshauptmann) was assisted by 'provincial councillors' (Landesrate), chosen, however, not by him but by the regional council. Both he and his assistants required confirmation by the Reich Statthalter. Finally members of regional councils elected 150 deputies to the Reichstag out of a total of 300; these 150 had to be 35 years of age, have spent five years in some official unpaid capacity and be resident in their region. They need not therefore necessarily be members" of their regional council but-whence they were to come is not made clear. The remaining 150 candidates were to be elected, as those for parish councils, by majority vote, any German over twenty-five years of age being eligible to vote. For these elections to the Reichstag 150 constituencies were to be formed, distributed throughout the Retch; candidates had to be residents of their constituencies. In addition to the Reichstag which was thus elected half directly and half in- directly, there was to be an Upper House known as the Reich Chamber of Cor- porations (Reichsstandehaus). It consisted of 'leaders of Reich groups (in- dustry)', in other words professional organizations, presidents of Reich Chambers of Commerce (all presumably elected by their Chambers), three Evangelical and three Catholic bishops, rectors of universities and a number of trade union council members equivalent to that of the industrial and professional representatives. Finally there were to be fifty Germans of repute drawn from any source; they had to be fifty years of age and be appointed by the Head of State. Whether this was liable to produce a good distribution of powers can only be judged by examining the attributes and methods of the various individual bodies. This shows that, despite the stress laid upon them, the responsibilities of the regions (Gaue) were in fact limited and the Reich was comparatively highly centralized. The regions administered universities, welfare and health services, land improvement schemes, regional district courts, regional roads, certain other functions on behalf of the districts or delegated by the Reich and finally their own property. There is no mention of taxes and so, apart from revenue produced from their own property, regions, districts and parishes 186 Goerdeler were dependent on the Reich for money. Pecunia nervus est return — without some independent source of money there could be little question of self- government. Goerdeler almost certainly overestimated the benevolence of the future Reich Treasury. The Reich and the central government were to be solely or primarily responsible for law, economic policy including social and labour legislation, internal policy, foreign policy, financial policy, basic principles for educational and church affairs (again calling in question the reality of the divorce between church and state), principles for reconstruction and public works, Reich railway, postal and air communications and finally for defence. The Reich government was headed by the Chancellor; ministers who did not approve his general policy must resign. The cabinet did not have to enjoy the confidence of the two representative houses but the Head of State was called upon to dismiss the cabinet and nominate a new government should this be demanded by a simple majority in the Reichstag and Reich Chamber of Corporations or by a two-thirds majority of the Reichstag, a new cabinet being appointed at the same time. Laws could be promulgated by the govern- ment with or without the agreement of the Reichstag; cancellation of legisla- tion promulgated without agreement required majorities similar to those for dismissal of the cabinet - a simple majority of both Houses or a two-thirds majority in one. One is tempted to say with Hans Mommsen that this was an emergency constitution intended to operate in normal circumstances; many other aspects also invite criticism. Goerdeler was never one to cling rigidly to formulae, although he almost in- variably laid stress on economic principles and their application to con- stitutional questions. He never over-emphasized consistency and was invariably optimistic and liberal. In his 1941 draft strikes and lock-outs were forbidden; at the same time, however, he emphasized that life in general, and particularly in industry, was a struggle, in this case a competitive struggle. In this draft no provision was made for the nationalization of certain industries; the working class as such was only to be permitted to participate in public life to a limited degree. Participation in industry was to be granted to the workers, this being one of the fundamental demands of the trade union leaders. Accor- ding to Dr Elfriede Nebgen, a close associate of Jakob Kaiser, they did not want any more institutionalized form of participation in public life since they were opposed to anything tending to introduce corporatism. 4 However the trade union leaders had long striven for a single united union; although of itself it would not have led to the institution of a corporate state, it would have been a step in that direction. In his 1944 draft, however, Goerdeler proposed large-scale participation in public life by the workers and their organizations, at least during the electoral process; he put them on a parity with the representatives of the employers and professional groups. He also proposed to nationalize mineral resources and monopoly concerns serving the economy as a whole such as the railways, postal services and producers of electricity, gas and water. Trade unions were encouraged to run their own economic undertakings. 187 Internal Political Plans All this was to be brought about primarily through the formation of the united trade union which the trade union leaders wanted. They proposed to organize it in units embracing each profession. After working with trade un- ion leaders during the years 1941 to 1944 Goerdeler adopted these ideas as his own. 5 Goerdeler may therefore have been more inclined towards a corporate system than the trade union leaders, though both tended that way, whether they consciously admitted the fact or not. Nevertheless the large political par- ties restricted in number which the trade union leaders wanted would have formed an effective counterweight to any corporate developments. At one point, however, Goerdeler seems to have wished to replace the political parties entirely by a 'popular movement' encompassing all classes and regions. 6 It is clear that Goerdeler, particularly under the influence of his socialist and liberal-democrat friends from southern Germany like Robert Bosch, was fully prepared for change, concessions and new developments. In his draft of September 1944 he says in so many words: 'This is the approximate form of the Reich constitution and administration.' Subsequent changes in the elec- toral system were equally allowed for. The idea of avoiding the formation of political parties as long as possible is unrealistic; the draft, however, leaves open the possibility of formation of groups representing socio-economic and political interests. Under Goerdeler's constitution obstacles to the overthrow of a government were considerable. It was highly unlikely that this would be demanded by a majority of the Reich Chamber of Corporations and equally unlikely that the Reichstag would muster a two-thirds majority. On the other hand there was no advantage in merely making it easier to overthrow the government, as France's example in the pre-war period had shown. None of this is crucial, however. Had there been a successful coup in 1941-44 a constitution on Goerdeler's lines would probably not have come into force. There could easily have been a military dictatorship against which Goerdeler's idealism would have been impotent; had things gone more smoothly a constituent assembly might quickly have asserted its rights; had none of this happened, Goerdeler's own comment remains valid — tha t the best constitution does not automatically guarantee justice and democracy; the principal requirement for a democracy, if it is to function properly, is the goodwill of its citizens. Goerdeler's draft should not, therefore, be taken too literally but regarded as a basis for discussion put forward by a man recognized as one of the leaders of the opposition but with no great backing in any of its groups, and whose military backing depended on Beck. Nevertheless under Goerdeler's draft there was at least adequate opportunity for a democratically-minded parlia- ment insistent on its rights to keep the government under control. In par- ticular it prescribed that the government invariably required 'the agreement of both Houses' for its budget, taxation legislation, treaties with foreign coun- tries and customs regulations. No government can rule without money and if parliament insisted on control of expenditure and of short-term legislation on the subject, the government would be forced to render account of every step it 188 Goerdeler took before it could get further money. If, added to this, resources for long- term requirements were forthcoming only on a case-by-case basis, the govern- ment could not afford to behave undemocratically. The tentative nature of Goerdeler's drafts is further emphasized by the position allotted to the Head of State. For the first five years the position was to be rilled by a Regent-General proposed by the government and elected by the Upper House. Elections would not be possible until after demobilization but a Head of State was required forthwith and he should be the most popular figure possible to ensure that the coup was acceptable to the public. The next Head of State would be elected by the Reichstag and the Chamber of Corporations. The idea of a restoration of the monarchy was put forward on many oc- casions before 1944 and a wide variety of candidates was discussed. Jakob Kaiser referred to Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria as a possible Reich Regent; Goerdeler looked to Fritz, Kaiser Wilhelm's grandson in England; Colonel- General von Hammerstein and Beck insisted on the legitimate successor in the event of a restoration of the House of Hohenzollern. 7 Finally Klaus Bonhoeffer and Otto John were continually putting forward the name of Prince Louis Ferdinand and arranged meetings between him and Jakob Kaiser, Leuschner, Winner, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin and Ulrich von Hassell. The Crown Prince refused to be a candidate and early in 1943 Prince Louis Ferdinand also withdrew. Goerdeler thought a hereditary monarchy to be the best solution but neither could nor would commit himself. The important point seemed to him to be that the Head of State or monarch should not rule but should carry out representative functions and be the guardian of the constitution. In the so-called racial question Goerdeler's position was one in favour of separation. In his memorandum, 'The Aim', he wrote: 8 'A new order for the position of the Jews appears necessary in the entire world; for there are movements afoot everywhere that cannot be stopped without some organic order; they will lead to injustices, inhumane treatment and at least to an un- satisfactory disorder, unless an organic structure is found. It is a matter of course that the Jewish people belong to a different race ... But the world can come to rest only if the Jewish people are given a realistic opportunity to found and maintain their own state. An appropriate territory with acceptable physical conditions could be found easily enough in Canada or in South America. Once this issue is settled through the cooperation of the Powers, there will be a natural development of the German position: The Jew is a citizen of his Jewish state, and an alien in Germany: as such he has the same right to engage in trades and commerce as any other alien. But, just as any Englishman or Frenchman, he cannot be a public servant, nor can he be elected to sit in popular representative assemblies or vote in such elections.' This is followed by a number of exceptions; exceptions are suggested on the basis of military service during World War I, and on the basis of the posses- sion of German citizenship before 1914 and, with further modifications, before 1871. Thus the majority of those falling under the restrictions would 189 Internal Political Plans have been Jews who entered Germany since 1914, mostly from East European countries. Goerdeler did not change his views on the 'racial question' in the light of the abominable crimes committed against the Jews since 1938, perhaps rather the contrary: what he was looking for was a realistic and permanent settlement that would make such crimes impossible in future. 9 He wrote in the belief that Jews living amongst other peoples in great numbers would always, again and again, become victims of persecution. It can be debated whether special dis- criminatory laws and the resulting separation were the best method. It is a fact, however, that even the most liberal and democratic nations, such as the Swiss or the British, have not found it possible in the 20th century to do without special legislation aimed at certain groups of foreigners; and it is another fact that leading members of the Alliance against Germany finally founded the Jewish state and thus implemented a proposal that many besides Goerdeler had advocated for decades. In addition to eliminating the possi- bility of future troubles, Goerdeler wanted to make restitution for injustices done, so far as that was possible: 'In the past years [he wrote in autumn of 1941 ] an injustice has been done in Germany by expropriation and destruction etc. of Jewish property and life that we cannot condone before our conscience and our history. The possibilities of a new order can only be examined and entered into when the full scope of this injustice has been determined. It will then be seen that we must take the initiative in seeking a method of healing, with a view to our position in the world as well as to our own conscience.' It was taken for granted, Goerdeler concluded, that all discriminatory regulations aimed at Jews in such matters as rationing of food and housing, in cultural activities, in the style of personal names, must be suspended im- mediately, and living conditions in the ghettos of the occupied territories had to be raised to a level fit for human beings. However averse one may be to Goerdeler's draft and however insistent on pointing out the contradictions therein, the fact remains that he himself did not regard it as final and it would not have been so in practice. Argument, proposal, counter-proposal and compromise are the essence of politics and democracy. Goerdeler's draft offered adequate opportunities for opposition if anyone wished to take them. 10 Those who say that, under Goerdeler's draft, opposition would have been practically impossible, are refusing in advance to place any confidence in the democrats of the future; alternatively they are looking for a sealed-pattern solution which, by providing the perfect democratic constitution, will create the perfect democratic citizens. Real life is never so abstract as a constitutional draft. Ritter has said aptly that, had a Prince of the Hohenzollerns like Louis Ferdinand placed himself at the head of the German resistance movement and publicly staked his life against tyranny, Germany would have looked quite differently both at the monarchy and the House of Hohenzollern and 'the painful memories of November 1918 would have vanished abruptly'. 11 In any case some trust in the goodwill and capacity for adaptation both of rulers and ruled is indispensable. Alternatively does anyone think that the comparatively favourable development of post-1945 190 Goerdeler West Germany has been due to more trustworthy direction and supervision than could have been provided by Germans? This would be justification for those constitutional drafts from the resistance movement which were far more authoritarian than those of Goerdeler. 191 17 The Kreisau Circle As a result of numerous meetings and discussions a number of drafts were produced by the 'Kreisau Circle', the most important in July 1941, May and October 1942 and June 1943; 1 they must be regarded as having the same provisional character as those of Goerdeler and judged accordingly; they were even further removed from reality. Although the 'Kreisau Circle' was at one on a number of principles, these were so broadly stated that much was left in the air, primarily for the sake of agreement. The Circle was so named after Graf von Moltke's estate where the group frequently met. It had no es- tablished leader, however, and more often met in Berlin, though not in full conclave; it consisted of highly independent personalities holding views of their own. They were both able and willing to compromise, for they knew that politics without compromise are impossible. In the discussion phase, however, they clung to their own views. Until the very end of opposition differences of view within the group remained on such important questions as the expropriation of real estate and heavy industry, support for an attempted assassination, the build-up of the post-war administration and confessional or interdenominational schools. Since the coup failed, the pressure of events required to bring about some practical consensus on such matters never materialized. It is seldom possible, therefore, to refer to the views or attitude of the 'Kreisau Circle' as a whole without being guilty of major over-simplification; the alternative is to restrict oneself to those proposals on which, at least for a time, the majority of the Circle were agreed. This is what I propose to do here. 2 I do not propose to deal in detail with the political, economic and social views of the Circle. For the purposes of this book it is more important to examine the attitude and influence exerted on the attempted coup and its preparation by the personalities involved in the Circle. I shall be reverting to this subject in Chapter 39 below. Different though they were in many respects, there were many parallels between Goerdeler's ideas and those of the 'Kreisau Circle'. 3 In both stress is laid on Christianity as the basis of society, of the reestablishment of the rule of law and of freedom of belief and conscience. On some points, however, the principles of the Circle were even more far-reaching but in the process they forfeited a considerable degree of realism and practicality. In the 1943 draft, for instance, entitled 'Principles of Reorganization* it is laid down that the 192 The Kreisau Circle dignity of man must be inviolable and also that the right to work and own property must be 'under state protection without regard to race, nationality or belief. How was the right to work and own property to be guaranteed in prac- tice ? What would people say if foreign capital obtained a decisive or even dominant influence in branches of German industry or the economy ? The question is not meant to imply that such a development is essentially bad, merely that it would produce long faces followed by counter-measures which could be regarded as restrictions of the right to hold property. A further tendency to a sort of Utopian socialism is to be seen when it is said that not only must the family as an institution be taken under state protection but also its daily requirements such as 'food, clothing, housing, a garden and health'. The principles enunciated on work and the citizen's political activity, on the other hand, are very similar to those of Goerdeler - 'work must be so organized that it promotes a ready acceptance of responsibility'. This entailed professional continuation training and sharing of responsibility in the factory and the economy as a whole. The object was to reduce 'agglomeration' and give back some meaning and purpose to the life of the individual within his social environment. Similarly in the exercise of his personal political respon- sibility the individual should participate in the administration of small manageable communities. Working upwards from this point, elected representatives should participate in the build-up of the state and a commu- nity of peoples. The sequence led from the family to the parish and thence to the Land and the Reich, the principles and methods of self-government being applicable at each stage. According to a draft by Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg the Lander should not be too large in order to ensure that they were manageable; in any reorganization, however, account must be taken of the historical and cultural background. 4 In contrast to that of Goerdeler, the electoral system provided for direct elections up to parish and district levels. Anyone over twenty-one could vote; fathers of families were entitled to an additional vote for each child (Goerdeler had only allowed one additional vote for a minimum of three children). Elec- toral districts were to be kept small to keep them within the purview of the electors. Nothing was said on the important questions of nomination of can- didates, their number or their source; an unspecified number of electors was to agree on the subject. The draft equally contains nothing on the majority required — relative, absolute or other proportion. At the level of the Land and the Reich elections were indirect. Land parliaments were elected by parish and district councils. A similar procedure was envisaged for large cities; there the district councils elected the borough council. Apart from military personnel any citizen over twenty-seven years of age could be elected; political officials, however, could not be candidates for borough councils, Land parliaments or the Reichstag. Moreover at least half of the representatives so elected might not be members of the parish or district councils which elected them. The local government bodies produced by this somewhat obscure electoral system, however, were allotted, at least on the surface, far greater respon- 193 Internal Political Plans sibilities than those of Goerdeler. In the Kreisau draft, for instance, the Land parliament had the right, not only to administer Land property but also to raise taxes; it drew up a budget and could promulgate laws; it chose the Landeshauptmann (senior minister of the Land) and the Landesverweser (Land administrator) who headed the Land administration for a period of twelve years. The senior minister headed a government composed of coun- cillors. The Land administrator had to be confirmed by the Reich Regent (Head of State); he supervised the entire administration in the Land and ap- pointed the Land officials — no mention of any elected body being entitled to propose them; he was responsible that Reich policy was implemented in his Land. He was Chairman of the Land Council, the composition of which was not explained but was presumably analogous to the Upper House at national level which was composed of leaders of industry and the professions and possibly also of trade union and community leaders. The Land administrator, therefore, constituted a powerful counter-weight to the senior minister. The federalism which might seem to be implied by the right to raise taxes and issue legislation, was perhaps unintentionally not of great importance in practice. 5 The Land parliaments nevertheless retained a certain influence over Reich policy since they elected the members of the Reichstag. The procedure was highly complicated; its primary purpose was not to bring the will of the majority of citizens to bear on Reich policy but to place in leading positions the maximum number of men able and willing to accept responsibility. Goerdeler, with his requirement for five years' administrative experience, had laid far greater stress on this aspect; no such qualifications appeared in the Kreisau draft. This merely said in general terms that Land parliaments were to elect the Reichstag and that at least half of those elected — no figures were given — might not belong to Land parliaments. No indication was given of the source from which they were to be drawn. Thus elected, the Reichstag was responsible for decisions on taxes, the budget and laws of the Reich. Again no clear or definite provisions were made for the production of legislation. The Reich government was under obligation to produce a draft — of the budget, for instance, but the Reichstag had only 'power of decision' on it. In the event of disagreement, therefore, was the government to act like Bismarck in 1862 or to resign? Nothing was said on this subject or on the vital question of the frequency of Reichstag sittings. The Reichstag could only ask questions and then decide. It chose the Reich Regent, the Head of State, but not the Reich government; this required only 'assent' from the Reichstag. The implication is that the majority in the Reichstag should (or must) be in agreement with the Chancellor nominated by the Reich Regent. The point is not made clear. The departmental ministers who, together with the Chancellor, formed the government, were to be proposed by the Chancellor and appointed by the Reich Regent. They did not even require 'assent' from the Reichstag', there was therefore no parliamentary responsibility. A com- plicated procedure was designed to ensure that a Chancellor and his govern- ment could not remain in power for ever, even if backed by the Head of State. 194 The Kreisau Circle The Chancellor could be dismissed by the Regent and his removal could also be requested (a binding request?) by the Reichstag', this required a 'qualified majority' and a simultaneous proposal for a new Chancellor. If the Reich Regent refused to appoint the Chancellor proposed, the result was an impasse. In addition to the Reichstag there was an Upper House, the Reich Council (Reichsrat); it consisted of the Land administrators, not the senior ministers of the Lander who could have represented their regional interests, but of func- tionaries whose duty it was to represent the interests of the Reich in the Lander. Other members of the Reich Council were the President (Speaker) of the Reichstag, the President of the Reich Chamber of Commerce and an un- specified number of counsellors nominated for a term of eight years by the Reich Regent with the agreement of the government. 6 The Council was em- powered to make proposals for the election of the Reich Regent and make recommendations to the Reichstag; it was also to act as a 'disciplinary court of appeal against the government or Land administrators'. It is not clear whether this implied that it was to act as a constitutional court or merely en- sure observance of government regulations. In this case too, as with all somewhat original constitutional arrangements, much would depend on how its provisions were interpreted, how they were used, what procedures were developed spontaneously, by case law, by reference to tradition or by habit, and how strong the tendency was to return to the old ways provided they proved effective. On the other hand there was a tendency, not always quite clear owing to imprecise drafting, to authorit- arianism and concentration of political power; this must inevitably carry with it certain dangers and temptations. It is more than doubtful, for instance, whether the Reich Council, being independent of the electorate, could have acted as an effective counter-weight. 7 Finally the Head of State, the Reich Regent, was elected by the Reichstag for a term of twelve years on a proposal from the Reich Council. He represented the Reich, he signed legislation, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and Chairman of the Reich Council. He also had the vital prerogative of appointing and dismissing Chancellors. It is not stated whether he could dissolve the Reichstag, but since there was no other way out of an im- passe, he presumably could. Although, therefore, the Reichstag had con- siderable, though not clearly defined authority, there was great concentration of power in the hands of the Regent. He could appoint and dismiss Chancellors and, if the general tenor of the draft has been correctly un- derstood, he had no need to take account of the Reichstag in doing so; in the event of conflict he could disregard it. Since the Regent was elected for a defined term, there can have been no thought of a monarchy. Nevertheless twelve years is a very long period of office. The Kreisau draft is really a draft of principles for a draft constitution. Its tendency is towards a strong central Reich authority produced and perpetuated by an 61ite. The emphasis is on authority and an 61ite. For purely practical reasons the 'Kreisau Circle' thought it impossible to return to the parliamentary system immediately after a coup.* Everything im- 195 Internal Political Plans plied by the word 'Weimar' in its negative sense was to be avoided, particu- larly its multiplicity of parties and self-interested unscrupulous party warfare, which could only do damage to the country, as had indeed been shown. The possibility of reconstruction of parties was left open till a later stage but it was not proposed to allow it initially. The first parliament was to be formed without participation by parties, by election of individuals and the principle of delegation from the bottom upwards. These drafts were designed to set out principles and guidelines, not to produce a constitution which could be introduced immediately. Their aim was a special and probably unrealistic one. They were intended to contribute towards the creation of a new mankind. This was to be done by the combina- tion and cooperation of all intellectual, political and social forces willing to carry responsibility, from the trade unions to the churches. Party and in- dividual interests were to give way to the interests of the community and humanity as a whole and this was to result, not from coercion but from volun- tary cooperation in the attainment of a common aim. 'Integration' was the key word; Moltke and most of the 'Kreisau Circle' thought the essential to be 'an attempt to replace the former party coalitions by a new spiritual integration 1 ? The foundation of this integration was to be the Christian religion; without a common foundation it was, of course, not possible. In the discussions from 1942 to 1944 Dr Gerstenmaier opposed these ideas as Utopian. He was not quite so flatly against them at the time as he is today (he now thinks that they were totally impractical) — they were, after all, only drafts, he says, and not matters of life and death. The 'Kreisau Circle' knew as well as anyone else that in practical politics compromise and therefore coali- tion were unavoidable and that, after a coup, they would probably have to reach agreement with Goerdeler. 10 There would have been many arguments — on questions of the churches (Goerdeler's divorce of church and state), of schooling (confessional or community schools), of agriculture (major estates or medium-size farmer-owned properties) and on economics (direction of competition, a planned economy on the Kreisau side, 11 controlled liberalism and nationalization on Goerdeler's). In any case there was no unanimity on these questions within the 'Kreisau Circle'. 12 The 'Kreisau Circle' and Goerdeler were at one in their efforts to reduce 'agglomeration' and thus, at least to some extent, in their search for a new mankind. Both wished to give men back some organic relationship and at least temporarily to eliminate political parties as being soulless engines of power. Goerdeler laid stress on the use of the most suitable people with previous ad- ministrative experience, the 'Kreisau Circle', and Moltke in particular, on in- tegration and restoration of an 61ite. 13 Understandably, however, neither had that confidence in the electorate and the citizenry by which they set such store. They intended their proposals to produce citizens who would justify that con- fidence. Until then they intended to impose their ideas, as the Weimar experience had shown was essential. Well-meaning though these drafts were, their general trend was illiberal, as Hans Mommsen has pointed out with some asperity in his comprehensive 196 The Kreisau Circle study on 'Social Ideas and Constitutional Plans of the German Resistance'. At the same time, however, he emphasizes how greatly planning must have been affected by the pressure of danger and by intellectual isolation in a totalitarian state and how great was the lack of practical political experience, particularly in the 'Kreisau Circle'. 14 The forces which would have emerged had a coup succeeded would not have been solely those whose political views and ideas have been set out in this Part. Goerdeler, Beck, Hassell, Moltke and Yorck would certainly have played important parts, but the Stauffenberg brothers and certain liberal democrats too would have made their voices heard. Claus Graf Stauffenberg in particular had his own peculiar political views, on which he proposed to insist. 15 No doubt practice would have looked very different from theory. 197 18 Socialists Constitutional drafts by socialists who were involved in the opposition to Hitler have not so far appeared. Perhaps this is due in part to a better un- derstanding of conspiratorial principles. Moreover, Social-Democrats such as Dr Leber saw little value in joining the ranks of those who were busily manufacturing too many drafts and programmes as it was. 1 Social-Democrats had good reason to avoid political prominence in the first hours after a coup: after they had formed the Republic in 1918—19, and after they had been forced by an Entente ultimatum to sign the Versailles Treaty (while the nationalist opposition refused to form a government and take responsibility for insisting that the Treaty not be signed), the Social-Democrats received no credit for saving the fatherland, for preventing foreign occupation and for bringing the troops home. They were merely denounced and held in contempt as traitors. Leber occasionally spoke to his friends of the 'positive goal' that must be set up in answer to National-Socialism, but he said that he had not yet put it down formally. He used to refer to the' "new state", for which we must find a new positive content and a convincing formulation.' One may infer however, from existing documentation, that the basic programme of the Social- Democrats as written during the 1920s had not changed greatly, although the tactics could no longer be the same as those that had, after all, allowed Hitler and the National-Socialists to seize power. Thus it was indeed questionable whether this important sentence from the 1925 Programme could still be con- sidered valid: 'The democratic republic is the best basis on which to wage the struggle for the liberation of the working class and thus for the realization of socialism.' 2 No Party Convention could discuss this after 1933, but certain statements of leading socialists may shed light on the issue. The traditional basis of Social-Democracy was the conviction that general and equal adult suffrage must lead to right and just representation of all classes in parliament, and that thus the interests of the most numerous class would be adequately represented. To make this effective, parliament and the central government responsible to it needed full authority, and while self- government on lower administrative levels was desirable, unity of the central government down to provinces and communities had to be stressed. Decen- tralization and federalism tended to strengthen provincial and local forces, that is forces of oligarchic, agrarian-patriarchal, clerical, establishment, or even monarchist tendencies. Bavaria was a clear example of this danger. A un- 198 Socialists itary republic was the only framework in which the influence due to the working class from its numbers could be secured and maintained. Conser- vatives often denounced this socialist position as egalitarianism and as apt to make the masses even more faceless and rootless, therefore more mobile, politically volatile and dangerous, than they already were; but for socialists, the unitary republic and centralism were basic necessities for the practical realization of their goals. As long as there were remnants of local authority in administration, in the judiciary, in provincial and community government, or in rural economic and social conditions, there could be no equal rights. Dr Leber demanded in 1944 a 'purely socialist solution' for the reorganiza- tion of Germany after Hitler's fall. In conferences with co-conspirators, he developed 'a radical socialist programme,' and he refused 'to throw overboard important principles of traditional Social-Democracy for the sake of unity [among the conspirators].' 3 But in reality, Leber went beyond the traditional concepts of Social-Democracy in his demand for a 'purely socialist solution' for this could hardly mean a return to a democratic republic as 'the best basis on which to wage the struggle for the liberation of the working class and thus for the realization of socialism'. It could only mean that all forces of political life were not to be given 'equal' starting conditions within a liberal framework, but that to a great extent socialism must be built into the reorganization and must be codified in a new constitution. Naturally Leber was under heavy pressure to compromise with somewhat more conservative leaders in the conspiracy in the interest of the immediate tactical aim of the overthrow of Hitler's regime, particularly when a proclama- tion was discussed to start a 'popular movement' for a new order. 4 Goerdeler also rejected a new state with the old political parties; he said he wanted one without parties and in their place unity of all classes, strata and regions through a 'popular movement'. On this somewhat nebulous basis he seems to have agreed with the socialists, although he certainly did not mean what they meant when he rejected a state including parties. The proclamation that was discussed and more or less agreed upon before the coup d'etat in any case con- tained declarations not only for the socialization (nationalization) of basic and key industries, but also for inalienable rights of liberty, for toleration in 'questions of race, faith and class', and even for German culture and for the Christian heritage of the German people. 5 This last point, particularly, had provoked a sharp attack by Leber. There was never any definitive agreement concerning the proclamation for the 'popular movement' that was to unite all parties from the Social-Democrats through the Centre to the German- Nationals, as Graf von Schwerin put it, although Goerdeler and Leber, with very different motives, wanted a state without political parties. Religion stood in the way of unity, especially in the negotiations between leaders of the Christian trade unions and the leaders of the Marxist labour organizations. In the interests of the overthrow of Hitler, the problem was smoothed over for the time being, but of course it was a fundamental one. Marxist socialists were definitely in favour of toleration in religious and racial matters, and they declared themselves in favour of the 'restoration of the 199 Internal Political Plans rights of Jews', but they were strictly against mixing government activities with religion in any form. 6 Therefore Leber rejected sharply the proposed for- mula 'of the divine mission of the Christian church in the secular state'. Religious and pseudo-religious principles were not to govern conditions in the new state, such as inequality of the sexes, sanctity and permanence of matrimony, legal discrimination against persons born out of wedlock, or revenge and retribution in the administration of justice. In the new state, rational and objective principles must be applied putting the interests of socie- ty as a whole before class interests. Such principles included among others, the participation of lay judges in trials in courts-of-law, the subordination of individual property rights to the rights and needs of society, equality before the law for men and women, for children born in or out of wedlock, easier divorce, abolition of the death penalty, humane methods of punishment aiming at resocialization, and generally in the administration of justice the principles of education, resocialization and protection of society instead of the principle of retribution. 7 All of this would serve to help remove class differences and inequalities, and to reduce the power of traditional authorities and of the haves over the have-nots. A number of other tenets of the Social-Democrat programme of 1925 were held, with more or less variation, by the socialists in the conspiracy. The right of labour to participate in economic decisions was emphasized here and there, the working class were to take part in the planning of the economy through their own structures of self-government and through labour organizations, and production cooperatives and national shops were to be fostered and expanded. 8 Basic and key industries were to be nationalized, likewise all mineral wealth. 9 The old demand that all land be nationalized, however, seems to have been abandoned, and state socialism was rejected in principle; the free market economy based on private initiative was to be restored in all but basic and key industries. 10 Goerdeler accepted these ideas. 11 There were also some points in which the new concepts went beyond the old programme. They were based on the experiences of the last fifteen to twenty years. During the Great Depression, the workers had found that they were almost entirely at the mercy of government and industry - a traumatic experience they did not wish to be repeated. Therefore, social insurance and social administration, the administration of unemployment, old age and sickness benefits were to be transferred entirely to the control and authority of the workers. 12 On the issue of narrowing the gaps between classes, Leuschner wanted to see education emphasized more than changes in the distribution of wealth and in control of the means of production. 13 Undoubtedly, the mere improvement of the material conditions of workers was not enough to raise for them the quality of life, even if a government had managed to distribute material benefits equitably. But participation in overall economic manage- ment, in decisions in the factory, in the cultural life of the nation were not possible without a fairly high level of general education, nor could the feeling of being socially low-class be removed without it. Ignorance and lack of educa- tion meant less power, fewer rights, and fewer opportunities for self- 200 Socialists fulfilment. Leuschner therefore laid particular emphasis on nine years of com- pulsory schooling, in the same type of standardized school for everyone. 14 It is obvious that this would have a tremendous levelling effect. Equal opportunity, but also unity and solidarity, were fundamental tenets of socialism at all times. Only by concentrating and institutionalizing their potential power could labour secure and safeguard an influence proportionate to their numbers. Again, it was the bitter experiences of the Weimar years that had taught leaders like Leber and Leuschner to insist on the organizational unity of the labour movement. The Einheitsgewerkschaft, a unified associa- tion of trade unions, was a point on which they refused to compromise. The National-Socialists had united the trade unions in the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front), but only after removing all power from them, making them an instrument of control for the dictatorship. Leuschner wanted to re- tain the unity, but reshape the Deutsche Arbeitsfront into 'a real political in- strument of the German worker', in other words, into an Einheitsgewerkschaft.15 For reasons of unity and of concentration of power in the hands of the workers, Leuschner was forced to oppose MierendorfFs de- mand for factory unions instead of trade unions. 16 Unity was the key word; federal and soviet structures could have no place in a Social-Democrat system. Leuschner told his Gestapo interrogators on 18 August 1944: 'It was my desire to form a unified trade-union movement, and I continued my efforts to this end when I negotiated with representatives of the NSDAP in spring of 1933. The principles that guided my actions then have not changed.' 17 And Leber told the Gestapo'. 'Leuschner was appointed leader of the German Einheitsgewerkschaft. The other [white-collar and Christian] unions were to delegate a deputy each (these were Kaiser and Habermann). With this, the un- ification of the unions (!) was virtually accomplished in February of 1944.' On the day before his execution, Leuschner told trade-union friends in Tegel prison: 'Tomorrow I shall be hanged. Create the unity.' 18 If the conservative leaders had more detailed plans for the constitutional reorganization of Germany after Hitler's fall, the ideas of the socialists, par- ticularly the Social-Democrats, seem to have had better chances of being adopted in the weeks before 20 July 1944. As Stauffenberg gained more and more complete control of the conspiracy, his friend Leber gained more in- fluence on post-Hitler planning, while Stauffenberg's own ideas were not exactly clear. 19 It is not known what Stauffenberg promised his friend Leber, the reserve officer decorated with the Iron Cross First Class in World War I and member of the Wehrausschuss (Armed Forces Committee) of the Reichstag in the Weimar years, with respect to social reorganization. But the fact is that both Leber and Leuschner were given key positions on all cabinet lists drawn up by the opposition after January 1943. On such lists, Leuschner always figured as a candidate for the Vice-chancellorship under Goerdeler as Chancellor; in discussions in 1944, either he or Leber was put forward as successor to Goerdeler, and some even proposed the elimination of the interim Goerdeler government. Leber always appeared as a candidate for the ministry of internal affairs (sometimes with Gayl and Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der 201 Internal Political Plans Schulenburg). 20 If Leber and Leuschner collaborated closely with Stauffenberg, they certainly did so in the conviction that this was the best way to ensure realization of their ideas and plans - even if this was not entirely clear to Staufienberg. As Leber once told Otto John, whatever could be done after the overthrow of Hitler remained to be seen once that situation had arisen, but it would not be likely to conform to what Goerdeler had in mind; meanwhile, said Leber, Stauffenberg must be supported since he represented the only remaining hope for action by the military. 21 It is therefore not sur- prising to find that Popitz, Professor Jessen and Hassell were opposed 'to the thorough integration [into the conspiracy] of the trade unions by Goerdeler', and that Helldorf declared the Einheitsgewerkschaft dangerous. 22 Popitz stated: 'It was clear to me that with the Einheitsgewerkschaft a power cen of the first rank would be created, especially if the trade unions were given con- trol of the assets and installations of the Arbeitsfront. I had the impression that pressure was being applied to which Goerdeler believed he had to give in.' 23 Jessen voiced similar misgivings and feared that the trade unions would become a state-within-the-state, and Helldorf, Gisevius and Striinck agreed there was a danger of being 'overrun by the workers' if too many concessions were made. 24 Stauffenberg, however, who had at first also opposed trade un- ions, hoped to 'win over' the workers and thus stave off communism. 25 Leber and Stauffenberg held in common the belief that the most important point was being there in the 'free moment* which would follow Hitler's death. 26 202 PART V/CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY 1940-1944 This page intentionally left blank 19 Albrecht Haushofer 1940-1941 During the winter 1939—40 contacts with the enemy had either failed to materialize or had come to nothing; there had followed the victorious German offensives against Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. It had all been a great triumph and it would have been surprising had many been found in the summer of 1940 to lift their voices in favour of the removal of the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the German Reich. Yet the determined opponents of Hitler did not relax for a single moment. Moltke in particular did not swerve from his at- titude or his views, even in face of this apparently unbroken run of victories, the fruits of which any moderate regime could have retained. In December 1940 he made this quite clear to Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington. 1 He also contrived to maintain his contact with Alexander C. Kirk, the American Charg6 d'Affaires in Berlin. 2 Admittedly, so long as there was no real prospect of a coup, such contacts had little purpose, however dangerous they might be for those involved. In 1940 the generals were less in favour of a coup than ever, a situation which only changed when the attack on Russia was imminent. Meanwhile, however, contacts had to be nursed and maintained so that they might be there when needed. One of the first attempted contacts after the French campaign is associated with the name of Albrecht Haushofer. His father was the First World War general, Professor Karl Haushofer, regarded as the founder of the science of geopolitics in Germany. The son taught Political Geography and Geopolitics at the Berlin School for Politics from 1934 and at Berlin University from 1939; he was at the same time on the staff of the Foreign Ministry. 3 Through his father Haushofer was in close touch with Rudolf Hess, the 'Fuhrer'?, Deputy and Reich Minister without Portfolio', who had been assistant to Professor Karl Haushofer for a short time in 1922; despite Hess' inadequate intellectual abilities a close and lasting friendship had formed between the two. 4 During the 1930s, thanks to his extensive knowledge of Britain, Albrecht Haushofer frequently had opportunity (or the duty) to act as adviser to Hess and so in- directly to Hitler. He tried to use his influence to prevent Ribbentrop's ap- pointment as Foreign Minister but with so little success that he felt forced to issue urgent and outspoken warnings - also without success. 5 205 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 Politically Haushofer inclined towards the Right. He advocated a liberal- bourgeois but authoritarian monarchy. He was opposed to Nazism and Hitler's policy from the outset but because of his parents (his mother was half- Jewish), his connection with Hess and his conviction that he could only work from the inside, he decided not to make an open break with the regime. 6 He did not propose, as he wrote to his mother in December 1939, to leave 'this limping ship which is already on fire at several points and is largely run and steered by criminals and fools/ to jump into the water where he would quickly sink; he intended to wait and try 'perhaps to give the tiller a favourable twist'. 7 During the war he was in contact, not only with the Hassell-Popitz- Langbehn group, but also with the 'Kreisau Circle' and leading members of the so-called 'Red Orchestra', Harro Schulze-Boysen and Wolfgang Hoffmann- Zampis. 8 Under the Nazi dictatorship his non-conformist views and clear outspoken opinions were as great a danger to Albrecht Haushofer as his mother's Jewish blood; so long as Hess retained his influence, however, and was prepared to protect the family, the threat could be averted. In August 1937, for instance, Haushofer wrote in the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik that everyone from San Francisco to Washington knew 'that the United States could not be a passive onlooker if Britain was fighting for her existence'. The common interests of the two powers went so deep that, even if not bound by treaty they would both pursue a policy consistent with an indissoluble alliance. 'Anyone who comes into collision with Britain should know that he will have America too among his enemies - despite all the laws of neutrality.' 9 In October 1938 Haushofer proclaimed, again in the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, that despite his sixty years Chamberlain had three times climbed into an aeroplane to 'explain to Hitler, man to man, that the British Empire is just as unlikely to mobilize its fleet to no good purpose as Germany is her army.' 10 In other words war had only been avoided on that occasion because Hitler had given way in face of the British threat. When Haushofer realized how little Hitler understood the situation or wished to understand it and how his intemperance and megalomania were growing, he raised his voice again and again to warn that Britain and France were determined not to retreat one single step further. In June 1939 he said so quite explicitly in the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik." At the time hardly anyone in Germany could publicize such views as freely as Haushofer - he was protected by Hess; at the same time he was able to maintain contact with Popitz, Beck and Hassell. With his intimate knowledge of Britain Haushofer sensed that, once war had broken out, this time the Western Powers would fight on until Germany had been defeated finally and unmistakably. Nevertheless he still searched for ways of persuading them to meet Germany halfway, always provided that a coup had taken place first. After his victory over France Hitler was also in- terested in getting rid of his British enemy and, since Hess thought that he should follow Hitler's lead, Haushofer had an opportunity to play it both ways. Hess wished to help Hitler conclude peace with Britain; Haushofer wished to exploit the resulting possibilities of contact for the benefit of the op- 206 Albrecht Haushofer 1940-41 position, to create the external conditions for a coup d'etat. 12 About 1 September 1940 Hess approached Professor Karl Haushofer asking whether he could think of any method of preventing the assault on England which was now ready; the Professor took this as a hint really ad- dressed to his son; he said that Albrecht might be able to meet competent British personalities in Lisbon. In a letter of 3 September 1940 he asked Albrecht whether he could not gain contact with Sir Ian Hamilton or Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, Duke of Hamilton. 13 Armed with this letter Albrecht Haushofer went to Hess and on 8 September discussed the whole question of peace mediation in detail with him in Bad Gallspach. 14 Albrecht Haushofer made a note, dated 15 September, on his talk with Hess, including in it his own view of the project. He sent the paper, labelled 'Most Secret', to his parents for safe custody. 15 Hess had said that it must be possible to find someone in a responsible position in Britain who would be prepared to accept Hitler's desire for peace, but Haushofer had replied that 'practically all Englishmen in this position regarded any treaty signed by the Fuhrer as a worthless scrap of paper*. Hitler had broken too many treaties to be considered trustworthy; in the Anglo-Saxon world he was regarded as 'Satan's representative on earth' who must be fought. When Hess pressed his point and asked Haushofer whether he personally saw any opportunities for contact, Haushofer adroitly replied that it might be possible, via the British Ambassador in Washington, to convince the British that an insecure peace was still better than war. This presupposed, however, that Britain had been deprived of all hope of American aid and this could only be established in Washington, not working from Germany. In addition, he said, it was con- ceivable that something might be achieved by a meeting on neutral territory with the Duke of Hamilton since he had access both to Churchill and to the King. Hess finally said that he would think the matter over, which Haushofer took to mean that he intended to talk to Hitler. The next move came from Hess with a further letter to Karl Haushofer on 10 September: he had reflected on the matter and now thought it best if Karl Haushofer or his son Albrecht could contact their friend (he can only have meant the Duke of Hamilton) through non-official channels; they should seek to discover whether the friend could come to some neutral country or alter- natively where he might be in the near future. 16 Owing to postal delays Haushofer did not receive Hess' letter until 18 September. Although, owing to the increasingly close relationship between Britain and the United States, Haushofer had practically no hopes of success, he nevertheless did what Hess asked. On 19 September he wrote a letter to the Duke of Hamilton and another to Hess. On the same day he sent copies of both letters together with his notes on his talk of 8 September to his parents asking that they be kept safely. 17 The letter to the Duke of Hamilton was despatched via Hess' brother but not until 23 September; in it Haushofer asked whether the Duke could pay a short visit to somewhere like Portugal for a highly important discussion, the subject of which the Duke could easily guess from his previous contacts with Haushofer. 18 207 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 In the letter to Hess Haushofer explained how he proposed to ensure that his letter reached the Duke of Hamilton and indirectly recommended that he himself should be the contact man on the German side since 'like many Englishmen H is extremely reserved with people he does not know per- sonally'. Haushofer also suggested that the channels already mentioned via Lord Lothian in Washington or Sir Samuel Hoare in Madrid offered somewhat better prospects than that via the Duke of Hamilton, though 'ad- mittedly from the political point of view they are more difficult to use'. Were Haushofer to confront the Duke of Hamilton as an official represen- tative with adequate cover against suspicions at home, his prospects of success were very meagre. If, however, he was to achieve anything either through Lord Lothian or Sir Samuel Hoare, he could under no circumstances appear as a representative of the Hitler government. Not only, therefore, must he have secure governmental cover (through Hess) but he must be able to appear to his British opposite numbers as a non-official emissary whose mis- sion had nothing to do with official policy or official agencies. He would then be able to reveal himself secretly as a representative of the resistance move- ment and explain to the British the conditions required for an internal German coup without fear of being disowned. 19 Since Hess had been prepared to sponsor the letter to Hamilton but not a journey by Haushofer, the latter was forced to do something which, from the opposition's point of view, he regarded as useless. He received no answer to his letter, although it reached its destination. 20 Then for a long time nothing happened. The assault on England faded into the background and increasingly intensive preparations were made for the Russian campaign. Not until April 1941 did Haushofer have a further opportunity of making contact. 21 He suggested to Hess that Professor Carl Jacob Burckhardt would be a suitable intermediary to the British, his object being to get sent to Switzerland himself. 22 While in Geneva on 30 January 1941 Hassell had been approached by Burckhardt who had told him that he had received private word from London that people there were still ready to conclude a negotiated peace with Germany — apart, however, from Anthony Eden who had joined the cabinet as Foreign Secretary in December; it would be somewhat on the following basis: reestablishment of Belgium, Holland and some form of Poland minus the former German provinces; Denmark and the Czech area to remain German spheres of influence; the former German colonies to be restored. None of this could be done with Hitler, however, whose word no one believed any more. 23 On 10 March 1941 Hassell met Albrecht Haushofer in Popitz's house and discussed with him how his (Hassell's) connections in Switzerland could be used to obtain assurances from the Allies in the event of a change of regime in Germany. 24 On 28 April Haushofer had a discussion with Professor Burckhardt in Geneva. The result was not encouraging. In the situation of early 1941 the generals, faced with the prospect of a war on two fronts - a mortal sin in their eyes - were once more becoming approachable, but when he returned to Berlin on 8 May, 25 Haushofer was unable to bring with him the assurances 208 Albrecht Haushofer 1940-41 which might have persuaded them to act. He hoped, however, to maintain this contact and perhaps achieve more if he continued to present himself as a man with good connections. At about this time he hoped that a lecture invitation might provide a pretext for a journey to Spain. 26 During the night 9—10 May news arrived via the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that Haushofer was to address the Academy of Sciences in Madrid on 12 May. 27 There seemed therefore to be a possibility of a meeting with Sir Samuel Hoare. On 10 May, however, Rudolf Hess, the Fiihrer's Deputy, embarked on his astounding flight to Britain where he proposed to contact the King through the Duke of Hamilton and arrange peace. 28 Haushofer had nothing to do with it; for him this mad foolhardy flight was a catastrophe. The Haushofer family had now lost their protector; they gradually fell into increasing disfavour and Albrecht Haushofer was finally murdered in April 1945 by an SS squad. All the steps taken so far and Albrecht Haushofer as their initiator lost all credibility and authenticity both in Hitler's eyes and abroad. Early on the morning of 12 May Haushofer was arrested in Berlin and taken forthwith to Hitler on the Obersalzberg where he was interrogated. 29 That evening he wrote a report on his British contacts and the efforts he had made together with Hess to use them for peace mediation. 30 In this situation his object was naturally not to provide some accurate document for the historians; he presented the efforts which he and Hess had made in as inno- cent a light as possible from the regime's point of view and cast himself in the role of faithful recipient of orders. With remarkable calm and presence of mind he tried to emphasize his own indispensability for further missions. According to this report an influential Englishman had recently expressed to Professor Burckhardt 'the desire of important British circles to explore the possibilities of peace' (which was not true); he (Haushofer) had suggested to Burckhardt that he arrange a properly authenticated contact with British per- sonalities of the necessary authority. For this purpose, as he had told Professor Burckhardt, he would probably be able to come to Geneva again. As regards possible peace terms, the report continued (again largely untrue), Burckhardt's impression was that moderate circles in Great Britain were only notionally interested in East and South-east Europe with the exception of Greece; they would, however, insist on reestablishment of 'the West Euro- pean order of states'; on the colonial question they would certainly be forthcoming provided that German demands were confined to her former possessions. The only point supported and agreed by Burckhardt was of course that dealing with the reestablishment of Western Europe; Haushofer, however, had to try to obtain Hitler's authorization for further negotiations with Britain in order to exploit them for the purposes of the opposition and perhaps at the last moment stop the war against Russia. Burckhardt did in fact think that Britain was still prepared for peace on a sensible basis but, as Hassell put it: '1. not with our present rulers and 2. perhaps not for much longer.' 31 Haushofer then repeated — basically entirely correctly — an alleged statement by Burckhardt that all relationships between Germany and Britain were overshadowed by the difficulty of finding 'a basis of personal confidence 209 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 between Berlin and London'; he followed this by adroitly phrased remarks about the 'indigenous plutocratic section' and the 'non-indigenous, primarily Jewish element'. All this was designed to convince Hitler of his loyalty, hones- ty and innocence. 32 But no one paid any attention to Haushofer. The reward of his friendship with Hess was eight weeks of Gestapo arrest in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, and after his release the permanent mistrust of the regime. Meanwhile, on 22 June 1941, the war against Russia began and demolished all hopes of peace and understanding with Britain. The United States became increas- ingly committed in Europe and, as Haushofer had prophesied in his report to Hitler, was no longer to be deterred from the aim of crushing Germany. Great Britain could now face the future calmly. Germany's defeat was certain. 210 20 Hassell 1941-1942 Among the German opposition too people were beginning to think that defeat was inevitable. Two months after the invasion of Russia it was generally thought by those in touch with Hassell, Popitz and Goerdeler that the enemy could now foresee the total overthrow of Germany and that not even 'a decent government would still receive an acceptable peace*.' This, however, did not preclude further soundings regarding the truth of this statement and perhaps the possibilities of negotiation. On 14 August 1941, from a British battleship in the north-east Atlantic, Churchill and Roosevelt proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, a general agreement on war aims. It created a new situation. America was not yet in the war but her entry was dearly only a question of time and occasion. The Charter was a declaration in favour of freedom for all nations, but, commenting on the Charter, Churchill said that it implied no commitment in so far as enemy coun- tries were concerned; it therefore applied only to neutrals and allies. Neutrals needed no assurance of territorial integrity; for the Allies such an assurance was a matter of course seeing that no western government had accepted the annexations of territory at the expense of Poland and the Baltic States. 2 There was therefore little substance in the Charter, apart from the threat to the enemy. 3 The opposition accordingly concluded that the generals would now be able to say that the enemy was determined to crush, not only Hitler, but Germany as such and to render her defenceless. Once again, therefore, it seemed essential to take soundings and obtain clarification in London. An opportunity presented itself through Dr Langbehn, the lawyer. Professor Burckhardt was in Germany on Red Cross business and was then to go to Britain for a similar purpose. On 18 August Burckhardt, Hassell and Langbehn met near Munich. Hassell explained the 'national German' view- point : the other side must not demand a change of regime; this must remain a matter for the German opposition; threats such as those contained in the Atlantic Charter destroyed every reasonable chance for peace; 'national Ger- many' made moderate demands but some of them they were not prepared to renounce. 4 On or shortly after 20 January 1942, during the return journey from a lec- ture in Paris, Hassell went to see Burckhardt again in Geneva. 5 Burckhardt said that peace with Hitler and his system was no longer possible, but, in the view of government circles close to Lord Halifax and Churchill, could still be 211 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 concluded with 'a decent Germany'. He had been asked again and again about the generals; there was much scepticism about the possibility of a coup in Ger- many. The 1914 frontiers, however, seemed a perfectly practical basis for peace talks. 6 Hassell also had a contact to the American government via the New York businessman, Federico Stallforth. 7 Stallforth was especially interested in trying to maintain the fragile peace between Germany and the United States; he wished to talk to responsible members of the German government. He was in Germany in the summer of 1940 and talked with Goring who outlined to him the following peace-plan (turned down immediately by both the British Prime Minister and the American President, when presented to them sub- sequently): '(1) British Empire in status quo, except certain colonies for Ger- many. (2) Political independence for France, Belgium, and Holland (except Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg to Germany). (3) Germany to have free hand in the East, including Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.' 8 In May 1941 Stallforth was again in Germany, but he did not get to see Goring this time. He talked with many old and new acquaintances instead, among them Udet, Brauchitsch and Keitel, and also a group of high-ranking officers of all branches of the Wehrmacht on the occasion of a rather formal lunch to which he had been invited. At the lunch, some officers expressed their confidence that Russia would be defeated, but added that it was hoped that a war with the United States could be avoided. Stallforth replied that neither the United States nor Britain would make peace with the present German government, whereupon he was asked: but what if Hitler and Goring were no longer there ? Stallforth then suggested that probably the whole regime would have to be replaced by a constitutional one before the United States and Bri- tain would be ready to talk peace. When asked: what about a monarchy? Stallforth said he believed this was a possibility, maybe something like the British monarchy. On the following day, Stallforth had a visit from one of those who had attended the lunch who asked him whether the Army would be acceptable as a negotiating partner if it seized power in the Reich. Stallforth said he thought it possible, and the officer then stated these conditions: '(1) No double crossing of Germany, as happened after Germany's acceptance of Wilson's Fourteen Points; (2) The army to remain in control to avoid chaos and thus of course disarmament could not be immediate.' Stallforth said it should be possible to reach agreement on this basis, and he mentioned the names of Donovan, Willkie and General Wood as possible negotiators (he thought it advisable to indicate by this choice of names that America would be quite united in such matters). The German officer mentioned as likely negotiators on the German side Falkenhausen, Haider, Stiilpnagel and Hassell. He added that there was no time to lose before resentment against the United States became too strong; undoubtedly the German people would accept the overthrow of Hitler once they saw that the change meant peace; all action against Hitler and the regime would have to come from within Germany to avoid all appearance of a coup engineered from outside. When the officer expressed his fear that 212 Hassell 1941^2 Churchill and Roosevelt might be so full of hate against Germany that they would reject the proposals just outlined out of hand, Stallforth said this was absurd. Concerning territorial arrangements, the officer finally said the Army would be ready to evacuate all territories except Austria. Hassell attempted to obtain further political and economic assurances in the event of a coup; in October he was told by Stallforth, who had meanwhile returned from America, that 'the "proposition" had been well received'. 9 Hassell's proposals, approved by Beck and Hammerstein, sounded most moderate. The United States could not speak for London, however, and Stallforth failed to see Roosevelt. Then, on 7 December, came the Japanese at- tack on Pearl Harbor and destroyed everything. 213 21 Lochner 1941-1942 About the same time and also because of the obviously imminent entry of the United States into the war the opposition approached Louis P. Lochner, the press correspondent and head of the Associated Press Bureau in Berlin. Lochner had been in touch for years with Hermann Maass, ex-Director of the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations, and with Colonel-General Beck. In August 1939 Maass had arranged through Beck to pass to Lochner a copy of Hitler's speech of the 22nd. Lochner was present on occasions at secret meetings of the opposition. 1 In late September 1941 a preliminary talk took place in Otto John's house between Lochner and Ernst von Harnack. Then, one night in November 1941, Lochner was taken to a meeting of twelve to fifteen people in the house of Dr Josef Winner, former Centre Party deputy in the Reichstag. Jakob Kaiser was in the chair and there were present: representatives of the old trade unions (M. Habermann, B. Letterhaus), of the Confessing Churches, of certain democratic parties of the Weimar period (Centre Party, Social-Democrats, German People's Party) together with J. Delbriick, Otto John and Klaus Bonhoeffer on behalf of Canaris and Beck. Lochner knew the President of the United States and both were friends of Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia who had been received in the White House in 1938. Lochner therefore seemed specially qualified to act as intermediary between the opposition and Presi- dent Roosevelt. This assembly in November 1941 requested Lochner, who was shortly due to return to the United States, to tell the President at once and in the greatest detail of the opposition's composition, aims and activities. He was also to ask the President to say something on the form of government America would prefer for a Germany liberated from Hitler. To facilitate subsequent agree- ment the conspirators gave Lochner a secret radio code, the object being to es- tablish radio communications between the American President and the opposition. Lochner promised to do all in his power but in fact could not keep his promise until June 1942 since, like many of his colleagues, he was interned in December 1941 when Germany declared war on the United States. When he finally returned to the United States he immediately sought an audience of President Roosevelt saying that he had personal and confidential messages from Prince and Princess Louis Ferdinand of Prussia and secret information 214 Lochner, 1941-42 on resistance groups in Germany which he might not confide to anyone else. All attempts to obtain an audience with the President failed, however; he wrote from Chicago but received no answer. Finally, through the Washington office of the Associated Press, he was informed that there was no desire to receive his information and he was requested to refrain from further efforts to transmit it. The explanation of the American attitude is obvious. The government in Washington was already well informed on the German resistance movement. Adam von Trott zu Solz had established contact in 1939. In November 1942 Allen Welsh Dulles, later Director of the CIA, was sent to Berne for the express purpose of establishing permanent contact with the German opposition. He informed his masters of all developments and Washington had a vast amount of information on resistance in Germany. 2 Viewed from Washington, however, the United States was not merely fighting the Nazi regime but a people permeated by an illiberal inhuman ideology who had learnt nothing from a fearful defeat in another similarly imperialist war. In face of Hitler's claim to total power a total victory must be won. Looked at in this light, the American government, as Lochner was informed, could only be embarrassed if it learnt and was forced to acknowledge that an anti-Hitler opposition existed in Germany capable of taking over the government. In addition there was the relationship between the United States and her allies. No assurances could be given to the resistance without consultation and this would have amounted to betrayal of the opposition. Finally, had Stalin learnt that the Americans were negotiating 'with Germans', he might have tried to forestall them and conclude a separate peace with Hitler. There was at least a risk of the Western Powers losing Russia as an ally, leaving the United States, almost alone, to carry the burden of the war against both Japan and Germany. 3 Even at the Yalta Conference in 1945, Roosevelt was urging Russia to enter the war against Japan as soon as possible after the end of the war in Europe — no one then knew what the effect of the atom bomb would be. 215 22 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schbnfeld 1942 Throughout the war numerous contacts existed between members and friends of the 'Kreisau Circle' on the one hand and neutral or Allied countries on the other. Only the most important can be dealt with here.' The entry of the United States into the war was a turning point which led to fresh thinking and renewed efforts in many quarters, including the 'Kreisau Circle'. Trott, together with other members of the Circle, in particular Dr Hans Schonfeld' and Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier who had worked with Trott in the Foreign Ministry in 1939 and 1940, drafted a memorandum which may be regarded as the outcome of this new thinking. At the end of April 1942, when in Geneva, Trott handed it to Dr W. A. Visser't Hooft, Secretary-General of the Ecumenical Council of Churches; 2 it was intended for Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Lord Privy Seal. In writing this memorandum the object of Trott and his friends was to keep alive any tendency in Britain which might help to bring about the coup d'etat through an encouraging statement of some sort. Equally, however, he wished to show that the opposition, in line with Moltke's thinking, understood the position of the western world to which Germany together with France, Britain and all other 'western' states belonged, acceptance of a common responsibility in other words. At present, the memorandum said, destruction of human life and economic resources was on so vast a scale that, after the war, even the victors would suffer from extreme poverty. Owing to the pressures of war totalitarian con- trol was increasing even in liberal countries; at the same time there was a tendency to anarchism and the abandonment of all established civilized stan- dards. Everywhere the threat of bolshevization was increasing owing to the victories of the Red Army and the consequent expansion of communist un- derground activity throughout the western world. The German anti-Hitler resistance movement had no wish to make excuses for the resulting situation but acknowledged its share of responsibility for it. In the light of its own struggle, however, it felt justified in appealing to the solidarity of the civilized western world. The best way of expressing this solidarity was to refrain from decrying in public the statements and appeals of the German opposition. The first most important step towards the prevention of a catastrophe in 216 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schbnfeld 1942 Europe was the overthrow of the present German regime. There were two possibilities of doing this, both intimately connected with affairs outside Ger- many. The first possibility lay in a Soviet victory; if Hitler fell as a result of this, the outcome would be catastrophe for all Europe and ultimately world revolution brought about by military methods. The success of the second possibility, formation of a German government prepared to return to the stan- dards of civilized Europe, however, was also dependent on conditions outside Germany, in other words on the final renunciation of nationalism in Europe, particularly in its militaristic form. Anti-Nazi forces in Germany, the memorandum continued, consisted of significant sections of the working class, of influential circles in the Army and administration and of militant groups from the churches. Names and details naturally could not be given. The aims of this widespread resistance move- ment were as follows: self-government and decentralization in Germany achieved by breaking down the mass society into local self-governing bodies and groups and the application of 'modern socialist principles in all fields of political and economic existence'; an organic link between a self-governing federated Germany and a federal Europe including Great Britain; close inter- national cooperation with other continents; reestablishment of free access to overseas raw materials instead of national autarky; reorganization of Europe on the basis, not of a return to the status quo, but of concentration on creating social and political security; international cooperation in solving the Jewish problem. The questionable nature of certain of these points leaps to the eye. It must be remembered that, when the memorandum was drafted, Germany's military situation was not completely hopeless — as Schonfeld said to the Bishop of Chichester on 31 May 1942 the German Army was then occupying territory 1,000 miles into Russia; 3 moreover account had to be taken of certain 'national' elements in the resistance movement, particularly in the Army. Such general statements, however, as 'the rights of all nations to self- determination within the framework of a European federation' and reestablishment of 'a free Polish and a free Czech state within their ethnographic frontiers' could not satisfy the British government. On 25 August 1939 that government's predecessor had guaranteed Poland, as she then stood, all support including immediate military assistance in the event of attack by a third power. 4 According to the memorandum, however, Poland would have been required to renounce without compensation considerable areas, perhaps even her access to the Baltic. It was doubtful whether a purely Czech state was viable and here too previous international obligations existed under the Munich Agreement, if nothing else. Finally the principle of self- determination would have been unacceptable to France if applied to Alsace and Lorraine. The resistance movement's objectives were not primarily material; basic- ally they wished to reestablish the dignity and the natural inalienable rights of man. Nevertheless they proposed to achieve these aims, as the memorandum explained, by the seizure of political power in Germany. But there were a 217 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 number of obstacles to this: continuance of warfare in the east, essential for national defence against the Soviet Union and against 'anarchic developments'; the ubiquitous power of the Gestapo in Germany and the danger of Nazi revolts after the coup', the complete uncertainty about the British and American attitude to a change of regime in Germany; the problem of controlling the anticipated outbursts of hatred in the territories occupied by German troops. These last two problems could only be solved by international cooperation and this was the purpose of the appeal. Sir Stafford Cripps read the memorandum and was very attracted by it. He gave it to Churchill who thought it 'very encouraging', as he noted in the margin. But that was all. 5 In August 1950, at the Consultative Assembly on the Council of Europe in Strasburg, Gerstenmaier reminded Churchill of the memorandum. Churchill 'remembered and regretted the course of events'. Closely connected with this memorandum passed by Trott to Visser't Hooft were the conversations conducted in Stockholm in May 1942 by Hans Schonfeld and Dietrich Bonhoeffer with the Bishop of Chichester, George Kennedy Allen Bell. 6 Dr Hans Schonfeld was Director of the Research Section of the Ecumenical Council in Geneva and had known the Bishop of Chichester since 1929. Dr Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a pastor who had been in charge of the German Evangelical community in London from 1933 to 1935; he was a theologian of independent unorthodox views; from about August 1940 he had been working with Dohnanyi in OKW Ausland/Abwehr and at the end of October was seconded to the Abwehr office in Munich. 7 In February 1941 Bonhoeffer was commissioned by Oster and Dohnanyi to go to Zurich and Geneva to reactivate the church contacts, which had lain idle since Dr Miiller's talks in Rome in 1939—40 and to find out Allied ideas on peace aims. 8 His journey produced little as far as reestablishment of contact was concerned. In September 1941 Bonhoeffer went to Switzerland again and had talks with Visser't Hooft and others. 9 He urged his friends, particularly those in the Ecumenical Movement, to use their influence to ensure that the Allies would call a halt to military operations during the anticipated coup in Germany. But Visser't Hooft and Bonhoeffer received no definite answer to their queries in London. Too few people in influential positions believed that there was a really serious opposition in Germany. There was also an obvious misunderstanding between Bonhoeffer and many of those to whom he talked, who thought that he himself, and still more his masters, insisted on maintenance of the German 1939 frontiers. From about 11 to 23 May 1942 Bonhoeffer was in Switzerland again but, to his disappointment, met neither Visser't Hooft (he had meanwhile gone to London with Trott's memoran- dum), nor Schonfeld nor the latter's assistant Nils Ehrenstrom. 10 It had long been known that Bishop Bell proposed to visit Sweden in May 1942 and, independently of each other, Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer planned to meet him there. 11 In preparation Bonhoeffer, through his brother Klaus and the latter's friend Dr Otto John, asked Jakob Kaiser, Wilhelm Leuschner and Max Habermann to give him a memorandum on their plans for the period following the overthrow of Hitler. But the trade union leaders refused and 218 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schbnfeld 1942 would only allow Bonhoeffer to give their names. They did not set much store by political soundings abroad so long as the Germans themselves had not succeeded in eliminating Hitler. The Bishop arrived in Stockholm on 13 May 1942 and first visited various places in Sweden, returning a fortnight later to Stockholm where he stayed at the British Legation. On 26 May he and Dr Schonfeld met at the headquarters of the Student Movement. Schonfeld gave a detailed account of the German opposition and its aims, in general on the lines of Trott's memorandum. Efforts to overthrow Hitler were under way, he said, possibly making use of a putsch by Himmler, whereupon the Army would seize power. The question now was whether Britain and America were prepared to negotiate with a post-Hitler or post- Himmler government and whether their attitude would differ from that of Versailles. Unless they could offer some encouragement in this respect, there was no hope of a coup. When the two met again on 29 May Schonfeld reported primarily on the op- position from the churches and, at the Bishop's request, promised to reduce his report to writing. In this aide-memoire Schonfeld enumerated the main groups of con- spirators: those in the Wehrmacht and the administration; leaders of the former trade unions and other working-class representatives; leaders of the Evangelical Church under Bishop D. Theophil Wurm and of the Roman Catholic Church under the Fulda Bishops' Conference. The leaders of these groups, he said, were now ready to seize the next opportunity to do away with Nazi domination, including the SS, the Gestapo and the SA. As Schonfeld explicitly emphasized, therefore, power would be seized, not by a military jun- ta but by a government comprising all these three main groups. Schonfeld gave the following three points as the main planks in the political programme of these groups (their similarity to those in Trott's memorandum is unmistakable, though they were not given in such detail): reestablishment of the rule of law and social justice in Germany with far-reaching self- government in the provinces; reconstruction of the economy 'according to truly socialistic lines'; instead of autarky close economic cooperation between free nations as the best guarantee against European militarism; a European federation of free countries including Great Britain, a free Polish and a free Czech state, with a common executive and a European Army. At present, he said, the situation in Germany was developing favourably for a coup by the Army and other opposition forces. A declaration by the Allies that they would enter into peace negotiations with a government formed by this opposition and on the basis of the points outlined above would assist and accelerate this development. Should the Allies, however, insist on fighting on till victory, as announced in the Atlantic Charter, then even the members of the conspiracy would continue to fight in the Army until the bitter end. In addition the op- position had information that the SS under Himmler was planning its own coup in order to save itself and its power. If, when the anticipated approach took place, the Allies would encourage the SS to do this, it would materially 219 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 assist to set in motion the whole process of a change of regime; the Army would then have a welcome opportunity to eliminate Himmler and the SS. 12 On 31 May the Bishop went to Sigtuna for talks with Harry Johansson, Head of the Nordic Ecumenical Institute, and Dr Manfred Bjorquist, Head of the Sigtuna Foundation. There, to his astonishment appeared 'another Ger- man pastor - Dietrich Bonhoeffer'. As Bonhoeffer records, the idea that he should go to Sweden to see Bishop Bell had originated from Oster and Dohnanyi. He had talked it over with them and they had consulted Beck, without whose agreement they would do nothing since he had been 'constituted coordinator' at the end of March. 1 3 Soon 30 May, only a few days after his return from Switzerland, Bonhoeffer was provided, through the good offices of Canaris, with 'Courier Pass No 474' from the Foreign Ministry and flew to Stockholm. 14 There he heard that the Bishop was in Sigtuna and immediately followed him. In a private discussion Bonhoeffer gave an account of the opposition similar to that of Schonfeld. The Bishop told him of Schonfeld's visit and said that, dangerous though it was, he would be greatly assisted in countering the suspi- cion of his report which he anticipated from the British government if he could give a few names of leaders of the opposition. Although Bonhoeffer was ob- viously uneasy at this enormous responsibility, he gave the names of Beck, Hammerstein, Goerdeler, Leuschner, Jakob Kaiser and Schacht, describing the latter, however, as an opportunist; he indicated that Field Marshals von Kluge, von Bock, von Kiichler and von Witzleben were 'trustworthy'. Dr Schonfeld then arrived in Sigtuna. Bishop Bell, Johanssen, Bjorquist, Bonhoeffer, Schonfeld and his assistant Nils Ehrenstrom now all sat down together and discussed the possibilites of a coup in Germany, but in more general terms and without mentioning names. Bonhoeffer emphasized that they were not looking for an easy escape since Christians could not wish to es- cape punishment or even chaos if that was what God willed for them. When Visser't Hooft asked what he was praying for in the present situation, Bonhoeffer replied: 'If you want to know, I pray for the defeat of my country, for I think that is the only possibility of paying for all the suffering that my country has caused in the world.' 15 Schonfeld agreed — with certain provisos — that Berlin must be occupied by Allied troops; his reasoning was less fun- damental, in other words more political, than that of Bonhoeffer. The question of a restoration of the monarchy under Prince Louis Ferdinand was also touched on. Finally Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer urgently reiterated their view that 'there was little purpose in the resistance movement accepting all the perils to which they were exposed in pursuit of their aims if the Allied governments intended to mete out to a Germany purged of Hitler and his minions exactly the same treatment as to a Hitler-Germany'. 16 They asked Bishop Bell to obtain infor- mation on this subject from the British government and, if possible, inform them of the results. Should the reaction be positive, they proposed Adam von Trott zu Solz, a friend of Cripps' son, as participant in further talks. Informa- tion in both directions was to be passed via Geneva. 220 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schonfeld 1942 The Bishop returned home on 11 June. On 18 June he visited Mr Warner in the Foreign Office who suggested to him that he write to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary. The Bishop wrote the same day, explaining briefly that the subject was connected with the memorandum which Eden had received through Visser't Hooft and asking for an interview. Eden fixed this for 20 June. He seemed highly impressed with the Bishop's comprehensive report but envisaged the possibility that, without their knowledge, the two pastors were being used by the German government to put forward peace feelers; similar attempts to gain contact were being made, he said, in Turkey and Spain. With an eye to Russia and the United States, however, the British government could not give even the smallest impression of negotiating with the enemy. Such was, and remained, the attitude of the western Allies to all attempts at contact by the German opposition. 17 At the same time the Bishop handed over a secret memorandum, which he had drafted himself, on his talks with Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer. In this he gave an outline, similar to that of Schonfeld in his aide-memoire, of the resistance movement and its aims: representatives of the Army and ad- ministration, of the former trade unions, of the Protestant and Catholic Churches all wanted to eliminate the Hitler regime including Himmler, Goring, Goebbels and the heads of the Gestapo, the SS and the SA. Would Britain advocate a monarchy? If so Prince Louis Ferdinand should be con- sidered. The new government would renounce aggression, repeal the Nuremberg laws and cooperate in an international solution of the Jewish question; German troops would withdraw by stages from the countries which they had attacked and occupied; Germany would not further support Japan and would assist the Allies to end the war in the Far East; she would cooperate with the Allies in reconstruction of areas destroyed or damaged during the war. On behalf of the opposition Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer then asked whether, under these conditions, the Allies would negotiate peace with a new German government on the following basis: (1) Formation of a state based on the rule of law and on the principle of federalism together with far-reaching local self-government; (2) the closest possible international economic relations in Europe both as a matter of justice and as the most effective possible guarantee against militarism; (3) formation of a representative federation of free nations or states including a free Polish and a free Czech nation; (4) for- mation of a European army to control Europe; the German Army to be incor- porated into it under centralized European command. The opposition, Bell's memorandum continued, had complete confidence in the Army; should the Allies refuse to negotiate with a new non-Hitler govern- ment, it would fight to the bitter end. The opposition warned, however, against the millions of deaths which this would cause; for Europe it would be a suicidal struggle in fact. The opposition was strong enough to carry out a coup\ it had groups and supporters in all important centres of power. Bell repeated the names given him by Bonhoeffer - Beck, Hammerstein, Goerdeler, Leuschner, Kaiser. The opposition knew that Himmler was plan- ning his own coup; this might be a first step, but no more than that. The op- 221 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 position wished to sweep away the entire present regime, including Himmler's SS. At the same time the opposition wished to pledge their goodwill. German troops would cooperate with Allied and neutral military units in the maintenance of order in Germany and in the territories now oc- cupied by German troops. Some form of occupation of Germany was therefore already accepted. Now, however, the memorandum continued, the opposition representatives with whom the Bishop had talked asked what encouragement the Allies could give the opposition leaders to enable them to set the coup in motion. Would, for instance, the Allied governments let the opposition know privately that they would be prepared to negotiate with a new government on the basis of the above principles? Alternatively could the Allies announce publicly and un- equivocally that, after the fall of Hitler and his entire regime, they would be ready to negotiate with a German government on the basis of these principles ? Eden promised to consider the Bishop's report and memorandum. Meanwhile, on 13 July, the Bishop met Sir Stafford Cripps who gave an enthusiastic account of Trott and his memorandum transmitted through Visser't Hooft. Cripps had told Hooft to encourage Trott 'but on the basis of a defeated Germany'. The Bishop then showed Schonfeld's memorandum to Cripps who was so impressed by it that he proposed to show it to Eden. He accepted the argument that encouragement of the opposition could do no harm (to Britain) and in the best case might do much good. On 17 July Eden wrote to the Bishop to say that he had examined these in- teresting documents with care and had no wish to question the honesty of the two Germans; he had, however, come to the conclusion that it would not be in Great Britain's national interest to reply. Thereupon Bell wrote back on 25 July saying that he was glad that Eden had given such careful attention to the papers and did not doubt the honesty of the two German pastors; he must, of course, bow to the Foreign Secretary's decision. Reading between the lines it is dear that, in view of the credibility of the two emissaries, the Bishop found the decision incomprehensible. He reemphasized his hope that the Foreign Secretary would be able 'in the near future to make it plain in an emphatic and public way that the British Government (and the Allies) have no desire to enslave a Germany which has rid itself of Hitler and Himmler and their ac- complices'. There was, as he had said, a clear difference between Nazis and other Germans; the opposition was urgently awaiting recognition of this difference, with all its consequences, on the part of the British government. On 13 May 1940 Churchill had proclaimed Great Britain's purpose as 'war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark lamentable catalogue of human crime'. 18 Support of an internal German opposition pursuing the same aim was the obvious course if Great Britain, as Churchill had equally said, wished to achieve victory at any price. Nothing could be expected from the op- position without such support, in other words without a statement that there was no intention to enslave Germany and that anti-Nazis would not be treated exactly like Nazis. Otherwise the opposition would be forced to believe that 222 Trott, Bonhoeffer, Schonfeld 1942 Lord Vansittart's remarks, which breathed hatred, represented official British policy. Eden replied on 4 August. No one could believe in the opposition, he said, until it had taken active steps to remove the regime. So far the opposition had given 'little proof of its existence'; it had not shown itself in active operations like the resistance movements in the occupied countries. Under these cir- cumstances it was not possible to promise Germany more than 'a place in a future Europe' after the war. The longer the German people tolerated the Nazi regime, the greater became its responsibility for the crimes which the regime committed in its name. The Bishop replied on 17 August pointing out that resistance movements in occupied countries were fighting under different conditions; they had been promised liberation which had been explicitly refused to the Germans. They were the exception under the Atlantic Charter. There was no purpose in arguing further with Eden. The Bishop was un- deterred, however, and unwilling to end the correspondence without going on record once more in favour of the German anti-Hitler resistance. He explained that the longing for legality and justice, for removal of the Nazi regime and the hope that a better Germany could find a place in a future Europe were potent factors which might enable the opposition to come increasingly into the open. After so hopeful a start the British government's refusal even to reply to the opposition's questions came as a severe disillusionment to Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer, as also to the Bishop, who had done all he could. On 30 July he had also passed copies of the documents given to Eden to John G. Winant, the American Ambassador in London, and had given him a detailed account of the opposition in Germany. Winant promised to inform the State Department but the Bishop heard no more from him. Undeterred, however, he continued his campaign, both in parliament and the press, for the formulation and an- nouncement of reasonable peace aims applicable to Germany. When Beck was told of the results of Bonhoeffer's and Schonfeld's efforts, he ordered a report to be prepared and passed to the Vatican. This was done. 19 Trott, who had been named by Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer as a contact man for possible talks with representatives of the British government, visited the Swedish contacts from 18 to 28 September 1942, despite Eden's negative reaction to the overtures of Schonfeld and Bonhoeffer. 20 In his conversations there, Trott emphasized the danger of bolshevization of Germany from within, and he searched for ways of generating understanding on the British side for the efforts and aims of the German opposition and of producing some sort of statement of policy towards a Germany that had liberated itself of Hitler. But as he was about to leave Sweden, Trott wrote to Harry Johansson on 26 September 1942: 'I feel that you have fully understood that we do not in- tend to plead for support or even encouragement from friends on the other side - but that we wish to repose our faith in the necessity of some movement springing from like-thinking minds in the whole of Christian Europe to make salvation possible.' It is fair to ask if the many misunderstandings Trott encountered were not 223 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 at least partly caused by his tendency to reason and argue on very varied levels. It was certainly pointless to try to deal with Britain on any level other than that of practical politics, and the suggestion of a possible bolshevization of Germany from within, or of a solidarity movement for the salvation of Europe, were not obviously on this level. Had Trott forgotten that Britain wanted no part of the Holy Alliance of 1815, and that the danger of the bolshevization of Germany in 1919, when this was a much more unknown and horrifying quantity, had not caused Britain to do her utmost to modify the Treaty of Versailles in order to make it more acceptable to the German people ? At this point Britain was inevitably more anxious to keep the anti- Hitler coalition going, and to win the war. The bolshevization of Germany would depend on the will of the occupation powers much more than on the wishes of the German people, and Trott's suggestions looked suspiciously like an attempt to split the coalition. Moreover, a certain amount of contradic- tion in Trott's statements could not be overlooked, and it was not at all clear whether Trott was speaking for a group able and willing to overthrow Hitler, or for a group that expressly did not wish to do so. 21 224 23 Moltke 1943 Despite Allied refusals to deal with them the active members of the opposition continued their efforts even after Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on the formula of'Unconditional Surrender' in Casablanca in January 1943. In the same month Trott went to Switzerland, where he met Dulles through the good offices of Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz who was on Dulles' staff. Trott tried to explain to Dulles how essential it was for the enemy to differen- tiate between Germans and Nazis if the resistance movement was to have any possibility of action. 1 People in the resistance movement began to feel that 'the Anglo-Saxon countries are filled with bourgeois prejudice and Pharisaic theorizing. There is a strong temptation to turn East. The reason for the eastward orientation is the belief in the possibility of fraternization between the Russian and German peoples, although not between the present governments. Both have broken with bourgeois ideology, both have suffered deeply, both desire a radical solution of social problems which transcends [sic] national limits ... Fraternization between Germans and imported foreign workers is also an important element.' Even if there had been on the American side any willingness to recognize the opposition and acknowledge the difference between Germans and Nazis, Trott's somewhat woolly and inaccurate statements, together with the threat of turning East, were not likely to further such an attitude on the part of the American government. Dulles maintained that 'to stop short of total military victory, to allow Germany any doubt of its total defeat, would have been un- thinkable on our part'. From summer 1943 Langbehn could only report from Switzerland that 'the Anglo-Americans have absolute confidence in victory and are determined to see it through to the end'. 2 The longer the opposition failed to show itself by 'deeds' — nothing was known in the West, of course, about the assassination attempts, that of March 1943 for instance - the greater became the suspicion of its sincerity. Before the war, Dulles said, people had wanted to appease the devil; now no one would trust any German. 3 But since the opposition was opposing as a matter of conscience, they could not simply resign themselves to failure. They pondered over possible success but it was not the overriding factor. In June 1943 Trott was officially despatched to Turkey by the Foreign Ministry to discover what the Turkish attitude was; secretly he probed the possibilities of establishing fresh contact with the Allies. 4 It is not clear what 225 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 progress he made. But immediately thereafter Moltke also travelled to Turkey, having been given the opportunity by Canaris who commissioned him to enquire into the case of certain ships which had moved from the Danube into the Sea of Marmora. In Istanbul Moltke discussed the prospects of agreement between the opposition and the Allies with Professor Hans Wilbrandt whom he had known from earlier days, and with Professor Alexander Riistow, a friend of Wilbrandt's who was in touch with the American secret service. 5 Moltke proposed that an officer of the German General Staff with all necessary information and full authority be brought over to England to agree with the Allies on free passage for Allied troops through the German front in the west, the eastern front against Russia continuing to be held. He wished to discuss this with Alexander C. Kirk, the American Minister in Cairo. His object was to obtain acceptable peace conditions and withdrawal of the de- mand for unconditional surrender; as a quid pro quo the Western Allies were to occupy Germany. He rejected an attempt at assassination and an internal coup using force. 6 Riistow, however, said that there could be no question of withdrawal of the hated formula and, if Moltke insisted on this, he could not undertake to mediate further. Moltke thereupon gave way. 7 The journey to Cairo never took place and Moltke had to return to Germany without having made any form of contact with the Western Powers. Wilbrandt and Riistow, however, promised to pursue the matter. Finally, in November 1943, Moltke received news that contact had been es- tablished and Kirk would come to Turkey secretly for a discussion. Once more assisted by Canaris, Moltke went to Istanbul in December prepared, if the American reaction was positive, to offer himself as mediator and arrange for the German and Allied military commands in the West to cooperate. But Kirk was not in Istanbul after all. Moltke, who was under imminent threat of arrest, was sadly disappointed. He did meet Major-General R. G. Tindall, the American Military Attach^ in Turkey, but the encounter was fruitless; both sides were suspicious and the American merely wanted military information from Moltke. Shortly thereafter General Donovan, Head of OSS (Office of Strategic Services) himself brought to New York an offer of negotiation from the resistance movement. What he had was a letter written on the paper of the German Embassy in Ankara and signed by Dr Paul Leverkuehn who had been in Washington before the war as German representative on the Mixed Claims Commission. This document was submitted to Professor Karl Brandt of Stan- ford University, California, who was in New York on business. He knew cer- tain leading members of the opposition personally and Trott had visited him in Palo Alto in December 1939. 8 With elaborate security and secrecy precautions Professor Brandt was asked to go at once to General Donovan's office in Rockefeller Centre, New York, examine the document with the ut- most care and give an opinion on it. There was to be a discussion with Presi- dent Roosevelt next morning to decide whether to follow the offer up or not. 9 226 Moltke 1943 The letter said that the opposition could not guarantee that the entire western front would remain inactive in the event of an Allied invasion; it had, however, sufficient influence with important German Army and some Luftwaffe commanders to ensure that counter-measures against an Allied landing would at least be delayed. If this were to happen the Western Powers should be prepared to negotiate with a German government formed by the op- position after a coup. Professor Brandt acknowledged the offer to be genuine; he already knew of these ideas and he also knew that OSS was very well informed about the German opposition. That night the document, together with Brandt's opinion on it, was taken to Washington under strict guard by Mrs Emmy Rado, General Donovan's assistant (who later worked for OSS in Military Government, Berlin, with the rank of Colonel). Brandt later heard from Mrs Rado that, based on his opinion, Donovan had advocated accep- tance of the offer but that President Roosevelt had flatly declined to negotiate with 'these East German Junkers'. Before leaving Turkey Moltke had written a letter to Alexander Kirk, whom he had known since 1936.'° In it he said how much he wished to talk over the possibilities of ending the war more quickly and dealing with the resulting problems; he offered to come to Istanbul again, at the earliest in February 1944 and at the latest in April. Kirk replied on 10 January 1944 saying that the war could be ended by nothing other than the unconditional surrender of the German Wehrmacht. This information reached Moltke's friends in Istan- bul, 11 but it did not reach Moltke. He was arrested on 19 January 1944. 227 24 Trott 1943-1944 Until the very last moment, only a few days before 20 July 1944 in fact, Trott was still pursuing his efforts to establish contacts and obtain assurances. As did a number of other members of the opposition from the 'Kreisau Circle' and their friends (Eugen Gerstenmaier for instance), Trott visited Sweden in the autumn of 1943 (27 October to 3 November) and in late October had an exhaustive discussion with Dr Ivar Anderson, editor of the Svenska Dagbladet.' The subject of their talk was the establishment of some contact with Allied diplomats. The opposition urgently needed outside help for their coup and without delay; otherwise, in the light of the meagre forces and resources at the disposal of the resistance movement, the danger of counter- action by the regime and of civil war was great. The major obstacle was the demand for unconditional surrender. In reply to a question by Trott Anderson said that the prospects of outside help were extremely small, whereupon Trott said that they could only wait. This was of course highly dangerous, he added, because it might mean that Russia would win the game. 2 Anderson finally arranged meetings for Trott with Christian Giinther, the Swedish Foreign Minister, 3 and Sir Walter Monckton, then Under-Secretary in the British Ministry of Information. 4 Both meetings were fruitless, as also was a contact with members of the British Embassy in Stockholm arranged by a Swedish lady. 5 Trott received no answers apart from assurances that his in- formation would be transmitted to London. 6 About the time of his visits to Sweden Trott wrote certain comments on the peace programme of the American churches, which was presented to the Ecumenical Council in Geneva in November 1943. 7 In these comments Trott emphasized the necessity of international federal organizations based on the rule of law instead of that of force; a measure of self-government should en- sure the cultural autonomy and equality of all peoples and racial groups. He acknowledged 'the inadequacy of the sovereign nation-state as the ultimate international authority' and the necessity for some limitation of national sovereignty, without which the problems of central and eastern Europe could not be solved. Without some restriction of national sovereignty, moreover, effective limitation of armaments and prevention of the recurrent misuse of armed force were not possible; in this connection, however, too great hopes should not be placed on measures of enforcement. Disarmament applied to the 228 Trott 1943-44 defeated countries alone would deprive the new international organization in advance of its quality of objective legality and would create second-class nations - 'international cooperation burdened from the outset with mistrust of entire peoples cannot be lasting'. In the long term peace could not be guaranteed solely by an international police force and reduction of ar- maments; rather one must look to the effects of'continuous practical and con- structive cooperation between nations', of 'desuetude' of suspicion, hatred, fear and enmity in relations between peoples and a gradual change in traditional ways of behaviour. Compromise and agreement are the keynotes of this memorandum. It also dealt with the economic aspect, stressing freedom of the masses from want and the necessity to restrict the monopoly position of individual states, not in order to deprive them of something but to assist the development of the less powerful. Free trade was an obvious ideal provided that the smaller nations were not prevented from expanding their exports by currency and other restrictions and provided that access to the raw materials of rich countries did not remain theoretical. The Christian way of life was another central concept running through the entire memorandum and this was contrasted with 'the agglomeration of humanity' and its evil results. Nothing is known of any reaction to this document. Trott was in Stockholm again in March 1944 and yet once more for a period of several days between 19 June and 3 July. 8 As with many other probes from the German side, both from Himmler's entourage and anti-Nazi circles, the primary object was to obtain withdrawal of the demand for unconditional sur- render and its replacement by clear acceptable armistice terms and an assurance that negotiations would take place after the end of hostilities. In this instance, however, Trott took pains not to request any modification of the 'unconditional surrender' formula before the overthrow of Hitler by the opposition. 9 Roosevelt's view was that there could be no deviation from the principle of total victory over Germany as a whole, that there was no desire to annihilate the Germans as human beings but that he was not prepared to say that the German nation would not be destroyed in so far as, for the Germans, the words 'nation' and 'Reich 1 and all that they implied were one and the same thing. The Germans should be allowed to live, he said, and should quietly place their trust in the generosity of the Americans; the errors and failures of the post-1918 period, however, must not be allowed to happen again; the Ger- mans must divest themselves of their warlike and aggressive nature. This might take two generations but anyone who thought otherwise must realize that, after a time, there would be a third World War. 10 After much hesitation Roosevelt eventually drafted a proclamation to the German people and all those who sympathized with them; it was to be published in the name of the three major Allies shortly after the planned Allied invasion of the European continent. 11 In it he reiterated that the Allied aim was not 'total destruction of the German people' but 'total destruction of the philosophy of those Germans who have announced that they could subjugate the world'. In the long term the Allies wanted individual, political, religious 229 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 and intellectual freedom together with greater social and economic justice. The victory of the Allies was assured. It was unintelligent of the Germans to carry on the war; every additional casualty was an unnecessary one. Admit- tedly the Allies would also suffer losses if the war continued, but their reserves and population were so incomparably larger that, as the war went on, the sufferings of the German people, of every family in fact, would be by far the greater. For the Germans this proclamation was highly encouraging. In their desperate situation of 1944 they would inevitably have regarded it as a signifi- cant departure from the principle of unconditional surrender. But the proclamation was never made, for it could not be done without Churchill and Stalin. On 25 May Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that 'considerable concern was expressed' in the British cabinet 'at the tone of friendship shown to the Germans at this moment when troops are about to engage'. 12 One could hard- ly proclaim at this moment that the Allies and the Germans were divided by little more than the latter's 'evil philosophy'. There would then hardly be sound reason for continuing the struggle. Almost all Europe was crying for vengeance against the brutal tyrant. How would the total disarmament of Germany, on which they were agreed, be carried out in practice ? How was Poland to be compensated for the cession of the Curzon Line to Russia if she was not given East Prussia and certain areas reaching to the Oder? In short, in this form and at this time Churchill and the cabinet could not agree to the proclamation. The next day Stalin replied in similar vein: the nature of the Germans held out little hope of success; the uncertainties of the military situation im- mediately before the invasion constituted a further factor against the proposed proclamation. 13 There may have been fear that the opposition might be encouraged by such a proclamation, that they might succeed in overthrowing the regime, and that then the Western Allies might deal with them separately after all. Finally, the communists had at this time not yet entered into any negotiations with the opposition — had they had any chance of influencing a post-coup government, it might have been a different proposition. 14 Roosevelt gave way; he could say with a clear conscience that his hands had been tied. The difficulties were insuperable. There could be no agreement between the Allies and the German opposition because of mutual suspicions between the Allies, because of the excessive number of persons involved, each with their opinions, their convictions and their rancours, and finally because of the im- minence of the invasion. Before the Second Front had scored its first great vic- tory and before the success of a great new Russian summer offensive Stalin had no wish to cause the Germans to lay down their arms. He was not very concerned with human life and the further the Red Army advanced, the better. Churchill put the dilemma thus: 'I think myself that the message might con- ceivably be taken as a peace feeler and that the Germans might reply that they accepted your [Roosevelt's] note as a basis for further discussion." 5 In this situation Trott's missions had no prospect of success. He did not, of course, 230 Trott 1943-44 know of the exchange of views between Washington, London and Moscow but he was the victim of the results. Johnson, the American Minister in Stockholm, had sent to his government detailed reports on both Trott's visits to Sweden. 16 During his March visit Trott had hoped to reactivate the British Embassy contact established early in November 1943 and possibly obtain from London the answer of which there had seemed to be some hope at that time. Through the same Swedish lady who had acted as intermediary in the autumn of 1943, he indicated to the British Embassy that there was now somewhat greater probability of an un- derstanding with the Russians; they were fighting very hard at the front whereas the British and Americans were merely killing German civilians by bombing. As agreed with his backers - it is not clear whether these were the Beck-Goerdeler group, the Kreisau group, or the circle around Stauffenberg that included elements of both 17 - however, Trott now asked for nothing in advance except a gesture. (On his next visit to Sweden in June, Trott once again requested a qualification or retraction of the 'unconditional surrender' formula. 18 ) The leaders of the conspiracy had now become convinced that the coup must be attempted under all circumstances, with or without external political 'assurances'. 19 Trott proposed that, on the fall of the Nazi regime, the British should cease their air raids on Berlin and so indicate their approval of the coup. Stauffenberg, who was by this time the practical leader of the opposition, was apparently firmly convinced that the position of the Western Allies was strategically catastrophic and that they could not afford to treat Germany badly; they would have urgent need of her in face of the menacing Russian superiority on the continent. 20 Trott thought this an illusion. Both were right. Stauffenberg, however, assumed that the policy of the Western governments would be dictated by their own interests and their view of the future, whereas Trott knew that this was not so. In answer to Trott's question the British Embassy replied that they were interested in his information but had nothing to say on the subject. The Em- bassy was prepared to take at their face value Trott's assurances that he was acting on behalf of the opposition, though fruitless attempts were made to find out who its members were. The Foreign Office, however, inclined to the view that Trott was an agent of the regime - there were plenty of them going around on behalf of the now somewhat pitiable German super-man. 21 Policy was made in London, not in the Embassy in Stockholm. After this abortive attempt Trott was extremely downcast and discouraged. Germany's situation was so desperate, however, that every effort, however hopeless, had to be made to persuade the Allies to make some positive gesture. In many of his reports from Berne Dulles urged that something be done on these lines. 22 Eisenhower and General Bedell Smith, his Chief of Staff, also took the view that the demand for unconditional surrender should be aban- doned since it merely raised the fighting morale of the Germans. Quite apart from these concrete and pressing considerations, however, in Trott's view (and here he was in full agreement with Moltke and the 'Kreisau Circle') some 231 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 progress would have been registered had there been any form of cooperation at all - for the future, after the end of the slaughter. 23 In April 1944 Trott paid a further visit to Switzerland where he met Dulles' assistant, Schulze-Gaevernitz. Trott pointed out that Russian influence in Germany was growing all the time - owing to the 'Free Germany National Committee', the mass of forced labourers in Germany, the presence of Rus- sian prisoners of war and even more the continuous stream of constructive ideas for the post-war period issuing from Russia. In comparison the West had nothing to offer as regards the future of central Europe. The working- class leaders feared that, if present developments continued, the present dic- tatorship would be replaced, not by democracy but by another dictatorship. They therefore urged: 1. Some encouraging declaration to the working class from the democracies; 2. a declaration that Western business interests would not seek to influence the organization and development of the German labour movement; 3. a statement of the degree of self-government to be granted to Germany with emphasis on self-government in the Lander and in parishes; 4. a declaration that the Allies would not set up a puppet government; 5. a message of encouragement specifically aimed at the socialist leaders; 6. leaflets, which would best be drafted in agreement with the resistance movement so as to fit the psychological situation, to be distributed in such quantities that the Gestapo could not collect and destroy them; 7. es- tablishment of active contact 'between the German socialist labour movement and progressive forces in the West' as a counter-weight to the links between Russia and the German communists; 8. restriction of air raids to military and industrial targets in order not to promote the proletarianization of central Europe. These were not terms or conditions to be fulfilled before the coup could take place. They were simply proposals for the prevention of the anticipated Rus- sian hegemony in Europe. The Russian armies were advancing inexorably, while France, Holland and northern Italy were still under German domina- tion. Nevertheless, however sympathetic Dulles was to Trott's ideas and however genuinely he recognized their strategic validity, he could do no more than report to his superiors. To Trott he had to say that he should not rely on anything. Trott had agreed to meet Albrecht von Kessel in Geneva at the same time but the meeting did not take place. The two were able to spend a few days together in Venice, however, in the second half of May. In the company of his friend and in these beautiful surroundings Trott recovered from his deep depression and regained some of his strength. In June Trott made a further attempt to make contact in Stockholm. 24 On 21 June Trott talked with a fairly high-ranking British diplomat who was also a member of the secret service, David McEwan. 25 McE wan said that the Allies were planning a new and comprehensive bombing offensive against industrial centres in western Germany and that they might consider dropping the idea if the opposition was strong enough to help them end the war quickly. Trott promised all required information on condition that the Allies revoke or 232 Trott 1943-44 qualify their demand for unconditional surrender. In a memorandum Trott wrote at the request of McEwan, he described, without mentioning any names, the political situation of the German militant opposition to Hitler. It was psychologically and politically impossible for these men, Trott wrote, 'to shoulder the burden and blame of Hitler's defeat unless they can hope to offer the people some improvement or advantage in their situation compared to what would follow Hitler's own defeat. Accepting unconditional surrender now, they would feel unable later on to counteract the mass slogan of having "stabbed in the back" our fighting forces.' That in turn would make it impossible for them to gain political control in Germany and to establish a new system on broadly socialistic lines, but it would probably bring to power strongly nationalist or communist elements. Trott was unable to offer assurances of action, however, in exchange for 'some qualification of the term "unconditional surrender",' but merely stated that 'it is recognized, however, that the opposition must first act and establish itself ... provided that some qualification of the term "unconditional surrender" is forthcoming' - in other words, without such qualification there was not likely to be any action. 26 On 22 June he told a Swedish intermediary who was in touch with the American Legation, that the 'Free Germany National Committee' was now active on Germany territory; the Russians had dropped organizers by parachute. Trott's resistance group, he said, had no scruples about working with the 'National Committee'; they wished to have contacts both with the Russians and with the 'Anglo-Americans'. They had not, however, yet con- tacted the 'National Committee' because a friend in the Gestapo had warned them that it had been penetrated by spies. His group, he said, was composed of bourgeois, Catholic and Social-Democrat elements and was in touch with certain officer circles. They hoped to emerge as a political force after the fall of Hitler and were preparing a coup against the Nazis. At that time, Trott also attempted to contact Mme Alexandra Michailovna Kollontay, the Soviet Am- bassador in Stockholm. 27 This contact did not materialize perhaps owing to lack of time. As is well known, Russian officials invariably have to ask for instructions from Moscow and their freedom of action is severely limited. Moreover the implied threat, voiced with increasing frankness by Trott, clearly missed its mark. This was not the way to persuade the Western Powers to come out openly in favour of the opposition. They had no wish to tie their hands and sensed, with some justification, an attempt to split the alliance. The Russians were extremely suspicious; Roosevelt and Churchill were very strict in their observance of their obligation to consult their ally; they immediately informed each other and Stalin of any peace feelers received. 28 Allen W. Dulles, the OSS representative in Berne, had reported back to Washington that Gisevius and another emissary of the opposition, Waetjen, had approached him with a proposal from Beck and Goerdeler to mastermind a coup d'etat on condition that the opposition group 'would deal directly with the Western Allies alone after overthrowing the Nazi regime ... excluding the USSR from all 233 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 negotiations ...' This information had been transmitted to the British and Soviet Embassies in Washington dated 24 May 1944. 29 On 23 June, through the Swedish senator Professor Gunnar Myrdal, Trott met John Scott, the correspondent of the American periodicals Time and Life. He made it abundantly clear that the demand for unconditional sur- render was a powerful reinforcement to German fighting morale and was playing straight into Goebbels' hands. Until it was withdrawn there would be no hope of a successful coup in Germany; the Germans would continue to fight because they could see no alternative. In the later stages, however, the Russians would occupy part of Germany and most of the well-disposed anti- Nazis would gravitate thither because they could clearly expect more sym- pathetic treatment and a better understanding of their sense of dignity from the Russians than from the Americans. For his part, Trott said, he would act this way. Trott enumerated the following points as important for the treat- ment of Germany if the Western Allies wished to avoid the dangers described above: (1) Demobilization to be carried out by German officers and not too quickly in order to avoid total chaos with the resulting threat of revolution; (2) Maintenance of a certain degree of German sovereignty. On 3 July Trott was back in Germany. He wished to go to Sweden once more in July but could no longer obtain a travel permit. 30 Alexander Werth, a member of his staff in the Foreign Ministry, accordingly undertook the journey. It was as fruitless as the rest. 234 25 Gisevius In autumn of 1939 Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius began his career as 'diplomat' of the opposition when he smuggled a letter from Dr Schacht to George Frazer, the banker and former president of the Bank for International Settlements, in Switzerland. 1 Gisevius also played a role in connection with the talks in Rome conducted by Dr Josef Mu'ller in 1939—40. 2 At the instigation of Oster and Canaris, Gisevius was called up to serve in the Army, more precisely in the Amt Ausland/Abwehr, and in summer of 1940 he was installed in a counter- intelligence post under the Abwehr in the German Consulate General in Zurich where he was appointed vice-consul. 3 Gisevius' work included shielding other members of the German underground who had connections in Switzerland and who were frequently in danger of being discovered by agents of the Gestapo and SD (SS Security Service) operating in Switzerland. In his key position Gisevius was aware of and in some way a participant in most op- position activities that were channelled via Switzerland, including Bonhoeffer's 'mission' to Sweden and other efforts of the German Evangelical and Confessing Churches and their ecumenical contacts. For instance, he also took part in the drafting of a letter by the Rev. Asmussen in 1942 which became a basis for the 'confession of guilt' of the German Evangelical Church proclaimed in Stuttgart in 1945. In Zurich he was to maintain contact with the enemy on behalf of the opposition. In war, such contacts are best main- tained through secret-service methods and channels; but in any case really useful contact could not begin to be established before the end of 1942, the first time there had been any serious prospect of an opposition coup since spring of 1940; it was then that Allen W. Dulles, who knew the American President well, came to Berne. 4 Dulles' closest assistant, Gero von Schulze- Gaevernitz, was a friend of Gisevius and told him that one could talk with Dulles not only on the secret-service level but also 'on a purely political level' (by which phrase he meant primarily diplomatic contacts). Gisevius then ob- tained authorization from Beck, Canaris and Oster to build up and solidify the contact from January 1943 on - at about the same time Trott transmitted to Schulze-Gaevernitz his first memorandum for Dulles. 5 Gisevius' first object was to convince Dulles that America should concen- trate on halting the advance of the Bolshevik world revolution rather than on winning a war. 6 On this premise, he pleaded again and again for an arrange- ment between the opposition and the Western Powers that would provide for 235 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 continuation of the war in the east. At first Gisevius met only lack of un- derstanding on the American side; then he was forced to acknowledge the realities of the coalition against Germany. 7 Dulles' answer was always the same: separate arrangements were out of the question, the war would be ended by the United States only in concert with her allies, and peace would not be concluded without them. 8 It was probably not unimportant in this connection that the American government was con- cious of a race between the United States and the German Reich for the production of operational atomic bombs. At any rate, even though the Americans were undoubtedly convinced of their industrial and military superiority in the long term, it would have been frivolous to risk losing their Russian ally's assistance in defeating Germany and, in future, perhaps Japan, when the compensation for such a risk was as uncertain as the statements coming from the German opposition. The invasion of France had not yet been carried out, the effectiveness of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war was not yet known, Japan was still in control of a vast area of Asian mainland and the struggle against the Japanese was at least as bloody, cruel and hard as that against Germany. Not only Trott and John, but also Beck, through Gisevius, Waetjen and Striinck, were brought up against some of these realities again and again when they made their overtures, or harboured illusory hopes. In March 1944, despite all the negative reactions from the Western Allies received so far, and despite his deep insight into the overall strategic position, Beck once more wanted 'clear information': Did the Allies want a construc- tive, that is to say conservative reorganization of post-war Germany ? Did they want to 'eliminate the Nazi system in collaboration with thefronde, or were they now prisoners of ideological, diplomatic and strategic con- siderations?' Gisevius was instructed to put these questions to Dulles, acting as Beck's representative. 9 If Gisevius had reported to Beck the negative at- titude of the Western Allies as early as January 1943 (then underlined by the Casablanca Declaration), and again and again later, as he and Dulles and Hassell all say, 10 it is difficult to see what the useful function of the op- position's outpost in Berne was, since the basic and obvious results of its work were not accepted in Berlin. Admittedly it seems that Gisevius himself was not fully convinced of the inflexibility of the Allied position for about another year after January 1943. 11 During this time he may therefore have kept alive unrealistic hopes on the part of Beck. But from about February 1944 Gisevius' prognostications hardly differ from those of John with whom he takes issue so sharply. 12 No doubt the overtures of John, Trott and others in Madrid, Stockholm and also in Switzerland did not make Gisevius' life any easier; he felt justified in considering himself the 'legitimate' representative of the opposition led by Beck and Goerdeler, especially from March 1942 when Beck had been recog- nized by most groups as their central authority. 13 It was probably naive to think that a variety of contacts would help rather than damage the prospects of the opposition, that it would be useful to have contacts, and not merely con- tacts but serious communication, in Stockholm, in Madrid, in Geneva, in 236 Gisevius Istanbul, and wherever American and British diplomats and intelligence agents could be approached. There were enough reasons for caution and suspicion on the Allied side as it was, without this confusing variety of con- tacts. From the Allied point of view, it could not be ruled out that the opposi- tion was involved in the Venlo affair; the action promised in the autumn and winter of 1939-40 had never materialized although the British had gone quite a long way in trying to encourage the opposition; Trott was always in an am- biguous position carrying out official business for the German Foreign Office as well as his diplomacy for the opposition - it was not far-fetched to suspect that he could be an agent provocateur whose purpose was to elicit some British statement that could be used to 'prove' that Britain was negotiating with the Germans behind the Russians' backs; it was often not at all clear for whom in Germany the various emissaries were speaking — did they represent a group that was able and determined to overthrow Hitler, or one such as the 'Kreisau Circle* that in contrast was opposed to any attempts at overthrowing the dictator? But the desire of the conspirators to leave no avenue of contact unused is also understandable. Moreover, the different groups had different concepts for the reorganization of Germany, and these they wished to bring to the attention of the potential occupation powers. Trott was talking about the application of modern socialistic principles in all fields of political and economic life in 1942; 14 in the same year, Schonfeld said in a memorandum that the German economy must be reorganized 'according to truly socialistic lines' after the war; 15 in his June 1944 memorandum Trott referred to agroup that had now been formed to lead the fight against Hitler, potentially representative of 'the two churches, the moderate as opposed to the violently communist working-class organizations, the conservative and progressive elements in the bureaucracy and army'. 16 The objections to inclusion of trade- union leaders, and, indeed, to any opening to the left, voiced by Gisevius and Helldorf among others, at first also by Stauffenberg and as late as 15 July 1944 by Striinck have been mentioned. 17 In the face of such important dis- agreements on long-term planning, members of various opposition groups who had an opportunity to travel abroad felt obliged not to leave contact with the Allied Powers entirely to another representative of another group who might be pursuing a different post-war concept, even though a united front abroad would undoubtedly have served the opposition better. In 1943 Gisevius was sucked into the vortex which developed around the arrest of Bonhoeffer, Dohnanyi and Dr Mu'ller, and he escaped arrest only by a precipitate departure for Switzerland. 18 As Gisevius was now threatened and so less useful, and since he could no longer travel easily to Germany and back to Switzerland, another contact man was installed in the German Consulate General in Zurich: the lawyer Dr Eduard Waetjen. Captain (res.) Dr Striinck, who also worked for the Abwehr, was the principal courier who carried information and instructions back and forth between Zurich and Berlin. He visited Gisevius four times in 1944: on 15 February, 4 May, 6 June, and 8 July. 19 With Waetjen Gisevius went to see Dulles in April 1944, on express instruc- 237 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 tions from Beck, Goerdeler and their group (not on Stauffenberg's instruc- tions, therefore). They declared that Beck and Goerdeler were ready and willing to lead a coup d'etat against Hitler, as Dulles reported to Washington on 12 April 1944 and again after another contact, on 16 May 1944. 20 Dulles continued, however: 'Such action would be contingent upon assurances from Britain and the United States that, once the Nazis had been overthrown, negotiations would then be carried out solely with the Western Powers and under no circumstances with the USSR. The essential conservatism of the group's planners was stressed, but also its willingness to cooperate with any available elements of the Left except for the communists. The group expressed its anxiety to keep Central Europe from coming under Soviet domination. If the capitulation were to be made primarily to the Soviet Union, the negotiations would have to be carried on by another group. Such Wehr- macht commanders in the West as von Rundstedt and Falkenhausen, the declaration maintained, would be ready to assist the Allied landings once the Nazis were removed from power.' Gisevius and Waetjen had then actually been instructed to offer secret peace or armistice negotiations between the opposition and the Western Allies. These would obviously not remain secret for long and would inevitably lead to the break-up of the coalition of the Western Powers with the Soviet Union. Since all were agreed that it was only a question of months before the final vic- tory of the Allies, this can only be taken seriously as an attempt to persuade the Western Powers to join forces with a non-Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, the vanguard of the World Revolution. Gisevius, however, could not report anything much different from what Trott and John had told the groups for whom they had made their contacts. As Dulles wrote to the head office of the OSS in Washington on 12 April 1944: 'To these overtures the OSS representative said little beyond expressing his strong conviction that the United States would never act without previous consulta- tion with the USSR.' 21 Nevertheless, Gisevius and Waetjen again approached Dulles, on instructions from the Beck-Goerdeler group which claimed Rundstedt, Falkenhausen, Heusinger, Olbricht and even Zeitzler as members, with a plan to end the war in the west while continuing it in the east. Dulles wrote to Washington on 16 May 1944: 22 'The group was reported ready to help Allied units get into Germany if the Allies agreed that the Wehrmacht should continue to hold the Eastern Front. They proposed in detail: (1) three Allied airborne divisions should land in the Berlin region with the assistance of the local army commanders, (2) major amphibious landings should be un- dertaken at or near Bremen and Hamburg, (3) landings in France should follow, although Rommel cannot be counted on for cooperation, (4) reliable German units in the area of Munich would isolate Hitler and other high Nazis in Ober Salzburg. 23 The opposition group is reported to feel that Germany has lost the war and that the only chance of avoiding Communism in Germany is to facilitate occupation of as large a section of Europe as possible by American and British forces before collapse of the Eastern Front.' This time, Gisevius and Waetjen added that they believed the request for 238 Gisevius separate arrangements excluding the Soviet Union was unrealistic, and that they were reporting to Beck and Goerdeler accordingly. 24 The time for negotiations had definitely passed, Gisevius wrote to Beck and Hansen in letters carried by Striinck. 25 Gisevius further told Dulles in May that the most important thing was the early occupation of Germany by British and American troops, and if they knew some way of carrying out such an occupation quickly, 'the Allies might do well to ignore their [the opposition group's] propositions', because he, Gisevius, had no confidence in the political courage of the German generals. 26 When he reported to Berlin, the only instruction Gisevius received was to do nothing more. 27 Then, on 8 July 1944, Captain Striinck came to Switzerland again. Gisevius learnt of his arrival on 9 July. 28 Striinck said that the collapse of Army Group Centre in Russia and the invasion of Normandy had galvanized the opposition activists. General Fromm, Commander of the Home Army, had joined them. But the opposition still planned to begin the liquidation of the war by withdrawing on the western front and by throwing the best divisions against the Red Army. Since this information came from Colonel Hansen via Striinck, it can be assumed that it had been approved by Stauffenberg. 29 Dulles reported on these latest contacts on 12, 13 and 18 July and concluded 'that a dramatic event might take place up north'. On 11 July Gisevius and Striinck travelled to Berlin to be at hand for the coup d'etat. 239 26 Miscellaneous Contacts Until the final days preceding 20 July 1944 all possible contacts were kept open and some fresh ones created. As late as 15 July Dr Theodor Steltzer, a prominent member of the 'Kreisau Circle', passed a memorandum to Moltke's British friends, Lionel Curtis in particular, giving the situation and views of the 'Circle'; the object was to prevent the Allies taking ill-considered post-war measures. 1 In September 1943 Goerdeler told Hassell that he still had a line to Churchill through Jakob Wallenberg. He went on to say, however, that Churchill had passed word that London would 'look with benevolent interest' upon a German opposition government. This seemed somewhat improbable. 2 An inquiry designed to elicit such a response from the American government made via the American Minister in Stockholm, Herschel V. Johnson, remained without any reply. 3 There is much to show that in June and July 1944 Stauffenberg had one or two contacts of his own to Western military agencies. In the winter of 1943-44 Berthold von Stauffenberg and Captain (Navy) Alfred Kranzfelder (both were working in naval Headquarters) had been sent to Sweden on duty and while there they had tried to establish touch with Churchill through the Wallenberg brothers. 4 Trott told the Gestapo that, when he visited Sweden in the summer of 1944, he had been commissioned by Stauffenberg to find out 'what the at- titude of Britain and the USA would be if, in the short term, Germany found it necessary to open negotiations'. 5 In mid-August Goerdeler told the Gestapo that in June Stauffenberg had suggested Graf Bismarck to him as an in- termediary to Churchill. 6 Goerdeler was vexed by this since Wallenberg was in the habit of visiting Bismarck when in Berlin; Goerdeler accordingly suspected that Stauffenberg was trying to take over his contact without previous discussion. It is not possible to say whether this is correct or merely a story told to the Gestapo pending the availability of further documentary evidence. 7 In his memoirs written in prison in November 1944 Goerdeler also records that Stauffenberg told him on 18 July that Churchill was in possession of his (Stauffenberg's) demand that in the event of 'an action' all German territory must remain within the Reich. No more is known and allowance must be made for Stauffenberg's obvious optimism; the nature and effec- tiveness of his contacts, however, will remain obscure until the British and American files become available. 240 Miscellaneous Contacts Throughout the war contact was maintained between German and non- German resistance movements, the closest being that to the Norwegians and Dutch. The 'Kreisau Circle' was particularly active in this respect. 8 In con- trast to the connections described above, the purpose here was not to come to some accommodation with the enemy, but to prepare the ground for the Euro- pean Federation to be formed after the war, thereby eliminating nation-states and nationalism. Additional aims were to alleviate the oppression of the population in the occupied territories, to give timely warning of acts of vengeance, anti-Jewish measures, punitive expeditions, deportations and if possible arrange for persons to be released from arrest. 9 As a subsidiary but important issue, through the contacts between the German and non-German resistance movements, the Allies received better and more reliable informa- tion on the German resistance. Steltzer, Moltke, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Canaris arranged for Bishop Berggrav's release from arrest in April 1942 and naturally made use of the con- tact thereby established to ask the Norwegians to intervene with the Allies and urge them to gain touch with the German resistance movement. 10 The Norwegians, however, thought that the time was 'not yet ripe'. In Belgium General Alexander von Falkenhausen, the Military Governor, was himself in touch with the local resistance movement. In France Professor Carlo Schmid, a senior administrative officer (Kriegsoberverwaltungsrat) in Lille, had been acting as intermediary between Moltke and the French resistance since early 1942. Moltke had contacts in Denmark from his time in Silesia before 1933. These he used in October 1943 and, working through Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, adviser to Dr Werner Best, the Reich Plenipotentiary, helped to save most of the Danish Jews who were due to be taken to an extermination camp on an express order from Hitler. When Moltke arrived in Copenhagen and heard that the Wehrmacht was to support the SS in their anti-Jewish man- hunt, he went at once to General Hermann von Hanneken, the Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief, and said to him (approximately): 'You must have gone mad. You'll pay dearly for this one day. Don't you understand that P' 1! Contacts with Holland were particularly active. Dr Schonfeld, Dr Paul Collmer and Trott were frequent visitors there. 12 A particularly good line led through Colonel Wilhelm Staehle. 13 He intervened successfully on many occasions on behalf of Dutchmen and so came in contact with the Dutch un- derground. At the end of 1943 he told his Dutch contacts of the German op- position's plans for ^putsch and discussed with them how best to arrange for a smooth transition from the existing administration under Seyss-Inquart to a German military regime and thence back to Dutch self-government. He readi- ly agreed to the Dutch terms - dissolution of the Dutch Nazi organizations and return of forced labourers. When asked about the Jews, however, he could only reply in a whisper: 'They are no longer there.' Staehle told his Dutch contacts that he himself would probably head the transitional regime in Holland after the coup. He warned members of the Dutch resistance who were in danger of arrest, but otherwise simply kept his 241 Contacts with the Enemy 1940—44 contacts open. Early in 1944, however, the Dutch government-in-exile in Lon- don, after consultation with the British government, forbade anything which could be regarded as negotiation or treating with the enemy. Staehle himself was arrested on 12 June 1944. The Gestapo could find out very little about his activities, however, and the People's Court, one of whose members was General Reinecke who knew all about Staehle's views and activities, only sentenced him to two years imprisonment. On 23 April, however, he was murdered by a Gestapo squad led by the notorious Police Inspector Stawizki. 14 242 27 'Eastern Solution* ? Since the Western Allies were turning a deaf ear to all attempts at contact and the situation in the East was becoming increasingly menacing, voices were to be heard both in Hitler's entourage and among the opposition in support of a separate agreement between Germany and Russia. From the opposition point of view a factor in its favour was a declaration by Stalin in February 1942 when he differentiated between Hitler and his clique as transient figures on the one hand and the German people as a permanency on the other. 1 Quite apart from the removal of Hitler it was in Stalin's interest to allow fresh Russo—German agreements to appear not altogether improbable; they could be used as a means of pressure to impose his territorial demands in Europe. Such was the position in Moscow in November 1943, in Teheran in December 1943 and in Yalta in February 1945 when the Americans were urging Russian entry into the war against Japan and Stalin consequently held the trumps. President Roosevelt and his advisers, moreover, looked upon Russia as a future world power with which they wanted to be on good terms and they were therefore ready to make numerous concessions. They systematically sacrificed German interests to the friendship for which they hoped. 2 At the same time, since July 1943 Stalin had been trying to gain touch with the German opposition through the 'Free Germany National Com- mittee', formed of prisoners of war and 6migr6s. The contacts between the un- derground German Communist Party and the socialists Reichwein and Leber were another attempt to influence the opposition and potentially post-war conditions in Germany; probably they were also a reaction to the offers made to Dulles in Berne by the Beck-Goerdeler group to negotiate with the Western Powers alone, without their Russian ally. 3 The opposition's ideas about an 'eastern solution' must be looked at in the light of all these factors, not from an ideological standpoint and still less through the spectacles of the post-1945 Cold War and the Adenauer era. This is the background to many misunderstandings and accusations, to which admittedly numerous fanciful ideas originating from the opposition have contributed. The 'Kreisau Circle', for instance, toyed with ideas about a sort of anti-fascist world revolution and even Stauffenberg is said by some to have become imbued with enthusiasm for them. 4 There may be something in this but nothing like as much as many have thought; Stauffenberg has been called a national-bolshevist because, quite rightly, he believed that the war 243 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 with the Soviet Union could not be won against the Russian people but only with its support. 5 But in 1944 such opportunities had long since disappeared. German policy towards Russia had turned defence of the Soviet system into a patriotic duty for all Russians, because this system alone represented the in- terests of their country. Early in 1944 Stauffenberg explicitly rejected any cooperation with the 'Free Germany National Committee', saying: 'What I am doing is treason against the government, but what they are doing is treason against the country.' 6 Trott's message to Dulles in January 1943 has already been mentioned. This referred to the possibility that Germany might turn eastwards and that the two peoples, having abandoned bourgeois concepts and set their sights on radical social solutions, might march arm in arm. 7 The question is whether these statements should be regarded as seriously meant. If so, Trott was a champion of romantic unrealistic ideas; in the light of their relative strengths the Russian and German peoples could only have 'marched arm in arm' under Russian leadership and with Stalin's agreement. In his biography of Goerdeler Ritter says that Trott put forward these ideas as a method of exer- ting tactical pressure. 8 Rothfels on the other hand says that in his January 1943 message Trott expressed the hope that the West would support an anti- communist anti-atheist popular movement. 9 What Trott hoped to obtain from Dulles and his government, except perhaps some attempt to prevent the development which he forecast, Rothfels does not say. The 'originator (or at least instigator)' of Trott's message to Dulles in April 1944 was probably Leber. This too Ritter regards as a genuine effort to collaborate with the West by giving warning of communist underground activity and of the growing trend to the Left. In practice it is impossible to distinguish between hope of collaboration with the West against the world menace of communism and the expectation that the danger of Russo—German collusion might persuade the West to act. No one can believe that Trott was so naive as to have thought of the one but not the other. There was nothing in Trott's statements as reported by Dulles that could justify Gisevius' impression (which he says he received in talks with Trott in April 1944) 10 that Trott advocated an 'option for the East' or a 'rejection of the West'. There were admittedly many fanciful ideas and much disappointment over the attitude of the Western Powers which may have led Trott on occasions to make extreme statements. 11 Opposition hopes of western readiness to come to some agreement rose and fell. When Trott returned from his visit to Sweden in the autumn of 1943, he was forced to report that Britain was not so prepared. 12 If that were so, was it not essential to try one's luck with Russia ? Nothing should be left untried in order to stop the war, the slaughter and the destruction. In August 1943 Hassell had said that, if necessary and as an expedient, an attempt must be made to convince either Russia or the Western Powers that the preservation of Germany was in their interests and, if the Western Powers would not cooperate, accept agreement with Russia. 13 Trott was in full agreement with him - he was realistic in other words. If the Western Powers rejected the Ger- man offers, particularly those coupled with a hint of possible understanding 244 'Eastern Solution' ? with the East, then there was no alternative but to implement the threat unless one was to remain totally isolated and helpless. In autumn 1943 Trott had ac- cordingly tried to contact Mme Kollontay, the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, but without success. 14 In order to initiate talks with Stalin, Goerdeler and Tresckow seem to have thought of infiltrating through the Ger- man lines Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, the former German Ambassador in Moscow. 15 Goerdeler certainly had doubts; the plan clearly originated from Tresckow. 16 In April 1944 Albrecht Haushofer and Hassell put forward the idea that the best place to contact the Allies was Stockholm because from there it might be possible to talk to Stalin, should the Western Powers be un- willing to negotiate after a successful coup d'etat. 11 In contrast to the Western Powers there were definite indications that Russia was ready to negotiate. Trott and Graf Schulenburg knew all about the feelers and offers of negotiation which the Russians had been putting out to Hitler ever since the end of 1942 through Peter Kleist, a desk officer in the Foreign Ministry and for a time also in Rosenberg's Ministry for the East. 18 The German Minister in Stockholm Victor Prinz zu Wied received a Russian peace feeler at the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943, and so did Ambassador von Pa pen in Ankara in May 1943. 19 The Soviet government had expressed a wish to conduct peace negotiations with Schulenburg but Hitler had in- variably refused. Schulenburg was regarded as the only diplomat capable of negotiating with Stalin. Moscow in fact had a high opinion of him and people there knew what they were doing when they suggested him as a negotiating partner. Schulenburg had invariably warned against war with Russia. There was, in fact, no serious contact between Hitler and Stalin or between the German opposition and the Soviet government. According to Franz von Sonnleithner, who acted as Ribbentrop's representative in Hitler's headquarters during the later years of the war with the rank of Minister, con- tact between the opposition and the Russian government through Schulen- burg did not materialize because the Russians thought that the opposition did not intend to make an honest deal but was merely trying to use them as a pawn in their chess-game with the West; Schulenburg, on the other hand, 'visualized Germany occupying a genuine intermediate position between East and West and had no intention of deceiving Stalin'. Let it be said once more: in the light of the situation the resistance move- ment had no alternative but to consider an arrangement with the East as well, although they would have preferred one with the West. In contrast to their contacts in Western capitals, those with the East never progressed further than the deliberation stage. No one in the opposition was 'east-orientated', apart of course from the communists. 20 The opposition wished to open negotiations with all sides as soon as possible; for contact they placed their hopes on Gisevius in Berne, Weizsacker and Kessel in Rome, Goerdeler's link to Wallenberg in Stockholm, Trott's reputation in London and Schulenburg's in Moscow and finally on Dr Otto John's contacts in Madrid. 245 28 Otto John 1944 Dr Otto John was a lawyer, legal adviser to the German Lufthansa. From pre- war days he had been working with the opposition group in Amt Ausland/Abwehr and from February 1944 with Canaris* successor Colonel Georg Hansen in particular. His brother Dr Hans John was scientific assistant to Dr Rudiger Schleicher, a senior civil servant (Ministerialrat) in the Reich Ministry of Aviation and Head of the Institute for Aeronautical Law in Berlin University.1 In his position with Lufthansa Otto John had been able to carry out intelligence missions for the Abwehr and he used both these and his posi- tion as cover for conspiratorial opposition activities. In April 1942 and also between November 1942 and January 1943 John was in Madrid ostensibly on business for Lufthansa; he tried on behalf of Goerdeler to establish contact between Prince Louis Ferdinand and President Roosevelt but without success. 2 In November 1943 he was commissioned by Captain Gehre to find out whether communications permitting rapid contact could be established to General Eisenhower's headquarters through the United States Embassy in Madrid. John flew there and was soon able to send a coded message to Berlin that the link had been established and could be used. He waited daily for orders to activate it after a planned assassination of Hitler during his inspec- tion of a new uniform. But John found this waiting too prolonged; it was em- barrassing and might have drawn the attention of SD and Gestapo agents to him. On 16 December he flew back to Berlin to find that Hitler had called off his inspection. In January 1944 John met Stauffenberg in Werner von Haeften's house and in the first week of February he flew back to Madrid with the task of es- tablishing a link to Eisenhower and Montgomery. Colonel William Hohenthal, his contact in Madrid, was willing to see what he could do. John reported back to Berlin and on 17 April flew to Madrid again to develop the contact. In his politico-military reports sent to Colonel Hansen from Madrid and Lisbon early in 1944 John dealt in particular with the planned and anticipated invasion which was to create a second front against Germany. The Italian front, he said, had practically nothing to do with the case and was only a secondary front. Preparations for a major invasion from the British Isles were in full swing. In March 1944 he reported that the location of the invasion had been decided and that it would be somewhere between Bordeaux and Ham- 246 Otto John 1944 burg; with Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander all further decisions would be in the hands of the military; the operation would take place, he said, some time in June. John was also able to confirm something which the opposition's emissaries had always been saying but which Trott, for instance, would not believe: that the Allies, the British and Americans, were completely united in their deter- mination to impose unconditional surrender by military means. 3 Nevertheless, in his contacts with Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Am- bassador in Lisbon, John had the impression that there was still a distinct possibility of armistice negotiations following a military coup in Germany. 4 Many of John's masters were confirmed in this view by a message from Roosevelt's entourage received by Canaris at the end of 1943 or early 1944 to the effect that offers of peace negotiations should be addressed to Eisenhower. 5 By this time Stauffenberg was in command of preparations for the coup and was working closely with Julius Leber. Early in June 1944 he and John met one evening in Leber's house. Stauffenberg expressed the view that invasion was possible this year but not probable. 6 The question was how much time remained available for preparation of the coup d'etat. Stauffenberg thought that, if the invasion took place at all, there was a fifty-fifty chance that it would be thrown back into the sea. 7 If it were abandoned or defeated, prospects of negotiation would be better. According to later testimony from his friend Professor Fahrner, Stauffenberg knew very well that the Western Powers had explicitly refused to give any support to a German rising and that they preferred to defeat Germany totally rather than have any contact with the German opposition. 8 He hoped, however, that after the coup he would be able to talk to General Eisenhower 'as soldier to soldier'. 9 On the German side he wished to exclude 'the politicals'. 10 He may not have realized the extent to which Allied military commanders were, or rather were not, empowered to take political decisions. In any case he agreed with Leber that the new situa- tion could only be judged after the coup when action would be taken accordingly. 11 All these ideas were overtaken by the invasion of 6 June 1944 and its im- mediate success. The landing was on a vast scale and had succeeded; the situation could not be reversed; the Allies were far superior to the Germans both in fire-power and in the air, over France as well as over the Channel and Atlantic. The Luftwaffe was so weak that not only was it practically helpless against the bombing of German cities but during the days and weeks preceding 6 June it had been unable to provide any useful enemy intelligence. 12 After this Stauffenberg had little time to bother with the foreign policy side and on 10 June he commissioned Hansen and John to take the necessary steps with a view to negotiations with the enemy in the West. John had tried in vain to convince Stauffenberg and Hansen that the war could only be ended by un- conditional surrender. Later, on 20 July, John reproached himself for his failure to get his view across particularly with 'the generals' although, as he himself admitted, they were then less ready to negotiate than ever. 13 On 10 247 Contacts with the Enemy 1940-44 June Hansen emphasized to John the necessity of a link to Eisenhower cutting out 'the politicals', in particular Goerdeler and his group. In a 'soldier to soldier* talk, he said, agreement would quickly be reached. John was com- missioned to establish a contact to be used immediately following the coup. John flew to Madrid on 19 June. He was successful in so far as he obtained an assurance that all his messages and information would definitely be passed to General Eisenhower but he could obtain no guarantee of an answer. He now waited in Madrid for authority to act from the shadow military headquarters under Witzleben; this was to be passed to him by Hansen after the coup. 14 The key phrase, however, was still 'unconditional surrender' and John was forced to report to Berlin that the Allies would insist on this, no matter who was ruling in Germany. Meanwhile Stauffenberg too had become convinced that unconditional sur- render was unavoidable even after a successful coup.* 5 At a meeting in Striinck's house during the night 12—13 July he told Hansen and Gisevius that it seemed too late for any accommodation with the West; Stalin would be in Berlin in a few weeks' time, and was not one therefore/orccrfto deal solely with the East on political matters? On 13 July Beck also said to Gisevius that Ger- many was defeated and total occupation could now no longer be avoided. 16 Naturally John also was convinced that the only prospect of negotiations lay in the earliest possible initiation of the coup d'etat. He wished to fly back to Berlin in order to urge speed but, in answer to his question, was told that he would have to count on being arrested. Leber had been arrested meanwhile. John therefore sent his message to Hansen and Stauffenberg via Gerhard Lindenberg, a colleague in the Lufthansa office in Madrid who was flying to Berlin on 10 July. The answer received by Lindenberg was that John should come to Berlin for a day or two; the coup was now definitely to be made and John was to hold himself available to carry messages from the putsch government. Accordingly on 19 July John flew to Berlin and held himself in readiness. On the evening of the 20th he believed that the rising had succeeded but the arrests began that very night so John had nothing further that he could do. On 24 July he escaped to Madrid in a Lufthansa aircraft. 248 PART VI/ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS 1933-1942 This page intentionally left blank 29 The Early Days As the war went on influential opposition circles came to realize that the removal of the dictator in person, his murder in other words, was an essential prerequisite to the success of any attempted coup. A sacred oath had been sworn to him; in strict legal terms and in the minds of the unthinking citizenry and soldiery, the majority in fact, he was the legally established warlord and Supreme Commander. Unless, therefore, its Supreme Commander were first removed, the Army could not be counted upon; yet it was the sole instrument with which a coup could be carried out. The majority of the opposition realized this comparatively late; some of them, however, held this view from the outset and the events of 20 July 1944 proved them right. 1 A number of attempts at assassination had been made, however, long before 1943, some by the sort of people who invariably try to assassinate rulers, some from those resistance circles which were later the protagonists of the attempt of 20 July 1944. As early as May 1933 a preliminary legal investigation was necessary 'owing to a planned attack on the Reich Chancellor'. 2 Konigsberg communists led by a shipwright named Kurt Lutter planned a bomb attack on Hitler for his expected appearance at an electoral meeting on 4 March. The conspirators held two secret meetings in February and on 3 March the police acted. Since no evidence could be produced, however, towards the end of 1933 Lutter was 'released from investigation'. Also in 1933 an attack on Hitler was planned by a group led by Dr Helmuth Mylius but nothing came of it. 3 On 8 March 1937 Helmut Hirsch, an architectural student, was condemned to death by the Second Chamber of the People's Court and beheaded in Plotzensee on 4 June. He was a Jew originally from Stuttgart, had been active in the Youth Movement and had emigrated to Prague where he had got in touch with Otto Strasser and the 'Black Front'. He felt some responsibility for his fellow-Jews in Germany and wished to ensure that they would be well treated by Strasser after his 'seizure of power'; he also wished to show that Jews had the courage to fight and so was persuaded into making a bomb at- tack on a building in the Nuremberg Stadium, on Julius Streicher or even on Hitler himself. Strasser's purpose was to demonstrate his power and avenge his brother who had been murdered in 1934. 4 On 20 December 1936 Helmut Hirsch went to Stuttgart; he was due to take over the explosive in Nuremberg on the 23rd. His name was known to the Gestapo, however, from a previous 251 Assassination Attempts 1933-42 visit to Stuttgart and his arrival form, which he filled in correctly in his lodging, inevitably gave him away. One of his fellow-conspirators had already been arrested on crossing the frontier and he handed the explosive, together with full information, over to the Gestapo. In 1938 two men named Dopking and Kremin were supposed to have made a similar attempt. On 12 October 1940 Karl Hoffmann, Erich Schulz, Wilhelm Tosch and Hermann Chill from Danzig were beheaded in Plb'tzensee for 'preparation of treason against the government and crimes involving explosives', and on 30 January 1942 Bernhard Rust and Ludwig Schmitt suffered the same fate for the same reason, also in Plotzensee. In several of these cases Otto Strasser, brother of Hitler's former rival for leadership of the Party, was suspected, not without reason, of being behind the would-be assassins. 5 Early in March 1937 the Gestapo received a tip that a bricklayer named Max Kostriba was planning to come to Germany from Czechoslovakia to attack Hitler; 6 he had had issued to him a passport from police headquarters in Troppau on 27 February. 7 There were frequent manhunts after foreign assassins. Early in April 1938 the Gestapo office in Koblenz suspected that 'certain Jewish circles abroad are trying to find persons ready to carry out assassination attempts in the Reich with the object of eliminating the Fuhrer and other leading figures in Party and State'. This led to a hunt for twenty-four named Jews, almost all of whom were said to have entered from Czechoslovakia. 8 In August 1938 the head of the SD Sub-Region in Koblenz passed on to his out-stations a message received from Wilhelmshaven to the effect that criminals arrested in Paris had given the names of no fewer than twenty-two people said to be planning attacks on Hitler; the names were listed on an attachment to the SD memorandum. 9 In 1939 Colonel Mason- Macfarlane, the British Military Attache, suggested in all seriousness to his government that he should himself shoot Hitler from a favourably placed win- dow of his apartment on No. 1 Sophienstrasse, near the Charlottenburger Chaussee, Berlin. He did not try because the British government would have nothing to do with such methods. 10 One or two attempts were made from Switzerland. In 1935 a certain David Frankfurter, a medical student of Jugoslav nationality living in Berne, son of a Jewish pastor, was ready to attack Hitler. Since he could not get near him, he shot Wilhelm Gustloff (Hitler's Party representative in Switzerland) in Davos." In 1938 a committee with the specific purpose of preparing an attack on Hitler was formed under the chairmanship of Dr Wilhelm Abegg, a former State Secretary in the Prussian Ministry in Braun-Severing's time. 12 This 'Committee A' recruited ten Prussian ex-police officers who had been ran- somed with Swiss funds from German concentration camps. As many as possible of Hitler's potential successors in the event of his death were to be killed at the same time. It was planned to dress the assassins up as Italian courier officers carrying important intelligence. For various reasons, for in- stance alleged difficulties in the production of the bomb, the attempt was post- poned until 1942 and then it was said no longer to be necessary since certain circles in the German Wehrmacht were meanwhile preparing an attack. 252 The Early Days Also in 1938 Maurice Bavaud, a Swiss Catholic student of theology, attempted to attack Hitler. 13 Marcel Gerbohay, a Frenchman attending a theological college in France, had formed the Compagnie du Mystire with ten of his fellow-students; its object was to fight and destroy communism. Bavaud was commissioned to persuade Hitler to attack the Soviet Union and to kill him if he refused. However this may be, in October 1938 Bavaud went to Ger- many and in November attempted to murder Hitler in Munich. He was arrested, condemned to death by the People's Court on 18 December 1939 and finally executed on 14 May 1941. Mention has already been made of Captain Josef (Beppo) Romer, the ex- Free Corps commander. 14 He too wanted to kill Hitler and from 1939 to 1942 kept himself permanently aufatt with Hitler's comings and goings through Lieutenant-Colonel Holm Erttel, aide to the Berlin City Commandant. 15 He was in close touch with people like Halem, Schlabrendorff, Niekisch and Guttenberg as also with members of the so-called Solf Circle. In the summer of 1938 Halem parted from his friends Albrecht von Kessel, Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg and Botho von Wussow because, as opposed to them, he was one of the few who had realized from the outset that Hitler must be murdered if his regime was to be overthrown. 16 He also thought that regular Army officers were not in a position, either individually or collectively, to attempt assassination and he therefore rejected Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulen- burg's plans on these lines as fanciful. The mental attitude and moral concepts of German officers, Halem thought, made anything like this impossible and what was required was a sort of professional thug. Romer was not, of course, a thug but for a long time Halem thought that he had found in him an underling capable of carrying out the assassination. The opportunity never presented itself and in February 1942 Romer was arrested together with many of his contacts, including Halem and the Sachse-Uhrig group. He was executed in September as were some forty other conspirators, some earlier, some later. Hitler knew perfectly well that he was in constant danger of assassination. He calculated that there had been a total of seven attempts on his life, as one of which he included the Rohm affair. Elser's attempt was not the first to show him 'how easily death can strike down a statesman'; he once said: 'There will never be anyone in the future with as much authority as I have. My continued existence is therefore a major factor of value. I can, however, be removed at any time by some criminal or idiot.' 17 This he said in August 1939; on 23 November that year, after the Elser affair, he said: 'Attempts at assassination may be repeated.' 18 He also expressed his conviction that 'no one is safe against some idealist of an assassin who ruthlessly stakes his life for his pur- pose'. 19 When Heydrich was murdered in Prague he said that men of such political stature, himself even more so of course, 'must realize that people are lying in wait for them like some wild beast'; it was mere stupidity if such peo- ple did not take the elementary security precautions and, for instance, in order to show their courage, travelled in an open car. 20 Hitler does not seem to have suspected that there might be some 'idealist of an assassin' among the soldiers or officers; in 1942 he referred to the 'fact' that 253 Assassination Attempts 1933-42 'all German idealists were either risking their life at the front or were expen- ding all their efforts for the victory of Germany either in the arms factories or at their normal places of work'. 21 He was contradicting himself but this can be explained by the different meanings which he attributed to the word 'idealist' — characteristic of his disdain for any form of idealism. He did not think that true idealists, in other words people who would risk their lives, were to be found among the 'bourgeois and Marxists'. The only dangerous people, therefore, were 'assassins whipped up by the black crows in confessionals or patriots from the countries now occupied by our troops'. 22 In Germany these 'dunderheads', as Hitler called them, numbered a few hundred thousand in- cluding 'all leaders of opposition tendencies and particularly those of political Catholicism', inmates of concentration camps and 'all criminal elements, no matter whether they are now in prison or at liberty*. In the event of a 'mutiny', Hitler said, he would simply assemble these few hundred thousand men 'within three days for execution and have them shot'. 23 The reference to 'dunderheads', to the few hundred thousand, including the leaders of Catholicism and the idealists, shows Hitler up for the unreasoning tyrant that he was. His remarks about assassination and its likelihood, however, also show the depth of the man's cunning. For him there was nothing sinister or mysterious about it. For anyone who lives dangerously the sense of danger becomes more acute. Not only was Hitler living dangerously but he relied more on intuition and impression than on rational thought. Moreover, since he wished to be protected as far as possible against assassina- tion, he thought a great deal about how it might occur. 24 254 30 Attempts of 1938-1942 When General von Witzleben together with General Haider, the Chief of Staff of the Army, were planning the overthrow of Hitler in September 1938, the majority of the conspirators did not yet think it essential for the success of the project that Hitler should be killed immediately. A small number, however, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Oster and Major Heinz, agreed about 20 September that they would kill Hitler even without the agreement of the other conspirators. 1 It was proposed to adopt the following simple plan: While Berlin was oc- cupied by troops of III Army Corps under Witzleben's command, Witzleben himself and certain of his staff officers would go to the Reich Chancellery and demand that Hitler resign. An additional group of officers under Major Heinz would accompany him as an 'assault squad' in order to ensure his entry into the Chancellery and assist in the arrest of Hitler and his entourage. They had to pass several sentries, first at the entrance and then in a large anteroom. Hitler's room was reached through a marble hall from which led a long cor- ridor and in the middle of this was the door to Hitler's study. 2 Once they had reached Hitler wherever he might be, Heinz and his officers intended to provoke an incident during which Hitler would be shot. This of course would only be necessary if, contrary to expectations, the SS did not resist. For the reasons given in Chapter 7 above the confrontation never took place. 3 We have already seen how the conspiracy was paralysed after the Munich Agreement and acquiescence in the occupation of the 'rump of Czechoslovakia'; the conditions for an attempted assassination synchronizing with a coup d'etat no longer existed. The great victory over Poland was a further factor; after that no general would take part in a putsch. The preparations for the attack on France and the British Expeditionary Force, planned to take place through the neutral countries of Belgium and Holland, gave fresh impetus to the planning for a coup and attempted assassination. Once more catastrophe, a fearful defeat for Germany, seemed inevitable and in the view of many conspirators a situation had arisen in which a coup would be understood and might succeed. Then, coupled with the preparations for a coup being made in late October and early November 1939 in the Army General Staff, the OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr and the Foreign Ministry, Dr Erich Kordt, a Counsellor (Legationsrat) and Foreign Ministry spokesman, offered to assassinate 255 Assassination Attempts 1933-42 Hitler. 4 Majors Heinz and Groscurth had long been discussing the possibilities of a further attempt and General Haider encouraged the group in the Abwehr to try. On 1 November 1939 Oster said to Kordt: 'We have no one to throw the bomb which will liberate our generals from their scruples.' Kordt replied: 'All I need is the bomb.' Oster said: 'You will have the bomb by 11 November.' 5 In his capacity as assistant to Freiherr von Weizsacker, the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and as Ribbentrop's Chef de Cabinet, Kordt had always accompanied the Foreign Minister to the Reich Chancellery like a shadow; he was not at all conspicuous even when he came alone, he was no longer subject to identity checks, he had the entree to the Chancellery at any time and could wait about in the main anteroom until Hitler appeared. In the next few days he went to the Chancellery as often as possible in order to accustom the sentries even more to seeing him. Groscurth obtained plans of the Chancellery. 6 Kordt told his cousin Susanne Simonis, Hasso von Etzdorf and Albrecht von Kessel what he proposed to do; he recorded it in a statement of which copies were earmarked for Alexander Kirk, the American Charge" d'Affaires, and Dr Kappeler, a counsellor in the Swiss Legation. Oster was certain that he could obtain explosive and detonators for Kordt, but he had not yet got them. Accordingly, early in November, he summoned to his office Major Lahousen, head of Section II (Sabotage) in the Abwehr; two other Abwehr conspirators, Dohnanyi and Heinz, were already there. Straight away Oster asked Lahousen whether he could obtain explosive and detonators for an attack on Hitler; the assailant had already been found. 7 It was not so simple as it might seem to obtain explosives. All such material was held by Group T (Technical) of Section II and even the Section Head could not remove any without sound reason. Lahousen asked for time to think it over. Meanwhile, on 5 November, Hitler and Brauchitsch had had their quarrel about the western offensive and Hitler had insisted on his date of 12 November. Kordt heard of this from Etzdorf on 7 November and told him that, with the explosive promised to him, he would stop the offensive. On the evening of 8 November, however, Hitler only escaped by a hair's breadth from the assassination attempt by Georg Elser in the Burger- brdukeller, Munich. On 10 November Kordt and Oster discussed the project once more and decided to adhere to the plan for 11 November; as a result of the stricter vigilance following the Elser affair, however, the difficulties of ob- taining explosive, great enough anyway, were so vastly increased that Oster was forced to abandon the idea. 8 Lahousen was in no position to remove the necessary explosive from Section II's laboratory; in view of the strict supervi- sion being exercised, the Gestapo would have known at once. As a result both Lahousen and Oster as the recipient of the explosive would have been in an extraordinarily dangerous position because, with the best will in the world, they could have given no good reason for going about with explosives; moreover, owing to the excessive risk of premature detection the entire project had really become hopeless. On 10 November Lahousen was forced to issue 'further strict instructions' to Major Marguerre, the head of the laboratory, 'to proceed with great caution in the issue of detonators and 256 Attempts of 1938-42 explosives'. Marguerre thereupon stated that a precise record was kept in the laboratory but that, once something was issued, he could no longer be respon- sible for its whereabouts. 9 When Kordt visited Oster in his house in the Bayrische Strasse, Berlin- Wilmersdorf, late on the afternoon of 11 November in order to fetch the explosive, Oster had to tell him that it had not been possible to obtain it. All laboratories now had to render precise reports on every ounce of explosive and the use to which it was put. 10 The western offensive had meanwhile been postponed to 19 November so that more time was available for the attempt. Kordt now wished to try with a revolver but Oster dissuaded him. Kordt would not be able to see Hitler alone, he said, and he had no chance in the presence of aides, orderlies and visitors. Before the offensive finally took place Kordt visited Oster on two further oc- casions when the decision seemed imminent; he also asked Groscurth for help in obtaining the necessary explosive. In fact, towards the end of November Lahousen did succeed in bringing to Berlin a quantity of explosive previously held in Sweden by Abwehr II for use against targets in Norway; intensive preparations were then under way for 'Exercise Weser'. Kordt did not get any of it, however. Plans for a coup d'etat were no longer top priority; less reliance than ever could be placed on Haider and Brauchitsch and efforts were being made to reactivate them by means of Allied assurances. Unless there were a simultaneous coup assassination seemed purposeless; Goring, Goebbels, Himmler and Heydrich would presumably survive; the SS and Gestapo would remain intact. The conspiracy would therefore almost certainly be crushed and the regime would not have been eliminated. Georg Elser, who was responsible for the assassination attempt in the 'Lowenbrau' (formerly 'Burgerbrau') restaurant in the Rosenheimer Strasse, Munich, was connected to no other opposition circles. He had temporarily belonged to a communist organization but made his attempt on his own. His care, perseverance and skill brought him remarkably near success. 11 On 8 November 1939 the annual commemorative ceremony of the ill-starred putsch of 1923, at which a number of 'Old Fighters' had lost their lives, was due to be held; between early August and this date Elser succeeded on many occasions in spending the night unnoticed in the 'L'owenbratf hall where there were few security precautions; it was used partly as a historic site for visitors and otherwise as a restaurant. The pillars were of stone and cement, panelled with wood, and in one of these, against which Hitler made his annual speech, Elser inserted an explosive charge, connecting it to a detonating mechanism in- cluding two Westminster clocks. Some of the explosive (Donarit) he had stolen from a quarry, in which he had taken a job specifically for this purpose. In addition he used for his bomb military explosive from a 75 mm shell together with black powder. It took him thirty to thirty-five nights to prepare the chamber in the pillar which was one of the main supports for the roof. As far as is known there was no one behind Elser. He was uneducated but technically intelligent; during his subsequent interrogations, which included beatings, hypnosis and other methods of'intensified interrogation', he proved 257 Assassination Attempts 1933-42 to be merely an opponent of the Nazi regime who in particular felt that ever since autumn 1938 it had been heading for war. By murdering Hitler he thought that he would be doing something great and good. 12 Since the country was at war in 1939, 'a considerably reduced* programme was planned for the usual ceremony. Hitler did not intend to make a speech himself and instead Hess was to broadcast over all German stations at 7.30 p.m. on 8 November. 13 On 7 or 8 November, however, Hitler decided that he would nevertheless make a speech and on 8 November the Volkische Beobachter carried an announcement dated the 7th that Hess would speak on the 9th, not at 7.30 on the 8th. Finally it was announced on 9 November that there would be no speech by Hess since Hitler himself had spoken on the 8th. 14 On that day Hitler flew to Munich. Because it was frequently foggy in November and take-off for the return journey might therefore be delayed, he decided to return to Berlin the same evening by train (although he had originally intended to stay until the 9th). Regular trains for Berlin left for Munich at 9.45 and 10.20 p.m., but Hitler used his special train leaving at 9.31 p.m. and therefore had to leave the hall at the latest at 9.10 p.m. 15 By 6 p.m. on 8 November the hall and balconies of the 'Lowenbr'dii 1 were packed tight; among the 'notables' present were Bouhler, Himmler, Rosenberg, Frank, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and Sepp Dietrich. The Badenweiler march was played and the 'Blood Banner' borne in. Then the Fuhrer arrived to the enthusiastic applause of the three thousand people present. Previous custom had been that Hitler began his major speech about 8.30 p.m. ending about 10 p.m., but owing to the short time available, the start had been advanced by half an hour. Hitler arrived on the stroke of 8 p.m. and made his speech, ending at 9.07 p.m. 16 The explosion took place at 9.20 and the roof fell in killing eight 'Old Fighters' (one of them died later in hospital) and injuring more than sixty. That same evening Elser was arrested in Constance as he was trying to es- cape into Switzerland. He had all sorts of incriminating material on him, in- cluding a 'Burgerbrau' postcard, technical drawings of shells and detonators, distinguishing marks of ammunition boxes, parts of a detonator and in the lining of his coat a membership card of the former 'Red Front Fighters League'. 17 It was first assumed that foreign secret services were behind the at- tack but investigation results were meagre and there was no proof; during the war, therefore, no great trial of Elser was staged. As the end of the Reich drew near in spring 1945 * Gestapo Miiller' extracted via Himmler Hitler's decision 'concerning the special prisoner "Eller",' the cover-name under which Elser was held. On 5 April 1945 Miiller wrote to SS-ObersturmbannfuhrerWeiter, camp commandant of Dachau: 'During one of the next terror raids on Munich or the neighbourhood of Dachau "Eller" is to meet with a fatal accident. I request, therefore, that when such a situation arises "Eller" be liquidated in an entirely unobtrusive manner. Report of completion should be rendered to me as follows: "On ... on the occasion of the terror raid on ... among others Eller, prisoner in protective custody, was fatally injured"." 8 After the opening of the western offensive in May 1940 concrete planning for a coup d'etat by the opposition was at a standstill. Both externally and in- 258 Attempts of 1938-42 ternally conditions were unfavourable and no cooperation from the Army could be counted upon. Conditions were even more unfavourable after the great victory over France. Field Marshal von Witzleben for one declared any attack on Hitler something that could not even be considered in view of the victories over Poland and France. For the time being he abandoned hope of a coup d'etat.™ Nevertheless individuals were still to be found ready to risk their lives against the dictator even when he was winning victories. Among them were Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier and Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg. 20 Gerstenmaier had been scientific assistant in the External Ecclesiastical Office of the Evangelical Church since 1936; from the outbreak of war he worked in the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry. Until the western offensive Schulenburg remained as Government Representative (Regierungsprasident) in Silesia, but in May 1940, as a Lieutenant on the Reserve, he reported to the Training Regiment of the famous No 9 (Potsdam) Infantry Regiment, to which four of his brothers had belonged. Schulenburg was then thirty-eight years of age but he reported not, as he said at the time, to spend his war in training recruits but 'to go on active service as soon as I was considered fit for it'. From earlier days he knew many officers in the regiment and soon reached a position in which he could work for a coup; 9 Infantry Regiment would have a vital part to play. At the same time Schulenburg was 'emigrating' into the Army; the imminent dismissal of the Gauleiter, Josef Wagner, would have made his position in Silesia untenable. He joined the regiment on 1 June and remained in the Army until his execution. Gerstenmaier and Schulenburg proposed to assemble a group of officers of about company strength and arrest Hitler in Berlin. If, as expected, resistance was offered, Hitler would be shot. They were never able to approach their vic- tim despite many attempts — they considered, for instance, attacking Hitler during the planned victory parade in Paris but on 20 July 1940 it was finally called off. Postings, official duties and other circumstances invariably stood in their way. Hitler did in fact go to Paris once, on 23 June 1940, but he flew in unannounced very early in the morning, landing at Le Bourget at 5 a.m.; he at once made a tour of the city visiting the Champs-Elys6es, the OpeYa, the Louvre, the Eiffel Tower and the Invalides including Napoleon's tomb; about 8 a.m. he was back at the airfield and flew off to his headquarters 'Tannenberg' near Freudenstadt. In discussion with his aide during the tour Hitler decided against a victory parade. 21 In 1941 a similar plan was worked out by the staff of Field Marshal von Witzleben who was C-in-C West with headquarters in Saint-Germain near Paris until March 1942; being a member of the conspiracy, he was always on the look-out for people prepared to attack Hitler. 22 At this time Captain Graf von Waldersee, operations officer on the staff of the Commandant of Paris, was ready to do it, as were Major Hans-Alexander von Voss and Captain Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, both of Witzleben's staff. 23 Goerdeler and Hassell were heavily involved since both were invariably trying to goad Witzleben into action. In January 1941 Hassell visited General Otto von 259 Assassination Attempts 1933-42 Stiilpnagel, the Military Commander France, but he seemed in no way equal to the situation and was in fact relieved at the end of that month. 24 Goerdeler was in Paris several times in 1941 and on each occasion sought out Graf Waldersee and implored him to do something. 25 Waldersee assured him that Hitler would be arrested or killed as soon as he set foot in Paris; the necessary steps only had to be taken in Berlin and everything in Paris was ready. In May 1941 a parade of German divisions down the Champs-Elys6es was planned. Supposedly the troops had already been assembled and a saluting base had been set up near the Place de la Concorde; Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was coming to Paris anyway and it was expected that Hitler would be present. 26 Hitler was to be shot by two designated officers while at the saluting base. Graf Schwerin, Witzleben's aide, had also pledged himself to throw a bomb at Hitler if opportunity offered, perhaps from a hotel balcony. But Hitler did not come. 27 Meanwhile, in April the Jugoslav and Greek campaigns had begun; on 10 May Hess flew to England and on 22 June the war against Russia began. In 1942 an attempt was made to produce another plan to kill Hitler during a visit to Paris but it was not possible to persuade him to come. On this occasion Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Witzleben's successor as C-in-C West, was in- volved together with SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Hans-Victor von Salviati and Major Achim Oster. 28 Prospects of success were very meagre, however; a sharp watch was being kept. In March 1942 the Gestapo and Customs Service were hunting for two Montenegrins named lovan Kovacevis and lovan Vukovic who had allegedly been recruited by 'England' as 'fanatical elements' for attacks on 'highly- placed European personalities'. Early in May Hitler was warned by the RSHA of a murderous attack planned on him; it was to be made by 'an Austrian officer' who was either a Major or Lieutenant-Colonel, so an 'informer' had told the RSHA; he was of 'non-Aryan origin' and had served in the Austrian Army. He proposed to go to the Fuhrer's headquarters as a courier and there shoot Hitler. He was backed by 'Jewish-bolshevist agents working hand in glove with the English Secret Service'. 29 In those days Hitler was continually referring to assassination attempts, both past and potential; on 27 May Heydrich fell victim to the well-known attack. All this was no encouragement to Hitler to pay visits to the front, particularly if announced beforehand. 260 PART VII/TRESCKOW AND ARMY GROUP CENTRE This page intentionally left blank 31 Preparations Not only Brauchitsch and Haider but also many other generals who had previously been in close touch with the opposition or had belonged to it, had increasingly taken refuge in strict military duty. They shut their eyes even to what they were forced to see and know — the daily shootings in hundreds, primarily in German-occupied Poland, of Jews, doctors, professors, writers, architects, engineers, librarians, teachers, communists and alleged partisans or gipsies. Colonel-General Blaskowitz's courageous protest in late 1939 awoke no echoes; in the spring Brauchitsch and Haider accepted Hitler's removal of the SS and Police units, in particular the so-called Einsatzgruppen (action groups) from the jurisdiction of the Army, which had had full authori- ty in the occupied areas. 1 So the Army was enabled to stand aloof from 'these things'. 2 Acquiescence in this sort of 'division of powers' was monstrous enough. When, however, in the spring of 1941 Hitler broke this agreement and issued the notorious 'Commissar Order', Brauchitsch and Haider still remained at their posts. The so-called 'Commissar Order', issued from the Fiihrer's headquarters, carried the date of 6 June 1941 and was authenticated by the Chief of OKW. It was entitled 'General instructions on the treatment of Political Commissars' and its preamble included this: 'You are requested to limit distribution to the Commanders of Armies or Air Fleets [air force territorial commands] and to arrange for further communication to lower commands by word of mouth.' 3 A key sentence in the instructions ran: 'In the struggle against bolshevism, we must not assume that the enemy's conduct will be based on principles of humanity or of international law.' This did not come very well from men who were guilty of or had tolerated the gruesome crimes in Poland, quite apart from the fact that they had initiated the war against bolshevism of their own free will. The order continued: 'Political commissars have initiated barbaric, Asiatic methods of warfare. Consequently they will be dealt with immediately and with maximum severity. As a matter of principle they will be shot at once, whether captured during operations or otherwise showing resistance. The following regulations will apply: ... on capture they will be immediately separated from other prisoners on the field of battle . .. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated.' Apart from some feeble protests Brauchitsch and Haider accepted even this without demur. The criminal nature of the Commissar Order was clear; it 263 Tresckow and Army Group Centre flew in the face of everything connected with European civilization, irrespec- tive of whether Red Army Political Commissars were accorded prisoner of war status or not. They were quite simply to be murdered. No attempt was to be made - the instructions are quite clear on this point - to establish or prove individual guilt for war crimes or other offences before they were 'liquidated'. Nevertheless Brauchitsch and Haider did mitigate the effect of the Commissar Order by a special army order stressing that the duty of the troops was fighting and that this would usually allow no time for special search or mopping-up operations; under no circumstances were individual soldiers to act arbitrarily; they must always act under the orders of an officer. 4 The two most senior officers of the Army, therefore, remained at their posts with the praiseworthy intention of 'preventing something worse'. They un- doubtedly saved thousands of lives in that by their attitude, their comments and their supplementary orders they made it clear that strict execution of criminal instructions was not desired. Nevertheless the question arises how much evil a responsible senior officer should do in order to prevent something worse. Participation in crime, even in the hope perhaps of sabotaging it, is always questionable. In any case this could only be done with the cooperation of those more junior generals who were candidates for the succession. That being so, the contention that after the resignation of Brauchitsch and Haider no one would oppose crime, is not valid. Insubordination may not have been in the make-up of men like Brauchitsch and Haider — but no more was the execution or toleration of criminal orders. Nevertheless there was widespread indignation in the Army over the crimes committed by the SS in the occupied territories and over the Commissar Order which turned many soldiers into accomplices. Enthusiasm for the regime declined in many circles. At the same time the will to resistance grew — by no means everywhere but at least in many important staffs and headquarters. This, be it noted, was at a time when Hitler was still scoring major victories and his advance seemed irresistible. The initial impetus to resistance did not come from the defeats of 1942 and later, although they largely contributed to the obliteration of the prestige which Hitler had won through his military vic- tories. 5 Gradually there formed groups of resistance - to the Commissar Order, to atrocities, to the regime in general. Such centres of resistance already existed in Berlin and Paris; now they appeared on the eastern front as well. By far the most active was a group in headquarters Army Group Centre. Army Group Centre was the descendant of the former Army Group 2. On 1 September 1939, as Army Group North, it advanced into Poland under Colonel-General (later Field Marshal) Fedor von Bock; on 5 October 1939 it was rechristened Army Group B and transferred to the western front where it took part in the French campaign. In September 1940 it returned to Poland; its headquarters was in Poznan. 6 On 1 April 1941, in preparation for the Rus- sian campaign, it was renamed Army Group Centre and in the summer of that year advanced on Moscow. Field Marshal von Bock was still Commander-in- Chief; Major-General Hans von Greiffenberg was Chief of Staff and the senior operations officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Henning von Tresckow. 7 264 Preparations Tresckow came of an old Prussian officer family; in 1918 he was a platoon commander. Then he travelled for a bank, going round the world; in 1924 he rejoined the Reichswehr, sponsored by Hindenburg. His original unit was the 1st Prussian Regiment of Foot Guards; from 1936 he served in the famous 9 Infantry Regiment, dubbed 'I.R. von 9' by the malicious. He attended the Staff College as a Captain in 1932 and joined the General Staff of the Army in 1936. 8 During the war he was considered by his superiors to be an outstan- dingly capable officer, far above average, very hard-working and exceptionally capable of taking decisions. 9 Tresckow could not abide anything mean or un- just and there was plenty of both under Hitler's regime; over the years his op- position became more deep-rooted. In the summer of 1939 he told Fabian von Schlabrendorff that 'both duty and honour demand from us that we should do our best to bring about the downfall of Hitler and National-Socialism in order to save Germany and Europe from barbarism'. 10 Ever since Hitler's intention to attack Russia had become clear Tresckow had set about methodically assembling on to the staff of Army Group Centre men who would help to turn it into an instrument for a coup. He assumed that Germany would be rapidly defeated in Russia and that this would materially assist his plans; in this he found himself sadly disappointed, as he had been over the French campaign. Hitler's order of December 1941 that the front was to be held at all costs prevented a catastrophic retreat of colossal proportions and so concealed the seriousness of the strategic situation. 11 Among the conspirators in Army Group Centre upon whom Tresckow could count without more ado was Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) Georg Schulze-Buttger, Tresckow's Operations Officer from December 1941 to end February 1943; he had been Beck's aide from August to October 1938. 12 At the end of February 1943 he became Senior Operations Officer to Field Marshal von Manstein in Army Group South and was promoted. Tresckow placed considerable hopes in this posting as also in the influence of Stahlberg, Manstein's aide, but owing to Manstein's strictly military attitude they were not realized. In the summer of 1944 Schulze-Buttger became Chief of Staff to 4 Panzer Army. His part in the conspiracy was discovered and he was executed on 13 October 1944. His successor as Operations Officer in Army Group Centre in February 1943 was Lieutenant-Colonel Hans-Alexander von Voss, who had previously been Training Officer with the rank of Major. He had served on the staff of Field Marshal von Witzleben, Commander-in-Chief West, and, as son-in-law to General Joachim von Stiilpnagel, he had good contacts; moreover he also came from 9 Infantry Regiment. Those who knew him invariably emphasized his uprightness of character and his sense of realism. He committed suicide on 8 November 1944. His successor as Training Officer in Army Group Centre was Major Hans-Ulrich von Oertzen who also committed suicide on 21 July 1944 when on the staff of Wehrkreis III, Berlin. 13 A most important member of this group was Army Group Centre's Supply Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Berndt von Kleist who, like Tresckow, came from the 1 st Prussian Regiment of Foot Guards. Schlabrendorff described him as 265 Tresckow and Army Group Centre the essence of nobility and integrity and this was the background to his political attitude. He had lost a leg in the First World War but was now ser- ving again. He did inestimable service by maintaining contact with Goerdeler and other conspirators in Berlin; his personality and far-seeing judgement exercised a decisive influence throughout the circle. Another most important member was Colonel Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff; he was a cavalryman and served as Intelligence Officer to Army Group Centre from April 1941 to February 1944 when he became Chief of Staff to LXXXII Corps; he was posted to Seventh Army at the end of 1944. He was well known for his industry, his tact and his assured, winning manner. Those who knew him could not speak highly enough of his clarity of mind, sureness of judgement, chivalrous attitude, great courage and solid, upright character. 14 Many of the conspirators owe their survival to his circumspec- tion, ability and discretion. The aides to Field Marshal von Bock and, from mid-December 1941 when Bock relinquished his command, to Field Marshal von Kluge had a most im- portant part to play. It was hoped that they would influence their commander and 'keep him on the level'. Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Carl-Hans Graf von Hardenberg and Lieutenant Heinrich Graf von Lehndorff did all they could, but unhappily without success. In June 1942 Lieutenant Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager became Kluge's aide. In January 1943 his brother Georg, who had been awarded the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross and was then a tactics instructor, began, in agreement with Kluge, to form the 'Boeselager' cavalry unit in the area of Army Group Centre; it will be referred to later. One of his assistants in this was Captain Walter Schmidt-Salzmann. Georg Freiherr von Boeselager was killed in action in Poland in late August 1944; he was posthumously promoted Colonel and awarded the Swords to the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross. Others who played a decisive part in the conspiracy in headquarters Army Group Centre were: the lawyer and Reserve Lieutenant Fabian von Schlabrendorff, aide to the head of the Operations Section, and one of the principal liaison officers between the Army Group and the centre of the con- spiracy in Berlin; Major Schach von Wittenau, 3rd aide to the Commander- in-Chief; Lieutenant Graf von Berg, aide to the Chief Signals Officer; Captain Graf von Matuschka; Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Horst Pretzell, operations officer from January 1941 to March 1942 and intelligence officer from March 1942 to February 1943. Kluge's aide from August 1943 was Lieutenant (later Captain) Eberhard von Breitenbuch, who had been aide to Witzleben in 1940; he continued with Field Marshal Ernst Busch who com- manded Army Group Centre from October 1943 to the end of June 1944. 15 Taken as a whole, therefore, the strongest opposition group yet formed was that in headquarters Army Group Centre. This was the aim which Tresckow had pursued from the outset in his personnel policy and he was given much assistance by his friend Rudolf Schmundt, senior Army aide to the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and from October 1942 also head of the Army Personnel Office, who of course had no notion what purpose he was 266 Preparations serving. Tresckow thought that, if the German offensive failed — he thought first of that against France and then of that in Russia — it would be possible to strike against Hitler with some prospects of success. Psychologically he thought it would be impossible to persuade a victorious German Army to act against Hitler. 16 The resistance of Tresckow and his friends to the Commissar Order may be regarded as a prelude to their efforts to overthrow the regime. 17 The Commissar Order reached the field headquarters in June 1941 during preparations for the Russian campaign. 18 It had been preceded by a 'Decree concerning the application of military law in the area of Operation Barbarossa and special measures to be adopted by the troops', dated 13 May 1941, forbid- ding courts martial and summary proceedings. 19 This prescribed that 'guerillas' were to be 'shot down without mercy' on the battlefield or while trying to escape, also that 'all other attacks by enemy civilians against the Wehrmacht, its members or ancillary services' were to be 'crushed immedi- ately by the most stringent measures including summary execution'. Included under 'other attacks' were theft, bribery or suspicious movement. Since suspects were not to be made prisoner, they had to be shot on mere suspicion as they might otherwise continue their alleged activity. At the same time 'ac- tion against enemy civilians taken by members of the Wehrmacht and its an- cillary services' was exempted from disciplinary proceedings; only acts affec- ting the troops and their discipline - unnecessary destruction of habitable 'dwellings' for instance — remained punishable. This was a gruesome order which could be interpreted, like the Commissar Order, as legitimizing crimes committed by members of the German Army; against it, however, could be set Brauchitsch's supplementary order of 24 May 1941. This laid down that the troops' primary task was to move and fight, not to search and mop up; the Fuhrer's decree, it said, applied mainly to serious cases of hostility by enemy civilians; arbitrary action by members of the Army should under all cir- cumstances be prevented. When these instructions were followed in June by the Commissar Order, 'a storm of indignation arose from all senior headquarters'. 20 When the order reached Gersdorff he went at once to Tresckow, who was acting as Chief of Staff that day, and the two then went on to the C-in-C. Tresckow suggested to the Field Marshal that concerted action be taken by the three Army Group Commanders but Bock would do no more then send Gersdorff, the first recipient of the order, by air to see General Eugen Miiller, General on special assignment attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Tresckow's view was that Germany would forfeit her honour if this order were not un- animously rejected and he urged Bock to fly to Hitler himself together with Rundstedt and Leeb. But Bock only replied: 'He'll chuck me out.' 21 Gersdorff was told by Miiller that Brauchitsch had already done all he could against the Commissar Order; he had 'twice been thrown out by Hitler without succeeding in getting this order withdrawn or changed'. 22 Brauchitsch's order of 24 May, Miiller said, was designed to maintain the discipline of the troops and put a spoke in the wheel of the Commissar Order. Gersdorff was unable to speak to Brauchitsch himself since he was not there. When he returned to Poz- 267 Tresckow and Army Group Centre nan to report, Bock was at dinner; he merely said: 'Gentlemen, you see I have made my protest.' 23 For him the subject was closed. In fact the Commissar Order was only partly implemented. Gersdorff and the intelligence officers of other army groups and armies who were primarily responsible, agreed that it should not be carried out. If questions were asked, fake reports on alleged shootings of commissars were rendered to superior headquarters, but in practice no check was made. 24 Finally Bock himself con- tacted other commanders and discussed with Kluge, Weichs and Guderian among others, what should be done. Verbal agreement was reached that corps commanders be told that execution of the orders for restriction of military law and the shooting of commissars was not desired. 25 Nevertheless these orders roused in the minds of decent officers a feeling of abhorrence against Hitler and his murderous minions; they could not remain inactive in face of the shootings of Jews carried out by the SS and Police Einsatzgruppen in the narrow strip behind the combat zone over which army commanders now had no jurisdiction. The head ofEinsatzgruppeB, however, working in Army Group Centre's area (but not under Army Group headquarters) was Arthur Nebe, Director of the Reich Criminal Police, and he had been on the opposition's side ever since 1938. He undoubtedly tried to stop the usual mass executions carried out by the Einsatzgruppen, while in- variably reporting that orders had been completed. He had only gone to Russia against his will, having been persuaded to do so by his friends Oster and Gisevius in order to retain his position in the centre of SS power, so vital for the opposition. He hoped that after a short period of fulfilment of his 'duty', which Himmler also demanded from other senior police officials, he would be able to return to Berlin; he had some idea of what awaited him, whereas his friends had not an inkling. 26 Finally, in the summer of 1942, the Commissar Order officially became inoperative when it had been clearly shown that its effect on the fighting morale of the Red Army was a positive one; final proof was apparently a propaganda manoeuvre when commissars who were taken prisoner or deserted were promised their lives and good treat- ment and an unusually large number of captured commissars was reported. 27 In spite of all this there occurred the horrifying incident of Borissov, of which first Gersdorff and then Tresckow and Bock were told by Graf von Hardenberg. He had flown low over Borissov during the 'action' and he had seen a Latvian SS unit herding together several thousand Jews from the ghetto and murdering them in a most bestial manner. 28 The order presumably had been issued by one of Nebe's SS officers acting for another who was on leave. Nebe was at once informed by headquarters Army Group Centre and im- mediately flew to Borissov himself but by then it was too late. Bock demanded that the SS officer responsible be most severely punished but no one ever heard what happened. Gersdorff was not afraid to write in Army Group Centre's war diary: 'In all the protracted conversations which I have had with officers I have invariably been asked about these shootings of Jews without bringing the question up myself. I have the impression that there is almost universal detestation in the 268 Preparations officer corps for these shootings of Jews, prisoners and commissars, the latter most of all because it increases enemy resistance. These shootings are regarded as a stain on the honour of the German Army and in particular of the German officer corps.' 29 Yet in autumn 1941 a senior officer like Colonel- General Busch, commanding Sixteenth Army in Army Group North, could listen from his hotel to salvos of shots mowing down Jews in Kovno and not be disturbed, merely saying: 'Well, I can't do anything about it; these are political matters which don't interest us, or rather they interest us but we shouldn't do anything. These things don't concern us.' 30 No cases are known in which commanders who protested against such crimes suffered anything worse than removal from their command. In late August or early September General Thomas paid a series of personal visits to army groups trying to initiate preparations for a coup, but the mo- ment was unfavourable. 31 In the spring of 1941 Hassell, Popitz, Goerdeler, Beck, Oster and their circle had hoped that army commanders would refuse to carry out the orders for brutal measures in Russia and that this might bring about the downfall of the regime. 32 But commanders were only prepared to make somewhat half-hearted attempts at evasion as described above and then became completely engrossed in their offensive. The period of mobile warfare was no time for coup d'etat planning; the winter was more suitable. The military victories and the hectic activity at the front and in the staffs were not, however, the only factors standing in the way of the coup. In fact planning, which had been largely in abeyance since the start of the French campaign, was resumed after the eastern offensive opened. 33 Berlin, however, was not yet looking eastwards but still towards the west and Tresckow's group had no real organizational link with the centre in Berlin. Since the beginning of the eastern campaign SchlabrendorfF had been to Berlin several times in order to talk to Oster, from whom he learnt that Witzleben was wondering whether something could not be done against the regime from France. 34 Both in Berlin and on Witzleben's staff, however, peo- ple were uncertain what the attitude of the troops fighting in the east would be. Schlabrendorff could not give an encouraging account of Bock but he did say that Tresckow was still hoping to be able to carry his commander along. 3S This was reported to Witzleben and towards the end of January 1942 he sent Major Hans-Alexander von Voss, who was still on his staff at this time, to Haider to discuss possible measures of coordination. 36 Haider said that he agreed with everything that Witzleben was planning but that he could do nothing himself since he was alone and nobody around him would cooperate. 37 At the end of September 1941 Tresckow sent Schlabrendorff to Berlin to discuss matters with the headquarters of the conspiracy, 'to find out whether opposition was crystallizing at home' and to assure them that in the staff of Army Group Centre 'one' was ready for anything. 38 It would be good, Tresckow said, if one could count on a benevolent attitude from Britain after a change of regime. Armed with this message Schlabrendorff went to Hassell. He could naturally guarantee nothing and could only assure Schlabrendorff that 'a respectable Germany would always have a very considerable chance to 269 get peace and an acceptable peace at that'. Hitler, on the other hand, he said, could certainly get no peace unless Britain and America had been knocked out. 39 This, as Hassell noted, was the first initiative to come from the front and from the Army at all and so constituted an entirely new factor in the op- position. The incident illustrates both the unique character and the revolutionary drive of the group of young officers assembled around Tresckow. After this talk Hassell went on tour to Bucharest, Budapest and Brazza on business for the 'Central European Economic Council'; he returned shortly after the middle of October and saw Popitz, Jessen and Goerdeler. General von Falkenhausen, the Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France, and General Thomas had meanwhile visited Brauchitsch who 'comprehended what beastliness is rampant' and was 'gradually awakening to the fact that a share of the responsibility was his'. It was planned to send Hassell once more to Witzleben via Falkenhausen and fresh hopes were now placed in Brauchitsch and Haider. 40 Contact was established with the 'young circles' centred on Trott, Yorck and Moltke and basic questions concerning a change of system were discussed. Then, on 19 December 1941, after the winter catastrophe in Russia had become obvious and the United States had joined Germany's enemies, came the severe blow of the dismissal of Brauchitsch. Hitler himself took over command of the Army. 41 There was nothing more to be hoped for from Brauchitsch; four years of fruitless effort had ended. In January 1942, as agreed with Popitz, Goerdeler, Beck, Jessen, Planck, Oster and Dohnanyi, Hassell went via Brussels (Falkenhausen) to visit Field Marshal von Witzleben in Paris. On 17 January he had a long talk with Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld and Witzleben and in the evening lectured to the officers of the military administration on 'Lebensraum and Imperialism'. On 19 January he had another meeting with Witzleben, at which Schwerin was again present. 42 They were all agreed on the necessity for the coup, but both the commanders thought Beck's and Goerdeler's proposal, that the coup be in- itiated by a putsch in the west under Witzleben and Falkenhausen, to be Uto- pian. They had not the fighting troops and there were sufficient other reasons against it. The result would be a struggle for power approximating to civil war which the Nazis might easily win through use of their auxiliary forces, their hold on the actual reins of government with its consequent prestige, their pop- ularity and their methods of mass indoctrination. Unless simultaneous action were taken against Hitler himself and his immediate entourage, no putsch had a hope of success. Early in February Hassell reported to Popitz, Jessen, Beck and Planck on his tour, which had in fact been without tangible result. 43 Once more everything was at a standstill. It was learnt that Popitz and Hassell were both under strict surveillance by the SD; for the moment it seemed impossible to do anything against Hitler; Witzleben was seriously ill and was eventually relieved of his command. 44 He retired on 15 March 1942. Admittedly towards the end of March the Beck-Hassell—Oster-Olbricht group decided, with the agreement of Goerdeler and Jessen, that Beck should 270 Tresckow and Army Group Centre Preparations in future hold all the strings of the conspiracy. Beck was officially 'constituted as the headquarters' and from July 1942 Army Group Centre was in perma- nent touch with Beck and Goerdeler through Schlabrendorff. 45 Hassell himself, however, described the prospects for any form of action as very meagre. Expressions such as 'nothing to be done', 'hardly a hope' and 'little to be done' frequently appear in his diary of this period. Tresckow had meanwhile attempted to make use of the shock caused by the winter crisis to persuade his Commander-in-Chief to act against Hitler. But when Bock realized what Tresckow was aiming at he shouted: 'I will not allow the Fuhrer to be attacked. I shall stand before the Fuhrer and defend him against anyone who dares attack him.' 46 As a result Army Group Centre was temporarily out of the running as the focus for a coup and Tresckow had to start from the beginning with Kluge, the new C-in-C who took over on 19 December 1941. 47 Eventually the indefatigable Tresckow succeeded in win- ning him over but it took years of effort and no one other than Tresckow could exert any influence on Kluge. 48 A particular opportunity of exerting pressure on the vacillating Kluge arose when he accepted a gift of 250,000 marks from Hitler in October 1942. 49 It was explained to Kluge that he could only justify his acceptance before history if he could show that his purpose was to remain at his post in order to work for the coup d'etat.™ Schlabrendorff maintained and improved communications to Beck, Goerdeler and Oster, in the process meeting Dohnanyi, Freiherr von Guttenberg and Justus Delbriick of Oster's staff, also Captain Ludwig Gehre and the John brothers. Nevertheless during the hectic period of summer operations any real preparations for a coup were inevitably forced into the background. They could not be resumed until the autumn of 1942 and in the shadow of a fresh, even greater, military catastrophe. 51 In October or November 1942 Goerdeler visited Kluge and Tresckow in Smolensk. 52 In August he had been in Konigsberg and had there talked with Field Marshal von Kuchler, C-in-C Army Group North; on his return to Berlin Schlabrendorff had asked him to go to Smolensk. 53 His talk with Kluge was such a success that the Field Marshal gave certain general assurances and thereafter was regarded as having been won over to the conspiracy. 54 Whenever Kluge wavered Goerdeler and Tresckow succeeded in winning him over again. But in January 1943 Tresckow was forced to communicate to his friends in Berlin a discouraging reply from Kluge to a request for a decision. Captain Hermann Kaiser of Fromm's staff noted in his diary: '1. No participa- tion in any Fiesco operation. 2. Nor in any operation against Pollux [Hitler]. 3. Will not be in the way when action begins.' 55 Towards the end of 1942 or early in 1943 Schlabrendorff met General Olbricht of the AHA (Allgemeines Heeresamt — General Army Office) through the good offices of Captain Her- mann Kaiser who was his permanent contact to Goerdeler. All this eventually led to a meeting in Berlin between Goerdeler, Olbricht and Tresckow, at which Olbricht pledged himself to organize a coup using the Replacement Army in Berlin, Vienna, Cologne and Munich. 56 But even Olbricht had to be 'worked on' constantly, as Tresckow told Captain Kaiser on 6 February 1943: 271 Tresckow and Army Group Centre 'You must do everything to strengthen O[lbricht]'s resolve.' 57 Doubts about Olbricht's ability or will to take the initiative kept recurring. 58 There was still a question whether the main blow against the Nazi centres of power would be struck by the Field Army or the Replacement Army. 59 It was decided to com- promise, certain specialized formations being constituted as raiding parties. 60 It was not until the summer of 1943 that, through the efforts of Stauffenberg, emphasis swung towards use of the Replacement Army. From the end of 1942, however, everyone was agreed on the question of initiation of the coup: under all circumstances this must come from the Field Army. At the time only Tresckow and his group were either able or resolute enough to kill Hitler. 61 Tresckow considered various methods of eliminating Hitler — arrest, shooting by a single assailant or by a group, a raid on the Fuhrer's headquarters. Even after deciding on a certain method he kept the others in mind in an attempt to make use of every sort of opportunity. He felt it impor- tant, however, to have every conceivable assurance that the attack would succeed. Without such assurance the danger to the conspiracy was too great; a single abortive attack might lead to the annihilation of the entire opposition. 62 For these reasons Tresckow decided on a bomb attack. His preference for a bomb had nothing to do with the safety of the assailant; depending on the cir- cumstances, even with a bomb attack he might have to sacrifice himself if he was to succeed. The danger that 'innocent people' might be involved or even killed was greater with a bomb attack than, for instance, attack with a pistol, although even in this case people other than the intended victims might be killed or wounded in the shooting match which would probably ensue. The con- spirators wrestled most seriously with this problem. Men prepared to be the assailant were in any case aware that they would subsequently be labelled as traitors, even if the result of their act was salvation and the end of the war; they knew that in accordance with current laws and ideas they would be com- mitting murder. 63 Tresckow in particular held the view that this must be con- sidered in the light of the magnitude of the task and that this applied both to the sacrifice of the assailant, perhaps of his family, and the danger caused to 'innocent persons'. The object was to save a whole nation, he said, and prevent suffering for millions of human beings; a pistol attack was out of the question owing to the high probability of failure, in which case it would achieve the exact opposite of that intended; there was therefore no alternative between inactivity and non-involvement of the 'innocent* on the one hand and action entailing risk on the other. Eventually the members of the opposition decided - whether or not they had a right to do so - that those who might be endangered could not be con- sidered entirely 'innocent'. Some people will undoubtedly protest violently but they should consider that even the assailants themselves did not think that they were entirely 'innocent', quite apart from their plans for murder and a coup d'etat. Hardly anyone who knew about the Nazi crimes and held his tongue could claim 'innocence'; anyone, for instance, who knew about the Commissar Order and said nothing was morally partially responsible and 272 Preparations anyone who protested in vain and then felt himself innocent was in fact guilty. There was no black and white in this business, only grey, and even the con- spirators felt themselves to be in that category. 64 Certain people had long lived in close proximity to Hitler — his immediate entourage such as Jodl, Keitel, the SS aides, Himmler's and Ribbentrop's liaison officers (from a distance and from outside the many lesser aides hardly made an impression among the mass of SS and Party dignitaries and were not considered by the conspirators). After all that had become known to the outside world about Hitler's way of life and the group with which he was surrounded, the members of the immediate entourage could certainly not call themselves 'white'. The question must re- main problematical but it applies to assassinations and coups d'etat at any time. In the summer of 1942 Tresckow commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Gersdorff, Intelligence Officer of the Army Group, to obtain the equipment suitable for an assassination. The explosive should be of the smallest possible volume with the greatest possible effect, he said; the ignition mechanism must provide for the setting of various time delays but above all it must be silent. 65 Tresckow did not say why he wanted this explosive but Gersdorff understood very well. He went off to the depots maintained by Abwehr Sections I, II and III which were under his orders and in that of Sec- tion II (Sabotage) he found what he was looking for. 66 Gersdorff asked to see all available explosive material and to have some of it demonstrated to him. He hinted that he was thinking about anti-partisan war- fare and wished to equip Russian volunteers serving in 'Front- Reconnaissance Detachment No 103' or the newly formed 'Boeselager' cavalry unit with it. He was shown a small quantity of British plastic explosive which, fastened to a railway line, cut it clean through. In another test with between { and lib of this explosive the turret of a Russian tank was blown off and hurled some twenty yards. Gersdorff said that he wished to show this interesting material to the Field Marshal and collected a specimen of the explosive and detonators after having been shown precisely how to han- dle it. As he was about to go Lieutenant Buchholz, commanding the depot, came running after him and demanded a receipt. On the numerous subsequent occasions when he took some explosive Gersdorff invariably had to sign a receipt. Some of this explosive came from containers dropped by the British for sabotage purposes or for the French resistance and had been discovered through 'radio play-back games' and other methods; some had been captured as a result of the British commando raids on Saint-Nazaire and Dieppe in the summer of 1941. 67 Considerable quantities were stored in ammunition depots in Silesia and many Army agencies, particularly intelligence sections, carried out tests and could then order what they wanted. The explosive taken by Gersdorff was primarily the British 'Plastic C' consisting of 88.3% hexogen and the rest axle grease and other additives to prevent crystallization and hardening. It could be kept for two to three years before becoming hard and crumbly; it could only be used in temperatures bet ween 0° and 40°C; below 0° it became too brittle and above 40° too oily and greasy. This explosive was 273 Tresckow and Army Group Centre used in many tests subsequently carried out in fields near the Dnieper by Tresckow, Schlabrendorff and Gersdorff. The British fuses were the most suitable and of these there were several types. In many of them, on removal of a pin a spring acted on a strip of soft metal until it parted, releasing the firing pin on to the detonator. Others worked by acid: a spring was held under tension by a wire encased in cotton wool and above it was a capsule of acid. If the capsule was crushed the acid es- caped into the cotton wool and after a predetermined time ate through the wire; this released the spring which in turn drove a firing pin on to the detonator causing the explosion. 68 There were fuses with delays of 10, 30, 60 etc. minutes, each marked by different coloured rings. Timings were calculated on a constant temperature of 65° Fahrenheit (18°C). Tables gave the timings anticipated for different temperatures but Tresckow would not rely on them and drew up his own tables after making tests. It proved that at 0°C ignition time was doubled. These British fuses were not only particularly suitable for use with the plastic explosives but they were also completely silent. German fuses of this type were not available; those in use hissed or, with hand grenades for instance, had to be pulled. Tresckow did not feel that he could accept either noise or a conspicuous pulling motion if he was to be sure of success. 69 The possibility of instantaneous silent ignition through an electric battery appears not to have been considered. As the months went by Gersdorff took delivery of several pounds of explosive and hundreds of chemical fuses — each time signing his receipt. From time to time new forms of bomb appeared and were tested for suit- ability. One day during this process the conspirators stumbled upon a small British adhesive mine which seemed to them particularly handy. This little bomb, which was excellent for sabotage purposes, was known by the British as the 'clam'. A black plastic casing, rounded at the corners, was screwed on to a base plate; in the base plate were four recesses housing magnets which, however, did not project above the surface of the plate. 70 The mine was flat and the pencil-shaped fuse was inserted through an opening in the narrow side of the mine and held in place by a clip. The whole thing was about the size of a small thick pocket bible; measurements were 5|" x 2|" x \\". The standard filling for a 'clam' was 55% tetryl and 45% TNT. This explosive was so powerful that a single 'clam' could penetrate a 1" steel plate, twist a railway line or crack a cylinder block. 'Clams' delivered empty were best filled with a plastic explosive known by the British as 'Compound B'; it consisted of 60% hexogen and 40% TNT and its effect was approximately the same. It is almost impossible to foretell the effect of an explosive unless it is used in a completely solid enclosed area, a bunker for instance. The effect may be far greater at a distance of three feet than at four inches or vice versa. The point is what 'blanketing' takes place, in other words what resistance is met by the bullet-shaped explosion wave, also whether the object is to produce a pressure or expansion wave. It can also be that under similar conditions (blanketing, air temperature, flooring) a target which is highly resistant at a 274 Preparations distance of ten yards may be completely demolished at a distance of eight in- ches and completely intact at a distance of three feet. Too great confidence, therefore, could not be placed in these small magnetic mines. It was not certain, for instance, that one of them would be enough not merely to wound but to kill a man in an unblanketed space and at short range. There were therefore obvious limits to experimentation but on the basis of trials success seemed likely enough. In any case it was now proposed to attempt the assassination in an entirely different manner; a demolition charge of four 'clams' was prepared for concealment in Hitler's car; if this did not work, the charge was to be smuggled into his aircraft. The quantity of explosive used would certainly have been fatal in a car since Hitler would have been sitting immediately next to it. In an aircraft the effect would at least have been enough to cause the machine to crash. While Tresckow pursued his preparations for the attempt on the eastern front, the Berlin conspirators were working to create the conditions for the coup d'etat. Olbricht was playing his part, preparing measures to be taken in Berlin, Cologne, Munich and Vienna, of which Berlin was naturally the most important. He proposed to use troops located in Frankfurt on Oder to occupy the eastern half of Berlin. Units of the 'Brandenburg' Division were to be used to cordon off the SS Artillery School near Juterbog, occupy the western half of Berlin and isolate the Fuhrer's headquarters,'Wolfschanze' (Wolf's Lair) near Rastenburg in East Prussia, where Hitler was to be found at the time. 71 The history of the 'Brandenburg' Division was as follows: in mid-October 1939, on orders from Canaris, Captain Theodor von Hippel of Section II of the Abwehr formed 'No 800 Special Construction-training Company' which was expanded into a battalion a month later. The unit was located in Branden- burg on the Havel and its duty was to prepare for 'special operations'. No 1 Company was composed of expatriate Germans originally intended as a reser- voir of informers; this company later became the 'Kurfurst' Regiment. The other companies were stationed at the Quenz estate on the Quenzsee and given general infantry training and special training in sabotage. After the French campaign the battalion was expanded into 'No 800 Special Construction-training Regiment' with No 1 Battalion in Brandenburg and Nos 2 and 3 in Vienna and Aachen, later Diiren. In October 1940 the unit was rechristened the 'Brandenburg' Regiment. At the end of October 1942 it was further expanded into a division directly subordinate to OKW Ausland/'Abwehr and commanded by Colonel Haehling von Lanzenauer. At the turn of the year 1942—43 parts of the division were put into action on threatened sectors of the front in southern Russia where they suffered heavy casualties. Early in 1943 they returned in some disorganization and had to be re-formed. Colonel Haehling was sick and died shortly thereafter. Canaris now looked for a new divisional commander with the necessary qualifications and front-line experience but also likely to be reliable from the opposition's point of view. Oster suggested Colonel Alexander von Pfuhlstein, a man who had shown himself an outstanding regimental commander and had been awarded the Knight's Cross; on 1 February 1943 Oster summoned him 275 Tresckow and Army Group Centre to Berlin. He had numerous talks in his own house with Pfuhlstein, probing and instructing; Pfuhlstein was also on good terms with Olbricht. Oster in- dicated that he was speaking on behalf and with the agreement of Olbricht and Canaris. Jodl wanted to organize the division as an OKW reserve force and in the succeeding period Canaris had only a limited say in its employment. However this did not prevent Oster charging Pfuhlstein to organize the divi- sion as a mobile force specially for use in a coup d'etat. It was to be ready for action by the end of April. Pfuhlstein was given certain officers who were members of the conspiracy, including Captain Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld and Lieutenant-Colonel Heinz. 72 He was officially appointed commander of the 'Brandenburg' Divi- sion on 1 April 1943. 73 According to his own account formation of No IV Regiment in Brandenburg under Heinz was not complete until the end of April. The entire division was under the authority of the OKW Operations Staff, partly because the bottom of the barrel was being scraped for troops to hold the front and partly because in spring 1943 theAbwehr had fallen into dis- favour. 74 While Haehling von Lanzenauer was sick Colonel Lahousen had temporarily commanded the division so that it would have been available for a coup during a critical period in March 1943. What would have happened is, of course, difficult to estimate. There were different opinions about the suitabili- ty of the division, particularly about No IV Regiment which was the unit in question; it contained many volunteers who were supporters of the regime and also some completely unreliable adventurer types. Nevertheless in March Heinz, the regimental commander, stated that it was ready and on call for the conspirators. 75 On the eastern front formation of a special fcoup d'etat force* was con- siderably more successful. As with the 'Brandenburg' Division the first con- sideration was formation of a unit for war and, again like the 'Brandenburg' Division, it was used accordingly. Army Group Centre had formed a 'Cavalry Regiment Centre' and in 1943 and 1944 this was involved in heavy, costly fighting. At the same time it was hoped that by judicious selection of officers and certain organizational measures the unit could be made suitable for use in a coup. The opportunity presented itself at the end of 1942. Lieutenant Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager had been aide to Field Marshal von Kluge since June 1942; his brother Georg was a tactics instructor with the Rumanian troops. During the winter 1942-43 Georg visited his old squadron which was with 6 Infantry Division in Army Group Centre's area and Philipp asked the Field Marshal whether his brother, whom the Field Marshal knew from his Miinster days, might visit Army Group headquarters. Kluge agreed and in- vited Captain Georg Freiherr von Boeselager to accompany him as his aide on a duty flight. During such flights Kluge used to shoot foxes from the air if he had time and opportunity. 76 The weather was bad for flying, however, and Georg von Boeselager spent several days in Army Group headquarters. On several occasions he talked cavalry problems with Tresckow who had not met him before. Boeselager 276 Preparations wanted to withdraw cavalry squadrons from infantry divisions since they were frequently misused and 'burned up', as the saying was, to no good pur- pose ; he wished them to be independent and to be used in their proper role. He was a cavalryman heart and soul and was trying to save the cavalry from the threat of abolition hanging over it. He accordingly proposed to the Field Marshal that a cavalry unit be formed to act as a sort of fire brigade available for mobile operations in the Army Group area, seeing that reserves were in- variably inadequate. Kluge agreed and told Boeselager to discuss details with Tresckow. In discussion with Tresckow Boeselager placed himself un- reservedly at the disposal of the conspiracy. In January 1943 Georg Freiherr von Boeselager was officially appointed to form the 'Boeselager' cavalry unit with the energetic support of Tresckow and of Colonel Stieff, head of the Organization Section in the Army General Staff since late 1942. High-class equipment was provided and a first-rate unit formed consisting of two bat- talions each of five squadrons of 220 men. Some 650 men were Russian cossacks. In late March 1943 Philipp von Boeselager took command of one of the two battalions; on 7 April 1943 Georg Freiherr von Boeselager was ap- pointed commander of 'Cavalry Regiment Centre' which in practice he had been since mid-March. Army Group Centre now had available a highly mobile specialized force whose officers were largely members of the conspiracy or at least 'reliable' people and which had been specially formed for exceptional employment. There was reason to hope that, at the right moment, it could be flown to Berlin and used for the coup. As with the 'Brandenburg' Division, however, people were under no illusions about some of the troops. On 21 May 1943, in reply to a question from Tresckow about the retention of Russian volunteers Boeselager wrote: 'One must realize that these people are only fighting on our side because they are better fed that way. Moreover they hope, if possible, to come out of this war alive.' 77 277 32 Projects of 1943 About the turn of the year 1942-43 something like a sense of catastrophe spread through Germany and in some cases to the front. 1 Stalingrad and the annihilation of Sixth Army were fearful blows, from which the German Army never recovered. At the same time the demand for 'unconditional surrender' was announced from Casablanca implying the abolition not only of the Nazi regime, which was more or less detested in any case, but of German sovereign- ty as a nation. The failure of the opposition's attempts at contact abroad in the spring and summer of 1942 had made the Allied attitude clear; now Germany was faced by it with utter clarity. In this situation, defeat and failure on one side, confidence in victory on the other, a near-revolutionary atmosphere spread in Germany. The demonstration of the Scholl group in Munich University was an expression of this mood, a flash quickly extinguished by the ubiquitous Gestapo and general fear. 2 As already mentioned, about the turn of the year Tresckow had met Georg Freiherr von Boeselager; he had been awarded the Oak Leaves, was known throughout the Army as one of the best pentathlon athletes and early in 1943 committed himself to the opposition. Tresckow now asked whether he thought that he could shoot Hitler at short range with a pistol. This method could only be tried, Tresckow said, if one could be sure of killing with a single shot. A lone assailant's chances of success were small in any case and, moreover, Boeselager was not sure that he had the necessary sangfroid.3 It is one thing to shoot an anonymous enemy and quite another deliberately to kill a man when all the sociological and psychological factors associated with a battle situation are absent. It does not matter who the man is; the point is whether he is an anonymous 'enemy' or a fellow human being, personally recognizable. 4 In any case it was generally thought among the conspirators that, to guard against attempts at assassination, Hitler wore a bullet-proof waistcoat and cap. Tresckow and Gersdorff had been told as much by Schmundt, Hitler's Wehrmacht Adjutant; Gersdorff had once lifted Hitler's cap and had remarked on its extraordinary weight. 5 The next plan, therefore, was that Hitler should be shot by a whole group of officers in the Army Group headquarters mess during a visit to the front which it was hoped to persuade him to make in view of the desperate situation. Cap- tain Schmidt-Salzmann and Colonel von Kleist declared themselves ready to 278 Projects of 1943 do it together with ten officers from No III Battalion of the 'Boeselager' unit which was still in process of formation. Shortly before Hitler's visit, however, the project had to be abandoned because Field Marshal von Kluge, who would inevitably have been present at the time, could not bring himself to accept the idea. He had to be informed so that he might keep himself out of the line of fire. Kluge said that it was not seemly to shoot a man at lunch and there would also be a risk to a number of senior officers (including himself) who would have to be there and could not be spared if the front was to be held. Meanwhile, as efforts to persuade Hitler to visit Army Group Centre in Smolensk continued, the Fuhrer did pay a visit to the headquarters of Army Group Don in Saporozhe. 6 On 17 February 1943 he left his headquarters near Rastenburg in his Focke-Wulf 'Condor' and flew via Vinnitsa to Saporozhe. This was a snap decision and he took off at 2 a.m. He was accompanied among others, some travelling in two further 'Condors', by General Jodl, head of the OKW Operations Staff, and General Zeitzler who had relieved Haider as Chief of Staff of the Army. In Saporozhe Hitler conferred with Manstein. In headquarters Army Group B commanded by Field Marshal Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs, however, it had been hoped that Hitler would go there, in other words to Poltava, where General Hubert Lanz and his Chief of Staff Major-General Hans Speidel were prepared to arrest him. Lanz had been commanding 'Army Detachment Lanz' in the Kharkov area since the end of January; it had been formed after the collapse of the Italian Eighth Army and consisted of the 'Hausser' ss Corps, the ss 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler' under Sepp Dietrich, the ss Division 'Reich' under Keppler, the ss Division 'Totenkopf' under the ex-Inspector of concentration camps SS- Gruppenfuhrer Theodor Eicke, parts of the 'Grossdeutschland' Division un- der Lieutenant-General Walter Hornlein, two other corps, one of which was commanded by Lieutenant-General Erhard Raus, and 24 Panzer Corps. In a late-night briefing conference in 'Wolfschanze' on 26 January Lanz had been instructed by Hitler to hold the area and city of Kharkov against any attack - an almost impossible mission since the strength ratio in the area was 1:4. The next morning, in a snowstorm, Lanz flew to Kharkov, where he found the few available troops in a desperate position. Hitler then held him responsible for the catastrophic situation and its subsequent developments, although he could hardly exert any influence on them at all. His only available reserve was the 'Grossdeutschland' Panzer Regiment under Colonel Graf von Strachwitz in the Poltava area. While Strachwitz was in hospital recovering from a wound received at Stalingrad he was told by Colonel Wessel Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven of the crimes committed by the SS behind the German lines. From the beginning of 1942, Strachwitz had become more and more convinced that Hitler must be removed from the military and political leadership of Ger- many. On 8 February Strachwitz discussed the employment of his regiment with General Speidel, who asked him what he thought of the situation; Strachwitz replied that, if everything people said was true, then Hitler must go. Speidel said that he thought so too. The same evening General Lanz sum- 279 Tresckow and Army Group Centre moned Strachwitz; he had meanwhile been told of Strachwitz's views by Speidel and now asked him to repeat what he had said to Speidel. This first talk between Lanz and Strachwitz took place in the village of Valki between Kharkov and Poltava, where the Army Detachment's headquarters were located. In this hopeless military situation, in which Hitler was in effect demanding that entire armies sacrifice themselves, Lanz and Strachwitz soon found that their views were identical on the high command in general and Hitler in particular - in short they agreed that Hitler was a criminal and must be removed. This was the origin of the 'Lanz Plan'. Through Dr Strolin, burgomaster of Stuttgart, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commanding the ' Afrika Korps', was informed of the plan, though in fact he could hardly have made much contribution to its success. Strachwitz repeatedly assured his partners that he could rely totally on his tank regiment. It was accordingly decided that Hitler should be arrested by selected sections of the regiment under the personal leadership of Strachwitz, if possible on landing in Poltava or alternatively during a conference in the headquarters. The situation being what it was, the unit could easily be moved over the comparatively short distance necessary without attracting attention; troops were always on the move to and fro. Weapons were only to be used 'in the event of serious resistance' according to Lanz or 'if it came to a fight' according to Strachwitz. Both were to be reckoned with, however, since Hitler was invariably accompanied by members of the Reichssicherheitsdienst (RSD, police bodyguard in ss uniforms), his personal SS Escort (SS-Begleitkommando), and officers of OKW; the Operations Staff and aides were usually present. Assassination was not, therefore, intended but its possibility was accepted; under the cir- cumstances and according to current ideas this would not have amounted to sheer murder. Undoubtedly, however, the soldiers would have preferred to arrest Hitler if at all possible. Strachwitz then proposed to hand him over to Kluge. On 17 February, when Hitler made his sudden visit to the front, however, Army Group B and Field Marshal von Weichs had already moved from Poltava and Hitler visited Saporozhe instead of Poltava. On the third day of his visit he ran into a highly dangerous situation, although in this case the op- position had nothing to do with it. Russian tanks were driving along the road to Saporozhe which ran alongside the airfield, and were only two hours away while Hitler was still in the town. 7 Baur, his pilot, drove into town forthwith to urge him to hurry and, as the three 'Condors' took off, the Russians had already reached the eastern end of the airfield, where, however, they took up positions in a kolkhoz. As Hitler and his entourage flew off two six-engined German 'Giants' came in carrying anti-tank guns, of which there were none in Saporozhe. The Russians had not attacked the airfield because they had run out of fuel. Meanwhile preparations had been proceeding in Berlin; Schlabrendorff had been there again in February. 8 But the measures were not yet fully decided. Olbricht hoped to be ready by 1 March but Pfuhlstein thought that it would be 280 Projects of 1943 April. Captain Kaiser noted in his diary after a conversation with Schlabren- dorff on 19 February: 'Deadline 1 March 43'. 9 Dr Gisevius spent many days in January and February 1943 in an office in Bendlerstrasse that Olbricht had made available to him and revised the old 1938 plans. 10 New data on the loca- tion of SS garrisons were procured, liaison was established with police commanders and, tentatively, with some field marshals. It made little sense now to wait, if an opportunity presented itself. To a certain extent all was, in fact, ready; postings and other developments could always upset the best-laid plans; much would have to be improvised in any case. At the end of 1942 Olbricht had told Tresckow that he wanted eight more weeks. When these were up, Schlabrendorff had a talk with Olbricht who said to him: 'We are ready; it is time for the flash.' 1 ' This was at the end of February. Naturally it was true only within the limits indicated above. There had been a discussion, for instance, of the question how to cut all communications to the outside world from 'Wolfschanze', the Fuhrer's headquarters, which also housed the whole of OKW and its Operations Staff when Hitler was there; General Fellgiebel, the Wehrmacht Chief Signals Officer, said quite rightly that few preparations could be made since it would be necessary to occupy the repeater stations and trunk exchanges. Without ensuring the assistance of the Post Office no preparations could be made; in this case, therefore, 'action' could only be taken when the 'flash' had taken place. 12 A certain degree of coordination and agreement, however, between the focus of action on the eastern front and headquarters in Berlin, was essential. For this purpose, on 7 March 1943, Canaris flew to Smolensk with a con- siderable staff on pretext of holding a general intelligence conference. He brought with him Major-General Oster, head of his Coordination Section, Colonel Lahousen, head of Section II, his special assistant, Dr von Dohnanyi - and a box of explosive. 13 This was handed over by Gersdorff to Section II of the Abwehr Detachment. 14 Tresckow and Dohnanyi talked late into the night and agreed on a code to coordinate measures taken by the Berlin group and that at the front. Tresckow declared that the 'flash' would take place at the next available opportunity and accepted an assurance that all necessary preparations for the coup had been made in Berlin. So eventually Hitler arrived in Smolensk on 13 March 1943 on his way back to East Prussia from Vinnitsa. The situation at the front was so precarious and his anxiety on this score so great that he was prepared to make the journey in spite of his fright at Saporozhe. 15 He wished to discuss the Kursk offensive, both pros and cons, and, as for his visit to Saporozhe, brought with him Generals Jodl and Zeitzler together with his RSD and SS escort, doctors, photographers, aides, Party dignitaries, his personal cook and his driver. Hitler and his entourage again arrived in three 'Condors'; immediately on landing at Smolensk airfield he drove to headquarters Army Group Centre nearby. 16 Kluge and Tresckow had gone to the airfield to meet Hitler; he did not use an Army Group vehicle, however, but departed in his own car driven by his personal driver, Erich Kempka. During the war four motorcades were stationed at various points in Germany, in the west, on the eastern front (at 281 Tresckow and Army Group Centre this time in Vinnitsa); they were moved as necessary wherever Hitler might need them. Other security measures were very comprehensive. Rail traffic on a section of line which crossed the road between the airfield and the headquarters was halted for the duration of the visit. Wherever Hitler went SS men with sub-machine-guns at the ready were to be seen. 17 These security measures were offset by Lieutenant-Colonel von Boeselager who deployed a group of officers and non-commissioned officers from Cavalry Regiment Centre willing to assassinate Hitler. 18 Several squadrons of Boeselager's regiment were used on that day to set up a wide security cordon around the headquarters of Army Group Centre. No. 1 Squadron under Major Konig had to guard the road from the airfield to the forest in which the headquarters buildings were situated; from the edge of the forest the visitors and their hosts proceeded on foot, and this path was also lined by men from No. 1 Squadron with sub-machine-guns. Some of these, who were led by Major Konig personally, were collectively to shoot Hitler as he walked back to his car. It is not clear why the plan was not carried out, although Konig hinted a few weeks afterwards that Hitler had not followed the path originally planned. This is not unlikely; Hitler himself claimed that this sort of thing was an effective security precaution. 19 It is also possible that Tresckow considered an attempt with explosives more promising and less incriminating for the Army. A conference was then held at which in addition to Hitler, there were pre- sent Jodl, Zeitzler, Schmundt and others of the entourage, Kluge and Com- manders of Armies included in the Army Group, with their Chiefs of Staff. Following this came lunch in the Army Group headquarters mess. According to the earlier plan Hitler was to be shot during this lunch and this would have been perfectly possible, though the others present would have been in some danger. During lunch Tresckow asked Lieutenant-Colonel Heinz Brandt of the OKH Operations Section, who was accompanying Hitler, to take a package for Colonel Stieff in OKH; Brandt willingly agreed since there was nothing unusual in this. 20 The package to be carried by Lieutenant-Colonel Brandt, however, was to contain a live bomb. That morning, in accordance with the agreement reached with Dohnanyi on 7 March, Schlabrendorff had called Captain Ludwig Gehre, a member of the Abzvehr in Berlin, and given him the codeword indicating that the 'flash' was imminent. After lunch Kluge and Tresckow once more accompanied Hitler and his entourage to the airfield and this time Schlabrendorff followed with the package of explosive. He waited until Hitler was about to board his aircraft, activated the fuse by pressing the acid capsule through the wrapping with a key and, on a signal from Tresckow, passed the package to Lieutenant- Colonel Brandt who boarded the same aircraft as Hitler. After all three 'Con- dors' had taken off with their fighter escort, Schlabrendorff hurried back to the headquarters and called Gehre again; this time he gave the codeword meaning that the 'flash' had been sparked off. Gehre passed the information to Oster via Dohnanyi. The 'bomb' constructed by Tresckow consisted of two pairs of British 282 Projects of 1943 'clams' held together by their own magnets and also bound round with adhesive tape. Wrapped up, they could pass for two bottles of Cointreau. The fuse was set for thirty minutes and it was thought that the aircraft would crash after 125—150 miles, shortly before reaching Minsk. Hitler in fact flew first to Vinnitsa and thence to Rastenburg so that the crash might have been expected before he overflew Kiev. A few hours later, however, those waiting in Smolensk heard that he had landed in Rastenburg. 2 ' Schlabrendorff at once called Genre yet again and gave him the codeword for failure of the attempt. He then discussed with Tresckow how to save the situation. The first consideration was to lay hands on the package again somehow before a catastrophe occurred; no one could tell whether it might not still explode and Stieff, its addressee, knew nothing at all. Tresckow therefore called Lieutenant-Colonel Brandt and asked him to keep the package, saying that there had been a mix-up. Next morning Schlabrendorff flew by normal courier aircraft to East Prussia, went to see Brandt in OKH's camp 'Mauerwald' and exchanged the package for one really containing Coin- treau. Then he took the bomb into his sleeping compartment in a train in Korschen siding which served as overnight accommodation for visitors and carefully opened the package with a razor blade. 22 He found that the fuse had functioned correctly up to the moment when the acid had eaten through the wire and released the striker on to the detonator which should have set off the explosion; the striker had struck correctly, the detonator cap was burnt and the detonator black on the outside. But the explosive had not ignited, probably due to the excessive cold. 23 Schlabrendorff kept the 'clams' and took the night train to Berlin where he arrived on the morning of 15 March. He went at once to Gehre and Oster and showed them the detonator. The disappointment of all those involved was great; all the dangers and nervous tension associated with keeping and transporting explosives in so mysterious and clandestine a manner and in close proximity to Hitler had been in vain. Already, however, they were thinking of some fresh occasion. In a few days time the ceremony of 'Heroes Memorial Day' was due to take place; this year it was to be held on 21 March, not around the 15th as usual. On 14 March, two days before the date proposed, Hitler had postponed the oc- casion to the 21st. He hoped that some visible victory would be won on the eastern front meanwhile, as in fact happened with the recapture of Kharkov by SS troops. Colonel Freiherr von Gersdorff had a chance to be present at the 1943 ceremony and, when asked by Tresckow, he declared himself ready to use it to make an assassination attempt. 24 He had to be prepared to blow himself up with Hitler; he had been a widower since January 1942 and, in view of the object, his own life did not seem to him too great a sacrifice. Naturally he wished to know whether, if the attempt succeeded, the coup d'etat would proceed according to plan. The sacrifice of his own life must serve some pur- pose and be justifiable before history. Tresckow assured him that a fully prepared organization existed which would 'swing into action'; agreements 283 Tresckow and Army Group Centre had been concluded with the Western Powers for a separate surrender in the west, while the eastern front would be held in order to safeguard the existence of the German Reich and ensure that a democratic form of government was set up. Gersdorff s opportunity to be present at this annual ceremony arose from the fact that on this occasion it was to be coupled with an exhibition of cap- tured war material to be provided by Army Group Centre and organized by Gersdorff s Intelligence section. Gersdorff therefore had an excellent pretext for being present in order to explain the various exhibits to Hitler when he made his opening visit. Gersdorff having declared himself ready to make the attempt, Schlabrendorff was told by Tresckow to remain in Berlin and, when Gersdorff arrived, hand him the British 'clams' which remained 'over' from the last attempt. On 20 March Gersdorff flew to Berlin with Field Marshal Walter Model, Commander-in-Chief Ninth Army; the Heroes Memorial ceremony was due to take place next day. Hitler had actually wished Kluge to be present and he would have come as well. Tresckow's group, however, felt that they could not spare him since they placed great hopes on his collaboration after Hitler's death and he would have been in considerable danger during the assassination attempt. With great difficulty they dissuaded him from going and they had even more difficulty with Frau von Kluge. They could not possibly tell Kluge that an attempt was planned since, owing to his oath of allegiance which he took very seriously, he might have felt compelled to report the fact. Model wanted to go on to Dresden on the 20th to see his wife and only return to Berlin the next morning. This meant, however, that he must know as accurately as possible when the ceremony would begin. Model and Gersdorff therefore went to Schmundt who had also arrived in Berlin on the 20th with Hitler and the usual entourage. Here two major difficulties presented themselves at once. In the first place Schmundt was not willing to say when the ceremony would start or how it was intended to proceed. This was remarkable and in- dicated that special security precautions were being taken. In recent years the ceremony had always opened with Hitler's arrival at the same time, on the stroke of midday. When Model pressed Schmundt he revealed the timetable on pain of the strictest secrecy and with repeated references to 'the death sentence'. Schmundt and Gersdorff were old friends even though Schmundt had some suspicion that Gersdorff and also Tresckow, of whom he was an even older friend, did not love the Fuhrer anything like as much as he did. In any case, in this instance he overcame his scruples. From what he said it could be inferred that about half an hour had been allotted for Hitler's visit to the exhibition. The second difficulty arose when Schmundt said that the list of those atten- ding the visit to the exhibition had been drawn up in detail and that under no circumstances could Gersdorff be there. Here Field Marshal Model came to GersdorfFs assistance — without of course realizing that he was assisting an attempt at assassination. He insisted that Gersdorff must be there since he, 284 Projects of 1943 Model, would be highly embarrassed if he was unable to answer a question from Hitler about one of the exhibits. Gersdorff, he said, must definitely be at his side and available to explain. After much hesitation Schmundt once more gave way. The normal programme of the ceremony, which took place in the Unter den Linden Armoury, now a museum, was this: Hitler drove from the Reich Chancellery via the Wilhelmstrasse and Unter den Linden, both of which were lined, to the museum where he would arrive at midday. He was received at the entrance by the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services (only two from the end of 1942 since Hitler himself had taken over command of the Army) and by the Chief of OKW. From the entrance he went through lines of war-wounded into the great hall of the museum where he took the first chair in the front row immediately to the right of the centre gangway. To his right, in order, sat Field Marshal Freiherr von Bohm-Ermolli representing the Imperial Army, then Donitz and Goring, Keitel, General (retd) Reinhard, Head of the ex-Servicemen's Association, and SA-Obergruppenfuhrer Oberlindober, Leader of the War-Wounded. The hall was decked with flags and an orchestra played solemn music. Hitler then made his usual speech and the national anthem was played. Then the guard battalion, the official guests, the war-wounded and the standards took up position in front of the memorial. While all this was happening, in order to occupy the ten minutes or so required for the move from indoors into the open, Hitler would visit an exhibi- tion arranged for the purpose in the side-rooms of the museum. On a special signal Hitler would leave the exhibition and emerge through the main en- trance with a small following of Reich dignitaries, inspect the guard battalion and lay a wreath on the memorial. The guard battalion then had to move off to form up for the march-past, which entailed another pause of some five minutes, during which Hitler conversed with the war-wounded of the First and Second World Wars. After the march-past (two minutes) Hitler drove back to the Chancellery; the rest of the company dispersed and departed. During the afternoon Gersdorff examined the inside of the museum and checked 'his' exhibition. At the same time he looked for possibilities of con- cealing a bomb and was forced to admit that there were none. The only place where Hitler would certainly be a target, where he would be for a sufficient length of time in other words, was the speaker's rostrum. The great hall of the museum, however, was large, high and roofed with glass; the blanketing effect would be far too little for a comparatively small bomb and there was no way of either obtaining or concealing a large one. Moreover GersdorfFs information about the timetable was not sufficiently precise to enable him to set a time fuse. Finally that afternoon the museum was full of workmen laying out chairs and setting up staging and the whole place was so closely watched by uniformed and plain clothes SS men and police that there could be no question of concealing a bomb. Even had he succeeded in doing so, it would have had to be fused the next day before Hitler's arrival and this was even less possible. Gersdorff could therefore only make his attempt during Hitler's inspection of the exhibition because only then could he be sure of being close to Hitler for a 285 Tresckow and Army Group Centre sufficient length of time. A pistol attack had not been seriously considered for the reasons we already know, so there was no question of anything other than a bomb. This, as Gersdorff knew from Tresckow, Schlabrendorff had in his possession from the last time. During the night 20-21 March Schlabrendorff took the British 'clams' to Gersdorff in the 'Eden' hotel, but major difficulties then arose in finding a suitable fuse. The type used for the 13 March attempt was out of the question. In the first place it had a 30-minute delay and secondly it had not functioned. The best would have been an instantaneous fuse but in the time available none could be found which fitted the 'clam'. Both Schlabrendorff and Gersdorff tried to obtain other fuses through Oster; Gersdorff had brought along from Smolensk some fuses with a 10-minute delay in the hope of finding cir- cumstances favourable for an attempt relying on such a time-span; Schlabren- dorff had been in touch with Oster about this problem before Gersdorff s arrival. Explosives experts who served in the German Army in the Second World War say that German pioneer explosives in 100 gram or 200 gram slabs could have been procured easily, and fuses to fit them as well. 25 But the fuses would have to be activated by a pull, and such a conspicuous motion seemed to be a serious danger for the success of the attack (although Axel Freiherr von dem Bussche was of another opinion, as will be seen below). The German fuses also did not fit the 'clams'. In short, the difficulties in procuring exactly the right kind of explosives and fuses for the opportunity at hand seemed in- superable to the conspirators in their situation at the time. Even enquiries had to be made with extraordinary caution, particularly so soon before one of Hitler's rare public appearances. Even at the front, where partisans had to be fought and sabotage squads equipped, Gersdorff had not found it easy to obtain explosives and detonators; for Oster, tied to his desk, it was far more difficult, quite apart from the security precautions which were very tight. It was not easy to produce a plausible explanation of a general's need for fuses. The great difficulty, however, was that there were no fuses which would fit into the British 'clam' giving a delay of less than 10 minutes. The fuse of the German hand grenade gave a delay of 4\ seconds but, even accepting its hissing noise, it would not fit into the 'clam' any better than any other German fuse, as comparison of the measurements shows. The attempt had to be made with the 10-minute fuses which Gersdorff had brought with him. The museum was unheated but Gersdorff hoped that the low temperature would be compensated by his body heat through the pockets of his greatcoat so that the delay would, at worst, be only a little over 10 minutes. On 21 March Gersdorff went to the Unter den Linden museum about mid- day. From what Schmundt had said the ceremony was due to begin about 1 p.m. though this was only made known to the general company at the last mo- ment. In contrast to previous years the Vblkischer Beobachter did not even publish the timing afterwards. 26 In the great hall of the museum the orchestra was in place together with twenty-seven flags of the Imperial Army, three of the Imperial Navy and thirty of the new Wehrmacht and Waff en-SS. 286 Projects of 1943 Representatives of the Army, Navy, Luftwaffe and Waffen-SSwere assembled together with three hundred war-wounded; numerous generals, admirals, ministers, Party dignitaries and state secretaries were also present. Hitler drove up to the front of the museum in his open Mercedes, got out and greeted at the main entrance Reich Marshal Goring, Field Marshal Keitel, Grand Ad- miral Donitz, Himmler the Reichsfuhrer—SS, Field Marshal von Bock, Field Marshal Milch and Oberlindober, head of the War-Wounded Association; he was accompanied by Goebbels. All then went into the great hall and took their places in the front row. The orchestra played the first movement of Bruckner's Seventh Symphony and Hitler made his speech, lasting 12—14 minutes. Its theme was: 'The danger has now been averted.' Kharkov had been recaptured on 14 March and Sepp Dietrich had been awarded the Swords to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oakleaves; the crisis had been overcome and now at last he, Hitler, could leave his headquarters for a few moments, although his duties at the front had necessitated the postponement of Heroes Memorial Day. Now, however, vic- tory was assured over bolshevism, capitalism, the hordes of Asiatic barbarians and the criminal warmongers, Churchill and the Jews. Hitler then moved away to inspect the exhibition. His speech had been exceptionally rapid and short, as even the monitoring service of the BBC noted. The entire ceremony was broadcast over all German stations including the Forces networks throughout Europe, so that Tresckow in Army Group Centre could follow the proceedings on the radio. Gersdorff had stationed himself meanwhile near the entrance to the exhibition. 27 He could not know how long Hitler would speak nor how great a pause there would be between the speech and the visit to the exhibition, otherwise he would have fused his bombs beforehand; he had one in each greatcoat pocket. Field Marshal Model and a director of the museum 28 were with him at the entrance to the exhibition. Hitler approached; Gersdorff, Model and the museum director gave the Hitler salute with the right arm, Gersdorff keeping his left hand in his greatcoat pocket and squeezing the cap- sule of the fuse. He did not press the fuse of the bomb in his right-hand pocket to avoid arousing suspicion by too many movements; on one occasion, when visiting Hitler, a fellow-officer's arm had been seized by an SS man when he was merely trying to take out his handkerchief. 29 He also thought that, being so close, the left-hand bomb would set off the other. Gersdorffhad had only a superficial impression of the presence of SS uniforms everywhere he looked when he had inspected the exhibition the day before. In fact security precautions were far more elaborate than Gersdorff ever suspected. Twenty-four hours a day during a specified period before, during and after Hitler's announced public appearances, all sites and approach routes were under close surveillance by hundreds of Gestapo and other police agents, preventive arrests were made, building experts and watchmakers, electricians and explosives specialists had searched for hidden devices, and elaborate procedures of admission to the sensitive areas were in force. All security precautions, while under the general direction of ss and police chiefs, were 287 Tresckow and Army Group Centre subject to review and modification by SS-Gruppenfiihrer Hans Rattenhuber, Hitler's personal security chief, and sudden and unannounced changes often added to security by unpredictability. But only a search of the persons of all those admitted to the Armoury on 21 March 1943 could have prevented Gersdorff's assassination attempt. If it was technically feasible in itself, the attempt of an insider such as Gersdorff had every chance of success. As Hitler reached the entrance of the exhibition rooms with his small following - Goring, Keitel, Donitz, Himmler, a few aides and bodyguards - he turned and asked Field Marshal von Bock to accompany him - to Gersdorff's consternation; Bock was accompanied by his aide Graf von Hardenberg who was a friend of Gersdorff, belonged to the resistance movement but had no knowledge that an assassination attempt was under way. Once Hitler had entered, Gersdorff tried to keep as close to him as possible, which he could do without attracting attention since in a sense it was his duty. Then something remarkable occurred: Hitler stopped nowhere; he literally ran through the exhibition, not even glancing at the objects displayed. Model and Gersdorff tried to show him and explain this or that exhibit but in vain. Goring then took a hand and began to tell Hitler of a proclamation by the Patriarch of Moscow, showing once more how the churches were anti-Hitler and so forth. Even this favourite subject, however, failed to interest the Fuhrer. If anyone says that Hitler must have had some presentiment or 'smell' of danger, this need not be brushed aside as ridiculous. Men who live so much on their emotions and so dangerously as Hitler do not possess supernatural qualities as a result but their senses are highly perceptive and sharp. The possibility that Hitler sensed Gersdorff s nervousness and took warning from it is not so far-fetched. It is sufficient, however, merely to establish the facts of what happened. Hitler cannot have spent more than two minutes in the exhibition. The an- nouncer reported his emergence from the museum with surprise; those responsible for the arrangements were taken aback and the programme became somewhat confused. Listeners on the radio noticed, as did the BBC monitoring service which noted the incident and the words of the announcer: ' "The Fuhrer goes into the Exhibition. We shall come back to report on the placing of the wreath on the Memorial." Interval of a few seconds [sic]; shouting of orders; drums. At the Memorial in Unter den Linden we hear again orders shouted. Reporter says: "The Fuhrer has left the Zeughaus. Lt./Col. Jehreke [Gehrke], bearer of the Knight Cross, reports the guard of honour." ' 30 Hitler inspected the parade and laid his wreath on the memorial. Then he turned to talk with the war-wounded; a major reported 286 present. Hitler asked some of them where they had been wounded and shook their hands as he sombrely repeated the replies: 'At Yukhnov.' 'At Sebastopol.' At Kalinin,' 'Where were you wounded?' 'In France.' 'In France' - how?' 'Air raid.' 'Air raid.' Gersdorff was no longer able to follow Hitler. At the end of his short visit to the exhibition he deserted his entire entourage. The attempt had failed. The main point now was to remove the fuse quickly and unobtrusively and an op- 288 Projects of 1943 portunity presented itself in a lavatory near the western exit from the museum. 31 Hitler mounted a small platform together with Goring, Keitel, Donitz and Himmler and took the salute of the guard battalion as it marched past. He then returned to the Chancellery while the crowd gave him only muted applause in view of the solemnity of the occasion. Gersdorff's assassination attempt was not foiled by regularly instituted security precautions, nor by any sudden changes ordered by security men. It was foiled, in part, by an internal weakness of the plan, namely the lack of an in- stantaneous fuse, and, in part, by Hitler's own often intentionally unpredictable behaviour. Gersdorff returned to his hotel and then to the front. He remained an active member of the opposition but never made another assassination attempt. In the autumn of 1943 he hid the British 'clams' in his brother's house in Breslau when he was there for a stomach operation. 32 289 33 Abortive Plans Henning von Tresckow continued his efforts with undiminished energy but he seemed to be tilting at windmills. He tried to influence Manstein, the Commander-in-Chief Army Group South (known as Army Group Don up to 14 February 1943), 1 but did not expect any 'initiative' from him. 2 In the winter of 1942—43 Beck had written to Manstein saying that the war could not be won and that something must be done, but Manstein had replied that a war was only lost if one considered it lost. 3 Captain Kaiser noted in his diary on 6 April 1943, after a conversation with Tresckow, that Manstein must be written off once and for all. In the summer of 1943 Gersdorff went to Manstein's headquarters in Saporozhe carrying letters from Goerdeler and Popitz and with the backing of Tresckow on behalf of Kluge. 4 Tresckow had his contacts there, Colonel Schulze-Biittger, head of the Operations Section, and Stahlberg, the aide, so the Manstein-Gersdorif meeting was well prepared. GersdorfF was only to hand over his letters, however, if it seemed that they would do some good and would not endanger their authors; if Major-General Theodor Busse, the Chief of Staff, was present he could only discuss military matters. Manstein did not insist on his Chief of Staff being present and so Gersdorff was able to talk frankly about the 'top level'. The Field Marshal agreed that 'a change' was essential but said that he himself could not suggest this to Hitler since he was not in high enough favour; Kluge or Rundstedt were the only people who could do it. He rejected the idea of concerted action by all the Field Marshals saying that 'Prussian Marshals do not mutiny'. Gersdorff replied that they were not very taken with the idea in Army Group Centre either and were looking for a solution in another direction. Manstein understood at once and said: 'You want to kill him then.' Gersdorff said: Yes, indeed; that was what they proposed. Manstein then became indignant and said: 'I will not go along with that; it would ruin the Army.' Gersdorff therefore did not hand over his letters and merely passed on Kluge's request that, in the event of a successful coup, Manstein be prepared to assume office as Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht. To this Manstein replied with a slight bow: 'I shall always be loyally at the disposal of the legitimate government.' 5 Later Manstein took refuge in the assertion that he was concerned only with military matters and had merely done his duty. Nevertheless he could of course see quite clearly that Germany was heading for ruin and he admitted as 290 Abortive Plans much. Beck thought that Manstein's attitude stemmed more from his character than from his (alleged) conviction that everything must be done to keep the Russians away from the German frontier and that, in the event of a coup, this would be difficult if not impossible. In fact the surest way of bringing the Russians into Germany was to prolong the war and this would certainly happen if there were no coup. 6 Tresckow's efforts with Kluge were only superficially more successful. When out for a walk with Kluge in July 1943 Tresckow and Gersdorff dis- cussed 'the situation' with him and demanded the removal of Hitler. 7 Kluge said that he could not bring himself to do it. Tresckow then said that walking by his side was a man who had already tried — which Gersdorff confirmed. This was the only way, Tresckow said, to save the German Reich and people from total ruin. Kluge thereupon said: 'Children, you've got me!' But he did not keep his word. Kluge always remained the same — lacking initiative, as Captain Kaiser noted in his diary early in April 1943 after talking to Tresckow. 8 From early April Tresckow was frequently in Berlin trying in some way or other to set the coup in motion but, despite all his efforts, he encountered only set-backs and mishaps. 9 In May and again in July he gave himself prolonged periods of leave. The first he spent probing and discussing, the second in preparing the coup d'etat, living with his sister in Neubabelsberg. 10 On 25 July he was transferred to OKH command reserve and became available for posting by the Army Personnel Department; from 1 August to the beginning of October he stayed in Berlin; on 10 October 1943 he took up his new appoint- ment as commander of 442 Infantry Regiment." Meanwhile efforts had been made in Berlin to bring about 'a change' at 'top level'. The idea was to persuade Hitler to give up supreme command in the east so that the war might once more be run on sensible lines and possibly ended. There were thoughts of making Kluge Chief of Staff of the Army and Manstein Commander-in-Chief, a suggestion aired by Tresckow in May. 12 Somewhat later Gersdorff made a similar proposal to Manstein but with the appointments the other way round. Hopes were still placed in Zeitzler and Olbricht, even in Fromm and Guderian; any of these, it was thought, might go to Hitler, open his eyes to realities and demand a 'change'. Goerdeler obtained an introduction to Guderian through General von Rabenau. 13 But it was all in vain. Hammerstein was then approached once more; early in March it was hoped to persuade him to go to Fromm. But Hammerstein refused. If he had a divi- sion, he said, he would be prepared to fetch that devil (Hitler) out of hell, but he had not got one. Those able to do something would not and the willing ones could not. Meanwhile Goerdeler, with incredible optimism and an intrepidity worthy of respect, continued his efforts to keep things moving. In February 1943 he tried to galvanize the generals by presenting them with an ultimatum — from the end of the month he would no longer be available. 14 He remarked that the workers 'did not want to wait any longer', and he saw 'indications of [impen- 291 Tresckow and Army Group Centre ding] revolution or uprising without the forces of the intelligentsia'. He soon abandoned this idea of threatening, however. A memorandum dated 26 March 1943 and intended for the generals exists but it is not clear who received it. Tresckow, in any case, thought it useless and advised urgently against it. 15 On 17 May Goerdeler wrote a letter to General Olbricht saying that he had been thinking about the generally-held view that the correct psychological moment must be awaited for a coup and had come to the conclusion that 'we must not await the approach of the "correct psychological" moment but must create it'. 16 The leadership's crimes were colossal, he said; the number of civilians executed was over a million. Popular tolerance of this was incomprehensible and explicable only by terror and the protection afforded to lying and crime. This would change at once, however, 'if the people saw that terror had been brought to book, an end put to corruption and candour and truth established in place of secrecy and lies'. If no other way was open he, Goerdeler, was ready to seek an interview with Hitler and tell him that his resignation was necessary in the vital interests of the people. It was possible, though not probable, that Hitler would realize this; if he did not, in other words if the in- terview ended 'nastily' for Goerdeler, then he must have the assurance that 'action would be taken immediately'. Olbricht thought the idea of an interview with Hitler completely illusory and advised urgently against it. 17 Then Goerdeler wanted to go and see Keitel, with Captain Kaiser strongly advising against it. Kaiser put in his diary: 'He often seems to me to be a dreamer after all.' Meanwhile, despite all its activity since autumn 1942, the opposition had suffered a continuous series of setbacks. Early in March 1943 Beck fell seriously ill and had to undergo an operation. 18 At about the same time Colonel Fritz Ja'ger, commanding II and XXI Panzer Replacement units, was arrested together with his son who was serving as a lieutenant in Frankfurt on Oder. 19 Colonel Ja'ger had long been a member of the conspiracy and later, on 20 July 1944, had an important part to play. Various highly incautious remarks by the son had now brought the conspiracy into great danger; he had said, for instance, that the balloon would soon go up, his father would take over the Guard Battalion and so forth and his listeners had not kept these comments to themselves. All went well for both father and son, however; the case was closed in July — not without active assistance from Captain Kaiser and a number of kindred spirits in the Army Legal Department. About the same time Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg got into trouble. The word went round that he was looking for reliable young officers for the Potsdam bat- talion and a certain lieutenant connected this with the current rumours about a coup — the time was shortly after the Stalingrad catastrophe and the affair of the Scholls in Munich. Accordingly on 2 April Schulenburg was interrogated; he was nevertheless released, although naturally it was true that he was looking for 'reliable' officers and for the purposes of the coup too. 20 Since January 1943 he had been a member of General von Unruh's special staff which was screening agencies and headquarters for men fit for service. 21 These set-backs were comparatively easily overcome but the same could 292 Abortive Plans not be said of the direct assault launched by Himmler's RSHAon OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr; major damage to the opposition resulted. 22 The Abwehr office in Munich had become involved in a private currency affair, the culprit being one of its informers, Dr Wilhelm Schmidhuber, an exporter and Por- tuguese honorary consul. The Abwehr could not cover him in this case and he was therefore arrested and interrogated; this led to investigations inside the Abwehr which had long been a thorn in the flesh of Himmler and the head of his Section VI, the SD external intelligence service. During these investigations a further 'scandal' was uncovered: to assist cer- tain Jews considerable sums in foreign currency had been paid as illegal com- pensation for confiscated property and for this Dr Hans von Dohnanyi, specially employed officer (Sonderfuhrer B) in Oster's coordinating section, was responsible. 23 Dohnanyi was now in difficulty from two points of view. In the first place he was of partially Jewish origin, a so-called 'half-caste second grade'. This had long been known and on 14 October 1936 Hitler had issued a special dispensation permitting Dohnanyi to retain his civil service status and be treated as a German; he could not be accepted into the Party, however. 24 Now he seemed likely to lose the personal protection of the man who was Ger- many's supreme judge in 'racial questions' as in everything else. Secondly, backed and supported by Canaris and Oster, Dohnanyi had been using Jews as 'agents' abroad for years, thereby saving them from 'special treatment' and murder. Moltke, who was also working in the Abwehr, had warned Dohnanyi that he was in danger of arrest. On 5 April 1943 a senior Judge Advocate (Oberstkriegsgerichtsrat}, Dr Manfred Roeder, appeared in Canaris' office and told him that an investiga- tion was being initiated. He then went to Oster and asked him to be present at the arrest of Dohnanyi. Oster immediately assumed responsibility for anything of which Dohnanyi was accused, but this did not help since the case concerned private, not official, misdemeanours, involving misuse of the office. Dohnanyi wished to conceal certain papers lying on his desk. They dealt, among other things, with information to be transmitted to Rome by Dr Josef Mu'ller about the failure of the attempt of 13 March 1943 and were marked with an 'O'; they were camouflaged as 'intelligence material', in other words misleading information to be fed to the enemy — nothing unusual in the secret service. Dohnanyi wished to indicate to Oster that the papers should be treated as if they were really what they were supposed to be, official 'intelligence material'. While Roeder was searching the safe Dohnanyi whispered something to Oster which the latter misunderstood. When Oster tried to sweep the papers up into his coat pocket, he was observed by Sonderegger, a Gestapo official who was also present, and from then on matters became much worse. Oster's behaviour naturally increased suspicion of his entire group — the authorities had long been on the look-out for 'insecure agencies'. The central group around Oster had been warned early in 1942 that the Gestapo was on its trail and since the arrest of Schmidhuber in October every security measure had been taken. All these precautions, however, were cancelled out by this mishap over the papers; it took months for Dohnanyi, 293 Tresckow and Army Group Centre sending messages from prison, to persuade Oster to change his attitude and treat the papers as official. The suspicions of the Gestapo were only gradually allayed. 25 On the same day Dr Muller, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his sister, Frau von Dohnanyi, were also arrested. Oster was placed in cold storage; initially he was sent on leave and placed under house arrest; then, on 19 June 1943, he was transferred to 'leadership reserve'. On 16 December 1943 Keitel wrote forbid- ding him to have 'any official or non-official contact with the Abwehr or its members', it having been reported that Oster was still maintaining 'more or less official relationships' with the Abwehr and certain officers of the 'Brandenburg' Division. 26 Finally, with effect from 4 March 1944, he was released from active service. From this point until 20 July 1944 Oster and his friends, including Beck, were under permanent surveillance by the Gestapo. The blow suffered by the opposition was so devastating and so dangerous that for the moment all thoughts of further action had to be abandoned. An effective headquarters in Berlin had to be reconstituted first. It is characteristic of Beck that his first order was for an account of the incidents to be passed to the Pope, who had been involved on several occasions in peace feelers. This was the only way of maintaining the somewhat precarious con- fidential link between papal circles and the German opposition. Gisevius was accordingly entrusted with this mission by Canaris and despatched to Rome to see Father Leiber. 27 For two reasons other people did not become involved in the Gestapo's in- vestigations against Oster, Dohnanyi, Bonhoeffer and Muller. In the first place the accused held their tongues and were able to mislead the Gestapo for a long time and secondly Canaris succeeded in putting a major spoke in the wheel. During an interrogation of Dohnanyi towards the end of 1943 Roeder, the investigating Judge Advocate, had described members of the 'Branden- burg' Division as draft-dodgers and this came to the ears of Canaris. He sum- moned the divisional commander, Major-General von Pfuhlstein, an im- pulsive, difficult but highly courageous character, and suggested that Roeder had merited a lesson. 28 Pfuhlstein took a witness with him, went to Roeder, dressed him down for his remark and then floored him with a smack in the face. This was on 14 January 1944, by which time Roeder had become highly dangerous. Meanwhile Roeder had been bragging about his case to people outside who had nothing to do with it; Kanter, another Judge Advocate and a friend of Dr Karl Sack, head of the OKH Legal Department, lodged a complaint against Roeder who replied with a counter-complaint for slander and demanded disciplinary proceedings. The result was such a tangle of proceedings and complaints that Roeder finally asked for a transfer, which he was given. 29 Try as he might, Sack had not been able to engineer Roeder's removal earlier. Canaris was able to maintain his position for a while, although the Abwehr's work was largely at a standstill owing to the Gestapo investigations. In February 1944, however, the RSHA finally achieved its object and succeeded in abolishing or incorporating the entire OKwA mtAusland/Abwehr. The occasion 294 Abortive Plans was the defection to the British of a certain Dr Vermehren who had served in the Wehrmacht and been seconded to the Abiaehr office in Istanbul. Canaris was suspended from office and placed under house arrest. His successor, Colonel Hansen, belonged to the resistance movement and so the Abwehr's highly useful contacts were maintained until 20 July 1944. TheAbwehr itself, however, was incorporated into the RSHA as 'A mt Mil' and after 20 July 1944 was subordinated to Section VI under Schellenberg. For the opposition 1943 was the great year of plans and attempts. The in- creasingly desperate war situation finally produced the 'correct psychological' moment for which they had waited so long; many of the generals were more prepared to participate and support them. Even people like Himmler realized that the end could not be far off. The cruel fanatical lord of Hitler's black praetorian guard, the director of all the efforts made to maintain the so-called purity of the German race, the head of the National-Political Academies for toughening young National-Socialists, of the 'Ancestral Heritage' and 'Spring of Life' associations, of the concentration camps and mass extermination of the 'racially inferior' — this man was in fact weak, unstable and submissive, without loyalty or character. He could never quite make up his mind between his own interests—desertion for which he had not the courage— and his loyalty to the Nazi movement. He vacillated until the last day of his life; until he bit on his cyanide capsule he was still hoping to save his own skin. He ordered his SS to stimulate the fighting spirit of the Army by the most extreme and bar- baric atrocities such as hanging from meat-hooks soldiers who gave vent to 'defeatist' views during the closing months of the war; yet at the same time, ever since 1942 and finally early in 1945, he was repeatedly trying to negotiate with the enemy through Swedish intermediaries, not in order to save Ger- many — for that it was really too late — but to save himself. Hitler eventually heard of these machinations and on 29 April 1945 expelled Himmler from the Party and stripped him of all his official functions. Finally the mass murderer, whose confidence depended solely on his position and his uniform, tried to dis- guise himself as a private soldier and, so to speak, creep into a mouse-hole. 10 The lord of the concentration camps was even prepared to enter into negotiations with the German resistance movement and, if necessary, sacrifice his Fuhrer for them. But he first obtained authorization from Hitler. 31 Those of the opposition who entered into communication with Himmler were rewarded neither by success nor gratitude; all they did was to confirm long-standing suspicions against their right-wing, ultra-right-wing, political tendencies. They deserve recognition, however, although it is difficult to say whether they or Himmler harboured the more astonishing illusions. The removal of Hitler would not have made a better man out of Himmler nor could he himself have been removed with certainty. The Allies would have occupied Germany and put Himmler on trial. Popitz, Langbehn and Jessen believed that they could exploit the differences inside the Nazi leadership and bring about a split. The contact man was Langbehn who acted as Himmler's lawyer although long before the war he had become a committed opposition member, as Himmler well knew. 32 295 Tresckow and Army Group Centre Since May 1943 he had been in touch with SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Wolff who later, in 1945, following Himmler's line conducted treasonable negotiations with Dulles over the capitulation of German troops in Italy. Langbehn told Wolff that his enquiries abroad showed that without Hitler an acceptable peace might still be obtained, whereas clearly Germany could no longer win the war. He wanted to bring Himmler and Popitz together for negotiations. Olbricht first arranged a meeting between Popitz and Tresckow, at which Langbehn was also present: it took place in Popitz's house in August 1943. Tresckow seems to have given the project his blessing. Marie-Louise Sarre, a secretary in the staff of Army Group Centre and a determined opponent of the regime who did occasional courier service for the opposition, reports a conver- sation with Field Marshal von Bock in July 1943: 'Bock believed a putsch carried out by Wehrmacht generals only was bound to fail. He consented to participate only on the condition that the putsch would be made with Himmler. Only if the SS participated could it succeed.' 33 On 26 August Popitz had an interview with Himmler in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which Himmler had just taken over. Adroitly he suggested that Himmler assume the role of guardian of the true Holy Grail of Nazism; someone was required to reestablish order, both at home and abroad, after all the corruption and the unhappy conduct of the war by a single overloaded man. The war could no longer be won, he said, but it would only be lost if it continued to be conducted on these lines. In view of the bolshevist menace Great Britain and the United States were still ready to negotiate, but not with Ribbentrop. As a precaution Popitz did not go further; in the anteroom, however, Langbehn was saying to Wolff that he hoped that Popitz would speak quite frankly. Immediately after the interview it was clear that Popitz had not gone very far and it was agreed to arrange a further talk. But it never happened. In September 1943 Langbehn was arrested by the Gestapo. Some Allied message (Dulles insists that it was neither British nor American) was deciphered by the Germans and gave away Langbehn's Swiss contacts. It was shown to Himmler and he had no choice but to act, though he contrived to avoid ordering a trial. Popitz was still at liberty but he was completely isolated since his previous co-conspirators felt it too dangerous to consort with him. Langbehn said nothing about his talks with Wolff or the wider ramifications of the conspiracy. Only after 20 July 1944 did it become clear that Popitz and Langbehn were members of a wide-spread plot. At their trial their contacts with Himmler were presented as a minor, comparatively insignificant but in- sidious aspect of their conspiratorial defeatist activity. It is questionable whether this foolhardy contact with Himmler would have taken place, had the opposition in Berlin not been so lacking in firm leadership, particularly since the dismissal of Oster. Canaris had always worked cleverly in the background acting as a protective screen for the con- spirators; Beck was sick; Witzleben was a warrior, not aconspirator or politi- cian, and was also sick; Tresckow had both the energy and determination to lead but neither the position nor influence. He had only been on leave when in 296 Abortive Plans Berlin in the summer of 1943 and the fact that he was able still to work so in- tensively for the opposition from his positions as regimental commander and then Chief of Staff of an army was due more to his ability and determination than to the circumstances. Olbricht was nearer the potential centre of power but he had neither the initiative nor drive to act. Without Fromm, C-in-C of the Replacement Army, he could do little apart from planning; he had no com- mand authority and Fromm remained unapproachable and always ambiguous in his attitude, 34 The name of Colonel-General Freiherr von Hammerstein was sometimes heard but he was also sick and now had neither influence nor position. 35 He died on 24 April 1943. 36 Hopes placed in Guderian's coopera- tion proved to be false. 37 Then there seemed to be another chance to have Keitel fired at the end of May. Zeitzler wanted to talk to Hitler about it and propose Kluge as Keitel's successor; Tresckow tried to help things along behind the scenes by getting Heusinger to agree to the plan, and on 28 May Tresckow informed Olbricht of his efforts. 38 These were what was described to the Gestapo after 20 July 1944 as 'changes in leadership'. 39 Some of those interrogated claimed that this was all that was ever discussed in these treasonable conversations. Olbricht immediately considered the con- sequences, as Captain Kaiser noted: *[Olbricht] sees clearly two ways: 1. After change of leadership political demands to be made legally. 2. Zeitzler and the 6 section chiefs to make the demand: Heusinger, Wagner (QMG), Stieff (org), Berendt (foreign sect.). Gerke (Chief Troop Affairs), Fellgiebel (Signal C.). They must be unanimous. Z[eitzler's] demands now that A[dolf] H[itler] replace Keitel by a new man.' 40 But by 9 June, these hopes too had been dashed: 'The five chiefs in the last resort do not wish to torpedo things and to push Pollux [Hitler] out of the saddle.' 41 Finally, in July 1943, Witzleben had to go to hospital with a gastric ulcer. 42 At the same time fear began to grow that little more time remained available for the coup since the tide of war was running so strongly against Germany. The Kursk offensive in the summer of 1943 failed and by mid-July the Red Army was counter-attacking. On 25 July Mussolini fell and Italy prepared to cut loose from the Third Reich. Only an incurable optimist like Goerdeler could still think that the Allies would be persuaded to halt operations in the event of a coup in Germany. He received no reply to an ap- proach in this sense made via Sweden in May 1943. 43 On 25 July 1943 Goerdeler wrote a letter to Field Marshal von Kluge. 44 Once more he emphasized the material, economic and moral devastation caused by the war both in Germany and Europe as a whole, the mad crimes which otherwise decent young men were persuaded or compelled to commit and the hopelessness of the regime's political and military situation. If Kluge knew any way, he said, to keep Russia out of Europe and compel the United States and Britain to stop their devastating air raids on German cities, then he must tell the people so openly. 'If there can be no victory continuation of the war is jus t criminal, since the aim must never be the heroic end of a nation but always the possibility of continuing life.' The prospect of a favourable peace was still open, Goerdeler added, as he had recently established (he did not say 297 Tresckow and Army Group Centre that he had had no answer to his approach in May). In view of this situation and the fact that this was clearly the last chance he begged Kluge — and he assured him that he would not do so again — to take action against Hitler. Goerdeler could assure him of the support of the majority of the working class, civil servants and leaders of industry; if thought wise, he could persuade Goebbels and Himmler to ally themselves with Kluge or any other general willing to act; they had long since realized that with Hitler they were lost. The letter to Kluge was never despatched; Goerdeler's friends, including Olbricht, dissuaded him. They were afraid that Kluge would be offended by its candid emphatic language; Goerdeler was often reproached for offending the generals when he told them the truth. 45 All this took place at the time when Langbehn was trying to arrange the meeting between Popitz and Himmler. In general, therefore, the resistance's affairs were at a standstill. People still irrationally hoped that 'the generals', 'the Josephs' as Hassell called them in his diary, would take some initiative but they did not. On 20 February 1943, referring to Olbricht and Fromm, Captain Kaiser wrote in his diary: 'One wants to act when he gets the order and the other wants to give the order when someone else has acted. ' 46 Although by 1943 it was clear that the war was lost, although therefore psy- chologically the situation was as favourable as it ever could be, the opposition found itself well-nigh paralysed by these set-backs, particularly the Gestapo's invasion of the very focus of activity centred on Oster. Between 5 April when Dohnanyi, Bonhoeffer and Muller were arrested and 1 October when Stauffenberg officially became Chief of Staff to Olbricht in the AHA the whole headquarters of the conspiracy had to be reconstructed. Many of the con- spirators thought that, even had one of the two attempts at assassination succeeded in March, the coup d'etat would probably not have gone smoothly. 47 On several occasions, early in April and at the end of May 1943, Tresckow had been in Berlin; in July he took leave with the object of reactivating the planning, ensuring coordination between preparatory measures at the front and those at home, and providing some better basis for further plans for the assassination and the coup. 46 He lived with his sister in Neubabelsberg and gave some impetus to the preparations. Increasingly he became the leading brain of the military conspiracy. 49 He was convinced that there was no time to lose; early in August he met Goerdeler and told him that by 1944 the Red Army would be on the borders of East Prussia. 50 The conspirators now decided to use the Replacement Army for the coup, if necessary without Fromm's cooperation. 51 It could not, however, act on its own; the initiative must come from one of the high-ranking front-line com- manders. Further efforts were therefore made to persuade Kluge. 52 To ensure the widest possible cooperation, particularly from the armoured forces, attempts were made to arrange a neeting between Olbricht and Colonel- General Guderian, who had been Inspector-General of Armoured Forces since 1 March, but nothing came of it. 53 Kluge was thought to be 'committed' but once again this proved to be a pipe-dream. On 2 August Schulenburg came 298 Abortive Plans to Olbricht from OKH wit h the news that Zeitzler was prepared to cooperate and possibly take the initiative. Then it was discovered that further 'softening up' was required before Kluge would participate in the plan; the proposal was that he should issue an order to C-in-C Replacement Army and, in the event of non-compliance, arrest him and act in his stead, both of which things Olbricht was willing to do. The 'softening up' consisted primarily in the compilation and despatch of a letter from Olbricht to Kluge backed up by a further letter on 3 August. 54 Stieff was despatched to Kluge as an emissary 55 and finally Zeitzler was to be given a directive to act if 'the action' misfired. Early in August Tresckow told Goerdeler that Manstein, Kluge and Kiichler now realized that something must be done and that even the SS generals Sepp Dietrich and Hausser would 'go along'. 56 The question is, however, what these people meant by 'doing something'. They were perhaps thinking more of the famous 'change at top level' than of a coup d'etat using force. Possibly Goerdeler misunderstood Tresckow or he was again giving way to his optimism when he assured his friend Wallenberg in August that a putsch would take place in September. 57 It is equally possible that a putsch within a putsch was being planned to force the hand of the front-line generals and of Zeitzler rather than persuade them. In the summer of 1943 Colonel (Major-General from February 1944) Helmuth Stieff became heavily involved with the opposition. At the time he was head of the Organization Section of the Army General Staff; he had long been an opponent of Hitler and Nazism, ever since the early 1930s, and his an- tagonism had increased all the time. 58 Tresckow had already approached him on several occasions, both in Smolensk and in OKH in East Prussia, and had finally said to him in February 1943 that Hitler must be removed. It was the historic duty of general staff officers, he said, to act in the interest of the people and prevent the loss of the war; 59 would Stieff be prepared to participate in an assassination and a coup? During meetings in the Fuhrer's headquarters he, Tresckow, had convinced himself that Hitler could be killed during one of his briefing conferences. Early in August Stieff paid a short visit to Berlin where he met Olbricht and they were joined by Tresckow and Beck who had just been released from hospital. 60 On 6 August Stieff wrote to his wife saying that he had decided to join the conspiracy: 'I maintain that the point of view to which I have come during the last few days is the right one, in other words that one should never evade any responsibility with which one is faced by destiny. With this state- ment you must content yourself. I should be ashamed of my whole existence if I did not do my real duty at the moment of emergency. I will do nothing dis- honourable — of that you may be sure.' 61 Stieff thereupon returned to the east. He suffered his first disappointment in OKH. Colonel Thomale, Chief of Staff to the Inspector-General of Armoured Forces, told him that Guderian would not participate in any action directed against the Fuhrer. Stieff then went to Army Group Centre and on 13 August handed Olbricht's letter over to Kluge. 62 During a long discussion with Stieff Kluge did at least say that he would work for 'a change' in the 299 Tresckow and Army Group Centre military leadership; 63 Stieff, however, evidently had reason to hope for much more. On 27 August he met Kluge again, this time on Rastenburg airfield, and in September he gave a detailed report to Olbricht. During this same month Kluge also visited Berlin where he held discussions in Olbricht's house with Beck, Goerdeler, Olbricht and Tresckow. 64 From the foreign policy point of view Kluge wanted to know from Goerdeler what the prospects were for ending the war, at least in the west. Goerdeler said that only war against Germany had forced Britain and Russia together. To secure her empire B ritai n must always require a strong Germany as a counter-weight to Russia. Agreement must therefore be reached with Britain. This was pos- sible on the following basis: 1914 frontiers in the east, Austria and the Sudetenland to remain German and also South Tyrol and Eupen-Malmedy, Franco—German negotiations on a definitive solution of the Alsace—Lorraine question, full preservation of German sovereignty, no reparations, economic fusion between the countries of Europe excluding Russia. 65 After Goerdeler had then referred briefly to the essential internal political reforms Beck and Kluge withdrew for a private discussion. When Goerdeler was called in again Kluge said to him that, since Hitler would neither take the necessary decisions nor be acceptable to the West as a negotiating partner, there was no alter- native but to remove him by force. Goerdeler opposed this and said that one must speak frankly to Hitler; reason would always prevail. Kluge rightly questioned this, but he could not suggest to Goerdeler to take any initiative. Kluge admitted that the initiative must come from the military and promised to discuss with his fellow-commanders. Goerdeler, he said, should ensure that the Anglo-Saxons subsequently behaved 'correctly'. At last the coup seemed to be imminent; Goerdeler, the optimist, told Wallenberg that it was 'firm' for September. 66 It did not occur at this time, not so much because the opposition was once more dogged by misfortune - on 12 October Kluge had a serious car accident and was temporarily out of the running - but because a number of essential in- gredients were still lacking. 67 Tresckow had to take over a regiment at the front and did not occupy an influential position in Army Group Centre until two months later when he became Chief of Staff to Second Army; Kluge's successor as C-in-C of the Army Group was Field Marshal Busch, a Hitler dis- ciple, so the 'initial flash' could no longer be expected from that quarter. Had this change not occurred, the coup might have taken place in October 1943, but probably not, for the most essential ingredient was still lacking, the assassination. So far no one had been found who was ready to do it and had access to Hitler - the most obvious among the conspirators were Colonel Stieff and Colonel Meichssner, head of the Operations Section in the OKW Operations Staff, who both occasionally attended the briefing conferences. In October 1943 Stauffenberg thought for a time that he had Stieff's agreement but either he misunderstood or the agreement was withdrawn again. 68 Only in late autumn were young officers found with sufficient courage to sacrifice themselves and for whom access to Hitler might be engineered. Meanwhile other essential preparations continued and in general terms were completed. 300 34 'Valkyrie' For some time the idea had been mooted that the Replacement Army should be used to take over power in Germany but all such projects had so far been checkmated because Colonel-General Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and Commander-in-Chief Replacement Army, refused to cooperate. 1 A further obstacle was the highly involved chain of command governing military dis- tricts in Germany. The title of the local commander in Stuttgart, for instance, was: Commanding General Rear Headquarters V Army Corps and Com- mander Wehrkreis V. The first part of this indicated that as 'Deputy' Commander V Corps he commanded the static, replacement and training units of the corps while the fighting troops were in the field; in this capacity he was responsible to Colonel-General Fromm as C-in-C Replacement Army. The se- cond part of the title indicated that he was a territorial military commander in his own right and as such was responsible direct to OKW, in other words to Keitel or Hitler. 2 In 1943 the idea was conceived that the Replacement Army should be set to work, if necessary without Fromm. General Olbricht promised either to com- pel Fromm to participate or alternatively to arrest him and issue the necessary orders himself. To avoid, however, having to improvise everything and to en- sure that Army units stationed in the Reich would intervene smoothly, rapidly and by surprise, certain preparations were necessary to ensure, first that orders were issued without loss of time and secondly that they were obeyed without too much doubting and questioning. These requirements seemed best to be met by Plan 'Valkyrie'. In mid-December 1941 the German Army's situation in the frozen expanses of Russia was a desperate one. The object of the campaign, the enemy's overthrow and occupation of his industrial and political centres, had not been achieved. The German divisions were now hundreds of miles from their operational base, without winter clothing, weapons partially useless, without adequate supplies and facing an enemy preparing a major counter-offensive in defence of his country. The German Army's losses in killed during the Russian campaign had by that time risen to 162,799 officers, NCOs and men. 3 On 15 December 1941 Colonel-General Haider, Chief of Staff of the Army, discussed with Colonel-General Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and C-in-C Replace- ment Army, how the gaps were to be filled. 4 Fromm, however, had prepared the necessary orders as early as the summer of 1941, precisely in order to be 301 Tresckow and Army Group Centre prepared for the emergency situation that materialized by the end of the year. The codewords 'Valkyrie' and 'Rheingold' signified a raid on the reserves con- sisting of training cadres still in Germany, sick and wounded who had recovered, workers and employees to be withdrawn from industry and the economy. 5 In the spring of 1942 the 'Valkyrie' measures were revised, this time under the codewords 'Valkyrie I' and 'Valkyrie IP; in July 1942 the 'Valkyrie' units were called upon to fill gaps in the field Army for the second time. Up to this time there had been no thought of using 'Valkyrie' units for internal disturbances. Even in the succeeding months their use inside Ger- many was only a side-issue, not the main purpose of the plan. On 31 July 1943, however, C-in-C Replacement Army issued fresh 'Valkyrie' instructions which were to be implemented with the utmost speed. Copy No 83 (out of a total of 220) together with five additional copies was received by the headquarters of Wehrkreis XVII in Vienna; in addition to its 'Top Secret' stamp it carried the following in large letters: 'Forward im- mediately by special courier', 'Most Urgent', 'Submit at once.' The headquarters date stamp of Wehrkreis XVII shows 2 August 1943. Ad- dressees were to report completion of the preparations ordered by 12 August. 6 The Wehrkreise had to become familiar with the new instructions and carry out exercises. The haste is understandable in view of the war situation; but it is not likely that the orders were also considered possible putsch instruments at this early stage. At any rate, Olbricht's operations officer and predecessor of Stauffenberg in this position knew nothing of such a secret purpose although he had to do a great deal of work in connection with the orders. 7 The object of these instructions was not merely the rapid assembly of reserves from the Reich but, if necessary, suppression of 'internal distur- bances'; these might be caused by organized large-scale sabotage either directed from abroad or carried out by parties of agents dropped into Ger- many, by raids by airborne troops or by a rising on the part of the millions of foreign workers and prisoners deported or 'conscripted* into Germany. 8 Basically the 'Valkyrie' orders prescribed concentration into combat groups and into reinforced battalions, of all recruiting and training units in the Wehrkreis and of all soldiers in schools or on courses; battalions were to in- clude all available arms of the service. The whole process was to take place in two stages: 'Valkyrie Stage 1' signified 'Ensure combat readiness of all units (company strength) within six hours' but without issuing an alert order. 'Valkyrie Stage 2' meant 'Concentration of Stage 1 units into combat groups ready for action'. The time limit for Stage 1 was laid down as six hours; Stage 2 was to take place with the greatest possible speed depending on local con- ditions — locations, road conditions, mountains, availability of vehicles. Rail transport was only to be used for unit concentrations under Stage 2 if other methods of transport would entail considerable delay or vehicle movement was not possible. In detail the following was laid down: readiness for action rather than paper regulations was to constitute the criterion for the equipment of combat groups; armoured and armoured infantry units together with their schools, 302 'Valkyrie' courses and demonstration units were to be concen rated into special combat groups alongside the regular infantry; signals, transport and administrative troops were only to be included in combat groups as the strength of the latter required, in other words not all the available troops of this type were to be in- cluded to avoid overloading the combat groups with useless personnel. In addition to the combat groups alert units were to be formed. For this purpose mobile battalions and companies were to be used together with schools and courses, demonstration units, recruiting detachments and 'various' units. Under 'schools and courses' were included those for officers, cadets and senior cadets, medical and veterinary academies, the research sec- tion and medical officers of the Mountain Medical School, officers of the Medical Training Section, Army NCO Schools, the Army Pyrotechnical School in Berlin-Lichterfelde, Ordnance Schools I and II, the Army Signals School II, the Army Riding and Driving School, the Pioneer School in Karlshorst, the Technical Fortifications School in Sternberg, No 1 Railway Engineers' School in Rehagen-Klausdorf, administration and maintenance courses. Training and recruiting units included were: No 3 Pioneer Training Battalion in Rosenheim, the Fortress Training Section in Althofchen, the Decontamina- tion Training Company of the Medical Training Section, the Training Battery for Gas-tracker Dogs and the Postal Recruiting Section. Under 'various' were included such important units as the Signal Traffic Section HQ Replacement Army, the Guide Dogs for the Blind Detachment, the Special Army Patrol Service, the Train-control Section, the Welfare Service, the Army School for Female Signals personnel with its corresponding training sections, emergency squads of female signals personnel, ordnance issue offices, vehicle parks, medical sections, remount depots, depots for other arms, AAMG posts, AA batteries and the security service in factories. Only the permanent staff of all the above units was to be available for 'Valkyrie'; the remainder were to provide replacements for the combat groups. In addition to preparation and planning of these combat groups and their rapid availability Wehrkreis headquarters were to prepare and organize 'protection of vulnerable points in emergency'. In many Wehrkreis the troops stationed there already had specific tasks such as dealing with parachute or airborne troops and coastal defence; in such cases 'Valkyrie' was to form the basis for these duties also. The 'Valkyrie' units also had to maintain their regular duties — cor- respondence and personnel papers, welfare of recruits and convalescents as they arrived including accommodation, feeding and clothing, guarding of buildings and any equipment left behind in the event of combat duty. Per- sonnel allocated to these tasks were to be reduced to the minimum. In principle all personnel available in the area of the Wehrkreis were to be used for 'Valkyrie' including such recruits under training as were suitable and men on leave, not however personnel of mobile companies and battalions in process of formation. Weapons, equipment, ammunition, vehicles, tanks and horses were to be provided from the overall stocks of units located in the area; independent camps and parks, however, were only to be used on instructions 303 Tresckozv and Army Group Centre from C-in-C Replacement Army. On instructions they might be used to provide the entire equipment for the combat groups and alert units. If available stocks of vehicles and horses were inadequate, it might be necessary to resort to requisitioning but this was under no circumstances to be discussed with other agencies, those responsible for agriculture for instance; otherwise horses and carts would no longer be there when wanted. A supplementary order dated 6 October 1943 and signed by Olbricht produced a significant reinforcement of the forces available for 'Valkyrie'; it was now to include units of the field Army located in the 'Home Forces area' while forming, recuperating or reorganizing. To the extent that their arma- ment, mobility and other equipment permitted, they were to form combat groups or alert units like the rest on issue of the relevant codeword. They were invariably to form independent units and not be combined with other troops from the Wehrkreise. All alert units were to be ready within six hours as for the combat groups. Finally on 11 February 1944 Stauffenberg, who had by that time been Olbricht's Chief of Staff for some months, issued an instruction designed to streamline and standardize the formation of combat groups. He also made it possible, if 'Valkyrie' or a state of alert was ordered, to concentrate forces at vital points more or less unobtrusively. Combat groups were reorganized as 'reinforced grenadier regiments'; they were to consist of regimental headquarters and headquarters company, two to three battalions, an infantry gun company, one to two anti-tank companies, an artillery detachment of two or three howitzer batteries and a pioneer company. Stauffenberg's directive continued: '3. Above-mentioned gren. regts will, if necessary, be alerted in accordance with para 2 above by calling out the units required from various Wehrkreise to avoid excessive strain on any particular Wehrkreis.' This was perfectly sensible and legitimate. By this method one or two of these reinforced grenadier regiments could quickly be made available for operations. Equally however, under cover of this instruction, it was possi- ble to move or concentrate particularly suitable units in the event of an attempted coup. It was not necessary to order 'Valkyrie' throughout the Retch, entailing a lapse of at least six hours before the majority of units were ready to move. It was now possible, as necessary and required, to concentrate, say, one or two mobile (motorized) and well-equipped anti-tank companies from the surrounding Wehrkreise near, for instance, Munich or Berlin or round some SS barracks without setting the entire and somewhat slower machinery in mo- tion. Particularly in Berlin action had to be so rapid that the normal 'Valkyrie' procedure, expeditious though it was, would be too ponderous. Exercises and similar measures provided an additional reinsurance. 9 The 'Valkyrie' plans were, of course, of the highest security grading; special emphasis was laid on this: 'The number of people involved in these preparations is to be kept as small as possible. Under no circumstances may agencies or individuals outside the Wehrmacht be told of these plans and preparations' - not the Party, therefore, nor the SS. Waffen-SS units in any case could not be included in the preparations since in practice they were not 304 'Valkyrie 1 subject to the territorial command authority of Wehrkreis Commanders. 10 In some Wehrkreise Party and SS formations were numerically far stronger than those of the Army. Moreover on 6 July 1944, at the first briefing conference at which Stauffenberg was present with a briefcase full of explosive, Hitler decided that, should operations take place within Germany, the military com- manders would have plenary powers; the political authorities — the Gauleiter in their capacity as Reich Defence Commissars — were to have only an ad- visory function. This now applied particularly to any 'Valkyrie' operation. 1 ' With the 'Valkyrie' orders and their supplementary instructions the con- spirators had now created, by perfectly legitimate methods, an instrument with which they could, if conditions were right, set in motion all available mobile military forces in Germany with the exception of the SS. The orders were perfectly sensible and suitable for an emergency; on the face of it they were neutral and non-political. If initiated, they only acquired political significance through their object, in other words if directed against the Party and the SS instead of foreign workers and prisoners of war. This was a particularly vital aspect of their suitability for a coup. The weak point was the problem of initiation. 'Initiation' meant in the first place the concentration of available troops into combat groups or reinforced grenadier regiments and the formation of alert units; this took place on issue of a codeword, possibly in two stages. Codewords could be modified by certain additions; for instance ' "Valkyrie" Stage 1 for Wehrkreis V meant that only those units located in the Stuttgart Wehrkreis were to be ready for operations within six hours; an alert could be ordered by means of the code: ' "Valkyrie" alert for Wehrkreis V.' The difficulty was, however, that the codeword had to be issued by C-in-C Replacement Army; this was explicitly laid down. 'The codeword as in para (a) above will be issued by C-in-C Replacement Army. Receipt will be acknowledged immediately by teleprint.' Militarily this was obvious; orders were issued by the commander. If the commander became a casualty he had to be replaced according to the rules. Since, however, C-in-C Replacement Army was still Colonel-General Fromm, an extremely unhappy situation might arise unless the fullest precautions had been taken to cope with his 'unreliability' (from the conspirators' point of view). This situation did in fact arise on 20 July when addressees did not merely acknowledge receipt but asked in- creasingly pressing questions and demanded to speak to Colonel-General Fromm. 12 To ensure that Colonel-General Fromm would cooperate, it was essential to create a situation in which he would recognize that cooperation was the only correct course. The most important step in this direction was undoub- tedly the removal of Hitler. A great impression would be made on Fromm, however, and it would be of major significance for the success of the entire enterprise, if the measures prepared could proceed smoothly, quickly and ap- parently uninterruptedly. We shall be dealing later with the question how the main body of the Replacement Army could be mobilized against the regime; here too a situation had to be created — by facts and circumstances as well as 305 Tresckow and Army Group Centre propaganda - in which it would seem natural and socially acceptable to obey the orders of the conspirators. Preparations on the spot, where orders actually had to be executed, were possible only to a limited extent, but here too considerable efforts were made. Attention was concentrated primarily on two methods: recruitment of allies in the right places; under-cover preparation and rehearsal of measures for the coup. During the critical period, from summer 1943 to 20 July 1944, the con- spiracy had its members or supporters in various positions in a number of Wehrkreise. The list of arrests after 20 July gives a very complete picture, since almost all those who showed any form of willingness to obey the orders from Berlin were arrested. Later, after Stauffenberg had taken over the organization, these contacts fell into two categories: 1. Occupants of impor- tant posts in Wehrkreis headquarters; 2. Members of the conspiracy in the most varied positions appointed to act on D Day as liaison officers between the Wehrkreise and the AHA, the centre of the coup in Berlin; they were to be responsible that Berlin's instructions were correctly executed. 13 Members or adherents in the various Wehrkreise were as follows: Wehrkreis I (Konigsberg): Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Otto Erdmann, Operations officer. Wehrkreis II (Stettin): Major-General Siegfried von Stulpnagel, Comman- dant of Stettin;Colonel Friedrich Jager, commanding Panzer Replace- ment units II and XXI (in April 1943 he had been earmarked by the con- spirators as commander of the Berlin Guard Battalion). Wehrkreis III (Berlin): Major-General Hans-Giinther von Rost, Chief of Staff until posted early in May 1944; his aide, Lieutenant Heinz- Giinther Albrecht; his successor, Major-General Otto Herfurth (previously Chief of Staff in Stuttgart); Grafin von der Schulenburg, secretary to C-in-C Replacement Army; a number of officers in the numerous schools and training areas round Berlin. Wehrkreis IV (Dresden): General Viktor von Schwedler, Commander; his staff officer (personnel), Colonel Wilhelm Sommerlad. Wehrkreis V (Stuttgart): no one available after the departure of Herfurth. Wehrkreis VI (Miinster): Major Hermann Piinder (not very influential as Q Ops); Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Bartels (fully informed and prepared to assist a revolt). Wehrkreis VII (Munich): Colonel Max Ulich, Chief of Staff; Lieutenant- Colonel Bruno Grosser, Operations Officer. Wehrkreis VIII (Breslau): no member in a position of importance. Wehrkreis IX (Kassel): Major-General Ludwig von Nida, Chief of Staff, and his successor from spring 1944, Colonel Claus-Henning von Plate; Colonel Fritz von Vethacke (Operations) and Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Beck (Intelligence). Wehrkreis X (Hamburg): Karl Kaufmann, the Gauleiter (at least partially initiated and committed); Captain (Navy) Herbert Wichmann, Intelligence Officer (no effective command authority). 306 1 Valkyrie' Wehrkreis XI (Hannover): no one in a position of importance. Wehrkreis XII (Wiesbaden): Major-General Erwin Gerlach, Chief of Staff (would certainly pass on the 'Valkyrie' order). Wehrkreis XIII (Nuremberg): Colonel Viktor Kolbe, Chief of Staff; Colonel Hans Liphart, Personnel (participation of both officers being hoped for). Wehrkreis XVII (Vienna): Colonel Heinrich Kodre, Chief of Staff (a member of the conspiracy and in active touch with the Austrian resistance and independence movement); General Hans-Karl von Esebeck, Deputy Commander; Colonel Rudolf Graf von Marogna- Redwitz, Intelligence (unti l his posting to the AHA). Wehrkreis XVIII (Salzburg): Colonel Wilhelm Freiherr von Salza und Lichtenau, Chief of Staff. (The commander, on the other hand, General Julius Ringel, was an extremely loyal follower of the regime.) Wehrkreis XX (Danzig): Lieutenant-Colonel Hasso von Boehmer, Operations (recruited by Tresckow). Wehrkreis XXI (Poznan): apparently no one. 14 Prague: Colonel Kurt Engelschall, Operations, was probably informed. C-in-C West (Paris): a situation similar to that in Army Group Centre - a whole series of important posts occupied by officers who were either members of the opposition or strongly in sympathy with it. 15 Those senior staff officers in the Wehrkreise to whom Stauffenberg and his fellow-conspirators made known their plans hoped or were expected to active- ly assist in the execution of orders issued from Berlin on the day of the coup. Contacts could not be found or 'installed' in every Wehrkreis, however; postings could always upset the liaison at short notice; signal communications might fail; for overriding reasons the amount of information passed to these contacts was often small. Additional liaison arrangements between the centre and the Wehrkreis were therefore desirable and so special representatives were nominated who were to present themselves to Wehrkreis headquarters on D-Day as liaison officers from OKH. They were members of the inner circle of the conspiracy; they knew the plan, the prerequisites and the aims; they were to be responsible for correct, rational and rapid execution of the orders from Berlin in the various Wehrkreise. 16 Their names, together with those of the Political Representatives detailed to advise Wehrkreis commanders, will be given in Part VIII since their recruitment and briefing took place mainly in the Stauffenberg era. It was naturally impossible, without arousing suspicion, to arrange rehear- sals in all or even many of the Wehrkreise for the coup d'etat, now camouflaged as a 'Valkyrie' operation. Nevertheless this was done in Berlin since the city was plagued by Anglo-American air raids and frequently plunged into a catastrophic situation. Here Major-General von Rost, the Chief of Staff, organized his coup preparations with a thoroughness unknown elsewhere and camouflaged his opposition activities with great sophistication. 17 General Joachim von Kortzfleisch, commander of Wehrkreis III (Berlin), 307 Tresckow and Army Group Centre was an honest and extremely efficient officer, but he held Nazi views and so Rost could not work with him on anything to do with the coup. Instead Rost adopted a bombastic manner, held important discussions with official and Party representatives, gave himself an air of self-importance, organized large festivities in his mess and involved himself in such a whirl of activity that the uninitiated thought that this was what he was really like. He was generally thought to be an ambitious general who had returned from secondment to the Vichy regime in France thinking himself a diplomat and a genius. Behind this fa9ade, however, Rost concealed his real activity. Unfortunately on one occa- sion he made a 'mistake' when he pleaded for a minimum-existence food ra- tion for Russian prisoners of war. This did him great damage and was a con- tributory factor in his posting. In late summer 1943 Stauffenberg and Oertzen spent several days in Wehrkreis HQ, Berlin, working out the special plans for 'Valkyrie' in that area and Rost was of great practical assistance to them. He made it his business to acquire information on the functioning and importance of SS and Party agencies in Berlin and on security precautions taken at radio stations and similar installations. Accordingly, accompanied by his aide, he paid frequent visits to these places, where he was naturally received by dignitaries of equivalent rank. On each occasion precautions against all forms of catastrophe taken by the agency concerned were discussed at length and so he found out what they were. Rost was in general satisfied with broad sweeping statements while his aide, Lieutenant Albrecht, dealt with the details. As often as he could Rost also visited barracks, schools and training areas belonging to the Wehrkreis and, if possible, cautiously briefed commanders or members of their staff on the possibility of a coup and the duties that would fall to them. He had a particularly reliable and knowledgeable ally in Major Meyer, com- manding 9 Training Battalion in Potsdam, and his adjutant, Lieutenant von Gottberg. In autumn 1943 Major-General Helmuth Schwierz, commanding No 1 Pyrotechnical School in Berlin-Lichterfelde, after some hesitation also promised to cooperate. The results of these investigations were passed on to Stauffenberg. Based on them and on his own discoveries during his visit to Wehrkreis headquarters, he then issued General Staff directives for the various preparatory measures. There could be no end to all this work owing to the repeated changes in the situation, continuous fresh air raid damage and the resulting rearrangements. It continued until a few days before 20 July 1944, though with diminished energy after the departure of General von Rost. The repercussions of the war, however, which were always upsetting the preparations also enabled con- tinuous changes to be made in plans to cope with a catastrophe and therefore plans for the coup. During 1943, for instance, and particularly after the start of the very heavy air raids on Berlin in the summer, it was found that inadequate emergency preparations had been made by the responsible agencies such as Goebbels in his capacity as Reich Defence Commissar and his subordinate offices. Wehrkreis HQ thereupon leapt into the breach and General von Rost 308 'Valkyrie' ordered special emergency plans to be worked out within the framework of 'Valkyrie'. With this official cover troops could be moved about quite openly, sometimes to the discomfiture of Party headquarters. Naturally the emergency plans made by Wehrkreis headquarters did not merely serve as preparations for the coup but were also valid for catastrophes in the normal sense and were in fact successfully implemented on several oc- casions. At the same time the planners were entitled to regard these operations as general rehearsals. This happened, for instance, when a par- ticularly heavy air raid took place in November 1943. The government quarter was badly hit and Rost moved in troops from the Armoured School in Kramp- nitz, also alerting 9 Infantry Training Battalion. Goebbels thereupon called Kortzfleisch indignantly and demanded to know 'what fighting vehicles were doing in the government quarter'. From the time of alert the troops had taken barely over an hour to reach the centre of Berlin. As already mentioned, the 'Valkyrie' orders had no political implication. Theoretically it was possible to issue them and set the troops on the move but it was a far cry from that to the occupation of government, SS and Party offices, SS barracks, radio stations and telegraph offices, to the arrest of ministers, Gauleiter and SS commanders. Even if orders were carried out with the blind obedience ascribed to German soldiers — as a matter both of praise and blame - doubts and set-backs would certainly arise if resistance was offered, if someone like the voluble Goebbels refused to comply with this 'nonsense'. From early August 1943 Colonel von Tresckow was wrestling with this problem and at latest by the end of that month he was being assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Graf von Stauffenberg who had more or less recovered from his serious wounds and, when asked by Olbricht in the summer of 1943, had placed himself unreservedly at the disposal of the conspiracy. 18 Understandably the procedures, ideas and activities of Tresckow and Stauffenberg during these weeks in August and September 1943 remain some- what obscure. Both met their death on 20-21 July 1944; the surviving par- ticipants never knew everything and seldom much. Everything else has largely vanished in the upheavals of those days, the continuous revisions of plans and proclamations and the consequential imprecision of people's memories. 19 This much can be established with certainty: about 10 August Stauffenberg came back from sick leave, begun at the end of June and spent in Lautlingen; he went to Munich for an operation preparatory to the fitting of an artificial hand. This had to be postponed, however, because a bone splinter in his right arm began to fester. Also in August Stauffenberg had meetings in Berlin with Olbricht, Tresckow and others; then he returned to Lautlingen where he dis- cussed problems of the coup with his brother Berthold and Professor Rudolf Fahrner. The artificial hand operation due to be performed by Sauerbruch was first postponed for a month but early in September Stauffenberg called it off completely and went to Berlin. There he worked with Tresckow, whom he had known since 1941, primarily on political directives and proclamations. 20 Two sets of questions had to be answered: How much detail of the measures to be taken in the Wehrkreise, particularly in and around Berlin, 309 Tresckow and Army Group Centre could be laid down beforehand? What would be the most convincing explanations and motivations for the initiation of 'Valkyrie' on the day of the coup} To settle the details Tresckow and Stauffenberg contacted officers whom they could trust. These matters could not be dealt with quickly or impetu- ously. Inevitably weeks passed before, for instance, some member of the con- spiracy in an Army school or garrison knew what some new man in Berlin was thinking and had decided whether he could trust him - and even then coopera- tion in emergency was not assured. Stauffenberg in particular had been working indefatigably on this problem ever since September 1943 and his engaging soldierly character had brought him considerable success. The main work of coordination and establishment of a command channel, however, was not done until late 1943 and early 1944. 21 In answer to the question of the explanation to be given for the initiation of 'Valkyrie' the first proposal was to spread the story of a putsch by the SS. 22 This was certainly a possibility; Himmler's peace feelers have already been mentioned. It was not proposed to announce Hitler's death immediately, although his death was considered essential to trigger off the putsch. In the autumn of 1943, however, it was still thought best, at the outset of the coup, to adhere to the story that the struggle was for Hitler not against him. This sprang from a realistic estimate of the mood both of the Army and the people but what practical impact the story would have was still in doubt. It is questionable, moreover, whether it would not have been more effective to lay all the cards on the table at once, as Goerdeler was always demanding, and an- nounce both the assassination and the coup as the work of the Army. 23 One thing is certain however — and this is not mere hindsight — doubts, insincerity and ambiguity on the part of the commanders concerned were unlikely to lead to resolute action. The early drafts of orders and proclamations produced in August and September were continuously revised and changed right up to 20 July 1944; so far none of them have been discovered. The orders actually issued on 20 July are still available since there was little difficulty in collecting them from the various addressees. The Gestapo managed to lay hands on only a few of the originals of these orders and still fewer of the autumn 1943 drafts; those they had were probably destroyed at the end of the war. 24 This much, however, is known with certainty about the contents of these orders: They proclaimed a state of emergency and the assumption of plenary powers on the territory of the Reich by the Wehrmacht under overall command of C-in-C Replacement Army, subordination of all authorities and agencies of the Reich, the Party and the SS, incorporation of the SS into the Army, occupation of supply, traffic and communications installations, arrest of all senior Party and SS functionaries, occupation of the concentration camps and a ban on all arbitrary acts of revenge. 25 Proclamations to the general public described and condemned the behaviour of the Party leaders, explained the imminence of catastrophe and set out plans for a transitional government formed to save the Fatherland; 310 'Valkyrie' peace would be concluded as soon as possible and any further sacrifices would be demanded solely with that end in view, not for the purpose of further con- quests; henceforth legality and justice would rule; the crimes of the previous regime would be punished and order reestablished. Such was the content of a proclamation to the general public. A similar call was made to the soldiery and a third directed particularly at women asking them to use their own special in- fluence for healing, compromise, love and reconciliation. 26 Fair copies of the drafts were made under incredible conditions by Fraulein Margarete von Oven (later Grafin von Hardenberg) who had been secretary both to Colonel-General von Hammerstein and Colonel-General von Fritsch, by Frau von Tresckow and by Grafin von der Schulenburg (later Grafin von Rantzau) who worked in Berlin Wehrkreis headquarters. 27 Tresckow, Stauffenberg and their secretaries would meet at various points in the Grunewald to discuss and exchange papers. At this time neither Tresckow nor Stauffenberg had their own offices. Stauffenberg's predecessor, Colonel Hellmuth Reinhardt, was present for the hand-over throughout the month of October and he was not a member of the conspiracy. Major difficulties were con- tinually being caused by air raids, absence of transport, the necessity to avoid at- tracting attention and the impossibility of using either the telephone or post. On one occasion, after meeting Tresckow and Stauffenberg in the Grunewald, Fraulein von Oven was going down the Trabener Strasse with them with drafts of the orders under her arm when a car full of SS men drew up sharply beside her. The SS men jumped out — but took no notice of the three conspirators and disappeared into a house. 28 Fraulein von Oven worked in gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints on the papers; her typewriter was carefully hidden after use. Out- of-date drafts were destroyed with the utmost care. Destruction of large quan- tities of paper was always a problem since it might easily attract attention. On 29 October 1943 Nina Grafin von Stauffenberg took a whole rucksack full of drafts from Berlin to Bamberg for burning. Wehrkreis headquarters on the Hohenzollerndamm was centrally heated, so papers had to be burnt sheet by sheet in a lavatory pan, the ashes flushed down and the blackened edges of the pan then wiped clean. On the day of the rising Field Marshal von Witzleben was to be asked to assume supreme command of the Wehrmacht and sign the orders proclaiming a state of emergency. When Tresckow showed and explained the drafts to him in the summer or early autumn, he affixed his signature to them without hesitation. 29 It was a far cry to their publication, however. 311 This page intentionally left blank PART VIII/STAUFFENBERG AND THE REPLACEMENT ARMY This page intentionally left blank 35 Stauffenberg's Career Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg was born in Jettingen on 15 November 1907; his family was Catholic and belonged to the ancient Swabian nobility. His father was a high-ranking official in the court of Wurttemberg and later became Marshal of the Court to King Wilhelm II of Wurrtemberg. His mother, nee Grafin von Uxkiill, was a great-granddaughter of Gneisenau and a con- siderable personality in her own right. The castle named Stauffenberg near Hechingen can be traced back to 1262. The brothers Berthold Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and his twin Alexander were two years older; Berthold was later closely involved in the conspiracy and in many respects a leading spirit in it. 1 The three brothers went to the Eberhard-Ludwig-Gymnasium in Stuttgart for a secondary education emphasizing classical studies. Berthold became a lawyer, Alexander a historian and Claus a regular Army officer. Berthold Graf Stauffenberg studied law and political science and the ease with which he did so was the envy of his fellow-students. 2 Later he wished to enter the diplomatic service. After passing his law examination and serving his term at court, he joined the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for International Law in Berlin and in 1931 the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In 1934 he returned to the Institute in Berlin and devoted himself to research. Gradually he specialized in military, particularly naval, law and so, when war broke out, was posted to Naval Headquarters as International Law Adviser. His influence there was considerable; all questions submitted to him were answered with the firm assurance of the legal expert and he contributed in no small degree to stemming the increase of savagery in the conduct of naval warfare. 3 Claus von Stauffenberg first thought of becoming an architect but, after matriculating in 1926, he joined 17 (Bamberg) Cavalry Regiment as a cadet. He was commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant on 1 January 1930 and promoted Lieutenant on 1 May 1933. He attended the Staff College from 1936 to 1938 and was then posted as Ib (Staff officer-Supply) to 1 Light Division in Wuppertal under Lieutenant-General Erich Hoepner. In the autumn he took part in the occupation of the Sudetenland, a year later in the Polish campaign and in May 1940 in the French campaign. On the outbreak of war 1 Light Division had been reorganized as 6 Panzer Division. In May 1940 Stauffenberg was posted to the Organization Section of the Army General Staff where he remained until early 1943. From February to April 1943 he 315 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army served in Africa where he was severely wounded, losing his right hand, the two little fingers of his left hand and his left eye. After months in hospital followed by sick leave which, though long, was too short for real recovery, he was posted on 15 September 1943 as Chief of Staff to the AHA under General Olbricht; he took up his duties on 1 October. 4 Only a short summarized account of Stauffenberg's personality will be given here. Theodor Pfizer, who was a school and college friend, has produced a sympathetic eye-witness account of the Stauffenberg brothers' development and background in their young days; to Eberhard Zeller we owe a more com- prehensive but equally sympathetic and attractive study; Joachim Kramarz and Christian Mu'ller have done careful research and have cleared up many points. 5 The picture of Stauffenberg, however, is still obscured by mis- understandings and well-meant silences and so it cannot be left to the biographers alone. One or two important points will be enough. From expressions used by Stauffenberg many of his colleagues concluded that he welcomed and supported the Nazi regime; not until after 20 July did they wonder whether he had spoken from conviction or to camouflage his real ideas. Stauffenberg always liked discussing political, social or historical questions; he had had a penchant for Greek philosophy since his school days. His fellow-officers had other interests; they were simpler characters and at times were sickened by his continuous political talk which they found preten- tious and tiresome. 6 Many who subsequently became opponents of the regime initially placed their hopes in 'the movement' and gave it their support — Fritz- Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, for instance. Even so determined a sub- sequent opponent of the National-Socialists as Colonel Albrecht Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim was carried away by the SA in 1932—33 and only became more balanced in the mid-1930s under the influence of Colonel Max von Viebahn in 5 Infantry Regiment; Mertz von Quirnheim's eyes were finally opened in the last years before the war. 7 Glaus Graf Stauffenberg was attracted to the platform of the National- Socialist Party initially, as were both his brothers, Alexander and Berthold, his uncle Nikolaus Graf von Uxkiill, and many others among his numerous Franconian and Swabian relatives and in-laws. 8 It was to them natural to be in favour of many things strongly advocated and apparently likely to be achieved by the National-Socialists: they were all in favour of a 'national policy', of removing the restrictions on national sovereignty imposed by the hated Versailles Treaty, of ending reparations, of re-armament to a level com- parable to that of the other great nations, of soldierly virtues and values, of Volksgemeinschaft, of an end to political strife, of order and integrity in ad- ministration and in every-day life as well. There was little if any mention of conquest and war, of winning new Lebensraum; but probably most Germans believed that Austria and the Sudetenland ought to be part of the Reich, and that Germany had certain territorial claims in the east. Such ideas were not the exclusive property of the National-Socialists. It has often been said that on 30 January 1933 Stauffenberg, in uniform, placed himself at the head of an enthusiastic crowd which marched through 316 Stauffenberg's Career Bamberg. 9 This is pure legend; the incident never took place. On the evening of 30 January 1933 there was a torch-light procession through Bamberg organised by the Nazi Party but Stauffenberg did not participate; in any case, as a soldier, he was not permitted to take part in Party demonstrations. 10 The story apparently started with mess gossip and seems to have been based on the following actual occurrence: 11 On 31 January 1933, not on die day of die 'seizure of power' therefore, No 5 Squadron of 17 Cavalry Regiment under command of Captain (as he then was) Hasso von Manteuffel was riding back to barracks from an exercise. Its route led through the town past die town hall where the swastika flag had been hoisted; Manteuffel had been told that the swastika had been raised to the status of national emblem (which was not true) and so he ordered his squadron to ride to attention as they passed it. 12 Manteuffel was given a sharp reprimand, rightly he thought since he had omitted to check whether what he had been told was correct. This comparatively innocent affair, therefore, turned into the legend of Stauffenberg, the enthusiastic National-Socialist. Many officers of 17 Cavalry Regiment, especially the younger ones, approved wholeheartedly of Hitler's 'seizure of power' at the time, and of policies to restore the prestige of the Reich, to expand the Army, and to improve armaments. 13 Stauffenberg agreed with such policies, too, but it was characteristic of him to view things critically, and to voice an opinion running contrary to whatever happened to be the predominant opinion, often for good cause, but often for the sake of dialectical argument. 14 On the occasion of a change in Wehrmacht uniforms decreed by the National-Socialist government, Stauffenberg raised the ques- tion 'most seriously' whether 'even worse things might not follow this measure'. 15 This does not mean that Stauffenberg did not follow Hitler's rise to power and his victory with interest, was not indeed fascinated by them. 16 He was attracted by the new drive which appeared to have 'broken through the crust of bourgeois habits' and opened the way to fresh arrangements; he was also attracted by the 'volkisch* ideal, in other words a community of the people, united and working for the common good, in which conflict would either cease or be muted by knowledge of the community's requirements and a sense of'togetherness'. Reconciliation between nationalists and socialists was equally an aim with which it was difficult to disagree. A man of Stauffenberg's background and education could not easily be a Nazi in the 'movement' as led by Hitler. Among his ancestors, of whom he was very conscious, were the Prussian Field Marshals Graf Neidhart von Gneisenau and Johann Graf Yorck von Wartenburg; his family was not excessively proud of its title but it was conscious of its tradition. He had been a pupil at the Eberhard-Ludwig-Gymnasium in the liberal and democratic at- mosphere of the royal capital of Stuttgart and had inherited the spirit of the school's famous graduates. He had learnt Latin and Greek; he had read classical history, philosophy and poetry. In 1924, as a seventeen-year-old, he had joined Stefan George's circle. 17 Four years before that, writing to Stauffenberg's mother about a photograph of the three brothers, Rainer Mari a Rilke had said that they were 'in many ways lads with a future'. 18 Despite a 317 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army certain undeniable affinity between George's intellectual antecedents and those of many ideas which the Nazis claimed as their own, George and his cir- cle were worlds apart from Nazism as it manifested itself in practice. Certain peculiar aberrations in the George cult which have occasionally been reported, moreover, did not really originate with George himself but rather from certain 'disciples'. 19 The Stauffenberg brothers in particular were opposed to anything false or sham. 20 Stefan George himself evaded the adulation to which he feared that he might be subjected on his sixty-fifth birthday on 12 July 1933. He left Bingen on 8 July and went first to Berlin. Thence he travelled to Wasserburg on Lake Constance, then to Heiden im Appenzell and finally in September to his usual winter resort, Minusio near Locarno. When he died there on 4 December 1933 the three Stauffenberg brothers with eight of their friends were present at his deathbed. 21 The most dangerous affinity between the ideas of George and those of the National-Socialists existed in the vague and irrational concept of das Vblkische and die Volksgemeinschaft. It may be surprising, but it is symp- tomatic not only in Germany but in the rest of the world that not merely irrational nationalists and uprooted mercenaries but also young men of the well-to-do middle classes, in this case of the Frankish-Swabian nobility, brought up on humanist, Catholic or other principles of basic respect and regard for every human being were receptive to such xenophobic ideas. They were anti-humanist and anti-Christian concepts which the twentieth century had inherited from the nineteenth: blood and soil; Lebensraum; whoever will not work shall not eat; or the social-Darwinist theory of life unworthy of preservation. In the 'racial question', also an anti-Christian concept, Stauffenberg, who was a devout Catholic, and his brothers agreed in principle with the idea of control, separate existence and the essentially foreign, non- German character of the Jews, though they objected to extremism and physical cruelty. 22 As Berthold Graf Stauffenberg told his Gestapo in- terrogators after 20 July 1944: 'The basic ideas of National-Socialism were almost all turned into their opposites by the way the regime implemented them.' 23 This is not the place to pursue the inconsistency of approving a theory while objecting to its implementation and its consequences. But the rejection of the regime's methods by Stauffenberg must be noted. Soon after the 1934 purges he must have revised his opinion of Hitler and begun to think about the change or removal of the regime. 24 He often referred to Hitler as 'the wallpaper hanger' and said repeatedly that it was impossible for him to be the subject of a petit-bourgeois. 25 Though approving of the Anschluss with Austria, he disliked the method by which the Sudetenland was annexed and he strongly disapproved of the invasion of Prague and of 'Rump- Czechoslovakia'. He considered this hubris and said to Professor Fahrner: 'The fool is heading for war.' When war actually broke out in September 1939 Stauffenberg bought himself a stock of books, including the works of Leibnitz, which he took with him to the field. He said to his bookseller in Wuppertal that, despite the 318 Stauffenberg's Career horrors of war, it was a relief to be on the move; war, after all, had been his family's trade for centuries. 26 When, contrary to all expectations, the Polish and French campaigns were so brilliantly successful, Stauffenberg once again revised his opinion of Hitler. He acknowledged Hitler's part in these military successes and spoke with respect if not admiration of him. After the battle of Dunkirk he said to his wife: 'That man has got a nose for military matters. In contrast to the generals he knew that the Maginot Line could be pierced... He made a mistake in the enveloping movements at Dunkirk — he won't repeat that.' 27 While on leave he visited his Wuppertal bookseller who found the apparent change in the young officer incomprehensible and said that always before he had been so ready to curse this petit-bourgeois; Stauffenberg replied: 'That man's father was not a petit-bourgeois; that man's father is war.' 28 About this time, after the Polish campaign, Stauffenberg was visited by his uncle, Nikolaus Graf von Uxku'll, and by Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulen- burg, whom he had known before; they told him of what was happening in Germany and behind the lines in Poland and tried to persuade him to take an active part in the opposition. He should try, they said, to obtain a position from which he could intervene. But Stauffenberg was not responsive. 29 For the time being, Stauffenberg devoted himself fully to the profession he had chosen in 1926: soldiering. He was a soldier first, and he meant to con- tribute his part to winning glory for the German arms. 30 Gradually, however, after his transfer to OKH in 1940, he became more and more sceptical and finally condemned both the regime and Hitler himself. 31 During the first winter of the Russian campaign, he seems to have seen matters as did many soldiers to the very end: every effort should be made for victory or for a stalemate achieved by force of arms; that was mere patriotic duty, but it would also set the stage for successful armistice negotiations after a coup. n This duty Stauffenberg did to his very last day with every ounce of his energy, even after he had long begun to conspire against his Fuhrer and Supreme Commander in order to save his country. When Moltke was looking in 1941 or early 1942 for influential officers who might join the resistance movement, he asked Hans Christoph Freiherr von Stauffenberg if anything could be done with his cousin in Army Headquarters. 33 Freiherr von Stauffenberg then asked Berthold von Stauffenberg who replied a few weeks later. According to this report Claus von Stauffenberg replied that the war must first be won and then the brown-shirted plague would be swept away. Until shortly before 20 July 1944 Stauffenberg invariably insisted on the necessity for a military decision. Because Stauffenberg was essentially a soldier he was disgusted by the in- efficiency of the Wehrmacht's leadership as he saw it at close quarters in the General Staff. He was particularly infuriated by Goring's fallacious promises about the capabilities of the Luftwaffe which were never fulfilled. 34 He now thought that the war could no longer be won but in 1942 was still hoping that defeat could be avoided, at least in the east, by a well thought-out arms policy and sensible military leadership. As the hopelessness of the situation became 319 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army clearer towards the end of 1942 and his despair became greater, he was relieved to be posted to the front. 35 On one occasion about this time, when Hitler was being discussed and someone asked how his methods of command could be changed, StaufFenberg replied 'Kill him'. 36 He had already said something similar in the summer of 1942. 37 Stauffenberg also tried to persuade senior commanders in appropriate positions to offer determined resistance, if necessary by concerted action. 3 " But no one was willing to do anything although all admitted the necessity for some 'action'. In January 1943 he visited Field Marshal von Manstein in Taganrog and put to him the necessity for a coup d'etat. 3 * Manstein refused for the well-worn reasons - the eastern front would collapse and mutiny would ruin the Army. After the war he said that, had he thought a coup to be either possible or necessary, he would have done it himself. Soon after this Stauffenberg was transferred to the 'Afrika Korps'. He left Munich about 8 February 1943 to become Staff Officer (Operations) of 10 Panzer Division. Both the divisional commander and Stauffenberg's predecessor had driven over a mine on 4 February; Lieutenant-General Wolfgang Fischer was dead and Colonel Wilhelm Burklin badly wounded. 40 On 7 April 1943 Stauffenberg himself was severely wounded in a low-level air attack near Gafsa. Even at the main dressing station his right hand had to be amputated above the wrist and so did the third and fourth fingers of his left hand; the left eye also had to be removed. Three days later he was taken to hospital in Tunis and thence to Italy on one of the last transports to leave (hi s division went into captivity in May). On 21 April he arrived in a Munich hospital where a middle ear operation was performed and later an operation on a knee joint. From the end of June to early August he was on sick leave in Lautlingen; about 9 August he returned to Munich where a preparatory operation for the fitting of an artificial hand was to take place, but a bone splinter began to fester in his right arm and the operation had to be postponed. Twice during August Stauffenberg visited his wife in Bamberg on his way to or from Berlin, finally returning for a second stay in Lautlingen where he had discussions with his brother Berthold and Professor Fahrner. From the autumn of 1943 to 20 July 1944 Stauffenberg was the real driving force behind the attempt to assassinate Hitler. Many of his acquaintances were struck by the fact that, after his wound, Stauffenberg seemed to be consumed by an urge to intense activity which some took for ambition. 41 In July 1944 Stauffenberg seemed to Colonel Hansen to be nervous, moody and 'burnt out', which Hansen ascribed to his severe wounds; in the summer of 1944 Ferdinand Sauerbruch, the surgeon, also thought that Stauffenberg's state of health totally precluded a project such as he had in mind. Stauffenberg himself was convinced that only through a stroke of fortune had he survived such severe wounds. From his early youth he had felt that he was destined for something out of the ordinary and this, he felt, had now been strikingly confirmed. He told his wife that he felt that he must now do something to save the Reich - but not only that; to Peter Sauer- bruch, the surgeon's son, he once said: 'I could never look the wives and 320 Stauffenberg's Career children of the fallen in the eye if I did not do something to stop this senseless slaughter.' 42 Gerhard Ritter thinks that Stauffenberg had 'a streak of demonic thirst for power'; he adds that 'without Stauffenberg's determination the op- position movement would have been stuck fast in helpless passivity'. What Stauffenberg wanted was to save Germany, to end the war with its millionfold deaths and its destruction. His vision of the future is given in the words of an oath which was intended to bind the members of the conspiracy together; it is quoted by Zeller: 'We wish there to be a new order of society, which will make all Germans supporters of the state, guaranteeing them justice and right, but we despise the lie that all men are equal, and accept the natural ranks. We wish to see a people with its roots deep in the soil of its native country, close to the forces of nature, finding happiness and satisfaction in labouring in the status into which it has been called, and proud to overcome the base emotions of envy and ill-will. We wish to see leaders from all classes of society, bound to the divine forces, taking the lead on the grounds of their highmindedness, virtue and spirit of self-sacrifice.' 43 This was phrased in general terms, but it indicates Stauffenberg's will, documented elsewhere as well, not only to fulfil the obligations of nobility as he saw them, but also to secure for the nobility a significant position in the new social structure of post-war Germany. 44 Until late in 1943 or early 1944, Stauffenberg seems to have had little sympathy for the socialist demand for strong trade unions, and when he adopted it he probably did so for tactical reasons rather than out of conviction. He hoped 'to win over' the workers, and to stave off communism. 45 In the weeks preceding the assassination attempt of 20 July, he still appears to have made only minor concessions to the Social- Democrats when he told the former Bavarian envoy to Berlin, Franz Sperr, on a visit to Bamberg on 6 June 1944: 'The goal was a federal state with very con- siderable autonomy of the member states, with much autonomy in administra- tion, with social reforms, with participation of workers in settling wages, working hours and holidays, and the like.' 46 It must be noted that Sperr was one of the leaders of a Bavarian separatist opposition group; certainly the terms of Stauffenberg's remark are so vague that there was still plenty of room to manoeuvre and to make sure that differences of 'natural ranks' would be respected. But the realization of his or anyone else's ideas depended much less on his convictions than on the political situation after the war. 321 36 Assassination Attempts — Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch On 1 October 1943 Stauffenberg assumed duty as Chief of Staff to the AHA, Berlin, under General Olbricht. Working unofficially during the summer, he had briefed himself on the 'Valkyrie' plans; he was familiar with the subject, having written a prize-winning article 'Thoughts on Home Defence against Enemy Parachute Troops' which probably had some influence on his plan- ning. 1 Shortly after Stauffenberg had officially assumed duty Colonel von Tresckow had to take over a regiment, which more or less divorced him from the centre of the conspiracy. Stauffenberg now applied himself to the creation of conditions for initiation of 'Valkyrie', in other words the 'initial flash'. For the moment plans for the coup were so far advanced that at the end of October Stauffenberg thought that it could be launched about 10 November. 2 He now thought it irresponsible to wait longer or try to win the war first. Force must be used, he said, to put an end to the Nazi regime and its leaders who had lost all sense of proportion and without a qualm were leading the German people to their destruction. 3 But the question remained - how? Two possibilities were under discussion: (1) Hitler could be made prisoner or killed by capturing his headquarters from outside. (2) Some brave man who had an official entree to the headquarters could assassinate him. There was little prospect of a successful attack during one of Hitler's rare 'public' appearances during the latter war years; preparations would almost certainly have been detected and the essential coordination with the coup d'etat measures would have been impossible. In his position and with his contacts Stauffenberg had no great difficulty in keeping informed of Hitler's whereabouts at any particular time. In most cases, however, it was impossible to tell beforehand when or where Hitler would move. Looking for a man who might be prepared to be the assassin, Stauffenberg first thought of Colonel Stieff. He was head of the Organization Section in OKH and so might have access to Hitler. When new weapons and equipment were shown to Hitler, Stieff was standing immediately next to him on several occasions; he was not, however, regularly present at the briefing conferences. 4 In late October Stauffenberg approached Stieff in the OKH camp 'Mauerwald' and asked him whether he could make an attack on Hitler. After profound thought Stieff refused; he kept the explosive, however, which Stauffenberg 322 Assassination Attempts -Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch had brought with him. To the Gestapo and in court Stieff naturally said that he personally had refused to attempt murder and his letters to his wife indicate the same. Nevertheless for a time Stauffenberg must have thought that Stieff would make the attempt - at least he told Professor Fahrner so. 5 The next to be approached was Colonel Joachim Meichssner of the Organization Section of the OKW Operations Staff. He also refused or could see no possibility. He too was not a regular attendant at the briefing con- ferences, but he had to accompany General Buhle a good many times, and in the summer of 1942 he attended Hitler's late-night teas together with Buhle on several occasions. 6 To admit to the Gestapo that his irregular attendance was the reason for refusal would naturally have been suicidal; it was better to give reasons of principle as Stieff and most others did. After his transfer to the Organization Section of the OKW Operations Staff in Potsdam-Eiche Meichssner had no official access to Hitler's conferences, but he had to report to Warlimont, Jodl or sometimes to Keitel. Early in 1944, somewhere between the end of February and the end of May, Stauffenberg himself tried to per- suade Meichssner to make the attempt but either he did not wish to or had thought better of it. 7 Stauffenberg therefore had to look further. He was not a candidate himself because he had no access to the briefing conferences before becoming Chief of Staff to Fromm and then only occasionally — he was seconded with effect from 20 June and finally appointed with effect from 1 July 1944. But he knew nothing of this until Summer 1944. Then Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, who was serving in 9 Infantry Training Battalion, came to his assistance. During the war Schulenburg was one of the mainsprings of the resistance movement and he acted with characteristic intrepidity. Some time in August 1942 he approached Lieutenant von Gottberg; he had been severely wounded, had spent months in hospital emerging as 'fit for home service only' and was Assistant Adjutant of 9 Infantry Training Regiment from May 1942 and Adjutant from September. Schulenburg outlined to him the project of removing Hitler by force and received an assurance of readiness to par- ticipate.* Another member of the battalion was Lieutenant Ewald Heinrich von Kleist, also a member of the conspiracy and one of Schulenburg's proteges. 9 Finally a much-decorated officer, Captain Axel Freiherr von dem Bussche, also came from 9 Infantry Regiment and was a friend of Schulenburg's. For some time Schulenburg had been 'looking around' and in the spring of 1943 had run into serious difficulties for doing so. The rumour had gone round that Schulenburg was looking for 'reliable' officers and at a most unsuitable time - shortly after the Stalingrad catastrophe and the trial of the Scholl group, when the assassination attempts in Smolensk and Berlin had mis- carried and the opposition's active centre in the Abwehr had been destroyed by the removal of Oster, Dohnanyi and others; rumours were rife and even Himmler was beginning to turn towards conspiracy. Schulenburg was forced to submit to an unpleasant interrogation but fortunately was not further harried. 10 He refused to be intimidated and now, in the autumn of 1943, was 323 Stauffenberg the Replacement Army once more actively assisting plans for the coup. He arranged a meeting between Stauffenberg and Bussche. Bussche was a soldier — and a very good one, as he had proved himself to be on innumerable raiding operations; he wore the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class, and the German Cross in Gold; in 1944 he was awarded the Knight's Cross and the Golden War-wounded Badge. Coming from 9 Infantry Regiment he had learnt and imbibed the old solid military principles and ideals of chivalrous warfare and human decency. Like many of his fellow-officers, therefore, he was basically opposed to the regime, an attitude in which he was naturally confirmed by Hitler's explicit ban on any form of chivalrous conduct. 1 ' Having been wounded in the lung in the spring of 1942, Bussche was classed as unfit for front-line service and became adjutant of 23 Reserve Regi- ment in Potsdam. He was personally commissioned by General Olbricht to ensure that, as far as possible, the regiment had no Nazis among its officers. In the summer of 1942 considerable parts of the Replacement Army were moved to Russia as occupation forces and Bussche unexpectedly found himself first in the Ukraine and then in the Crimea as adjutant of his scattered unit. On 5 October 1942 he was present on Dubno airfield in the Ukraine when the mass shooting of some five thousand Jews took place. The experience affected him most deeply. Bussche was present quite by chance and saw everything: the Jews were herded along by Ukrainian SS men, compelled to strip and then to lie face downwards on top of dead or still writhing Jews who had dug the pit and had then been shot; the newcomers were then also killed by a shot in the nape of the neck. The SS men did all this in a calm orderly fashion; they were clearly acting under orders. Bussche had already heard of these things; he knew enough about discipline under a dictatorship to realize that all this must be happening on orders from above, in fact from the highest quarter; moreover it was no isolated incident. But here, for the first time, he was seeing it with his own eyes. He grasped what he had seen: mass murder ordered by the govern- ment whose orders he was carrying out, to which he had sworn an oath and which ruled his country. Bussche remembered the wording of the emergency paragraph, No 227 in the code of common law, which had been taught to recruits in his regiment; it laid down the right of self-defence in emergency 'to defend oneself or another against unlawful attack'. The phrase 'unlawful at- tack' was obviously applicable in this case; it was inconceivable tha t all these men, numbering several thousands, had been lawfully condemned to death. They could not be partisans since there were many women and children among them. Bussche's first thought was to invoke the emergency paragraph and call a halt to the operation, but he realized at once that this was impossible. Even if the SS men had taken any notice of him, which seemed improbable, the 'special treatment' of the Jews would have continued next day both in Dubno and elsewhere. In other words this was a symptom and a mere captain, even a much-bemedalled one, could do nothing about it. Removal of the supreme 324 Assassination Attempts - Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch mass murderer would be more effective. Later, after much thought, there occurred to Bussche another answer to the existential question with which he had been faced in Dubno, the answer of the Christian. He now thinks that he ought to have stripped like the Jews, joined the death queue and lain down in the grave to be shot with the Jews. He would thus have demonstrated that all those involved, the Jews, the murderers and he himself, the captain present by chance, were first and foremost human beings. He would certainly not have been shot and perhaps the 'special treat- ment' would have been suspended on this occasion; perhaps senior com- manders would have come to their senses or a spontaneous resistance move- ment have developed in the Army. More probably Bussche would have been despatched to a lunatic asylum or a concentration camp. In practice the answer of the Christian — to share the sufferings of others — would have been ineffective. After what he had seen in Dubno in the autumn of 1942, however, Bussche was so eager to do something against Hitler that all he wanted was an oppor- tunity. He was still in this state of mind in October 1943 when Schulenburg arranged the meeting between him and Stauffenberg in Du'ppel camp, Berlin- Zehlendorf; a further talk followed in November. Stauffenberg asked Bussche whether he was prepared to attempt the assassination of Hitler and Bussche said that he was. The possibility of a pistol attack was discussed only briefly. The two men agreed that it was too risky and the chances of success too small. The risk of discovery was great; a straight shot could not be guaranteed and there was the belief that Hitler wore a bullet-proof waistcoat. Bussche, of course, had no access to the briefing conferences but Stauffenberg had another plan. In 1942 and 1943 various types of new equipment and uniform were being developed, particularly winter clothing for the fighting in Russia. It should be possible, Stauffenberg thought, to find an opportunity of demonstrating equipment to Hitler using a resolute officer ready to make the attempt and if necessary sacrifice himself— and this could be Bussche. He should conduct the demonstration using three or four soldiers as models, himself explaining the properties of the material and equipment. While doing so he would be carrying a bomb which he would fuse and then jump upon Hitler and clasp him until the explosion took place. Bussche had many advantages which made him the ideal candidate for this sort of demonstration, quite apart from his sense of obligation to do something. He had fought all over the eastern front from Leningrad to the Crimea; he had all the necessary experience and was much bemedalled; moreover he looked 'nordic', a quality much valued at the time. One idea was that Bussche should carry the bomb in his briefcase together with the papers for the demonstration, but this method was not certain enough. A few weeks later Schulenburg was saying to Kleist: 'You must tie that round your stomach." 2 There was no question of demonstrating an 'assault pack'. Critics of the opposition later liked to say that some 'poor inno- cent' ignorant 'private soldier' was to have a bomb planted on him and it 325 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army would then be secretly ignited; but this is a nonsensical story spread by the Gestapo, by Himmler (in his speech to Gauleiter on 3 August 1944), by Roland Freisler, President of the People's Court and by Goebbels. During cross-examination of Major-General Stieff before the People's Court on 7 August 1944 Freisler maintained that this was the plan for the attack in which Stieff was involved; Stieff denied it but Freisler cut him short. 13 The plan was obviously technically impracticable. How was the bomb to be ignited without the soldier noticing and precisely at the unpredictable moment when the group was summoned to Hitler? Who could ensure that at the moment of explosion the dictator and the bomb-carrier were close enough together? It could only have succeeded by chance. In order that he might make further preparations and obtain the explosive Stauffenberg devised some official pretext for Bussche to visit the OKH camp 'Mauerwald' near Lotzen in East Prussia, some ten miles from the Fiihrer's headquarters 'Wolfschanze'. There he discussed all major questions of princi- ple with Stieff and technical details with Major Kuhn. The latter offered him a pack of British plastic explosive with a chemical ten-minute fuse. Its great ad- vantage was that the fuse was completely silent and the explosive extremely powerful, far more so than the normal German explosive. Bussche, however, was not familiar with B ritish equipment; he had no first-hand experience of its effect and was not prepared to rely on second-hand reports. Moreover a delay of ten minutes seemed to him to introduce too many factors of uncertainty. He therefore preferred to use the normal German Army explosive which he knew; this would also eliminate one ambiguity inherent in the use of British explosive. The available stock had in fact been captured during the war and there was no question of it having been 'delivered by the British'; public opi- nion could easily be deceived on this point, however, as in fact happened after 20 July 1944. Bussche accordingly asked Stieff for a kilogramme pack of German pioneer explosive, a yard of fuse, a complete German hand grenade with 4}-second fuse and a personnel mine, all for trial. Bussche, Stieff and Kuhn agreed that a metal-cased bomb was far better and more effective than mere explosive. They suspected, however, that there were concealed electronic devices in the Fuhrer's headquarters which could detect any large-size metal object or weapons. This was also a reason against use of a pistol. Stieff and Kuhn were not able to meet Bussche's requirements at once; procurement of the German explosive and accessories necessitated various cautious manoeuvres. 14 Kuhn, who was working under Stieff in the OKH Organization Section, was concerned primarily with procurement of the explosive. In November 1943 a certain Major Gerhard Knaak passed through 'Mauerwald' on duty; he had been a friend of Kuhn's since 1936 and was now commanding 630 Pioneer Battalion located on the Dnieper east of Orscha, some 2-3 miles behind the front line; the battalion formed part of IV Army Corps which came under Army Group Centre. 15 Kuhn asked Knaak whether he could obtain explosive for an attack on Hitler and Knaak said that he would. On his return journey to the front Knaak was found a lodging in Minsk 326 Assassination Attempts — Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch by Major von Oertzen. In December Knaak received warning of a visit by Lieutenant von Hagen, who worked under Kuhn in the Organization Section, and he arrived shortly afterwards. 16 Hagen had certain official duties to perform on this trip, but he had also been instructed to take delivery of a quantity of normal Army explosive from Major Knaak. Hagen returned two days later with a standard 1-kilogramme charge used for bridge demolitions and a length of fuse. 17 Hand grenades were not held by pioneer units. Bussche took the explosive and fuse and returned to Potsdam. There he ob- tained a hand grenade through his friend Lieutenant von Gottberg who was on the staff of 9 Infantry Training Battalion. He preferred to use the 4{- second hand grenade fuse in spite of its hissing rather than the ten-minute time fuse which was silent. He thought that he could cover the few seconds of noise by clearing his throat and coughing, whereas in ten minutes all sorts of unpredictable things might happen. With the chemical fuse he would have been to a certain extent the prisoner of a machine instead of controlling it. 18 The procurement of a hand grenade was nothing like so simple as it sounds; in fact it was a most dangerous operation. What should a headquarters officer in a training battalion in Germany want with hand grenades? Gottberg took the risk, went to Sergeant-Major Knodel who was in charge of weapons and equipment and asked for two hand grenades. Knodel asked, as he was bound to do, what they were wanted for but accepted the explanation that they were required for certain purposes. Knodel was tactful enough never to refer to the subject again, not even after 20 July and certainly not to the Gestapo. Gottberg took the hand grenades home and Bussche visited him there. Together they extracted the fuses from the grenades. The next day Gottberg and Kleist threw the remains of the hand grenades into the Havel off the Glienicke Bridge. Helped by Gottberg, Bussche then constructed a fuse mechanism which he thought suitable for his purpose. He sawed the haft of the hand grenade in two, leaving the part containing the fuse, and he un- screwed the primer. He shortened the draw-thread which ran down inside the haft, leaving the pull-button so that there was very little play between the but- ton and the haft. In this way only a very small pulling motion would be required instead of the more extensive movement normally necessary. The hand grenade fuse fitted well into the pioneer charge. The whole thing could well be concealed in one of the deep pockets of the wide trousers then normally worn. Bussche was not afraid of having to make too obvious a motion when fusing the bomb since some gesticulation with the hands would be natural when demonstrating and explaining the uniforms. The 4| seconds during which the fuse would hiss was not a long time. After clearing his throat and coughing he would jump on Hitler and hold him until the explosion occurred. To guard against a failure he would carry a long thin knife in his boot. When all was ready and an approximate date had been set for the demonstration of uniforms — Hitler was hardly ever willing to be tied to precise dates — the Berlin conspirators and many others in Germany were given a 'preliminary warning'. Major-General Rost had only to sign and issue 327 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army orders already prepared in order to be in occupation of all Berlin in a very short time. 19 Arthur Nebe, head of the Reich Criminal Police Office, received his first request to hold in readiness the criminal police officers ear-marked for the putsch. 20 From 23 or 25 November Bussche was ready, waiting for a call from OKH. It must be remembered, however, that the procedure would have been approximately as follows: Speer, the Armaments Minister, or Field Marshal Keitel suggests to Hitler an inspection of equipment and tries to ob- tain a date; Hitler agrees but says: not this week, perhaps early December. This would produce a 'schedule' and efforts would then be made through Hitler's Personal Aides to obtain something more precise. In fact this did not produce a date but merely an approximate time envisaged. Apart from com- mitments which he could not alter such as 30 January, 1 May, 20 April and 8/9 November Hitler was not in the habit of fixing dates. If he agreed to something, he was punctual but as far as possible he avoided firm commitments. One day, while waiting for the summons to the demonstration, Bussche was called to Stieff who told him that the equipment earmarked for the demonstration (it was to come from Berlin) had been destroyed or severely damaged in a burnt-out railway truck during one of the recent heavy air raids. It could not be replaced quickly. 21 Stieff said that it would now be best if Bussche returned to the battalion which he commanded on the northern sec- tor of the eastern front. He would be recalled in January when replacement equipment had been obtained. 22 In fact in January 1944 Bussche did receive a telephone call from Stauffenberg asking him to be present for the demonstration which had been re-scheduled. At the same time Stauffenberg sent a teleprint from the AHA asking for Bussche for official duties. But when Bussche asked his divisional commander, who was not in the conspiracy, for leave to go, the general said that he would not have his battalion commanders acting as models for demonstrations of uniforms in East Prussia. Stauffenberg tried again to get Bussche released but the general again said 'No'. A few days later Bussche was severely wounded and lost a leg. He was in hospital for weeks and any active role in the conspiracy was out of the question for him. The little box con- taining the 'bomb' accompanied him through various hospitals until eventual- ly he managed to throw it into a lake in the autumn of 1944. The next in line for an attack on Hitler was Lieutenant Ewald Heinrich von Kleist. After Bussche's efforts had ended in failure and he had been so badly wounded Stauffenberg asked Lieutenant Ewald Heinrich von Kleist whether he was prepared to make the attempt. Kleist asked advice of his father, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, the landowner who had been one of the most resolute opponents of Hitler ever since the start of his dictatorship and had always refused to be intimidated. His answer to his son was that under no cir- cumstances must he miss this opportunity of fulfilling so vital a duty — and anyone who takes the trouble to think out the situation and its implications must realize what that answer must have cost him. 23 Stauffenberg's approach to Kleist was at the end of January 1944. The 328 Assassination Attempts — Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch presentation of uniforms was due to take place early in February, about the llth. After talking to his father Kleist told Stauffenberg that he would do it. Stauffenberg, however, wished to have someone else available with a bomb in case Kleist should fail. Stauffenberg had explosive, and the idea was to use the same type of fusing arrangement as Bussche's, with a hand grenade fuse. Meanwhile preparations for the coup, particularly in Berlin, were checked through once more. Olbricht and Stauffenberg met Major-General Rost and Lieutenant Albrecht in Olbricht's office. 24 Stauffenberg said that the 'flash' was imminent, whereupon Rost replied that the moment was highly un- favourable; he even threatened to withdraw his support but Olbricht and Stauffenberg managed to persuade him. Olbricht said that Germany's military situation was in fact totally hopeless but it might still be possible to save the country's existence; he saw no way other than the coup of avoiding the coming catastrophe. He knew perfectly well, he said, what the con- sequences of failure would be for him and his family but he was nevertheless prepared to risk his neck. Stauffenberg said that the uniform demonstration had been re-scheduled by the Armaments Ministry and this would provide an opportunity of attacking the 'Numbers One to Three' (Hitler, Goring and Himmler). As soon as it took place the codeword would be issued by telephone. After this meeting Rost and Albrecht returned to the office of the City Commandant, where they held prolonged discussions on details of the measures proposed with Lieutenant-General von Hase and Lieutenant- Colonel Hermann Schone, his operations officer. But everyone in Berlin waited for the codeword in vain. For reasons still un- explained this demonstration, too, did not take place. The original plan was to carry the explosive in a briefcase with reports on the trials of the uniforms and equipment, but it was then decided that it should be attached to Kleist's body since, as Schulenburg had remarked, this was by far the surest way. In con- trast to Bussche, however, Kleist never actually saw his 'bomb'. The uniform demonstration finally took place at Klessheim Castle near Salzburg on 7 July. 25 Stieff was present but made no attempt at assassination. 26 Meanwhile Tresckow had been trying in vain to get himself a position offering access to Hitler which would give him the opportunity of making the attempt himself. He first tried to persuade Schmundt to create a new office to be run by him (Tresckow) to assemble, evaluate and forward 'on up' psy- chological and political information. 27 Nothing came of this. Tresckow then renewed his earlier efforts to be nominated deputy and potential successor to Major-General Heusinger, head of the OKH Operations Section. 28 In December 1943 Schlabrendorff flew to OKH from Minsk carrying a letter from Tresckow to Heusinger, but Heusinger refused even to discuss the subject. One more plan and one more attempt are known of before Stauffenberg himself assumed responsibility for carrying out the assassination. In late January Lieutenant Werner von Haeften, who had been severely wounded, was unfit for front-line service and was now Stauffenberg's aide, thought that he might be able to shoot Hitler with a pistol. 29 His brother, Hans-Bernd 329 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army von Haeften, however raised the most serious objections, asking whether Werner was sure that this was a task given him by God and saying that gangster methods should not be used even against gangsters, so Werner von Haeften did not pursue his plan. The last attempt other than Stauffenberg's own and the last for which the initiative stemmed from Tresckow was to be made by Eberhard von Breiten- buch. It was originally intended to be a bomb attack but after much reflection Breitenbuch decided to try with a pistol. 30 In 1940 Breitenbuch had been aide to Witzleben; from August 1943 he oc- cupied the same position with Kluge until Kluge had his car accident. He was now aide to Field Marshal Busch who had taken over Army Group Centre. 31 In the summer of 1943 when Breitenbuch arrived, Tresckow said to him that he had not been posted there merely to go around with the Field Marshal but because his political views were known; it was his job to influence the Field Marshal so that, not only would he tolerate an attack on Hitler, but at the right moment make one or engineer one himself. Breitenbuch had known of all the various attempts and plans ever since summer 1943; he had prearranged codewords with which he warned his wife when some plan was imminent. On 9 March 1944 Colonel-General Zeitzler, Chief of Staff of the Army, telephoned Busch to say that he was required to brief Hitler at a conference in the 'BerghoP on 11 March. 32 As aide to Busch Captain von Breitenbuch had to make the necessary arrangements such as stop-off accommodation in Breslau and accommodation for the crew of Hitler's Focke-Wulf'Condor' which was to fetch the Field Marshal; finally he had to accompany Busch. Shortly after this telephone call, during the lunch break, Major-General (he had been promoted in January) von Tresckow and Major von Oertzen appeared in Breitenbuch's office which adjoined that of C-in-C Army Group Centre. They wished to speak to him alone and all three went into Breiten- buch's bedroom. Tresckow had heard that Breitenbuch was to fly to the Fuhrer's headquarters in two days' time and had hurried across with Oertzen from headquarters Second Army. He now asked Breitenbuch whether he realized what a responsibility he would be carrying that day. He would be holding Germany's fate in his hand; it would depend on him whether this mis- erable war with its air raids on women and children and its hundreds of thousands of casualties was to continue. At the end Oertzen smilingly produced a 'bomb' from his briefcase. This type, Oertzen explained, was a complete certainty and this single specimen had been obtained with great difficulty from Switzerland. It should be concealed underneath the tunic, against the chest and between two buttons; at some suitable opportunity he should ignite the bomb and clasp Hitler until it exploded. Well prepared though he was, Breitenbuch was taken aback by the proposal but he was ready to have the 'bomb' explained to him. It was of metal and looked like a small grenade, 8{ ins long and 3 ins in diameter; it weighed about |b, much the same as a hand grenade.33 The fuse was set in the base turning the base cap could be set for three timings — 1 second, 3 seconds or 3 minutes. Oertzen suggested that it be set at 3 seconds which would be done 330 Assassination Attempts — Bussche, Kleist, Breitenbuch beforehand, not necessarily at the time of igniting. 34 At the right time the fuse was set off by a small button. Breitenbuch was sceptical. He would have no opportunity of testing this bomb or finding out its effect. Since he would be sacrificing himself, it seemed important to have every assurance of success. He foresaw difficulties in ig- niting the bomb unobtrusively in Hitler's presence. Based on his own experience and attempts Tresckow had long since reached the conclusion that no method could be more sure than a bomb with a preset time fuse and that a pistol attack by an individual had virtually no hope of success. On the other hand, in the same way as Bussche had had his own ideas about his bomb, Breitenbuch was only willing to risk and sacrifice his life in a way which he thought reasonable and this Tresckow had to accept. Breitenbuch decided that, being a good pistol shot, he would try that way. He would have to leave his service revolver with his belt in the cloakroom before going into the conference and so he proposed also to carry a loaded 7 65 mm Browning in his trouser pocket. Tresckow pointed out to him that he must aim only for the head or neck since Hitler wore protective clothing against pistol shots. On 9 March 1944 Busch and Breitenbuch flew in Hitler's 'Condor' piloted by Hans Baur from Minsk to Breslau, where Busch spent 10 March with his family. On 11 March they flew on to Salzburg where they arrived about 10 a.m. Tresckow had meanwhile passed a 'preliminary warning' to the con- spirators in Berlin. From Salzburg the Field Marshal and his aide were driven to the 'BerghoP in Hitler's super-charged Mercedes. There was plenty of time before the briefing conference which never took place before midday. Breiten- buch used the interval to send to his wife, as agreed, his valuables such as his rings and wristwatch. As it so happened, on 11 March Field Marshal Busch, Colonel von der Groben, his operations officer, and Captain von Breitenbuch were the only officers summoned to the briefing conference from the front. Usually on such occasions several Commanders-in-Chief and their aides were assembled. Breitenbuch was therefore the only aide from the front who was present. Shortly before the time announced there gathered in the anteroom to the famous great 'hall' of the 'Berghof: Busch, Breitenbuch, Groben, Keitel, Jodl and Goebbels. Breitenbuch had taken off his cap and belt with his 8 mm ser- vice pistol but he still had his loaded Browning in his trouser pocket. Under his arm he carried a briefcase containing the papers which the Field Marshal would need for his briefing and which, as the aide, he would produce as called for. Finally the doors to the conference room opened and a man in SS uniform announced that Hitler invited the gentlemen to enter. Breitenbuch moved towards the door with his briefcase, the last in line as the most junior. The SS man, however, held him by the arm and said that aides were not to be present at the briefing conference that day. Breitenbuch protested and Busch turned round saying that he needed his aide at the briefing. But it was all to no avail; Breitenbuch was not allowed in and Busch had to deal with his papers himself. Even before this Breitenbuch had not exactly been calmness itself but he 331 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army now became a bundle of nerves. He was alone in the great anteroom where from time to time, obviously deliberately, an SS man appeared, did something trivial, took along a drink or simply passed through. From previous experience Breitenbuch knew that these SS men were always to be seen near Hitler and he had some knowledge of the security precautions. In contrast to previous oc- casions, however, this time he had a loaded pistol in his pocket - very difficult to explain if discovered — and he had intended to shoot Hitler. In his state of mind any glance in his direction by an SS man seemed to indicate that his plan was known or suspected. How else could his unusual exclusion from the conference be explained? He was convinced that his plan must have been betrayed or discovered. All he wanted now was to get rid of his useless but dangerous pistol as soon as he could; his plan was clearly impracticable. Whether in fact or in his imagination, however, the watch kept on him was too strict. At last his vigil was over. Busch emerged from the conference and Breiten- buch drove with him to Klessheim Castle near Salzburg where they dined. Then they flew back to Minsk. There Breitenbuch found Tresckow waiting for him in headquarters Army Group Centre and his first words were: 'Well, Breitenbuch, the thing was blown'. 35 Tresckow assumed that one or other of his telephone calls to Berlin had aroused suspicion and led to a tightening of security precautions. Soon after 11 March Breitenbuch had to go to the Obersalzberg once more with Field Marshal Busch but he never even considered making another attempt. Later he said: 'One can only do that sort of thing once.' 36 He did not think that he could stand the nervous strain again and in fact Stauffenberg was the only one of all the potential assassins to do so. Breitenbuch's last visit to Hitler's headquarters with Busch was in Berlin between 15 and 20 April 1945; after talking to the Fuhrer Busch came out saying that the 'great turning point' would come soon and the war would then be won. 332 37 Procurement of Explosive March, April and May 1944 were comparatively 'quiet' months for the con- spiracy since no real opportunity for an assassination attempt presented itself. They were more than fully occupied, however, with all sorts of other endeavours and preparations. The conspirators were patriotic Germans and very good soldiers; they had no wish to damage their country or its Army; their object was to save both from ruin. They therefore took their official duties most seriously and did their utmost to fulfil them. They could only dis- cuss or deal with plans for the coup in greater or less haste, during short momentary intervals or when they would otherwise have been sleeping or resting. This fact must always be remembered since it had a definite influence on the quality of the preparations. 1 Obviously no one could wait until he had more time. The object was to bring the senseless slaughter and destruction to an end, in the interests both of Germany and of mankind and to save the Ger- man Reich. So the work went on; but it was a labour of Sisyphus because something was always happening to upset the carefully constructed house of cards. One of the major difficulties was the procurement of explosive, curious though this may seem for a conspiracy so closely connected with the military; it was even more difficult to keep it. Danger of discovery was great and the conspirators were taking an enormous risk. None of the officers who handled the various 'bombs' could legitimately have them in their possession for more than a day or two. Such things were governed by strict regulations and it would have been difficult to explain, for instance, why Major-General Stieff should be keeping explosives and fuses in his house for weeks at a time. The constancy of all those involved after 20 July explains why the Gestapo were only able to establish roughly the origin and history of the explosive used on that day. Of the attempt of March 1943 the Gestapo knew nothing at all and so never even looked for the bomb intended for use then. As already mentioned, 2 the British 'clams' used by Tresckow and Schlabrendorff for the attempt on 13 March 1943 were recovered in OKH by Schlabrendorff before they had been discovered, were exchanged for a parcel really containing liqueurs and then defused. Schlabrendorff took them to Berlin, where he handed them to Gersdorff during the night 20/21 March. After his own abortive attempt Gersdorff took them back to Army Group Centre and gave them to Tresckow. The Gestapo knew nothing of all this. 333 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army Equally they never knew that, from September 1943 to January 1944, Gersdorff kept a package of British plastic explosive in the guest room of his brother's house in Breslau and eventually took it away with him. 3 As far as can be discovered today, between September 1943 and June 1944 three or four 'major deliveries' of explosive designed for assassination pur- poses took place. The Commission of Inquiry formed by Ami IV of the RSHA (the Gestapo) was really only able to discover two to three. 4 They only made progress, in fact, when lying had become useless and would only lead to un- necessary torture, when, for instance, other precise evidence was available or suicides, such as those of Schrader and Freytag-Loringhoven of the Abwehr, gave them a lead. Actually only two 'deliveries' were discovered — or three counting one consignment which was discovered, 'officialized' and then recap- tured by the conspirators. At least two others were never discovered at all. The prisoners — primarily Stieff, Hagen, Klamroth and Knaak — only ad- mitted what could be extracted from them by torture or otherwise proved to them. Thanks to the steadfastness of their fellow-conspirators the Gestapo never suspected that (for instance) Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Freiherr von Gersdorff or Freiherr von dem Bussche were involved in the procurement of explosive. It seems that the first consignment was a package of captured British plastic explosive in its original wrapping marked 'Hexogen'; this was taken to Berlin by Tresckow in late September or early October 1943 and given to Stauffenberg in October. Stauffenberg personally handed it to Stieff in 'Mauerwald' camp at the end of that month. 5 Stieff kept some of it in his quarters and some in his office in the headquarters in East Prussia. Some time before 20 November Stieff passed the explosive and fuses to Major Kuhn and during the night of 20 November he, together with Lieutenant von Hagen, hid them near a wooden watchtower of 'Mauerwald' camp. The two were seen, but not recognized, by a patrol of 631 Field Security Police Unit. The two made off and the police let loose a tracker dog which located the explosive but then took the trail to the wrong hut, where the search was abandoned. 6 The police handed the explosive over to the Counter-espionage Group of OKH. Lieutenant-Colonel Schrader, the head of the Group, and his Section Head, Colonel Radke, took no action and in December suspended enquiries; the search for the identity of the two officers and the source of the explosive therefore petered out. The head of No 12 Section of the Army General Staff at this time was Colonel Hansen; after discovery of the explosive he summoned Major Kuhn and told him that, via the dog and the patrol, two packages of explosive had landed up in his office; he would have to keep one for the SD. The other he handed back to Kuhn with one or two suitably sarcastic comments. In June 1944 Colonel Wessel Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven became head of the Staff Duties section. At the end of the month he took over the explosive and fuses from Schrader and passed them on to Stauffenberg. 7 Stauffenberg kept them, together with other explosive and fuses, partly in his office and partly in that of Lieutenant-Colonel Fritz von der Lancken in the 334 Procurement of Explosive headquarters of Potsdam District (Wehrbezirk). They were usually returned there in between the various assassination attempts in July. When Bussche had volunteered to make an attempt, Stieff had offered him the British explosive, the same which Kuhn and Hagen had buried. Bussche preferred German material and, through Kuhn and Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard Klamroth of the OKH Organisation Section, Hagen was commissioned to obtain some from Major Knaak, commanding 630 Pioneer Battalion, then located east of Orscha and forming part of IV Corps under Army Group Centre. Hagen flew to Minsk where he was met by Knaak's car, took delivery of the goods and flew back to East Prussia. The consignment consisted of a number of 'grenade fuses, fuse lengths, a box of detonators and two standard explosive charges' which Hagen handed over to Stieff. 8 Stieff kept the explosives in a drawer of his office desk in 'Mauerwald' until March 1944 when the headquarters moved to Berchtesgaden; the fuses he kept in a desk in his quarters. Before the move he took the explosive also to his quarters in East Prussia. At the end of May he made use of a duty trip by Klamroth and Hagen to send everything to Berlin, 9 where it was delivered to Stauffenberg. 10 It is not clear whether this was solely the material obtained from Knaak or whether it included the explosive which had been buried and recovered. A cousin of Colonel von Tresckow, Arnold von Tresckow who worked in OKH/Heereswaffenamt/WaPruf 5 (OKH/Army Weapons Dept./Weapons Testing 5) had also procured explosives of both British and German origin. At the end of 1943 he brought home with him a briefcase full, and later, in April or May 1944, someone sent by Colonel von Tresckow picked it up." On 20 July 1944 Stauffenberg and his aide, Werner von Haeften, had with them two packages of plastic explosive. On the drive from 'Wolfschanze' back to the airport Haeften threw one package out of the car; it was later dis- covered by a pioneer unit and the Gestapo described it as German material, though they originally thought that the explosive actually used in the attack was British. Gestapo reports, however, are not completely definite about the material discovered, referring to it somewhat vaguely as 'a combination of German and British explosive'. 12 The officials of the Technical Institute of Criminology under the Reich Criminal Police Office of the RSHA had no wish to report too precisely; some of them were only too ready to shield those not yet involved in the investigations. 13 The Technical Institute eventually concluded that both the explosive in the package thrown out by Haeften and the explosive actually used were of Ger- man manufacture and the fuses were of British origin. It may well not have been obtained by any of those referred to above or anybody questioned by the Gestapo. In the spring of 1944 WASAG Chemicals Ltd had begun manufacture of an explosive entitled 'Plastit W' in their factories at Reinsdorf and Sythen. After the capture of considerable quantities of the British plastic WASAG had been commissioned to develop something similar and even better for the Ger- man Army. The result was 'Plastit W' consisting of 64% hexogen, 24% dinitrotoluene, 9% mononitronaphtaline, 3% collodium wool and a small quantity of dinitronaphtaline. This explosive had certain very desirable 335 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army qualities; its effect was great and combustion was almost complete. Possibly, therefore, the conspirators thought that they now had a miracle explosive of almost unlimited efficacy. 14 No one after 20 July 1944 ever definitely established who had obtained the explosive used by Stauffenberg or whether, as seems probable, it had been ordered and manufactured specially for the assassination of Hitler. Equally it is not known whether any significance should be attached to the fact that Willi Fromm, manager of the WASAG factory in Reinsdorf, was a cousin of the Colonel-General. 15 In any case Arthur Nebe seems to have been heavily in- volved in the procurement of explosive. Early in 1944 he asked a chemist in his office what weight of explosive was required to give maximum combustion and blast; he was proposing to construct a bomb 'for an attack on Stalin'. The answer was that 5 kilogrammes (ca. 10 Ibs) would be adequate but that less than 2 kilogrammes (ca. 4 Ibs) was no good at all. 16 A fortnight before Stauffenberg's attack a number of British time fuses of the type which he used were ordered and collected from the Technical Institute by an official ofAmt IV AI I in the RSHA. 336 38 Communications Planning Even since the opposition had seriously considered killing Hitler in his headquarters or, as the phrase was, 'cordoning ofF the headquarters, much thought had been given to the technical signals problem of cutting the headquarters off from the outside world. If Hitler was only to be arrested there was no hope of success unless it could be so cut off; he would have been able personally to issue counter-orders and make speeches; hardly anyone would have listened to the conspirators. Even if Hitler were dead, however, his remaining entourage might create many difficulties. Keitel, Jodl and Donitz in particular were loyal followers; Goring and Himmler were less loyal but no less dangerous. If they were present in the headquarters when an assassina- tion attempt was made, but not at the briefing conference, they could probably rapidly take control of the entire machine. If the coup was to succeed, therefore, if the measures taken in Berlin, other German cities and the oc- cupied territories were not to be subjected to pressures from the old rulers, it was essential that technical signals precautions be taken to isolate the headquarters, at least for the first few hours. For this the conspirators could count on active assistance from a number of outstanding experts in the Army signals service. The most important was General Erich Fellgiebel; both his fellow-officers and his subordinates had an extraordinarily high opinion of him; he was regarded as a highly-educated, sensitive soldier, upright and human, well versed in the natural sciences with a bent for philosophy and an outstanding expert in everything to do with com- munications. 1 Even before the war Fellgiebel had been an outspoken critic of the regime, although he knew that his telephone had been tapped before 1938. He also knew, however, how indispensable he was; he remained fearless and straightforward. He loathed Hitler as an unintelligent inhuman tyrant; in wartime he loathed him even more as a militarily incompetent, culpable in- stigator of destruction. In his capacity as Chief of Wehrmacht-Nachrichten- Verbindungen (WNV, Wehrmacht Communications) and at the same time Chief of Heeres-Nachrichten-Wesen (HNW, Army Communications) Fellgiebel had undisputed authority over all Army communications provided he remained within the directives of his military superiors (Hitler, Keitel and until December 1941 Brauchitsch). Despite his title of Chief WNV, however, 337 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army his authority over Wehrmacht communications was limited to those running to the so-called OKW theatres of war and he had no authority over those of the Navy and Luftwaffe. In their case he had no right even to know about their system and the same applied to the SS. 2 Fellgiebel's Chief of Staff in his capacity as Army Chief Signals Officer was Colonel Kurt Hahn and his Chief of Staff as Chief WNV was Lieutenant- General Fritz Thiele; both were members of the conspiracy, were ready ac- tively to assist the coup and knew all about it. Fellgiebel and Hahn were located with OKH, usually in 'Mauerwald' camp, but when the Fuhrer's headquarters was in the 'Berghof they were often in Berchtesgaden. Thiele had his permanent office in the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin. Other members of the conspiracy in the Army Signals Directorate were: Major Heinz Burchardt, head of the Coordination Group (Personnel); Major Hopfner, head of Group IV (Radio communications) and from 10 July head of Group I (Operations, organization, training); Major Binder, Hopfner's successor as head of Group IV; Lieutenant-Colonel Maultzsch, Hopfner's predecessor as head of Group I (on 10 July 1944 he was posted as a regimental commander in II Corps where Tresckow was Chief of Staff); Major Degner, head of Group V (Transport communications). In July 1944 some of these were still in 'Mauerwald' and some in 'Zeppelin' camp near Zossen since at that time OKH was in process of transfer to 'Maybach' camp, Zossen. To ensure a smooth change the exchanges and circuits existing in East Prussia had been precisely reproduced in Zossen; even the nomenclature was retained with the addition 'Bu' (bunker). Thus 'Anna' ('Mauerwald') in East Prussia became 'Anna-Bu' in Zossen, 'Emma' (Lotzen) became 'Emma-Bu', 'Nora' (Angerburg) 'Nora-Bu' and so forth. The move was cancelled when the Fuhrer's headquarters remained in 'Wolfschanze' after 20 July. 3 Finally another conspirator must be mentioned — Colonel Kurt Hassel, Chief of Signals to C-in-C Replacement Army and in this capacity a subordinate of General Olbricht. In spring or summer 1943 a meeting took place in Olbricht's house at which Beck, Goerdeler and F. D. v.d. Schulenburg were present. Fellgiebel told them that, when the proposed attack and coup happened, he would 'secure' the signals communications for the use of the conspiracy, in other words 'all necessary orders and information from the conspirators would be passed through smoothly, while other subscribers would be cut off. Some weeks before 20 July and again early in that month he reiterated his promise to Stauffenberg. On the other hand he never promised that he would destroy or cause to be destroyed any signals installations. 4 Four means of communication were available to the Fuhrer's head- quarters: telephone, teleprinter, radio (both speech and morse), a courier ser- vice by land and air. If telephone communications failed, the teleprinter was still available; both used the same cables, exchanges and repeater stations, however, so if the circuit was broken, by cable-cutting for instance, teleprint communications would fail also. Even then the radio and courier services still remained. 338 Communications Planning The courier service could only be interrupted by physical force, by cor- doning off the headquarters, and this would have to be done by 'reliable' units stationed in the immediate vicinity. This would take at least one to two hours, however; only in the later stages could one hope to have the necessary number of troops available and even then there was likely to be fighting with neighbouring SS and Police units which were under the orders of Himmler. In the first few hours, therefore, couriers might get through, though their chances of achieving anything were small. Equally it was almost impossible to interrupt radio traffic from the headquarters by anything other than force and this the handful of conspirators would not have available in the first few hours. There were sets in Hitler's special train known as 'Brandenburg' and the special trains 'Braunschweig' (Keitel) and 'Franken I and II' (OKW Operations Staff). The trains were parked outside the restricted areas and were not normally accessible; again soldiers would be required to enforce wireless silence. Moreover, when parked in stations, the trains were always connected to the telephone and teleprinter network. Other sets were located on Rastenburg airfield, in the headquarters of Goring, Himmler and Ribbentrop and in that of Fuhrer Air Com- munications Detachment; the main headquarters radio station was at Heiligenlinde, some 12 miles from 'Wolfschanze'. The Reich Press officer had his own set in the headquarters and no one knew precisely what Martin Bor- mann had, but he certainly had his own telephone and teleprinter lines. Similar radio facilities were available in Berchtesgaden, Berlin and Vinnitsa in the Ukraine. In practice, therefore, radio communications could only be stopped on orders. Bormann, Himmler and Ribbentrop were unlikely to obey orders given by Fellgiebel and he would have no troops with which to enforce them. Nevertheless he was justified in hoping that, in the first few hours when sur- prise and confusion would reign, radio might prove too complicated for any effective counter-action by the regime. Where the wave-lengths concerned were known or could be monitored, they could be jammed. Older officers (in the Wehrkreise for instance) might be as sceptical about a radio message com- ing suddenly over the air as they proved to be about the telephoned orders from the Bendlerstrasse in Berlin given by unauthorized officers. Asking questions over the radio was difficult and private conversation impossible. The most important means of communication, therefore, remained the telephone and teleprinter. In this field Fellgiebel really was the master, always provided that his direc- tives accorded with those of his superiors. At the time in question the Fiihrer's headquarters might be in either 'Wolfschanze' or the 'Berghof' and both were connected by telephone and teleprint to: all Army Group headquarters, headquarters of Wehrmacht C's-in-C and commanders in the occupied territories, ministries in Berlin or in their emergency location, the RSHA, Wehrkreis headquarters, Himmler's, Goring's and Ribbentrop's headquarters in the field and so forth. The exchanges in the 'BerghoP were connected or 'looped' to these various stations via repeater stations in Au (and thence to 339 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army Salzburg) and Bad Reichenhall-Rosenheim. The 'Wolf sen anze' exchanges were looped via Rastenburg and Angerburg. Later (from end 1942/early 1943) there was an additional cable via Rhein and Lotzen. 5 Apart from Hermann's secret lines, therefore, an order from Fellgiebel should have been enough to isolate either of the headquarters; all he had to do was to instruct the repeater stations to pass no long-distance traffic. This was, of course, no small matter and depended on cooperation by the technicians in the repeater stations since no destruction of installations was being considered. For normal telephone traffic 'carrier frequency output circuits' were in- stalled in the repeater stations. The low speech frequency was transposed on to one of 160,000 cycles per second used by the transmitter and separated at the receiving end. This produced better range and cable load than with a lower frequency. The low-frequency lines were retained, however, and used for ser- vice communications between the repeater stations. If carrier frequency traffic was interrupted, therefore, the low-frequency lines between repeater stations would still be available; to put these out of action the cables would have to be cut at distribution points. Communications could, therefore, be blocked by issuance of orders, but not completely. It would be complete enough, however, if the previous rulers were prevented from issuing orders by other means or if their orders were no longer being obeyed. Fellgiebel hoped that his great authority would be enough to en- sure that his orders were obeyed even by the SS; of course they would not do so out of sympathy for him or the coup, but he hoped to convince them that nothing but damage to the regime's interests could result if news of the coup were allowed to penetrate to the outside world. This was one of the reasons in favour of spreading the story that the regime was being protected against a putsch by the Party or SS. There remained the secret circuits and connections (there were no actual secret lines), Bormann had a secret teleprint circuit running from his bunker in Area I to the teleprint exchange in Area II, by-passing the telephone exchange; this enabled him to send and receive teleprints direct from his bunker. His circuits were naturally routed through the repeater stations but the Post Office officials there did not know exactly how they were routed (i.e. through which terminals and switchboard positions) nor therefore how they could be cut. To be certain they would have to disconnect all terminals and positions and this would take a long time, at least a whole day if no damage was to be done; there was therefore no object in it. Moreover it would have taken an equally long time to put the repeater stations back to normal. In addi- tion to Bormann's there were probably other secret circuits around the headquarters; Himmler very probably had one and possibly also Goring and Ribbentrop. Unless, therefore, lasting damage was to be done by cutting cables in the repeater stations, these circuits could not be interrupted; the only alternative was to find Post Office officials who would cooperate and it was obviously im- probable that an adequate number could be found and persuaded. For the mere issuance of his orders Fellgiebel would have had to divulge much that 340 Communications Planning could not have been kept secret. He could therefore only rely on the knowledge and goodwill of the Post Office people. Fellgiebel's successor, General Albert Praun, who did not know all the details, criticized the preparations made by Fellgiebel and his fellow-conspirators as inadequate and imprecise; at the same time, however, he admitted that it was not practical to give junior and medium-level personnel the information necessary for thorough preparation. 6 Major Wolf, commanding the Fuhrer Signals Detachment, described the situation as follows: 'Technically it would have been easier for two or three junior Post Office officials to isolate 'Wolfschanze' than it was for Fellgiebel or Hahn. For them it was almost impossible to find the assistance essential for their project. Had the coup succeeded, of course, there would have been a good chance of their orders being executed.' The primary object on the day of the coup was not to stop all communica- tion between the Fuhrer's headquarters and the outside world but to gain con- trol of the Wehrmacht and the apparatus of military command as quickly and smoothly as possible. Fellgiebel's orders and his precautions should have been adequate for this, always provided that the assassination attempt succeeded. Other existing secret channels such as those of the SS, the Party, perhaps the Gestapo, the SD and the Foreign Ministry could have been brought under control after the first two or three hours. This could have been done by super- vision and checking in the repeater stations. A complete stoppage of com- munications was not in the interests of the conspiracy. The newly-to-be- formed government would wish to end the war as quickly as possible but it would not wish simply to allow the fronts to collapse; it needed the existing command apparatus to ensure an orderly withdrawal, particularly in the west, and maintenance of the front in the east. Both from the military and technical points of view any destruction or prolonged paralysation of com- munications would have been madness. Particularly in the immediate post-war years Fellgiebel has been presented as the man who, next to Stauffenberg, was responsible for the failure of the coup. The main reason for the collapse of the coup d'etat, it was said, was the failure of the assassination attempt, but all could still have been saved had Fellgiebel done his job and blown up the telephone exchange in 'Wolfschanze'. 7 It was even maintained that the second package of explosive which Stauffenberg and Haeften had with them, was intended for this pur- pose (in that case why did they take it away again and throw it away?). These criticisms of Fellgiebel stem, not from first-hand witnesses but from hearsay. No primary sources say that Fellgiebel promised personally to destroy the telephone exchange in 'Wolfschanze', Area I. To some extent the idea that on the day of the coup Fellgiebel was supposed to destroy certain signals installations is based on his and Hahn's statements to the Gestapo; they said that they had agreed 'to act when the coup took place. There was therefore no need for much preparation'. 8 This was misleading and was in- tended, as in fact it did, to save the lives of other conspirators and people with knowledge of the secret. In fact the preparations made by Fellgiebel, Hahn and Thiele were as com- 341 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army prehensive as they could possibly be. In no less than five sections of the Army Chief Signals Officer's office were leading members of the conspiracy or semi- initiated supporters. 9 Fellgiebel therefore merits no criticism. It cannot be overemphasized that destruction of the telephone communications in 'Wolfschanze', Area I, was impossible in the first place and senseless as well. The signals bunker in 'Wolfschanze', Area I, was proof against the heaviest bomb then in use in any air force. Even if an explosion had been set off inside it (and Fellgiebel would never have done this without first clearing it of any oc- cupants, which again would have made success questionable), the damage would have been very limited. There would have been a great tangle, the switchboards and keys would have been destroyed, numerous wires cut and the interior of the vital Area I exchange wrecked. Nevertheless within at most half an hour a repair squad would have been able to reestablish some form of communication and it would have been possible once more to telephone from the exchange bunker. If entry into the bunker was inadvisable, for fear of further explosions for instance, there were sufficient other possibilities. Outside the bunker were cable inspection pits, one on the north and one on the south where there was an annex to the bunker. Technicians could easily have reestablished com- munications using emergency equipment. Fellgiebel would therefore have had to blow up the pits as well but that would have required a total of three charges and an equal number of accomplices. The inspection pits were nearly bomb-proof and were fitted with heavy steel and concrete manhole covers which could only be lifted with special gear stored in the bunker - a further difficulty in placing the charges. All wires would probably not have been cut so that one or two telephones could quickly have been reconnected. 10 In the im- probable event that damage to the pits had made this impossible or imprac- ticable a number of cable check-points existed throughout the headquarters installation where access to the cables (3-6 ft underground) was possible without digging them up. Finally there were connections at 'Gorlitz' station, already mentioned; this was outside Area I but still only a few hundred yards from the centre of the Fuhrer's headquarters. Detailed examination, therefore, shows that, even using force, it was almost impossible to eliminate the Area I signal centre for more than half an hour- to do so Fellgiebel would have had to arrive with a regular demolition party and systematically blow up everything. In any case, owing to the decentralization of communications within the headquarters, such an operation would not have been effective. Allowance had been made for the loss of one signals bunker and so the telephone exchange had been located in Area I and the teleprinter exchange in Area II. It would have been possible, without great difficulty, to telephone from the teleprinter exchange, at least to the most im- portant points in all German-controlled territory including Berlin and the Wehrkreis headquarters. This could also have been done from Bormann's bunker in Area I (the necessary equipment could have been quickly produced) since, as already mentioned, Bormann's secret teleprinter circuit ran direct to the teleprinter exchange, by-passing the Area I exchange. Bormann and the 342 Communications Planning Reich Press Officer also had direct circuits to Berlin for normal newspaper teleprint traffic. 11 Finally there was a further security precaution which would have prevented the total isolation of the Fuhrer's headquarters, even had the destruction of both exchanges been practicable. In autumn 1943, to guard against just such an eventuality, construction of a 'tented camp exchange' had been planned and it had been tested on 1 and 2 October. 12 The test had shown that, even if the entire Fukrer's headquarters were destroyed, construction of a full tented camp with all essential communications would not take more than four to five hours. If the headquarters had not been totally destroyed, of course, less time would be required. The opposition did not, therefore, really need or want the destruction of specific bunkers or exchanges. What they required was some procedure which, during the first few hours of the coup, would prevent the previous regime using the communications but allow the conspirators to do so. This was the solution towards which Fellgiebel and his associates were working and they were continually discussing the problem and its implications with Stauffenberg, Stieff and General Wagner, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Army. The best method was to gain control of the East Prussian repeater stations, Rastenburg, Angerburg, Allenstein and, in the case of OKH, Lotzen. These were the vulnerable points through which all the 'Wolfschanze' communications ran. Secondly control must be established over the exchanges in the OKH camp 'Zeppelin' near Zossen and in the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin. Starting in spring 1943, if not earlier, Hahn was primarily responsible for recruiting officers in important posts and he also engineered a number of postings. 13 As planning proceeded it naturally became clear that, if the headquarters in question were to be completely cut off, a considerable organization and highly complicated preparations were required. 14 For a time the conspirators wondered whether to recruit NCOS as well as officers but eventually abandoned the idea since most NCOs had been in the Hitler Youth and were not, therefore, so firm or 'reliable' in their attitude or views as the officers. 15 Should the assassination attempt take place in the 'Berghof', the repeater stations in Berchtesgaden, Salzburg, Bad Reichenhall and Rosenheim would be blocked. Munich too was of major importance in the south and would have to be paralysed, although it could be by-passed through other stations. Fellgiebel did not rate the importance of radio communications and 'secret lines' very high; the lines were in fact only circuits in the repeater stations and their effectiveness for military purposes was very limited. 16 On 22 May 1944 Fellgiebel told his aide, Lieutenant Arntz, of the plan in broad terms; should the coup take place in the south Arntz was to be responsible for 'securing' the repeater station in Salzburg; Berchtesgaden, Bad Reichenhall and Rosenheim were to be dealt with by others whom Fellgiebel did not name. He himself in- tended to take over the telephone exchange in the 'Berghof. Instructions for 'Wolfschanze' were similar. Once Hitler had been killed, 343 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army Fellgiebel proposed to order the repeater stations in Rastenburg, Lotzen and Angerburg to switch off. As a security precaution they were camouflaged and, in Rastenburg for instance, were not invariably located in the post office; their position was known, however, to the army signals authorities. 17 Here again Arntz was commissioned to go to Lotzen on the day in question in a motor- cycle and side-car and pass on orders from Fellgiebel or Hahn to disconnect all terminals; he was only given his detailed instructions, however, on the mor- ning of 20 July. In OKH Hahn was to do the necessary and silence station 'Anna'. In addition Hahn attempted to draw someone in 'Wolfschanze' into the conspiracy — Lieutenant-Colonel Sander, the Wehrmacht Signals Officer. Despite orders to the contrary from Lieutenant-General Schmundt, at Hahn's request Sander kept Fellgiebel continuously informed of Hitler's movements and any planned shift of the headquarters. But he would go no further. When Hahn tried to persuade him to install secret teleprinters in his own office and that of Hahn in 'Mauerwald', Sander was not prepared to do so; so large a machine, he thought, would certainly attract the attention of visitors and others in the headquarters; there were already enough in Area II and he needed no more. It would, of course, have been of great advantage to the con- spirators to have a more or less private circuit available. All Fellgiebel's plans were based on the assumption that Hitler would be successfully assassinated. Otherwise he would still be tied to Hitler's and Keitel's orders which he could only contravene for a very short time without being relieved of his office. There was therefore no plan to cater for the failure of the attempt; if this happened, nothing could be done. This seems curious since it means that, if the attempt failed and was then discovered, all was lost. Action should not have been entirely dependent on the success of the attempt; at least some effort should have been made to proceed with the coup d'etat or to show the world that the opposition was active and prepared to stake everything — as indeed it did. But there was no plan to do so; it would have been a plan for failure. The conspiracy as a whole did not deal in alternative plans. 18 Such things could only be discussed, if at all, in the inmost circle. Success was dependent on numerous waverers and, had there not been an air of complete confidence, they could not have been carried along; everything, therefore, had to be based on the certainty of success. It seems, however, that even in the inner circle everyone was convinced that the bomb would do its work - provided it went off. For them failure meant primarily failure of the bomb to explode and this did not necessarily entail detection. They had already lived through a bomb failure followed by non-discovery. On the other hand they had no experience of the effect of the explosive under the actual con- ditions in which the attempt would be made; there was a limit to the amount of testing that could be done. In Berlin preparations were concentrated on the 'Zeppelin' exchange near Zossen, the Bendlerstrasse office block and naval headquarters. No access to or control over Luftwaffe communications seemed possible. In autumn 1943 Berthold Graf von Stauffenberg, Captain Alfred Kranzfelder and Dr Sydney 344 Communications Planning Jessen, all of naval headquarters, joined the conspiracy and they approached Captain Kupfer, head of the signal section in naval headquarters; he agreed to ensure that, when the coup took place, teleprinter messages from the con- spirators would be passed without delay and that his channels would be closed to any counter-orders. Towards the end of November 1943, however, naval headquarters was dispersed to various localities outside Berlin such as camp 'Bismarck' near Eberswalde and camp 'Koralle' near Bernau and Kupfer had consequently to withdraw his promise. Central control of naval com- munications no longer seemed possible. 19 Colonel Hahn was more successful in his efforts to control the exchange and repeater station in Zossen. From autumn 1943 cautious hints were dropped to Majors Burchardt, Degner and Hopfner, the heads of the Signals Sections, about a possible 'happening'. From October 1943 they were more or less in a state of perma- nent alert, awaiting developments. They and other officers were only gradual- ly let further into the secret early in 1944, particularly between March and June, when various talks were held, some in East Prussia and some in the Strub barracks near Berchtesgaden. On 19 March 1944 Colonel Hahn came into Degner's office in 'Mauerwald' and said: 'Stalin's on his deathbed'. Hitler was then in Berchtesgaden but was expected back in 'Wolfschanze' in one or two days time. It was anticipated that he would fly and, according to Hahn's information, the aircraft was to be shot down over the Bohmerwald. But Hitler came by train. 20 As on future oc- casions, Hahn's remark indicated to Degner that within his sphere, in other words in 'Mauerwald', he should ensure that communications remained open to the conspirators but were blocked for the previous rulers as soon as the assassination took place. As long as OKH, and therefore Fellgiebel's staff, were still in 'Mauerwald', this was not too difficult. Degner worked out the necessary measures and was ready to enforce them at any time. After the move to Zossen in mid-July 1944 he had to make fresh preparations and with speed. This he succeeded in doing; he was soon on such good terms with the Post Office officials in charge of the cable and switching stations (whom he knew already) that he was given a pass to enter Post Office premises. He was thus able to locate the important terminals where the main lines linking 'Zeppelin' and 'Wolfschanze' should be cut. Similarly, as time went on and they talked further with Fellgiebel and Hahn, Burchardt and Hopfner became increasingly involved with the oppos- tion and were given more details of the plans. On 13 or 14 July 1944 they were fully briefed by Hahn in Zossen largely on the lines of what actually happened on 20 July. 21 When the moment came, Thiele in the Bendlerstrasse was to issue the necessary orders to Zossen. Codewords were agreed which Hahn was to pass to Zossen from East Prussia. 'The signals equipment is leaving on the 15th' meant 'The attack will take place on the 15th'. 'The signals equip- ment has left' meant 'The assassination has taken place'. 22 In addition to the preparations made by Fellgiebel and Hahn General Olbricht took a hand in the control of communications and initiated the 345 Stauffenberg and the Replacement Army necessary measures. Unfortunately there was a certain lack of cooperation between Colonel Hahn, Chief of Staff to the Army Chief Signals Officer, and Colonel Hassel, Chief Signals Officer (from 30 November 1943) to C-in-C Replacement Army. 23 As head of the Wehrmacht Communications Group of OKW Lieutenant-General Thiele was a direct subordinate of Fellgiebel who in turn, in his capacity as Wehrmacht Communications Officer was under the OKW Operations Staff; Thiele therefore had Chief of Staff status, although Fellgiebel had formally no staff dealing with Wehrmacht communications; Colonel Hassel, on the other hand, was the most senior signals officer in HQ Replacement Army and was directly subordinate to the head of the AHA, General Olbricht. 24 Thiele had the wider command authority; he commanded two High-Command Signals Regiments and the following staff sections: Radio Communications, Long-distance Communications, Special Duties, Codes and Ciphers, Technical Signals Resources. 25 Colonel Hassel was in charge of the Signals Units Section (Inspectorate, one of the 'arms' sections in AHA), of the Signals Service Section, Signals Equipment Section and Female Personnel Section. 26 As part of the Signals Service Section under Colonel Kollner, Hassel was in charge of the signal centre in the Bendlerstrasse but he had no authority over the OKH centre in 'Maybach' camp near Zossen which was known as 'Zeppelin' and primarily served the field Army. Colonel Kollner's office was in the rear wing of the Bendlerstrasse block; behind and adjoining this wing was the exchange which was concrete-protected and had therefore turned into a bunker. 27 Hassel's office, on the other hand, had been evacuated and was in Diippel camp in Zehlendorf. On 21 November 1942, when the Stalingrad army had been surrounded, Hassel was present at a meeting in Thiele's office with Fellgiebel and certain others. 28 Fellgiebel outlined the war situation, concluding with the statement that the war was clearly lost. Somehow, he said, the leadership must be 'changed'. The next day Hassel had to report to Olbricht. They agreed that the military situation was bad and Olbricht seized the opportunity to instruct Hassel to compile a list of vulnerable communications points to be guarded in the event of internal disturbances. There were so many foreign workers in and around Berlin, he said, and disturbances were possible at any time; 'Valkyrie' units had, of course, been earmarked for vulnerable points but more should be done for particularly sensitive signals installations; finally not only the Wehr- macht communications were important but also those of the SS, the RSHA and the Propaganda Ministry. Hassel suggested in addition the main telegraph office, the Foreign Ministry, the radio stations at Nauen, Strausberg and Rangsdorf airfield and certain other agencies located around Berlin. Hassel compiled a list and brought it to Olbricht who put it in his safe. The list also showed troops required for the protection of each 'vulnerable point'; for the main broadcasting station, for instance, a company was earmarked. 29 On 1 May 1943 Hassel was posted as Signals Officer of Sixteenth Army but he returned to Berlin on 1 November and was appointed Signals Officer to C- in-C Replacement Army on the 30th. Olbricht and Stauffenberg frequently 346 Communications Planning discussed plans for the coup in Hassel's presence; he was regarded as a member of the conspiracy. Olbricht said to Hassel that, now he was back, they must work together as they had before. This applied mainly to the organiza- tion for 'vulnerable points', to changes in the plan made necessary by various moves and assembly of the necessary troops to occupy repeater stations, telegraph offices and radio installations near Berlin. 30 Early in July 1944 Hassel arranged for a party of twenty officers to deal with certain important communications objectives on the day of the coup. On the evening of 14 July he was given a definite date for the first time — 15 July. Thiele summoned Hassel to his house to tell him. 31 Hassel ordered the officers concerned, in- cluding Major Kempe, to remain on call during the weekend. 347 39 Internal Political Planning A word must now be said about the final preparations in the field of internal politics. Here non-military personalities and groups dominated the scene and the differentiation between the civilian side of the opposition and the special interests of the military is quite clear. Since the first few hours of the coup were inevitably governed by the military action and the revolt never progressed beyond this stage, the next part of this book necessarily deals primarily with soldiers and their activities; nevertheless the decisive, fun- damental importance of the civilian element in the opposition must not be forgotten. In the preparatory phase it played the major role in deciding the aims of the movement and, when resistance was being houn