What
Does
Quebec
Mfent?
ANDRE BERNARD
What
Does
Quebec
Want?
James Lorimer & Company, Publishers
Toronto 1978
Copyright © 1978 by Andre Bernard. All rights reserved. No part of
this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechnical, including photocopying, or by any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
ISBN 0-88862-139-6 Cloth
0-88862-138-8 Paper
James Lorimer & Company, Publishers
Egerton Ryerson Memorial Building
35 Britain Street
Toronto, Ontario
Design by Don Fernley
Printed and bound in Canada
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Bernard, Andre, 1939-
What does Quebec want?
Bibliography: p.
ISBN 0-88862-139-6 bd. ISBN 0-88862-138-8 pa.
1. Quebec (Province)—Politics and government—1960- I. Title.
FC2925.2.B47 971.4'04 C77-001791-6
F1034.2.B47
Contents
PREFACE 9
INTRODUCTION 11
I: WHAT?
Introduction 23
1. National Survival 24
2. Economic Well-Being 48
3. The Idea of a Homeland 71
II: HOW?
Introduction 99
4. Political Sovereignty 105
5. The Federalist Solution 127
6. Third Options 137
CONCLUSION 153
Suggested Reading 159
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Growth of Support for Nationalist Parties in Quebec 18
Figure 2 Map Showing French Language Territory in Canada 36
Figure 3 An Illustration of Income Distribution in Quebec
Households, 1976 61
Figure 4 Distribution of Quebec Private Sector Employment and
Generated Value-Added, mid-1970s 63
Table 1 Opinions on the Proposal of Quebec Separation 19
Table 2 Percentage of Quebec Work Force Showing Fluency in the
Other Official Language 40
Table 3 Average Per Capita Income by Province 49
Table 4 Tax Receipts and Expenditures of the Federal Government
in Quebec 66
Table 5 Main Views of Quebec Political Parties on Economic
Development 103
Table 6 Most Important Issues in the November 1976 Campaign 145
Table 7 Distribution of Valid Ballots, 1935-1976 148
PREFACE
A year ago I was discussing with several publishers the idea of
translating and publishing a number of books devoted to Quebec
elections and political parties which had appeared in 1976. In every
case, the response was that what was really needed was a book which
would give English-speaking readers the answer to the perennial ques-
tion of the sixties and seventies: What does Quebec want? What was
required was a book on Quebec written expressly for an English-
speaking audience. The author would have to be someone who, born
and educated in French-speaking Quebec, could identify with the
dominant attitudes of the Quebecois people, and yet also be a non-
partisan professional observer of Quebec politics who could take into
account the varied forces at work in the province. I decided to under-
take such a book.
The original manuscript was written in "bilingual" English. I am
most grateful for the assistance of my editor, Robert Chodos, in
rendering that draft into what I hope is a more colloquial and infor-
mal style.
Andre Bernard
INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 1976, a nationalist party, the Parti Quebecois,
gained a majority of the seats in the Quebec National Assembly. It
was the fourth time in the history of Quebec that a new nationalist
party dedicated to the "liberation" of French Canadians had won a
parliamentary majority. It occurred first in the 1830s, with the Parti
Patriote; it occurred again in the 1880s, with the Parti National; again,
in the 1930s, with the Union Nationale party; and finally, on Novem-
ber 15, 1976, with the Parti Quebecois.
Approximately 50 years elapsed between the first and second events,
between the second and third, and between the third and today. Each
of the first three nationalist parties, once in office, met with very
strong opposition to the constitutional changes it was calling for. Each
time, the English-speaking leaders of Canada were able to contain the
nationalist movement and to mobilize a majority of French-speaking
voters against any extreme solution.
The Parti Patriote, although successful in gaining a majority of seats,
eventually met with failure. Formed in 1828 by the republicans and
democrats of the period, lawyers, doctors, journalists and merchants,
and led by a brilliant, well-educated and rich seigneur, Louis-Joseph
Papineau, the Parti Patriote was unable to obtain parliamentary con-
trol over public expenditures and the other concessions it wanted.
Emboldened by its large majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly
and by the numerical superiority of French-speaking Canadians in
Quebec (then known as Lower Canada), the Parti Patriote tried to
achieve its objectives through rebellion. In 1836 and 1837 the party
leaders organized groups of armed rebels, who started to harass British
officials and soldiers who ventured outside the cities. In the fall of
1837 the British Governor of the colony sent his troops against the
11
12 What Does Quebec Want?
rebels. Parliamentary institutions and civil liberties were ignored in
order to restore the security of the British settlers. The rebels were
defeated, their houses destroyed, and their leaders put to death or
banished from Canada while many others were thrown in jail. The
Parti Patriote was disbanded and its outlawed leaders disappeared
from the political scene along with their dreams of a Republic of
Quebec modelled on the United States.
Finally, to crown their repression of the French nationalist move-
ment in Canada, the Colonial Office and the British Parliament for-
bade the use of French in the government of the United Canadas. The
defeat of the Parti Patriote had thus led to a severe setback for French
Canadians and it took them many years to regain their lost language
rights.
The second nationalist party to gain a majority of seats in the
Quebec Assembly was the Parti National which took office in 1886, 50
years after the rebellion in Lower Canada. Like its earlier counterpart,
the Parti National met with failure.
In 1886, a small minority of Parti National activists, and at least one
newspaper editor, Jules-Paul Tardivel (editor of the weekly La Verite),
were in favor of the secession of Quebec from Canada.* These anti-
federalists were convinced that there was no hope for the survival of
the French-Canadian nation except in Quebec, where French Canadi-
ans at the time (as today) accounted for 80 per cent of the population.
Since French Canadians were outnumbered in the institutions of the
federal government, there seemed to be no hope for pro-French-
Canadian federal policies. Indeed, by remaining within Canada where
they were being submerged by British immigration, French Canadians
faced gradual minoritization: 50 years earlier, they had been 80 per
cent of the population in their "country"; the union of Lower and
Upper Canada had reduced the proportion to 50 per cent, and now, in
less than ten years, British immigration had succeeded in making
French Canadians a minority in their own country. In 1887, French
Canadians, although 80 per cent of Quebec's population, accounted
for only 30 per cent of Canada's. The future for French Canadians in
Canada looked very gloomy. A sample of what was awaiting them had
just been given by the governments of Manitoba and New Brunswick,
which had deprived French Canadians of their schools and were
* In Le colonialisme au Quebec (Montreal: Editions R-B, 1966), Andre
d'Allemagne refers to "le gouvernement nationaliste et quasi-separa-
tiste d'Honore Mercier" ("the nationalist and quasi-separatist govern-
ment of Honore Mercier"), page 50.
Introduction 13
imposing on them an education that was English and non-Catholic. In
spite of this, the nationalist leaders of 1886 were unable to convince
the voters who had supported the Parti National to go on to support
their proposals for constitutional change.
The English-speaking elite, in power in the federal capital and in
command of finance, trade and industry, was prompt in reacting to
the threat of French-Canadian nationalism. Soon after the election of
1886, Canadian banks refused to award new loans to the nationalist
government of Quebec on the grounds that the public debt of the
province was six times as large as its annual revenue. Premier Honore
Mercier, leader of the Parti National, had to turn to foreign money
markets for loans. The Conservative party, which Mercier had
defeated, counter-attacked by trying to discredit the nationalist leaders
and by pointing out to French Canadians that their nation, the
French-Canadian nation, extended well beyond the boundaries of
Quebec.
This was the view of the traditional elite of French Canada and
particularly of the Catholic Church. In the preceding 20 years thou-
sands of French Canadians had emigrated to other parts of North
America, so that many inhabitants of Quebec had relatives or friends
outside the province. In 1887, a third of all French Canadians were
living outside Quebec, roughly ten per cent having settled in Ontario,
ten per cent on the Prairies, and ten per cent in the United States.
Most French Canadians in Quebec could not conceive of a "nation"
divided, with two thirds of the French Canadians living within a
sovereign Republic of Quebec and one third outside. The majority
supported a strong nationalist stand in favor of French Canadians
outside Quebec in matters of language and education, and had given
their votes to the Parti National for this reason. However, they were
not ready to follow those Parti National leaders who made speeches
(for example at a celebrated meeting held on the Champ-de-Mars in
the centre of Montreal) saying that if French Canadians could not
have their language rights respected a Republic of Quebec should be
created.
Indeed, as soon as he faced the reality of power, Mercier found that
he could not count on the electorate in a stand against the federal
government aimed at changing the constitutional status of Quebec.
French Canadians were not ready to abandon the dream of a brilliant
future in a Canada extending from coast to coast and many consid-
ered the Province of Quebec too small a territory for them.
Every year, thousands of French Canadians had to leave the prov-
14 What Does Quebec Want?
ince in order to find a job or a piece of land to till. Although Mercier
and his nationalist colleagues felt unable to take a firm constitutional
stand they made solid autonomist pleas. They asked for reforms,
requested guarantees for French Canadians outside Quebec and tried
to use the provincial government finances, already burdened with
debts, to help develop the economy of the province. But they made no
actual move toward separation.
The Liberal party, in opposition in Ottawa and led by a French
Canadian, Wilfrid Laurier, adopted some of the demands of the
Quebec nationalists. Laurier promised guarantees for French Canadi-
ans outside Quebec who wanted to remain French and Catholic and
have their children educated in French by Catholic teachers. At the
same time he made a pledge to uphold provincial rights. In so doing,
he gained the favor of a majority of Quebec voters in the federal
election of 1891 and recruited several of Mercier's supporters.
In the meantime, the Conservative party, in power in Ottawa, gave
its Quebec provincial section the means to defeat the Parti National at
the polls. Scandals involving nationalist leaders were "revealed" and
investigated by the federal government.
The federal Conservatives accentuated their pressure against the
Mercier government by using their control over federal institutions in
the province. The Lieutenant-Governor of the province, Real Angers,
an appointee of the federal government and a former Conservative
minister, refused to sign financial warrants proposed by the nationalist
government, using as a pretext the scandals and the financial problems
of the province. Eventually, in the provincial election of 1892, Mercier
and his supporters lost power and the defeat brought about the
disappearance of the Parti National.
The victory of the Liberal party led by Wilfrid Laurier in the 1896
federal election deprived the nationalist minority of electoral support
among moderates and marked the end of the second explosion of
nationalism in French Canada. Lack of money had prevented the Parti
National from developing the Quebec economy and lack of support
for a strong constitutional stand had prevented it from gaining more
legislative powers for the government of Quebec.
In 1936, for a third time, a newly formed nationalist party gained a
majority of seats in the Quebec Assembly. The new party, the Union
Nationale, had been formed less than a year earlier through the
merger of the provincial Conservative party and a splinter group of
members of the Legislative Assembly who had seceded from the
Introduction 15
Liberal party in 1934 and formed the Action Liberate Nationale. Led
by Maurice Duplessis, the Union Nationale was dedicated to the
objective of increased provincial autonomy and called for government
control over several large corporations. Its 1936 program was socially
progressive and actively nationalist. Its more nationalist leaders did not
hesitate to use English-speaking Canadian capitalists as scapegoats.
Nevertheless, in spite of its nationalist outlook, the Union Nationale
did not challenge the continuation of federalism in Canada; it was
satisfied with demanding increased provincial autonomy.
Even though it was not promoting secession, the Union Nationale
encountered strong opposition from a large segment of the English-
speaking elite of Canada. Banks and other financial institutions were
as wary of the Union Nationale government as they had been of
Mercier 50 years earlier. Leaders of the Liberal party tried to depict
the nationalist leaders as fascists. The proposals for reform put for-
ward by the new party met with objections from most parts of the
French-Canadian elite.
Lacking the money and the legislative powers required to achieve
the reforms he had promised, Duplessis tried to placate those interests
which opposed reform but approved of nationalism. In so doing he
lost the support of the most nationalist of his colleagues who were in
favor of socially progressive reforms. They quit the Union Nationale
and revived the Action Liberale Nationale. These progressive national-
ist leaders took a very strong constitutional stand. Several Action
Liberale Nationale leaders had advocated the secession of Quebec
from Canada in 1934 and 1935 and they spoke again to that effect in
1938 and 1939 after their split with the Union Nationale.
The Union Nationale found itself at war with many English-speak-
ing Quebec voters who in 1939 and 1944 gave their support to the
Liberal party in Quebec elections, and at the same time it found itself
at war with the most socially progressive of the French-Canadian
nationalists, who gave their support to the Action Liberale Nationale.
In the 1939 provincial election, the Union Nationale lost 67 of its 84
seats, retaining only 39 per cent of the vote, with seven per cent going
to the Action Liberale Nationale.
The victory of the Liberals in the 1939 election was a severe setback
for the nationalists, and they proved unable to recover from their
defeat. The Action Liberale Nationale was disbanded. Some of its
members tried to reorganize under a new guise, the Bloc Populaire,
and thanks to the anger raised by conscription, they were able to gain
16 What Does Quebec Want?
12 per cent of the vote in the 1944 provincial election. But that second
defeat was a death blow; the nationalist leaders left the political scene.
Surprisingly, the election of 1944 returned the Union Nationale to
power, although it polled only 38 per cent of the vote, one per cent
less than in 1939. This phenomenon was explained by its good show-
ing in rural areas, which were glaringly overrepresented in the Quebec
Assembly. Back in power, the Union Nationale was a moderately
nationalist government careful to placate rural interests and strongly
opposed to federal centralization.
After the defeats of 1939 and 1944, Quebec nationalists kept silent
or worked within the Union Nationale or the Liberal party. The
nationalists in the Liberal party were able, in 1955, to split the party
into separate federal and provincial organizations. The provincial
organization became known as the Federation Liberale du Quebec
and later as the Quebec Liberal party. In 1960, the Quebec Liberals,
with such nationalists as Rene Levesque in their ranks, were able to
oust the Union Nationale from power. Nationalist members of the
new Liberal government undertook some of the reforms that had been
promised in 1936 by the Union Nationale. Electric power was nation-
alized, social security was extended, and the system of education was
reorganized.
In the early 1960s, most progressive nationalists were supporters of
the Liberal government in Quebec, but a minority of very young
intellectuals, largely unaware of the adventure of the 1930s, felt that
the problems of French Canada could not be solved without Quebec's
becoming an independent state, separate from Canada. Their reason-
ing was similar to that of nationalists who had came to the same
conclusion in the 1830s, 1880s and 1930s.
The leaders of this minority explained their viewpoints in a series of
little books which had considerable influence: Is Quebec a Colony'!
and / Chose Independence by Raymond Barbeau, Why I am a Separa-
tist by Marcel Chaput, Colonialism in Quebec by Andre d'Allemagne,
White Niggers of America by Pierre Vallieres and others. These new
nationalist leaders formed numerous organizations, and although most
of these did not last, two were able to present candidates in the
Quebec election of 1966: the Rassemblement pour l'Independance
Nationale and the Ralliement National. Together the nationalist candi-
dates of these two parties got nine per cent of the popular vote, a total
similar to those of the Action Liberale Nationale in 1939 and the
Bloc Populaire in 1944. This time, however, the objectives were clear:
Introduction 17
the nationalists wanted Quebec to become a sovereign state, with a
flag, an anthem and a seat in the United Nations.
The two small nationalist parties had taken their votes mainly from
new voters and from former Liberals. The Quebec Liberal party found
itself in 1966 with 47 per cent of the vote, a loss of nine per cent from
1962. The Union Nationale, which had been defeated in 1960 with 47
per cent of the vote, now found itself in power with 41 per cent. Once
again, the good showing of the Union Nationale in the overrepre-
sented rural areas had given it a majority of seats (56 out of 108) with
fewer votes than its main opponent.*
After the defeat of the Liberal party, members of the party who
were strong nationalists tried to convert their colleagues to a more
nationalist program. The best known of these Liberal nationalists was
Rene Levesque, the former minister who had led the campaign for the
nationalization of the province's electric power companies in 1962.
Levesque presented a proposal that Quebec become a sovereign state
within an economic association with the rest of Canada to a Liberal
party convention in Quebec City in the fall of 1967. It was turned
down. As a consequence, Levesque and the few other nationalists
resigned from the party.
A few weeks later, on November 18, 1967, Levesque made public a
decision he and his supporters had arrived at: they were forming a
new organization called the Mouvement Souverainete-Association
(Sovereignty-Association Movement), with the objective of uniting all
Quebec nationalists on the proposal that had just been discarded by
the Liberal party: full sovereignty for Quebec, and economic associa-
tion with the rest of Canada. Levesque's ideas were detailed in a book
entitled Option Quebec, which appeared in bookstores in January 1968.
That book was one of the bestsellers of the 1960s. It was read and
sanctioned by so many members of the two older nationalist parties
that pressure from within eventually led these parties to join the
Mouvement Souverainete-Association. The merger of the nationalist
parties gave birth to a new organization, the Parti Quebecois, founded
officially on October 14, 1968.
The next provincial election, held in April 1970, revealed to Canadi-
ans outside Quebec that the separatist movement could no longer be
termed a "fad"—the Parti Quebecois reaped 24 per cent of the vote.
From then on support for the Parti Quebecois increased steadily, as
* Election statistics for the period 1935-1976 appear in table 7.
18 What Does Quebec Want?
32
29
24
19
n
40
34 35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Figure 1 Growth of Support for Nationalist Parties in Quebec, Accord-
ing to the Elections of 1966 (6), 1970 (19), 1973 (24) and 1976 (34) and
According to Pre-election Surveys Published in 1973 (21), 1975 (29) and
1976 (32). Figures are percentages based on total numbers of registered
electors (not only those who cast ballots).
shown in the results of surveys and in the polling booths (see figure 1).
On November 15, 1976, for the fourth time in the history of
Quebec, a newly formed nationalist party gained a majority of seats in
the Quebec Assembly. Nine years after its birth, the Parti Quebecois
was able to muster the support of 41 per cent of Quebec voters and
win 71 of the 110 seats in the Quebec National Assembly. This fourth
attempt to "liberate" French Canadians may turn out to be no more
successful than the previous ones. The victory of the Parti Quebecois
in 1976 has indeed much in common with the electoral success of the
Parti Patriote in the 1830s, the Parti National in the 1880s and the
Union Nationale in the 1930s. Just as in the previous cases, it is clear
that a substantial number of voters gave support to the nationalist
party not because they approved of its nationalist platform but
because they disapproved of the other parties.
Up to 1977 surveys have shown that fewer than 20 per cent of
Quebec respondents polled say they would favor complete "separa-
tion" of Quebec from the rest of Canada. The data are shown in the
table.
Introduction 19
Table 1—Opinions of the Adult Population of Quebec on the Issue of
the Separation of Quebec from the Rest of Canada, 1962-1977
Year
1962
1965
1968
1969
1970
1970
1972
1973
1974
1976
1977
Percentage
in favor
8
7
10
11
(spring) 14
(autumn) 11
10
17
15
18
32
Percentage
against
73
79
72
75
76
74
68
64
74
58
52
Percentage
undecided
19
14
18
14
10
15
22
19
11
24
16
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Number of
respondents
998
6.910
746
367
820
1.974
778
1.006
349
1.095
(not available)
Source: Data collected by Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton from various
surveys and (except for 1977 figures) published November 10, 1976 in Mon-
treal's Le Devoir and The Gazette and the Toronto Star. Questions included
the word "separation" except in 1977 when the question read: "The Parti
Quebecois wants Quebec to become an independent country associated eco-
nomically with the rest of Canada. If the government of Quebec were able to
establish such an economic association with the rest of Canada, would you
then vote in a referendum for or against Quebec becoming an independent
country?"
A survey published November 10, 1976, five days before the elec-
tion, showed that, among 309 respondents who stated they favored the
Parti Quebecois, 158 (or 52 per cent) approved of separation, 79 (25
per cent) were opposed and 72 (23 per cent) were undecided or
unclear on this subject. If the surveys can be trusted, and usually they
can within a small margin of error, it is safe to say that more that one
third of those who voted for a Parti Quebecois candidate on Novem-
ber 15, 1976 were at best undecided on the question of independence,
fewer than two thirds of Parti Quebecois voters being in favor of
Quebec's "separating" from Canada.
However, in spite of the similarities between the events of today and
those of earlier generations, contemporary circumstances differ from
those of the 1830s, 1880s or 1930s. One cannot conclude from past
events that the present attempt at Quebec separation will necessarily
20 What Does Quebec Want?
succeed. But it is possible to analyse the causes of the contemporary
unrest in Quebec, and to study the various solutions considered by
those who hope to solve the problems that lie at the roots of Quebec
discontent.
The objective of this short book is just that: to analyse the causes of
Quebec discontent and study the various proposed solutions, including
independence, that parties have put forward. The data presented here
should enable one to understand better what Quebec does want, and
to figure out whether extreme solutions such as the separation of
Quebec from Canada will prevail over compromise and conciliation.
PART I:
WHAT?
Introduction
The six largest political parties competing in the 1976 election considered
Quebec to be in a crisis from at least three viewpoints: cultural, eco-
nomic, and social. Although leaders of these parties disagreed on many
things, they all underlined the same problems and seemed to pursue the
same long-term objectives. There were, in particular, two major objec-
tives on which all the parties agreed:
• They were pledged to ensure the survival of French in Quebec.
• They said that they favored economic prosperity for Quebec and
increased control of the Quebec economy by Quebecers.
When asked the question, "What does Quebec want?" all party
leaders give similar answers on the issue of basic objectives. This
statement of objectives is not the whole answer, but it is the core of it.
23
1
National Survival
No political leader in Quebec would dare voice a doubt about the
sacrosanct objective of "la survivance francaise en Amerique". Sur-
vival of the French-Canadian people is an obligation, an article of
faith. It has been so for 200 years. It is basic, fundamental. Yet,
outside Quebec, many people find it hard to understand how it can be
a worthwhile objective to pursue. Unaware of the existence, in
Quebec, of a French "nation" (in the sociological sense of the word),
outsiders often have the same attitude toward French Canadians as they
do toward their own local minorities. And the prevailing view concern-
ing ethnic or linguistic minorities is that they should "assimilate" into the
majority.
The Economics and Politics of Unilingualism
The decision to "assimilate" minorities is based on sound economic
calculation. Indeed the cost of maintaining minority language rights in
a country leads most states to impose one common language within
their frontiers. The main argument in favor of unilingualism follows
from the fact that language barriers are costly to maintain, and that
their maintenance is an impediment to trade and the production of
goods and services. To maintain two or more languages in one country
implies costs in education: the money, energy and time devoted to
second-language teaching could be used for technical training and thus
could produce benefits in terms of goods and services available, or else
could be saved altogether. To maintain two or more languages in one
country also implies costs in communications: the direct costs of
translation and of duplicate or triplicate versions of any message, and
24
National Survival 25
the indirect costs of delays, repetitions and misunderstandings. Lan-
guage barriers, moreover, hinder social and territorial mobility and,
consequently, tend to maintain inequalities, while reducing adaptabil-
ity to change.
Although the benefits of unilingualism are obvious, it is not always
possible to impose assimilation on a minority because the short-run
costs to the minority of assimilation can be much higher than the costs
of language barriers. In other words, forced assimilation is not always
desirable from an economic or political viewpoint. Although the exist-
ence of minorities identified by a distinct language fosters division and
conflict in a country, it may sometimes seem advisable to protect
minority language rights, especially if the minority concerned is large
and concentrated territorially.
Such a linguistic minority often obtains a special status within a
country, its representatives being offered a certain degree of autonomy
either through federalism or through legislative devolution. Such a
special status enables the majority in the country to function as a
unilingual "nation" while the linguistic minority, within its special
status area, finds a compromise between the cost of being a separate
sovereign state and the cost of undergoing assimilation, a compromise
between the cultural benefits of political independence and the eco-
nomic benefits of union with a larger partner.
In seeking to solve the problem created by the unwillingness of
French Canadians to abandon their language, the Confederation of
the British North American colonies in 1867 can be seen as such a
compromise. French Canadians were given one of the Canadian prov-
inces, Quebec. It was understood that they would control the provin-
cial government of Quebec and legislate according to their own values
in all matters relating to civil rights and education as well as local or
private questions. But, in order to offer safeguards to the English-
speaking minority of Quebec, the provincial government was to protect
the English Protestant schools, maintain the parliamentary representa-
tion of the English-speaking areas of the province, and allow free use
of the English language in the Quebec legislature and courts (articles
80, 93 and 133 of the British North America Act, 1867).
Outside Quebec, as the arrangement was understood in the 1860s,
English was to remain the one and only language of the country. This
was consistent with the ideology of leading English-speaking Canadi-
ans, who were trying to build a new nation in North America, a
unilingual English-speaking Canadian people.
26 What Does Quebec Want?
The Idea of an English-Speaking Canadian People
In the Canada defined by the leading English-speaking nationalists of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was little place for
a minority language. Wherever they were a majority, English-speaking
Canadians made English practically compulsory. Nowadays the argu-
ments in favor of English run as follows: English is said to be easy to
learn, clear, precise, adaptable. Its grammar is said to be much simpler
than those of such languages as German, French, Spanish, Italian and
Portuguese. The English language is said to convey values that pro-
mote action and productivity, while the languages spoken around the
Mediterranean (French, Italian, Greek, etc.) are said to convey con-
templative values, which do not meet the requirements of a modern
industrialized society. English is said to be the dominant and most
widely spoken language in the world; it is the official language of the
richest nations (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, Australia, South Africa). In countries where English is not
yet the official language, it is nevertheless a "second language" and
it is taught in many schools in South America, Africa, Europe and
Asia.
Even people who do not argue for the inherent superiority of
English will hold that simple realism makes it necessary for French
Canadians to become English-speaking. English is the language of
North America and the expansion of trade and industrial capitalism
favors the growth of English. The largest corporations of the world
and most multinational corporations of all sizes are owned or man-
aged by English-speaking people. In order to get the best-paid jobs,
the ones offered by the large corporations, one has to speak English. A
great many English-speaking Canadians seem to know only one thing
in matters of language: no language is worth spending time and
money on, but English. And for them it is an appalling experience to
learn that millions of dollars of Canadian taxpayers' money are spent
to promote French in Canada.
Up to the 1940s, wherever they were a majority, English-speaking
Canadians deprived the French-speaking minorities of public school
facilities in their language and forbade the use of French in govern-
mental institutions (see box). In the British North America Act (1867),
there was no mention of French except for Article 133:
Either the English or the French Language may be used by any
Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada
National Survival 27
French Language and School Rights Outside Quebec
(1860-1930)
1864—Nova Scotia: French-speaking Catholic Acadians are for-
bidden to have French schools.
1871—New Brunswick: Catholic schools are closed and the teach-
ing of French (and in French) is forbidden in public schools.
1877—Prince Edward Island: Catholic and French schools
become outlawed.
1890—Manitoba: Separate (Catholic) schools are outlawed and
the teaching of French (and in French) is forbidden at the
secondary level.
1892—Northwest Territories (including what is now Alberta and
Saskatchewan): Teaching in French is outlawed in public schools
and Catholic schools are prohibited.
1905—Alberta and Saskatchewan: The regulations of 1892
(Northwest Territories) are confirmed.
1912—Keewatin: Denominational (Catholic) schools are sup-
pressed and the teaching of French is forbidden.
1915—Ontario: By regulation (regulation No. 17), French is out-
lawed in Ontario schools.
1916—Manitoba: The teaching of French is forbidden at all
levels.
1930—Saskatchewan: The teaching of French is prohibited even
outside school hours.
Source: Abbe Lionel Groulx, L'Enseignement franqais au Canada (Mon-
treal: Granger Freres, 1935).
Note: After World War I, most provincial laws were amended to permit
the teaching of French as a foreign language, usually for a maximum of
one hour a day. Since 1960 further amendments have been introduced.
French has been allowed as the language of instruction in classrooms
where students are all French-speaking, but minimum requirements
have been set for the teaching of English to such classrooms.
28 What Does Quebec Want?
and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec, and both those
Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of
those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any
Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court
of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of
the Courts of Quebec.
The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of
Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.
From the 1920s to the 1960s, the federal government was largely
unilingual, French being used solely for formal purposes in Parliament
and in some governmental transactions with the French-speaking pop-
ulation of Quebec*
The most drastic solution to the problem of French in Canada
would be the assimilation by force or by persuasion of French Canadi-
ans, including those of Quebec, into the English-speaking majority of
Canada. This solution is not even contemplated seriously by most
French-speaking Canadians because it does not fit their ideology of
survival as a distinct "nation", either within or outside Canada. This
would be extremely costly for both present and future generations of
French Canadians. In trying to apply a program of assimilation in
Quebec, a government would face strong—probably violent—resist-
ance. Assimilation of 5,500,000 French-speaking Canadians is not a
realistic solution to the language problem of Canada. The idea of an
English-speaking unilingual Canadian people is neither a reflection of
the reality of Canada nor a possible future.
The Fight Against English Unilingualism
Leading French-speaking Canadians have always fought the idea of
"assimilation" and they are doing so with renewed vigor now that
French Canada has emerged as a fully developed, industrialized, mod-
ern society. During the past century, the struggle of French Canadians
against English unilingualism at the provincial level culminated in a
* In 1944-1945, the overall proportion of French Canadians in the federal
bureaucracy was 12.25 per cent. In the most senior positions, those of
Deputy Minister rank, there was not a single French Canadian. Figures
taken from V. Seymour Wilson and Willard A. Mullins, Representative
Bureaucracy: Linguistic Ethnic Aspects in Canadian Public Policy, a
paper prepared for the Conference on Political Change in Canada at the
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, March 17, 1977, 12-13.
National Survival 29
series of crises which from time to time poisoned relationships between
the two language groups. These crises were stirred up by the school
policies of the English-speaking provinces, which deprived French
Canadians of their Catholic and French schools. These fights on the
school question were waged in one province after another by the
French-speaking minorities. Each fight roused a great deal of anger,
but French Canadians were the minority and up to the 1940s they lost
every time.
There has also been a long and sustained resistance to the informal
suppression of the French language in Canadian federal institutions:
the civil service, crown corporations and the armed forces. Three
times, language grievances combined with other questions to cause a
serious crisis. The first of these occurred during World War I when
Canadian army officers started their recruitment operations in Quebec;
resentment focussed on the fact that the recruiting officers were Eng-
lish-speaking. The crisis, known as the conscription crisis of 1917, led
to a division of the country along language lines; in that year's federal
election, every riding where French was the majority language
returned an Opposition member.
The second crisis, during World War II, closely resembled the first; it
is known as the conscription crisis of 1942. The government put the
question of conscription for military service abroad to the voters in a
plebiscite; the proposition was defeated almost unanimously in French-
speaking Quebec while it received an overwhelming majority in English-
speaking Canada. The third crisis occurred in the 1960s, lasted several
years, and led to the use of the armed forces in Quebec during the fall of
1970. This third and last crisis was a general opposition to the use of
English in Quebec, focussing on the federal public service, crown corpo-
rations, banks and financial institutions. One expression of this opposi-
tion was the resort to violence, as bombings became a frequent occur-
rence. The electoral success of the Parti Quebecois is in fact an aftermath
of the crisis of the late 1960s.
French Canadians who fight for their language do so for many
reasons. Some of these reasons relate to individual and group psychol-
ogy, others to sociology, and still others to economics. Psychology
teaches us that individuals value highly their own characteristics and
their particular surroundings, which they know best and find reassur-
ing. Conversely they tend to avoid people who exhibit different char-
acteristics and they feel insecure when they find themselves in unfa-
miliar surroundings. A child learns at a very early age to identify with
30 What Does Quebec Want?
his social surroundings. He is taught to seek out other individuals who
share the same language and the same values with him and to avoid
encounters with aliens, outsiders, people who speak differently and
profess different values. The learning and socialization process gener-
ally accentuates attitudes which lead individuals to associate with other
individuals who show similar characteristics, and to reject those who
appear different.
Naturally, French-speaking Canadians tend to associate with indi-
viduals who speak French and who profess their values, just as Eng-
lish-speaking Canadians tend to associate with other English-speaking
Canadians. As a consequence of such natural tendencies, members of
the two main linguistic groups of Canada usually locate in different
territories, or in different wards or neighborhoods. Normally they do
not intermarry. When time comes to find a job, to rent an apartment
or to buy a house, the choice is simple: people who go where
members of their group dominate can find a normal and socially
rewarding existence; those who move where members of the other
group dominate find themselves in the situation of any immigrant
thrown into new, unfamiliar and largely hostile social surroundings.
French Canadians who move "west" find themselves confronted with
the terrible choice faced by immigrants everywhere: either they try to
adopt the language and values of the majority with the hope of becom-
ing part of it or they stick to their own traditional manners, language and
values and remain "outsiders".
There is no joy in being an immigrant. An immigrant has to face
considerable problems. He is alone, isolated, segregated, or, at best,
linked with other immigrants who are segregated as a group. Like a
child, an immigrant has to learn a language, a whole system of values,
and social manners. An immigrant has to build a new network of
personal relationships: he has no relatives in his new surroundings, no
old friends. People migrate for various reasons, but usually they only
do so if the benefits of moving outside their familiar surroundings
outweigh the costs of such a move.
French Canadians who fight for their language do so because they
do not want to become immigrants in their homeland. The politics of
English unilingualism in Canada have already made "immigrants" of
French Canadians born outside Quebec. Many French Canadians in
Quebec are determined to avoid such a fate in the only province
where, so far, their language has not been seriously threatened. That is
the primary reason why so many French Canadians fight to preserve
National Survival 31
the French language; they want to retain the language and the set of
values they acquired in childhood. Many French Canadians, like many
people everywhere, object to the idea of learning two languages and
two sets of values, when only one should suffice. Why should they
expend their energies learning a second language when they already
lack the time, money and energy needed to acquire technical skills
that could equip them for productive roles in their society?
In spite of their objection to the idea of learning a second language,
many French, Quebecers have been forced to do so in order to find a
job in their own province, because the managers of Canadian corpora-
tions have generally insisted that their employees be able to speak
English, wheher or not English is actually used on the job. By the
1960s, this situation had been maintained for such a long time that a
large proportion of French-speaking Canadians were convinced that
"bilingualism" was highly desirable.*
The Economics and Politics of Bilingualism
The greatest enthusiasm for bilingualism can be found among interme-
diaries between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians: bil-
ingual salesmen, bilingual managers, bilingual advertisers, and so on.
They support the politics of bilingualism in Canada and, notably, the
idea of a bilingual federal public service and bilingual districts. When
the pressures for French unilingualism in Quebec, culminating in the
proposal to create a separate Republic of Quebec, reached the boiling
point in the early 1960s, the promoters of bilingualism found unex-
pected allies. Those who were afraid of the prospects of the partition
of the country joined the linguistic minorities of the various provinces
in support of the bilingualization of Canada. The idea was seen as a
solution to the language problem of the country.
The federal government declared French and English the official
languages of Canada. Zones where French-speaking and English-
speaking Canadians coexist in substantial proportions were declared
"bilingual districts". The program aimed at making federal services
available in both languages in the bilingual districts and providing a
* According to a survey conducted by the Groupe de Recherches
Sociales in 1965, more than 90 per cent of the French-speaking
respondents were in favor of "bilingualism" (Report of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism [Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1967], pages 97, 135).
32 What Does Quebec Want?
French-language working milieu for French-speaking federal employ-
ees. The federal government provided new resources for the minorities
in the bilingual districts, with the objective of ensuring their survival.
In the recruitment and career planning of federal government employ-
ees, special care was given to improving the proportion of the French-
speaking population in the civil service.
Between 1964 and 1974, Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick all
took measures to promote the French language. In Quebec, the pro-
vincial government of Liberal Premier Robert Bourassa declared
French the leading language of Quebec, English remaining the lan-
guage of the minority. The English-speaking Quebec minority
obtained formal guarantees concerning education in English for chil-
dren born into families where English was in common use. At the
same time, in Ontario and New Brunswick, the French-speaking
minorities were offered better services and new language guarantees.
Both the Acadians of New Brunswick (200,000 in a population of
634,000) and the Franco-Ontarians (325,000 in a population of
7,700,000) had fought a long battle for such guarantees.
These federal and provincial measures stirred a lot of interest but
they did not achieve what they were meant to. They did not stop the
growth of the movement for French unilingualism in Quebec, though
they did tend to foster some anti-French or anti-Quebec feelings all
over Canada (as revealed by the Goldfarb survey published in Sep-
tember 1977 in the Southam papers, and as documented in Jean
Beriault's book, Anti-Quebec). These measures did not stop the growth
of Quebec independence parties and did not stop the process of
assimilation of French Canadians in the "bilingual districts" outside
Quebec. But millions of dollars have been poured into language train-
ing, bilingual advertising, translation, and so on.* The main benefi-
ciaries of bilingualism seem to be those who were bilingual already.
In 1971, 13.4 per cent of the entire population of Canada was said
to be bilingual in French and English: out of 21,568,000 Canadians
registered by the 1971 census, 2,900,000 said they were "able to speak
both English and French." Of these, 1,664,000 lived in Quebec,
* In his Fifth Annual Report (1975), the Commissioner of Official Lan-
guages (Ottawa) revealed that, between 1964 and 1974, 58,000 federal
public servants (about 50,000 of them were Anglophones) had
received free language training during working hours (page 3). How-
ever, scarcely 11 per cent of English-speaking public servants taking
Language Bureau courses attained standard 1, which constitutes really
functional bilingualism (page 6). Moreover, only five per cent of
National Survival 33
716,000 in Ontario, 207,000 in the Atlantic provinces and 312,000 in
western Canada. In Quebec, 632,000 people said they spoke English
only, 3,668,000 said they spoke French only, 63,000 said they spoke
neither French nor English, and 1,664,000 were bilingual (27.6 per
cent of the total of 6,027,000 Quebecers). Among the bilingual Que-
becers, fewer than 20 per cent were of non-French origin.
Outside Quebec, among the 1,235,000 bilinguals, 713,000 said their
mother tongue was French. In New Brunswick, 98,000 bilinguals had
French as their mother tongue, while 101,000 French-speaking New
Brunswick Acadians said that they spoke no English. In Ontario,
260,000 bilinguals had French as their mother tongue. Only 93,000 out
of the 353,000 Ontarians who had French as their mother tongue said
they spoke only French (in other words, only 25 per cent of Franco-
Ontarians were unilingual). In western Canada, those who speak
French and English are usually people of French origin. Except for
children, people of French origin living in western Canada speak
English. Among the 15 million Canadians of other than French origin
living outside Quebec, only 3.6 per cent—the vast majority of them in
Ontario—said in 1971 that they spoke both French and English. Many
French-speaking Quebecers have opposed the bilingualization scheme,
arguing that it would only lead to the increased minoritization of
French-speaking Canadians. Such positions have been held with con-
sistent vigor by the largest patriotic organizations in Quebec, the St.-
Jean-Baptiste Society of Montreal and the Mouvement Quebec Fran-
cais.
The Crisis of Canadian Identity
French Canadians active in federal politics adhere to the idea that
their country is the whole of Canada, the territory extending from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific. They believe that Canada is the com-
mon country of two large language groups, with the French-speaking
group concentrated in Quebec but not limited to it. Many of them
would like to see the federal civil service staffed by French-speaking
Canadians roughly in proportion to their percentage in the population
Anglophone language course graduates make "extensive" use of their
acquired French at work (page 8). About three per cent of Franco-
phone federal employees in Quebec were still forced in 1975 to work
in English, in Quebec (page 13). The 1,400 translators of the federal
government translation bureau are expected to cost $60 million in
1980 (page 19).
34 What Does Quebec Want?
as a whole, and to obtain service in French from government offices
and government-owned airlines, railways and hotels all across Canada.
This is one view of what is or what should be the country called
Canada, and it has been the dominant one in the federal government
since the mid-1960s.
There is also a second view, which had been latent for a long time
and which has been growing in support in Quebec since the mid-
1960s. According to this view, first popularized by the former Rassem-
blement pour l'Independance Nationale,* French-speaking Canadians
are "foreigners" in the provinces of Canada where English-speaking
Canadians constitute a majority. In other words, Quebec is the only
territory which French-speaking Canadians can rightly call their coun-
try. In matters of language, according to this view, the provinces other
than Quebec have shown their refusal to accept linguistic minorities by
100 years of efforts to "assimilate" their French-speaking inhabitants.
And the assimilation process in the other provinces has been a success
(except in border areas such as eastern Ontario and northern New
Brunswick). Outside Quebec, according to the 1971 census, 1,421,000
Canadians were of French origin, but among them only 926,000
declared French as their mother tongue, and only 676,000 said that
they usually spoke French at home. The assimilation of French-speak-
ing minorities outside Quebec has been under way for such a long
time that there is no reason to expect things will change because the
federal government has enacted language legislation favoring French.
Accordingly, the argument runs, French-speaking Canadians should
abandon any dream of a bilingual Canada; they should, on the
contrary, concentrate their efforts on building a French unilingual
Quebec, and forget about Canada. In this perspective, French Quebec
should behave toward its English-speaking minority just as other
Canadian provinces have behaved toward their French-speaking
minorities.
These two main views constitute the extreme political alternatives
confronting contemporary Quebec: a more or less unilingual Quebec
within a formally bilingual Canada, or a rather unilingual Quebec,
separate from but associated with a rather unilingual English Canada.
There are, of course, other options: assimilation of the 5,500,000
French Canadians to the 250,000,000-strong English-speaking North
* Party led by Pierre Bourgault in the 1966 Quebec election. It got
approximately 5.6 per cent of the vote, and later dissolved so that its
members could join the Parti Quebecois.
National Survival 35
American "society" is one such option. The bilingualization of Quebec
is another. But these other options are not supported by any political
party in Quebec and do not appear to appeal to any substantial
number of French-speaking Quebecers. On the language question,
French-speaking Quebecers share a consensus on the following basic
objective: French should be safeguarded, and it should be the domi-
nant language of Quebec. In other words, French Canadians generally
agree on the objective of making French the only language required of
French Canadians in Quebec.
However, even if a majority of them agree on this basic objective,
French Canadians are still divided on some aspects of the language
question. Some, such as Bernard Smith, would like to see the "privi-
leged status of the English language abolished".
1
 Others, such as
Claude Ryan of Le Devoir, insist on the rights of the English-speaking
minority of Quebec.
2
 Raymond Barbeau articulates the most distant
possibility: "There is no hope for French-Canadian minorities but
from an independent Quebec which would obtain for French-Cana-
dian minorities the same rights that are awarded to Quebec English-
speaking minorities."
3
The Idea of a French-Speaking Quebec People
With the exception of border regions and the western half of Montreal
Island, the whole territory of Quebec is in some ways already unilin-
gual and French. In virtually every region of Quebec except for Mon-
treal and the border fringe, the proportion of French-speaking Quebec-
ers in the total regional population runs in the 95 per cent range.* In
Metropolitan Montreal, where half the population of Quebec is now
concentrated, this proportion is only 66 per cent. English-speaking Que-
becers live in Montreal or in areas bordering Ontario or the United
States. In similar fashion, French-speaking Canadians living outside
Quebec are concentrated in areas bordering Quebec (eastern Ontario
and northern New Brunswick).
Quebec is as unilingual and French as the whole of Canada is
unilingual and English. The zones where there are substantial linguis-
tic minorities are delineated on the accompanying map. These zones
* Statistics Canada, Catalogue 92-758, Population by Mother Tongue.
Among these "all-French" districts: Bagot, Beauce, Beauharnois, Bel-
lechasse, Berthier, Champlain, Charlevoix, Chicoutimi, Dorchester and
Drummond.
I
3
a
I
National Survival 37
largely coincide with the so-called bilingual districts defined by the
federal government in the early 1970s.
According to surveys conducted in 1971 for Quebec's Gendron
Commission on the French language, 86 per cent of the French-
speaking population of Quebec experiences a situation of French
unilingualism. Of the 4,870,000 French-speaking Quebecers registered in
the 1971 census 4,200,000 were living in all-French surroundings. A
reading of census data shows that some 3,000,000 French-speaking Que-
becers live in areas where English is barely spoken at all, the local popu-
lation being French in a proportion of 95 per cent or more. Only 39 per
cent of Quebecers of French origin say they can speak English. A dispro-
portionate number of these bilingual Quebecers, however, are in the
labor force.
The extent of French unilingualism in Quebec largely explains why
the "rights" of the English-speaking minority in Quebec hold little
direct interest for French-speaking Quebecers, who associate primarily
with other French-speaking Quebecers, at home, at play, and at work.
From this viewpoint, what is happening in Quebec is similar to what
happened in other provinces of Canada when the French-speaking
minorities of those provinces were deprived of their language and
education "rights".
If the idea of curbing the "rights" of the English-speaking minority
in Quebec has not yet obtained the sanction of any political party, the
idea of extending the use of French is on the political platform of
each of the six major provincial parties of Quebec. And extending the
use of French in Quebec generally means making it "attractive" for as
many people as possible without encroaching on the constitutional
guarantees included in the British North America Act of 1867: the
maintenance of denominational schools, a fair parliamentary represen-
tation, and the free use of English in the Quebec legislature and in
Quebec courts. Yet, as exemplified in the debates surrounding the
controversial 1977 Quebec language legislation, variously known as
Bill One or Bill 101,* many Parti Quebecois activists would like to go
as far as possible.
According to another survey conducted for the Gendron Commis-
* This bill is now law, and is titled "Charte de la langue franchise au
Quebec" (Charter of the French Language in Quebec). It can be
obtained from the Editeur Officiel du Quebec. Hotel du Gouverne-
ment, Quebec, Quebec G1A 1A7.
38 What Does Quebec Want?
sion in 1971, nine French-speaking Quebecers out of ten are ready to
support government action in favor of French. The survey data
showed that 88 per cent of the French-speaking Quebecers interviewed
said that they supported such action in one or more areas of interest,
such as advertising, communications, language of work, immigration,
education, the civil service, textbook publishing and sales, and labell-
ing and marketing practices. And 69 per cent favored action in all or
all but one of these eight sectors. The support for government action
in favor of French results largely from the idea that French-speaking
Quebecers can become a minority if immigrants to Quebec continue to
join the English-speaking community.*
But this support for government action in favor of French also
results from increased contact between French- and English-speaking
people in Quebec. These contacts have affected a growing proportion
of the Quebec population since World War II. Before the war, less
than 25 per cent of the French-speaking population of Quebec was
living in Montreal, where the English-speaking population was concen-
trated. Outside Montreal, contacts between members of the two lin-
guistic groups were both rare and superficial, just as they are today.
On the whole, those who had to complain of regular difficulties with
members of the other group were not very numerous. According to the
census of 1941, fewer than 20 per cent of the English-speaking inhabit-
ants of Quebec could speak French; indeed 14.6 per cent of the
Quebec population of 1941 spoke "English only". By the same token,
fewer than 20 per cent of the French-speaking inhabitants of Quebec
knew English. The war years, and the industrialization and urbaniza-
tion that followed, changed this state of affairs. By 1961, more than 30
per cent of Quebec's French-speaking population was concentrated in
Montreal, and the percentage of bilingualism had risen to 25 per cent.
In 1971, 37 per cent of Quebec's French-speaking population lived in
the Montreal area; 27 per cent of all Quebecers were bilingual; and
only ten per cent of the Quebec population spoke "English only".
The contacts between the two linguistic groups occur primarily at
work. Otherwise the two communities remain largely segregated, with
English-speaking Montrealers living on the western half of the island
and leaving the eastern part to the French. But in the work area
contact is inevitable because the leading employers in the Montreal
* This idea is discussed below.
National Survival 39
area are large corporations owned by Americans or English-speaking
Canadians and managed by English-speaking executives. For as long
as anyone can remember, approximately two thirds of the private
sector jobs offered in the Montreal area have had "knowledge of
English" as a basic requirement.
According to the 1971 surveys already quoted, of 1,163,000 jobs
registered in Montreal, 70 per cent required knowledge of the English
language. In the rest of Quebec, English was a requirement for fewer
than 25 per cent of the jobs registered. In Montreal, according to the
same set of data, 46 per cent of the French-speaking people surveyed
had obtained their first jobs in positions where English was required.
Many French-speaking Quebecers who need English in order to get
or to hold their jobs believe that English is imposed on them by the
management, not by the requirements of the job. Indeed, a majority of
the French-speaking Quebecers employed in corporations managed by
English-speaking executives do in fact work in French, but they have
to speak English with managers, engineers, accountants, foremen and
salesmen—and they have to read and write English to understand the
written instructions prepared by the English-speaking staff or to be
understood when reporting to superiors. Many of the 600,000 French-
speaking Quebecers who "need" English on the job do not understand
why they have to learn a second language, while some 60,000 English-
speaking executives and professionals need one language only. In the
view of the Mouvement Quebec Francais, it would be much easier and
more economical to teach a second language to 60,000 managers,
executives and professionals than to 600,000 laborers, welders, electri-
cians and other hourly-paid workers. It would be easier still to hire or
promote 60,000 French-speaking Quebecers to executive jobs, and to
move outside Quebec the 60,000 unilingual English-speaking execu-
tives who, according to some Parti Quebecois activists, have led Can-
ada into its present state of crisis.
In the view of these activists, this is the nub of the language
problem: the owners and managers of large Canadian and American
corporations would rather force hourly-paid workers to learn English
than promote French Canadians who dare use their own mother
tongue. The argument of these activists is strengthened by the fact that
the English-speaking "elite" in the Quebec work force has stubbornly
held onto English, as shown by the following data taken from the
report of the Gendron Commission.
40 What Does Quebec Want?
Table 2-Percentage of the Quebec Work Force Showing a High
Degree of Fluency in the Other Official Language, by Educational
Level and by Mother Tongue
French-speaking people English-speaking people
Years of Schooling Fluent in English Fluent in French
0 to 8 years 7.6% 16.0%
9 to 11 years 19.6% 12.0%
12 to 14 years 29.8% 12.3%
15 to 16 years 35.9% 10.5%
17 years or more 35.5% 7.3%
Example: line one, column one (7.6%) means that among the French-
speaking workers in Quebec who completed between 0 and 8 years of
schooling, 7.6% are highly fluent in English.
Source: Rapport de la Commission d'enquete sur la situation de la langue
franqaise et sur les droits linguistiques au Quebec (Gendron Commission—
Quebec: Editeur Officiel, 1973), table 1.59.
From the viewpoint of the whole society, it would be economically
rational for the minority to learn a second language where and when a
second language is required. From this perspective, in Quebec corpor-
ations bilingualism should be required of the top management, not of
the million-strong work force over which the top management pre-
sides.
But in spite of the economic rationality behind the movement for a
French Quebec, the idea of French unilingualism in Quebec is not
without its problems. The first question relates to the proportion of the
Quebec population made up of unilingual English-speaking people.
Population data show that among the 6,027,000 Quebecers registered
in the 1971 census, 13 per cent (789,000) had English as their mother
tongue and six per cent (371,000) listed their mother tongue as neither
English nor French. Among these 1,160,000 people, 696,000 said that
they spoke no French. These 696,000 people account for less than
eleven per cent of the total Quebec population, but although this is a
lower percentage than the 15 per cent registered in 1941, the problem
National Survival 41
remains: how is it possible to convert such numbers to the idea of
French unilingualism? How can French Quebec teach French to
696,000 unilingual English-speaking people when English Canada has
been unable to teach English to 300,000 unilingual French Canadians
living in northern New Brunswick and eastern Ontario?
The second problem posed by the idea of French unilingualism in
Quebec relates to structures of employment. What would happen to
Quebec corporations if French were forced upon their managers?
About 70 per cent of the private-sector jobs available in Montreal are
provided by corporations owned and operated by English-speaking
people. Moreover many of the corporations owned by French Canadi-
ans are suppliers to larger Canadian or American companies. Would
there be a tendency for these companies to move their managers out
of Quebec, leaving only plant, warehouses, retail stores and terminals?
Since the early 1960s, when Quebec's language conflicts started, a
number of larger corporations have done just that. Head offices which
were located in Montreal have been moved to Toronto, along with
accounting, planning, research and other staff services. Further expan-
sion in Quebec has generally been stalled or delayed. Some of these
moves and delays have little to do with language conflicts but reflect
the general displacement of the economic and demographic centre of
gravity in North America from east to west. Nevertheless the problem
is real.
And what would happen to all the English-speaking workers who
work in Quebec without knowing French? In 1971, out of a work force
of 2,340,000 people, 521,000 Quebec workers had a mother tongue
other than French. Among these 521,000 only 224,000 needed French
regularly on their jobs. What will happen to the unilingual English-
speaking Quebecers if the English-speaking managers move out of
Quebec, taking most administrative functions with them and leaving
behind nothing but the production and distribution facilities, which
are already staffed by French-speaking employees? These problems
are accentuated by the fact that most of the 696,000 English-speaking
Quebecers who do not speak French and most of the jobs for which
French is not a requirement are concentrated in one particular area of
Quebec: the western half of the island of Montreal. How will these
English-speaking Canadians living in Montreal, many of them well-to-
do, react to what they perceive as a threat to themselves?
Awareness of the problems it would cause English-speaking people
in Quebec does not stop the idea of a unilingual French-speaking
42 What Does Quebec Want?
Quebec from gaining support. French-speaking Quebecers already see
benefits for themselves in the government actions that have been taken
in favor of French. Although the percentage they constitute in the total
personnel of large corporations and institutions has not changed signif-
icantly in the last ten to fifteen years, French Canadians have appar-
ently gained easier access to higher levels of management. Moreover,
the pressure exerted in favor of English-speaking managers has been
reduced. That probably explains why the increase in bilingualism
among French-speaking Quebecers, which had been dramatic between
1941 and 1967, was very moderate between 1961 and 1971 and practi-
cally nil between 1971 and 1976.
The support given to the idea of French unilingualism in Quebec is
partly explained by economic motives on the part of some French-
speaking Quebecers. The first beneficiaries of such a change would be
the members of Quebec's French-speaking elite. These people have
much to gain economically, because recruitment for managerial func-
tions would be restricted to people speaking French. But the extension
of French is a matter of material well-being for other French Canadi-
ans as well. Many Quebecers believe that the leaders of a group tend
to recruit members of their own group when there is a job to fill, and
indeed to favor members of their own group in everything they do. If,
thanks to language legislation, the French-speaking Quebec elite is
able to displace the current English-speaking managers of Quebec's
larger corporations, then hundreds of thousands of French-speaking
Quebec workers could benefit from this extension of the French lan-
guage. Instructions will be issued in French, reports will be written in
French, managers will speak French, and workers will be able to use
differently (through additional technical training or greater leisure) the
time, money and energy they now spend on a second language.
The Ideology of National Survival
The idea of a French unilingual Quebec does not rest solely on
economic motives or group selfishness. It is also, and probably more
significantly, a reflection of the ideology of national survival, which is
a dominant feature of social thinking in French Canada. It is based on
the belief that French Canadians constitute a nation, but a nation
which does not control all of the economic and political institutions
operating in its territory. It is also based on the belief that the French-
Canadian nation is threatened by "outsiders" who control those insti-
National Survival 43
tutions which, although they operate in French-Canadian territory, are
not French-Canadian. And finally, the ideology of national survival
prescribes specific goals: the protection of the French-Canadian popu-
lation and territory and the gradual accession by French Canadians to
control over the economic and political institutions which remain
outside their command.
The French-Canadian nation, as defined by its leading nationalist
thinkers such as Lionel Groulx,* has always been characterized by two
fundamental features: the French language and the territory populated
by "les Canadiens" ever since the early stages of the European col-
onization of North America. Although a precise delineation of the
French-Canadian territory has never been possible or necessary,
French-Canadian nationalist thinkers have shown a very high degree
of agreement in their definition of the French-Canadian nation, its
problems and its objectives. Their definitions have been modified
gradually under the pressure of changing times and conditions, and
secondary elements in these definitions have often been presented
differently by different social thinkers, but despite these differences of
emphasis or detail there has been general agreement on the essentials.
One of the areas of agreement relates to the belief that French
Canadians do constitute a nation, separate and distinct from the
English-speaking communities of Canada. Indeed French Canadians
share a number of characteristics which clearly distinguish their nation
in North America: they all speak French; they have with rare excep-
tions been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith; they can trace
their "Canadian" ancestry back to the seventeenth or early eighteenth
century. French Canadians generally believe that "their land" was
opened by their forefathers long before the arrival of the first British
* Groulx's ideas are well summarized in the following quotation, taken
from Ramsay Cook's anthology, French-Canadian Nationalism
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969) page 193:
But in the large country [Canada], we in Quebec have a smaller
country, our French province. The land between Montreal and
Tadoussac was, for a long time, the cradle and hearthstone of our
race. And in this space, more or less, we were confined after the
Conquest; on this territory we lived, suffered, grew, we developed our
institutions and our ethnic character. Here, in a word, we placed
forever our French imprint. And it is the autonomy of this State as
well as its national particularism that was recognized in the federal
pact of 1867. What is there still lacking for us to feel attached to this
land and to determine to stay here at home?
44 What Does Quebec Want?
settlers, and they consider that "their territory" is theirs as a heritage:
they share a common territory. French Canadians who live in Quebec
control social institutions such as the Church, the schools and the
media which operate within their territory and affect its population.
They also control Quebec provincial and municipal politics. Except for
their lack of control over part of their economy and over federal
political institutions, French Canadians present, as a group, the usual
features which define nations. But, above all, most of them share a
common will to survive and a common faith in their future as a
nation.
Reading nationalist literature, one discovers that part of the argu-
ment revolves around the idea of a conflict of interests between
French Canadians and outside groups that threaten the national integ-
rity of the French Canadian people. Some see Quebec as a colony of
Canada or the United States.
4
 Outside groups, according to this view,
covet the territory and the natural resources of Quebec, and they try to
exploit French-Canadian manpower to their own selfish ends. In this
perspective, these groups constitute a threat to French Canadians;
moreover, the actions of these outside groups explain the problems
and the economic and political dependency of the French-Canadian
people.
Although they generally agree on the existence of an external threat,
French-Canadian nationalists are not at all unanimous in defining its
nature and origins. Various hypotheses have been proposed by differ-
ent groups at different times. During the 1950s, when worldwide
attention turned on Moscow's Communists, some Quebec nationalists
found a threat to their nation in Moscow.* Present-day worldwide
anti-Americanism has some echoes in Quebec nationalist circles.**
However, a survey of nationalist literature reveals that one group has
always been perceived as threatening: the English-speaking magnates
of Canadian finance and industry and the bureaucrats of the federal
government who are regarded as their servants.
What is perceived as a threat does not necessarily need to be one in
* The leader of the Union Nationale, Premier Maurice Duplessis,
became famous in the 1950s for his crusade against Communists. See
Herbert Quinn, The Union Nationale, A Study in Nationalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963).
** The Confederation of National Trade Unions' 1971 pamphlets, Ne
comptons que sur nos propres moyens, and Ce n'est qu'un commence-
ment, illustrate these views.
National Survival 45
fact. It would be very difficult to convince Soviet or American diplo-
mats that their country threatens French in Canada, or to convince
Toronto financiers or Ottawa civil servants that they constitute a
menace to French Canadians. However, French-Canadian nationalists
have always been able to support their assertions with examples taken
from the news headlines. In 1976, they quoted the opposition to the
use of French in air traffic over Quebec, the booing of announcements
in French at a hockey game in Toronto, the statistics on immigration,
on trade, on investment, on income, on unemployment, on federal
spending, and so on.
To resort to the idea of an outside threat to explain one's difficulties
is not peculiar to French-Canadian nationalists. This is a common
feature of many ideologies, and is held to with equal fervor by trade
unions, professional associations, and nations. Social groups usually
explain their difficulties by having recourse to some external "cause",
be it exploitation of a ruling class, the oppression of a dominant
nation, or some combination of the two. When a social group uses an
external threat to explain its problems, it also judges its own success
by its ability to resist the threat. And this, in French Canada, is
another area of agreement. In the view of many Quebec nationalists,
the survival of French Canada is not a miracle, it is a feat explained
primarily by the solid social virtues of French Canadians and by their
veneration of the French language.
The French language, as we have seen, is a fundamental characteris-
tic of the French-Canadian nation, but it is also more than that. It is
the symbol of identity for French Canadians as a group, the rallying
force among them, their pride and their wealth. It has an appeal
which compares to no other group characteristic. In the last analysis, it
is what French Canadians fight for. In this light, the idea of a
unilingual French-speaking people in the territory populated and dom-
inated by French Canadians is more a reflection of ideology than a
formula prompted by narrow economic interests.
The Survival of a French Nation in North America
With rare exceptions, French Canadians are united behind the objec-
tive of preserving and extending the use of the French language in the
territory where they are numerically dominant. They are also more or
less unanimously in favor of defining French Canadians as a nation.
And there can be no doubt that French-speaking Canadians agree on
46 What Does Quebec Want?
the objective of national survival, the survival of a French "nation" in
North America.
Among the important questions on which they do not agree is the
issue of "rights" to be guaranteed to the English-speaking minority of
Quebec. The degree of economic and political subordination consistent
with the objective of national survival in an industrialized and highly
interdependent world is another area of disagreement, although
French Canadians generally believe that the current degree of subordi-
nation is too high and should be reduced. Many members of the Parti
Quebecois believe that the maximum degree of subordination consist-
ent with the survival of the French-Canadian nation is that which
would remain after the government of Quebec gained full political
sovereignty. However, some Parti Quebecois members, and many
activists who work with small Marxist organizations, believe that for-
mal political sovereignty is not enough. Others, including most mem-
bers of the opposition parties, believe that full sovereignty is much
more than what is required.
Those who oppose the objective of Quebec political sovereignty
generally argue against it on the grounds that it would endanger the
very French-Canadian nation that it is meant to protect. They oppose
the reduction of French territory to the limits of Quebec, since such a
reduction would spell the end of French-speaking minorities outside
Quebec. But, as we have already seen, many French-speaking Quebec-
ers consider that the isolation and level of assimilation of the French-
speaking minorities outside Quebec have severed them from the
French-Canadian nation. For many members of the Parti Quebecois,
the French-Canadian nation is now reduced to the territory of Quebec
and the adjacent French-speaking "bilingual" districts of northern
New Brunswick and eastern Ontario (see figure 2).
A number of French-speaking Canadians, most notably Prime Min-
ister Pierre Trudeau, oppose "nationalism" or, more precisely, French-
Canadian nationalism.* However, even among these anti-nationalists,
a great many approve of la survivance francaise; they approve of the
idea of protecting the French language in Canada, but they condemn
French unilingualism and Quebec "separatism". Whatever their posi-
tion on questions such as bilingualism and English "rights" in Quebec,
French Canadians of Quebec are clearly in favor of one common
* This anti-nationalism is particularly well expressed in a famous article
by Pierre Trudeau, "New Treason of the Intellectuals" in Federalism
and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pages 151-181.
National Survival 47
fundamental objective, la survivance franqaise. The survival of the
French language is, in the view of a large majority, inseparable from
the survival of a French-speaking nation in North America.
2
Economic Well-Being
Like national survival, economic progress is an objective on which
French-Canadian political leaders agree. But while some leaders are
careful not to talk about the French-Canadian "nation" when they
address themselves to English-speaking audiences, no leader would
hesitate to voice his faith in economic progress.
The economic complaints heard in Quebec often seem more press-
ing than those which are heard in other parts of Canada. Quebec has
been lagging behind the Canadian average per capita income since the
end of World War I. Various explanations have been advanced for
this lag, and these explanations lead to a variety of proposed solutions,
but the objective remains the same: everybody would like to improve
the well-being of French-speaking Quebecers.
Quebec's Economic Lag
The national accounts published regularly since 1926 show that the
gap between Quebec per capita income and Canadian per capita
income has oscillated around an average 15-percentage-point spread.
Canadian per capita income being 100, Quebec has usually registered
about 85. And a similar discrepancy is found in every standard per
capita index of production or consumption.
At the same time, Quebec has been, along with the Atlantic prov-
inces, a leader in unemployment in Canada. The rate of unemploy-
ment in Quebec is regularly more than 25 per cent above the Cana-
dian average. When the Canadian rate of unemployment is between
seven and eight per cent, Quebec generally has ten per cent. Ontario,
on the other hand, registers an unemployment rate somewhat below
the Canadian average: when Quebec's unemployment rate is ten per
48
Economic Weil-Being 49
cent, the Ontario rate is between five and seven per cent. The differ-
ence between Quebec and Ontario from the viewpoint of unemploy-
ment is more dramatic than the difference registered from the view-
point of per capita income. When Quebec stands at 85 in comparison
to the Canadian average of 100 on the index of per capita income,
Ontario stands at 110 or more. The two western provinces of Alberta
and British Columbia usually fare almost as well as Ontario, while the
four eastern provinces, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island in
particular, fare considerably worse than Quebec (see table 3).
Table 3-Average Per Capita Income by Province, 1956, 1966 and 1975,
with 1976 Populations
Province 1976 Population Per capita income compared
with the Canadian average
Newfoundland
Prince Edward
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Canada
Canadian average
559,000
121,000
836,000
692,000
6,267,000
8,373,000
1,030,000
941,000
1,850,000
2,502,000
23,231,000
1956
56
55
74
65
86
119
94
83
102
122
100
$1350
1966
62
66
77
72
89
113
100
94
103
111
100
$2303
1975
69
68
79
77
91
110
97
102
104
107
100
$5838
Source: Statistics Canada, Geographic Distribution of Personal Income,
National Accounts, Income and Expenditure, 1950-1956, page 38 and National
Income and Expenditure Accounts, 1961-1975, pages 46-47, catalogue 13-201.
In order to provide Quebecers with public services in the same
quantity and quality as the neighboring province of Ontario or state of
New York, the Quebec provincial government must resort to higher
rates of taxation. Quebec rates for standard taxes run ten to fifteen per
50 What Does Quebec Want?
cent above the Canadian average. In 1976, a citizen of Quebec earning
$25,000 in taxable income was paying $825 more in income taxes than
an average fellow Canadian with similar income, and $1,400 more
than a $25,000-a-year Albertan.
However, contrary to what one might expect, wages and salaries
paid in Quebec compare closely to those paid in Ontario or New York,
at least since the mid-1960s. Moreover, minimum wage regulations
since the mid-1960s have been more favorable to workers in Quebec
than in most Canadian provinces. Taxation statistics published
annually by the federal Department of National Revenue reveal that
individual incomes by occupational category often reach higher aver-
ages in Quebec than in many other provinces. Census data confirm
these taxation statistics: in 1971, the average income, for all people
with income, was $4,969 in Quebec, only $64 less than the average in
the country as a whole.
Economic Lag and Demographic Structure
There seems to be a paradox in the fact that the wage paid in Quebec
for a specific job to a person with specific credentials is similar to the
wage paid in Ontario for the same job, while Quebec's per capita
income lags 20 to 30 points behind Ontario's.* The paradox is only
apparent, because income statistics are related to the demographic
structure of a population, and a significant part of the difference in
per capita income between Quebec and Ontario is explained by the
demographic structure of Quebec. Because of its traditionally higher
birthrate, Quebec has always had a larger percentage of children
(under fifteen years of age) than Ontario. In 1971, 4,242,175 Quebec-
ers, or 70 per cent of the total population of 6,027,000, were of
* In its study of regional disparities, published in April 1977, the Eco-
nomic Council of Canada explained that the differences in per capita
income between the various provinces of Canada result from differ-
ences in productivity from one region to the other. These differences
in productivity do not result from differences between "industrial
structures" but, in 80 per cent of the cases, from differences in the
professional qualifications of manpower. In 1970, for instance, the
average Quebec and Atlantic worker had 10 years of schooling, while
Alberta and British Columbia workers had 11 years. The lower educa-
tion level of the Quebec labor force explains four points of an 11
percentage point difference between Quebec production per worker
and Ontario production per worker. See Living Together: A Study of
Regional Disparities, Ottawa, 1977 (catalogue no. EC 22-54/1977).
Economic Weil-Being 51
working age. Ontario, the same year, had 71 per cent of its population
of working age (5,495,000 out of 7,703,000). In 1961, the respective
proportions were 64 per cent (3,396,000 out of 5,259,000) in Quebec,
and 67 per cent (4,228,000 out of 6,236,000) in Ontario. These figures
reflect the higher birthrate of Quebec and the higher immigration to
Ontario. Up to 1966, for every thousand inhabitants one could find
roughly 30 more children in Quebec than in Ontario. Until very
recently, Quebec adults had more mouths to feed than Ontario adults:
that is one explanation of Quebec's lower income per capita (including
adults and children) at least for the period extending to the mid-1960s.
Moreover, the percentage of adults who work outside home for an
income has regularly been lower in Quebec than in Ontario. Several
factors explain this lower rate of participation in the labor force. One
relates to the pressures on many Quebec women to stay home and
rear children; the ideal of high fertility and the economic dependency
of women were dominant values in French-Canadian society until the
mid-1960s. Another reason has been the persistence of seasonal
employment practices forced upon Quebec's rural population by cli-
mate, geography, and habitat dispersal. Habitat dispersal has hindered
manpower mobility and contributed to underemployment in rural
areas. These factors and many others, which have little to do with
"discrimination", have made for a participation index somewhat lower
in Quebec than in Ontario. In 1971, for instance, only 54 per cent of
Quebecers aged 15 and over had a paid job or were looking actively
for one (2,394,000 out of 4,242,000 adults were in the labor force). In
Ontario, the same year, the corresponding proportion was 58 per cent
(3,249,000 people in the labor force out of 5,495,000 aged fifteen and
over). In 1961, the percentages were 52 per cent in Quebec and 57 per
cent in Ontario. In other words, among 1,000 adults, in 1961, 480
stayed home in Quebec, but only 430 in Ontario: a difference of 50, or
almost ten per cent. The proportional difference remained roughly the
same for decades but it has been declining gradually since the mid-
1960s.
A significant part of the Quebec unemployment rate can be
explained by demography. Because of Quebec's traditionally higher
birthrate, the number of young people looking for a first job has been
proportionally higher in Quebec than in Ontario, leading to a higher
unemployment rate among Quebec youth. Unemployed Quebec
youths (16 to 24 years of age) have sometimes accounted for almost
half of Canadian unemployment in this age category. Another demo-
graphic factor, which has become significant in the last 15 years,
52 What Does Quebec Want?
relates to the recent decrease in Quebec's birthrate. While the positive
effects of this decrease in terms of youth unemployment will not really
be felt until after 1980, the transition has made for another increase in
unemployment: a growing proportion of Quebec women are becoming
liberated from the traditional obligations of motherhood, and as a
consequence, Quebec women are arriving on the labor market in
much greater proportions than before, and in greater proportions than
Ontario women. This recent phenomenon has led to a very high level
of unemployment among Quebec women, who have regularly
accounted for some 35 per cent of unemployed Canadian women for
the last 10 to 15 years.
The Difference Between Quebec and Ontario
The 1971 24-percentage-point difference between Quebec per
capita income ($3,027) and Ontario per capita income ($3,967) is
explained by:
A. Demographic factors, for ten percentage points:
In 1971, Quebec had 2,197,000 people employed in a total
population of 6,027,000 (36 per cent) and Ontario had
3,079,000 people employed in a total population of 7,703,000
(40 per cent). The difference between 36 and 40 is four, that
is ten per cent of 40. This difference results from the fact that
Quebec, in 1971, had a greater proportion of young people in
its population than Ontario, a lower rate of participation of
its women in the labor force, and a greater territorial disper-
sion of its population.
B. Factors of economic structure for ten percentage points:
One third of these ten percentage points in 1971 was related
to the lower education level of the average Quebec worker;
another third was a result of the Quebec overrepresentation
in the highly competitive textile, clothing and furniture indus-
tries; and the last third was related to other structural charac-
teristics of Quebec economy (non-resident ownership of large
corporations, for instance).
C. Other factors, including the impact of federal government
spending, for four percentage points.
Economic Well-Being 53
The higher Quebec unemployment rate, which is explained partly
by demography, partly by Quebec's adverse climate and seasonal work
practices in primary production sectors, partly by rural habitat disper-
sal, and partly by other factors such as Quebec's industrial structure
and dependency on foreign markets, also has a significant bearing on
Quebec's per capita production and income. In 1971, for instance,
there were on the average 197,000 unemployed in Quebec, while
Ontario had only 170,000. In 1961, the numbers were 168,000 (9.3 per
cent unemployment rate) in Quebec, and 132,000 (5.5 per cent) in
Ontario.
All these demographic factors have their effects on the per capita
production and income figures. In 1971, these factors gave Quebec
2,197,000 employed people in a total of 6,027,000 population (36 per
cent of the population actually worked). In the same year, Ontario had
3,079,000 people employed (or 40 per cent) in a total population of
7,703,000. Proportionally, the difference between Quebec and Ontario
was thus about ten per cent. In 1961, the proportions were 31 per cent
(Quebec) and 36 per cent (Ontario). In other words, Quebec's employ-
ment as a fraction of the total population is ten to fifteen per cent
lower than Ontario's.
In summary, demographic and labor statistics explain a large part of
the lower per capita income of Quebec in comparison with Ontario or
with Canada as a whole. All other things being equal, up to 1971, the
demographic characteristics of Quebec and of Ontario accounted for a
ten per cent difference in their per capita income.
Economic Lag and the Structure of Industry
But all other things are not equal: other structural characteristics
account for another ten per cent difference in the per capita income of
Canada's two largest provinces. These relate to Quebec industry.
Quebec is overrepresented in several industrial sectors which are labor-
intensive and severely threatened by international competition. More-
over, Quebec's industrial structure is dominated by corporations which
are owned by non-residents. As a consequence, per capita capital
income is lower in Quebec than in Ontario.
A large part of Quebec's manufacturing sector was developed before
1950: it is now aging, it remains labor-intensive, it is beset with social
problems related to technical modernization, and it is adversely
affected by the expansion of manufacturing production in newly
54 What Does Quebec Want?
industrialized countries where wages are considerably lower than in
Quebec. This is the case in the textile, clothing, leather, footwear,
furniture and electronics sectors, all sectors in which Quebec accounts
for a large share (between 30 and 50 per cent) of total Canadian
production. Competition from poorer countries leads to underpricing
and underpaying, which in turn further delays technical modernization
and accentuates social problems such as worker dissatisfaction and
strikes.
A significant proportion of the Quebec work force, a larger propor-
tion than in Ontario, is employed in the sectors most affected by
obsolescence and international competition. Wages rank well below
those paid in sectors such as the automotive industry, where competi-
tion comes from fully-developed, high-wage industrial countries. While
Quebec suffers from world competition in sectors where world prices
are lower than Canadian prices, Ontario benefits from the world price
levels established in the industrial sectors in which it is strong (notably
the automobile industry), Alberta benefits from world prices in the
energy resources which abound in its territory, and British Columbia
benefits from the growth of trade among Pacific Rim countries.
Another characteristic of Quebec industry which adversely affects
per capita income relates to the ownership of its largest corporations.
Just as in Canada as a whole, industry in Quebec is dominated by
American multinational corporations, especially those which manufac-
ture such complex products as chemicals, drugs and engines. But
unlike Ontario, Quebec has a further absentee ownership problem. A
growing proportion of shares in Canadian corporations operating in
Quebec have left Quebec and gone to Ontario. Moreover, unlike
Ontario, Quebec now clearly falls outside the North American centre
of gravity, which has moved from east to west with the passage of
time. As a consequence of this general displacement to the west,
Canadian capital has tended to leave Quebec in order to remain in the
mainstream of North American development. Foreign as well as Cana-
dian investors have naturally favored Ontario or the western provinces
because the pace of development held out the promise of higher yields
on capital invested there. As the most significant expansion takes place
to the west, Quebec is passed by.
As a general consequence of both the non-resident ownership of
Quebec's largest corporations and the relatively lower rate of private
investment in Quebec, millions of dollars of profits generated by
Quebec labor and Quebec consumers are collected and spent or rein-
vested outside Quebec, south and west of its borders.
Economic Well-Being 55
Finally, because of their traditionally high birthrate and consequent
high level of demographic expenses, the French Canadians of Quebec
have not been able to amass much capital. What their thrift has
allowed them to save has been primarily channeled into insurance
premiums and bonds over which Quebec residents do not exert much
control. This capital, owned indirectly by inhabitants of Quebec, has
also tended to pull out in order to follow the westward trend. As a
result of all this, capital income in Quebec is considerably less than in
Ontario.
Altogether, the aging and threatened Quebec manufacturing sector
with its low wages and the low capital income registered in Quebec
because of the non-resident ownership of its larger corporations
account for another ten-percentage-point difference in per capita
income between Quebec and Ontario.
Economic Lag and the Cost of Cultural Differentiation
The demographic and structural factors which explain most of the
economic lag experienced by Quebec in comparison to Ontario are
similar to those which explain the economic lag of the four Atlantic
provinces as well as that which affects several of the eastern states in
the American federation. But Quebec's economic lag is also partly
explained by Quebec cultural differentiation. By maintaining French
as their language, French Canadians reduce their territorial mobility
and sever themselves from the flow of ideas and innovation which
fuels North American economic progress.
Some of the authors of the anti-independence book, Le separatisme?
Non! 100 fois nonP think that the price paid by French Canadians
for their "national survival" is much less than what it would be if
Quebec were not subsidized by the rest of Canada and if Quebec
industry were not managed by English-speaking Canadians. According
to this view, by being part of the Canadian federation, French Canadi-
ans benefit from government services that they could not afford if they
were left by themselves, and by opening their territory to North
American industrialists, French Canadians avoid the disaster that they
would face if they had to count on their own elite for innovation and
gains in productivity. Indeed, in this perspective, French Canadians
should be amply satisfied with their economic and political situation,
because by and large they fare a lot better economically than those
Canadians who live in the four eastern provinces.
Attempts to explain Quebec's economic lag by such "cultural
56 What Does Quebec Want?
causes", are generally bolstered by statistics relating to religion and
education, factors which have long differentiated Quebec from the rest
of Canada. Taking into account not only language but also religion
and education, one can make a very convincing argument for the
"cultural explanation" of Quebec's economic lag.
The religious factor is the most obvious. French Canadians, with
rare and statistically insignificant exceptions, are all Roman Catholics,
while 75 per cent of all English-speaking Canadians are Protestants.
The hypothesis is that the Protestant ethic has favored economic
progress, industrialization, and capitalism, while these developments
are hindered by the Catholic ethic. The demonstration of this hypothe-
sis consists of a comparison between the industrial production of
countries where Protestantism dominates and that of countries where
Catholicism dominates. There is indeed a correlation: Germany, Eng-
land, and the United States are all highly industrialized and domi-
nated by Protestants, while Spain, Portugal and the South American
republics are much less industrialized and dominated by Catholics. In
Canada, the economic elite is dominated by Protestants, who hold
about 75 per cent of the executive positions in large Canadian corpo-
rations.
The value of the argument must not be exaggerated, however, and
one should be cautious when talking of the influence of religion on
the economy. Although one can see a correlation between religion and
industrial development, it is very difficult to find a direct causal
relationship between the two. Economic development results from a
variety of factors which can be directly related to production, know-
how, trade, organization, resources, transportation, climate, technical
innovation, and so on; none of these factors is directly related to
religion. Moreover, the religious argument obviously does not take into
account the changes that have occurred in Quebec since 1960.
Religion has to be mentioned as a factor when one tries to explain
Quebec's economic lag, but the hypothesis has yet to be tested conclu-
sively and the part of the economic lag that religion can explain has
yet to be measured. Surely, the methodological problems involved in a
measure of the influence of religion on the economic development of
Quebec would be considerable. But up to the 1960s and perhaps
later, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec had at
least an indirect impact on the economic development of French
Canada, through Church influence in matters such as education and
birthrate.
Economic Weil-Being 57
The phenomenal birthrate registered by French Canadians, which
produced a demographic structure that greatly affected per capita
income, was partly a consequence of values nurtured by the Catholic
ethic. According to Jacques Henripin, "During the last two centuries,
world population has been multiplied by three, European population
by four, and French-Canadian population by eighty, in spite of net
emigration that can be estimated roughly at 800,000."
6
 This is particu-
larly remarkable in light of French-Canadian emigration to the United
States: between 1870 and 1930, close to a million French Canadians
left Canada to go to the United States; in 1950, 13 million Americans
had at least one grandparent born in French Canada; and 2,600,000
Americans spoke French at home in 1970.
The social role of women, as seen by leading members of the
Catholic clergy, did not admit of work outside the home. The lower
rate of participation of French-Canadian women in the labor force,
while partly explained by family responsibilities and lower employ-
ment opportunities in rural areas, also has to do with attitudes conso-
nant with the teachings of the clergy. Another area where Church
influence has certainly been significant is the "agricultural vocation"
of French Canada. From the 1840s to the 1950s, a large segment of
the Catholic clergy of Quebec advocated a philosophy of agricultural-
ism; farming was believed to be the ideal achievement of man on
earth. Although these views were challenged by a minority in the
clergy, they contributed nevertheless to French Canadians remaining
in rural areas, kept them from engaging in industry and influenced
school curricula. Birthrate, lower rate of female participation in the
work force, and attitudes toward industrialization and education have
all had an impact on the economic development of French Canada,
and they account for part of Quebec's lower per capita income.
However, the influence of the Church in such matters is both indirect
and difficult to measure.
Another cultural explanation of Quebec's economic lag relates to
levels of education. The fact is that, in 1961, 55 per cent of Quebec
adults had seven years or less of schooling, while the comparable
figure in Ontario was 45 per cent. It is also a fact that up to the early
1970s, French-speaking universities produced fewer than ten per cent
of Canada's graduates in engineering and the sciences, while Quebec
French Canadians accounted for 23 per cent of the country's popula-
tion. Moreover, in fields such as engineering, chemistry and the social
sciences, French-Canadian university graduates have long constituted
58 What Does Quebec Want?
only ten to fifteen per cent of the total Canadian professional mem-
bership.
Educational level and personal income correlate within the same age
bracket and within the same linguistic groups. But for the same
educational level and the same age bracket, there is also a significant
"linguistic differential" between French- and English-speaking Canadi-
ans in terms of personal income (1961 data), as revealed in the Report
of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1969.
One example can illustrate this: upon graduating from university, the
"average" English-speaking Canadian, in 1961, was getting $800 more
than the "average" French-speaking Canadian. According to the B
and B Commission Report, French-speaking Canadians were those
who benefited least from their education. Studies based on the 1971
census show that the situation has not changed significantly (see box).
However, one should take into account, before concluding that dis-
crimination does exist, that French-Canadian university graduates tend
to take the jobs available in their own local communities rather than
compete for better-paid jobs available outside.
Some attention could be directed toward the content of school
curricula in the French-speaking educational system. Indeed, until the
late 1960s, the French-speaking schools of Quebec offered a smaller
amount of "technical" instruction than the English-speaking schools of
Ontario or other provinces. The differences in the school curricula
probably led to differences between graduates of the two main linguis-
tic groups in terms of managerial or technical capabilities. Such differ-
ences, in turn, possibly explain differences in personal income at the
start of a career. One should talk of "discrimination" only when
people with similar credentials are paid different salaries and offered
different work conditions because of their ethnic origin, religion, skin
color or sex.
According to our analysis, factors related to the French-Canadian
culture explain directly only a small part of the difference between
Quebec and Ontario in terms of per capita income. At best, it is risky
to explain the whole of the economic lag which affects Quebec by
resorting to nothing but the cultural differentiation hypothesis. Our
analysis has shown, so far, that Quebec's economic lag is primarily
and directly explained by demographic and structural factors (in 1961,
20 points of the 30-point difference between Quebec and Ontario per
capita income were so explained). Our analysis has also shown that
one of the cultural factors (education) directly explains approximately
Economic Well-Being 59
Unilingual Francophones Got Lowest Pay in 1971
Bilingual French-speaking employees earned less than unilin-
gual anglophones in 1971 while unilingual francophones dropped
into last place among the province's wage earners, a study pub-
lished Saturday shows.
The purpose of the study by Francois Vaillancourt, an eco-
nomics professor at the University of Montreal, was to update
1961 statistics used by the royal commission on bilingualism and
biculturalism, known as the B and B commission.
"The francophone worker is still the most underprivileged,
regardless of his occupation, and even if he becomes bilingual he
cannot match the anglophone, bilingual or not, except in the case
of office employees," said Vaillancourt.
In 1971 the average earnings of a unilingual francophone
employee were 64 per cent lower than for a unilingual anglo-
phone. However, the gap between bilingual employees in both
groups dropped to 20 per cent in favor of anglophones, the study
showed.
With only 14 per cent of the Quebec population, anglophones
held 31 per cent of administrative positions and only 10 per cent
of production jobs in 1971.
In 1961 francophones were in second-last place in average
earnings, just ahead of Italians. Vaillancourt's results showed that
between 1961 and 1971, francophones slipped into last place.
Source: The Gazette, Montreal, May 2, 1977, page 3.
another five points of this difference. In other words, the "cultural
explanation" does account for a part of Quebec's economic lag, but no
more.*
Moreover, a survey of the data for the last 25 years also shows that
Quebec's economic lag has been reduced gradually as its demographic
structure slowly improved in comparison with Ontario's and its educa-
* In 1971, according to the Economic Council of Canada, education and
culture accounted for four points in an eleven point difference
between Ontario and Quebec income per worker. See Living Together:
A Study of Regional Disparities, Ottawa, 1977 (catalogue no. EC 22-
54/1977).
60 What Does Quebec Want?
tional system underwent profound changes. In the 1970s, Quebec's
birthrate has fallen below the Canadian average, a dramatic change
compared with the 1950s. In the 1970s, Quebec school enrolment, at all
levels, has become one of the highest in Canada. These changes have
been reflected in the economic sphere: the difference between Quebec
and Ontario in terms of per capita income has been reduced grad-
ually. This difference was more than 30 points before 1963; it was
down to 25 in 1967; in 1977 it oscillated around 20 points.
Our analysis, which is limited to the first level of causal relation-
ships, emphasizes demographic, structural and educational factors. But
the analysis could be pushed further: one could try, for instance, to
discover what "caused" the Quebec school curriculum of the 1900-
1960 period to be what it was. One could also correlate recent changes
in the demographic trends and in education with the recent decline of
Church influence, or the recent impact of television. But, in every such
case, the relationship with Quebec economic performance would be
indirect and very difficult to establish precisely. What one can say is
that Quebec's economic lag in terms of per capita income is related
directly to factors such as demography, industrial structures and educa-
tional levels, and indirectly to such phenomena as ethics, values and
culture, as well as to habitat dispersal, climate, natural resources,
foreign markets and so on. It would be a gross exaggeration to
emphasize a single explanation—the more so if that explanation is not
directly verifiable. In short, the cultural differentiation hypothesis does
not provide anything resembling a complete explanation of the
Quebec economic lag.
The Quebec Business Community
Another aspect of the "cultural differentiation hypothesis" has to do
with the proportion of English-speaking people in the Quebec business
community. Census statistics reveal that, in the Quebec private sector
(which accounts for a little more than 75 per cent of employment in
the province), some 60 per cent of the executives are of French origin,
while people of French origin make up 82 per cent of the entire
population. This imbalance does not apply to public-sector executive
positions, including some para-public activities.
Quebecers of an origin other than French register a higher educa-
tion level than French Canadians,. and they have average property
incomes much larger than French Canadians. Putting the average
Economic Well-Being 61
income at 100, French Canadians employed in Quebec earn only 95,
while Quebecers of non-French origin earn 125: a difference of 30
percentage points. The studies conducted for the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism during the 1960s documented this
conclusion with 1961 census data and with special surveys.
Real income of
the family,
household or single
individual
$100,000
and more
$20,000
to $100,000 /
/
$7000 /
to $20,000 /
/
I
$4000 /
to $7000 /
I
I
$4000 /
and less /
Proportion of
the population
in the category
A
A
/3%\
\
12% \
\
\
\
30% \
\
\
\
\
35% \
\
20% \
Main characteristics
of the category
90% English-speaking: large in-
dustrialists, financiers and mer-
chants
40% English-speaking and 50%
bilingual: managers, profession-
als, businessmen
20% English-speaking, 20%
bilingual and 60% French-
speaking, smaller professionals,
organized workers, large farmers
5% English-speaking, 30%
bilingual and 65% French-
speaking: unorganized workers,
small farmers
95% French-speaking: unemp-
loyed, welfare recipients, stu-
Figure 3 An Illustration of Income Distribution in Quebec Households,
1976
Source Adaptation, for 1976, of an illustration in Pierre Jauvin, Le Sous-developpement au
Quebec et dans le monde (Montreal Secretariat national de la Jeunesse ouvriere catholique,
1971)
Note Pierre Jauvin's table is in turn inspired by a 1969 report of the Quebec Department of
Revenue Income includes capital gains registered m the course of the year
62 What Does Quebec Want?
Taking into account data on earnings, income from property and
capital gains, and other data on the number of income-earners per fam-
ily, one can illustrate income distribution in Quebec (see figure 3).
The Quebec private sector is dominated by a number of large
multinational corporations and Canadian-owned banks and trust com-
panies. Although these large firms are few in number, they provide a
large proportion of the jobs available and gain a large share of the
profits generated in Quebec. These large firms are owned and con-
trolled by outsiders. Quebec's private sector, in the mid-1970s, was
made up of some 120,000 firms, including partnerships in the profes-
sional sector and individual entrepreneurships. Based on the language
used in their communications with the government, some 75 to 80 per
cent of these firms were owned by French-speaking individuals. How-
ever, fewer than 50 per cent of Quebec workers were employed in
these French-speaking firms. And because they were more labor-
intensive and concentrated in highly competitive areas, these French-
speaking firms produced only 15 per cent of the value-added gener-
ated by the Quebec private sector, and a still lower percentage of its
profits. Figure 4 indicates that foreign-owned or foreign-controlled
firms are those which show by far the best results.
Except for the Banque Canadienne Nationale and the Banque Pro-
vinciale, major banks operating in Quebec are owned by English-
speaking Canadians. Out of some 1,500 bank branches operating in
Quebec in the mid 1970s, only 40 per cent, accounting for some 30 per
cent of Quebec's banking business, were branches of French-Canadian
banks. The operations of credit unions affiliated with the French-
Canadian Mouvement Cooperatif Desjardins only partially offset the
imbalance.
According to many French-speaking Canadians, notably Rodrigue
Tremblay, Parti Quebecois minister of industry, the business practices
of English-speaking Quebecers fit the definition of discrimination and
of segregation.* One faces discrimination when, within the same terri-
tory or firm, the same work and the same work experience command
different salaries or work conditions depending on such criteria
(acknowledged or not) as sex, race, religion, language or political
ideas. In Quebec, according to many, such discrimination exists on all
* Rodrigue Tremblay, preface to a new edition of Errol Bouchette's
L'independance economique du Canada franqais, (Montreal: La Presse,
1977), p. 28. Errol Bouchette was an economist of the early twentieth
century, the first well-known French-Canadian economist.
Economic Weil-Being 63
these bases, and the most widespread discrimination is on the basis of
language—against French Canadians. Moreover it is fairly apparent
that segregation also prevails. One sees economic segregation when,
within the same territory, employees of one particular language, race,
or religion are under-represented in firms owned by individuals of
another language, race, or religion. In the 1960s, protest against dis-
crimination and segregation reached a boiling point in Quebec.
It is, however, very difficult to link discrimination or segregation to
Quebec's economic lag. Linguistic discrimination or segregation does
not account for much in a statistical explanation of Quebec's economic
lag. But discrimination is thought to exist and it thus explains the
difference in perspective between French-speaking Quebecers and
Distribution of Quebec private
sector employment according to
the language and residence of
firm owners
Distribution of Quebec private
sector generated value-added
according to the language and
residence of firm owners
15%
in
French-Canadian
firms
m
Foreign-controll
firms
42%
in
Anglo-Canadian
firms
in
Foreign-controlled
firms
Figure 4 Distribution of Quebec Private Sector Employment and Gener-
ated Value-Added, According to the Language and Residence of Firm
Owners, mid 1970s
Source: Quebec Department of Industry and Commerce
64 What Does Quebec Want?
English-speaking Quebecers. And consequently, it does help account
for the electoral success of the Parti Quebecois. Indeed, in speaking of
discrimination, Rodrigue Tremblay was expressing a widespread
French-Canadian belief: many French-Canadians know of relatives
and friends who have been fired for their insistence on using French
at work, who cannot get jobs because they do not speak English, who
have experienced bankruptcy at the hands of English-speaking busi-
nessmen. Naturally, when one tries to explain Quebec's economic
problems, one resorts to what one knows on the subject, and what one
knows best are the statistics of personal experience.
Economic Lag and the Federal Government
Personal experience tells many Quebecers that the federal government
has long been another English-speaking employer, "discriminating
against French Canadians". From the 1920s to the 1960s, the percen-
tage of French-speaking Quebecers in the federal public service and
federal crown corporations remained approximately 15 per cent. Yet
French-speaking Quebecers were 23 per cent of the total population of
Canada, and French-speaking Canadians, 27 per cent.
Since the mid-1960s, dramatic changes have occurred: the propor-
tion of French-speaking Canadians in the federal public service has
grown steadily. In less than ten years, the proportion has grown to 26
per cent (from a low of 12 per cent in 1967). In the "officer catego-
ries" (the top tenth of the public service), the proportion of French-
speaking Canadians reached 19 per cent in 1976, from 13 per cent in
1971 and 10 per cent in 1966. In the armed forces, the proportion
reached 23 per cent in 1976, from 18 per cent in 1971 and 13 per cent
in 1961.* In spite of the changes of the last ten years, Quebec nation-
As of April 1, 1977, these were the facts: in Canada, there were
256,206 federal employees covered by the Public Service Commission
(this includes approximately 60 departments and agencies out of 120,
the main exceptions being the armed forces, Air Canada and the
CNR). Out of these 256,206 employees, 69,191 were people who
identify themselves as Francophones rather than Anglophones.
Among these 256,206 federal employees, 73,547 were stationed in
the national capital region (and of these 23,876 were Francophones).
Among these 256,206 federal employees, another 44,230 were sta-
tioned in Quebec (Ottawa-Hull excluded) and 40,793 of these were
Francophones. Francophone federal employees stationed in Quebec or
Economic Well-Being 65
alists still use the statistics of the 1940s, 1950s or early 1960s, the same
data which got tremendous publicity in the early 1960s when the first
"independence" organizations started their campaign.
Similar statistical battles surround the sensitive issue of federal
expenditures in Quebec. The final destination of federal expenditures
is not determined easily. Some expenditures, such as transfers to
individuals or institutions, are easily accounted for: of the total federal
expenditures in these areas, between 22 and 28 per cent have gone to
Quebec every year since 1961. However, salaries paid to federal
employees, government investments, and federal purchases of goods
and services can be accounted in two different ways: according to the
location of the expenditures, or on a pro rata basis. The first method,
used by Quebec, is based on the hypothesis that the only expenditures
which benefit Quebec are those which are made in Quebec or to
Quebecers (in or out of Quebec). The other method, used by Ottawa,
is based on the hypothesis that direct federal expenditures (those
which are not transfers) benefit every Canadian on a pro rata basis
wherever they are made.
The same difficulties underlie the accounting of tax receipts. Some
of the federal taxes collected in a province are really paid by residents
of other provinces. Quebec experts consider that the net transfer of the
tax burden is impossible to measure and they hypothesize that this net
transfer is limited. Ottawa experts argue that excise and tariff revenue,
as well as federal sales tax revenue, have to be attributed to the
various parts of Canada according to their share of the gross national
product.
Altogether, from Quebec's perspective, the federal government,
between 1960 and 1970, took an average of 20 to 24 per cent of
federal tax receipts in Quebec, but Quebec was the final destination of
approximately 19 to 21 per cent of the federal government's expendi-
tures and transfers. The discrepancy accounts for as much as three per
cent in the difference between Quebec's per capita income and Cana-
dian per capita income for most years during the period 1960-1970.
(See table 3 for Quebec data.)
in the Ottawa region numbered 64,669 (out of 69,191 Francophones
federal employees in the whole of Canada).
Improvement in Francophone representation has been important in
the area covered by the Public Service Commission, but much less so
in the armed forces (120,000 people), and in the 60 corporations and
agencies not covered by the Public Service Commission.
66 What Does Quebec Want?
Table 4—Tax Receipts and Expenditures of the Federal Government in
Quebec, 1961-1975 (in millions of dollars)
1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1974 1975
Total expenditures 1315 1592 2160 3227 4944 6929 8775
Tax receipts 1906 2312 2755 3742 5107 6387 6754
Difference -591 -720 -595 -515 -163 542 2021
Source: Comptes economique du Quebec, Ministry of Industry and Commerce,
Quebec, April 1, 1977.
According to Quebec economic accounts, the situation has improved
gradually since 1970, and by 1974 Quebec residents received more
from the federal treasury than they contributed. To some degree this
reversal was engineered by the Trudeau government as a way to
combat the Quebec separatist movement: the idea was labelled "le
federalisme rentable" (profitable federalism) by Quebec Liberals, who
won two provincial elections (1970 and 1973) with that slogan.
On the expenditure side, three main mechanisms have been put into
effect: new hiring practices consonant with the Official Languages Act,
better advertising in Quebec of federal tenders for supply and services,
and a general bias in favor of Canada's economically depressed areas
in federal programs (a map of these areas can be obtained from the
Department of Regional Economic Expansion, established in 1969).
On the transfer side, programs such as unemployment insurance, wel-
fare and equalization payments are inherently biased in favor of
economically depressed areas: the Trudeau government put more
money into existing transfer programs and created new ones specifi-
cally directed to the economically depressed areas (for instance Oppor-
tunities for Youth, the Local Initiatives Program, and the Regional
Economic Expansion program). For the new programs, budgets were
generally divided among regions according to their percentage of
Canadian unemployed: when Quebec had 40 per cent of Canada's
unemployed, 40 per cent of the "expansion" program budget was
channeled to Quebec. Moreover, perhaps in order to make sure that
the objectives were correctly pursued, the departments most concerned
with these programs were often administered by French-Canadian
ministers (such as Jean-Pierre Goyer, Jean Marchand, Gerard Pelle-
tier, and Jean Chretien).
Economic Weil-Being 67
Finally, on the taxation side, the federal government has raised the
level of personal exemptions for income tax purposes, introduced
various tax postponement schemes (such as the Registered Retirement
Savings Plan), included capital gains in the definition of taxable
income, and maintained stiff progressive rates in income tax. These
and other tax changes have led to a relative reduction of the total
personal income tax burden in the poorer provinces, including
Quebec, as compared with the better-off central and western prov-
inces.
As a consequence of all these policies, as well as of the federal oil-
pricing policy and of the stagnation and inflation that have severely
hit Quebec and the eastern provinces since 1973, federal payments in
Quebec have exceeded federal tax receipts from Quebec in the last few
years, even according to Parti Quebecois arithmetic. However, mem-
bers of the Parti Quebecois continue to refer to the statistics of the
1960 to 1970 period, dated statistics which had been widely publicized
by two popular nationalist leaders, Jacques Parizeau and Claude
Morin (the latter in two best sellers: Le pouvoir quebecois... en nego-
tiation and Le combat quebecois).
Quebecers who work for the Parti Quebecois are prone to use
statistics which "prove" that the federal government has neglected
French Canadians. They are also aware of the relative failure of the
bilingualization scheme in terms of French Quebec representation in
the federal public service. Those who know that for the last few years,
at least, federalism has indeed produced a net transfer to Quebec, such
as provincial cabinet ministers Bernard Landry and Rodrigue Trem-
blay, explain that welfare payments are not what Quebec needs. They
show that among federal expenditures in Quebec, transfer payments
stand out. In their view, transfer payments, however large, have not
compensated for the outflow of capital which afflicted Quebec from
1960 to 1973.
7
Meeting Parti Quebecois workers during the 1973 and 1976 electoral
campaigns brought to light a dozen other arguments against the
spending policies of the federal government. Some of these arguments
have also been mentioned, since their advent to power, by Parti
Quebecois ministers: the auto pact with the United States, Canadian
agriculture policy, Canadian National Railways and Air Canada fares.
(See box for contrasting viewpoints expressed by Parti Quebecois
minister Bernard Landry and Liberal economist Andre Raynauld.)
68 What Does Quebec Want?
Given that the Quebec economy has its problems, who or what is
to blame?
Poor productivity, lack of capable managers and the costs of
being different from the rest of the country, answers Andre
Raynauld, former chairman of the Economic Council of Canada
and currently Liberal MNA for Outremont.
The national policy created by Sir John A. Macdonald and
continued by successive federal governments, according to Ber-
nard Landry, provincial minister of economic development and
close confidant of Prime Minister Levesque.
The two men were carrying on the continuing debate on the
economics of federalism this morning at a meeting of the Asso-
ciation of Quebec Economists. Although both agreed that the
economy of Quebec is backward and underdeveloped, there was
little else in the way of common ground.
[As Mr. Raynauld argued], the traditional role of the Church,
French-Canadian attitudes to education and business, to risk
taking, to work and leisure have all played their part in the
evolution of two labor markets—one English and advanced, and
the other French and backward.
Source: The Montreal Star, April 21, 1977, pages 1 and 2 (a report by
Noel Wright).
According to Parti Quebecois members, the Trudeau government
has been able to do something for Quebec only by taking advantage
of the threat felt by English-speaking Canada as a result of the growth
of the Quebec nationalist parties. But Trudeau's solutions do not
answer the needs of Quebec. According to Parti Quebecois ministers,
what Quebec needs most is industrial investment in its small commun-
ities, which are burdened with excessive dependency rates. In most of
these communities, unemployment runs in the 20-to-25-percent range
and the labor force accounts for less than half the adult population. In
order to develop the economic capabilities of the French-speaking
inhabitants of these small Quebec localities, Parti Quebecois leaders
say that Quebec needs all available public resources and legislative
powers—half of which are in the hands of the federal government.
Economic Weil-Being 69
How to Remedy Quebec's Economic Lag?
The causes of the Quebec economic lag are numerous: lack of geo-
graphical mobility, lower educational levels, and structural problems
related to demography and industry. Quebec has a number of primary
industries which follow a fluctuating world market; it has a number of
secondary industries which are undergoing a modernization process
under severe market difficulties; it has public services which have
become inflated out of proportion in response to social and economic
problems. Quebec also suffers from absentee ownership of the larger
corporations in its leading sectors. All these factors combine to give
Quebec a lower per capita income, a higher rate of unemployment,
and insufficient industrial investment. French-Canadian nationalists,
and notably Parti Quebecois ministers, would add that the division of
legislative and administrative powers hinders the search for solutions.
French Canadians, experts and laymen, agree on the objectives: the
increased well-being and economic capability of French Canadians as
a group and of individual French Canadians and the survival of the
French language. There is also general agreement on definite reme-
dies. People know that collective productivity has to grow, through
mechanization, automation, organization, ideas, market research, edu-
cation, better use of available manpower. But to achieve this, resources
are needed: savings have to be channeled toward productive industrial
investment, dysfunctions have to be eliminated and so forth. Members
of the Parti Quebecois believe that none of this is within reach if a
collective will to gain a national economic capability is not instilled in
Quebec's population and if governmental institutions are not restruc-
tured to give the Quebec government full and unified power over all
the levers of collective action in Quebec. Those who oppose the Parti
Quebecois either do not regard Quebec's economic problems as being
as serious as the Parti Quebecois does, or believe that - they can be
solved within the same institutional structures in which the economic
difficulties have grown.
It may be that the Quebec government does not have to worry (see
box). The educational reforms in Quebec have already started to
produce results; Quebec's young people now rank among the best
educated in Canada. The birthrate has been reduced below the Cana-
dian average and the demographic structure is improving; the percen-
tage of the population that is of working age will increase to a point
significantly above that of other industrialized nations, partly because
70 What Does Quebec Want?
of a lower life expectancy in Quebec. The opening up of European
markets for primary resources will probably lead to a new era of
industrialization in Quebec. Social measures already in operation, such
as nurseries, adult training, and part-time work facilities, will lead to
further increases in productive capabilities. Language can even be seen
as an advantage, with Quebec being able to benefit from two sources
of innovation, the United States and western Europe.
At the Royal Bank, we have confidence in Quebec. Quebec,
indeed, has a vigorous and diversified economy. Its industrial
and economic profile is almost identical to that of the rest of
Canada: for example, it has pretty much the same proportion of
companies in the manufacturing sector, pretty much the same
proportion of resource industries, pretty much the same propor-
tion of financial and other service industries, etc. Quebec is far
from being an underdeveloped province. The rest of Canada
should not think of Quebec as having a simple economy, lacking
in capital, specialized manpower, imagination or resources. It's
not the case. Quebec has a vigorous economy.
W. Earle McLaughlin, chairman and president of the Royal Bank of
Canada, speaking in Montreal, April 18, 1977.
Source: La Presse, Montreal, April 20, 1977.
Still, the leaders of Quebec's political parties believe that Quebec's
economic problems will not disappear unless there is some government
action. But the specific measures advocated vary widely according to
the perception each leader has of the causes of Quebec's economic lag.
Economists who explain Quebec problems by pointing to the shift to
the west, such as Liberal Andre Raynauld, believe that Quebec must
do everything to remain within the attraction zone of this golden west,
and they favor the maintenance of Canadian federalism and the
industrial renaissance of Montreal. Those who believe in the "linguis-
tic discrimination hypothesis", and in federal neglect of French Cana-
dians, as do Parti Quebecois ministers, advocate Quebec political
sovereignty. Others, who believe in the "cultural differentiation cost",
generally favor compromises between Quebec and Ottawa. But there
is a common denominator behind all of these: nearly all opinion
leaders favor an improvement in the material well-being of French
Canadians.
3
The Idea of a Homeland
Material well-being is not everything. It is far from being all that
Quebec French Canadians yearn for. Indeed, Quebec French Canadi-
ans who favor an increase in their collective well-being do not want to
give up any of their cultural or social particularities as a price for such
an increase. One thing is clear: most French Canadians living in
Quebec and in the bordering regions want, at the same time, to keep
using French and to increase their collective well-being. Material well-
being is the dominant objective for many; national survival is the
dominant objective for others; but most French Canadians agree on
the crucial importance of both these objectives.
Moreover, a great many of them want to reach a third objective
which has little to do with material well-being, but has extreme
emotional value. They would like the territory they inhabit to be their
homeland, a territory where they can live with total dignity, perma-
nently free from the frustration now imposed on them by what they
see as economic inequalities drawn along language lines, free from the
frustration now imposed on them by a political system dominated by
"others". By and large, Quebec's French Canadians are ready to
support changes which would let them feel more at home in Quebec.
Unlike the other two collective objectives pursued by a large propor-
tion of the French-speaking population of Quebec and neighboring
regions, the idea of a national homeland challenges the present Cana-
dian constitutional framework. The language problem could be largely
solved by a measure of territorial unilingualism, or by improvements
in the bilingual solution that has been tried since 1968. Settling the
economic problem does not necessarily require a constitutional reorg-
anization. But the idea of a national homeland necessarily challenges
the current Canadian constitutional framework. In this sense, Pierre
Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, was perfectly aware of the reali-
71
72 What Does Quebec Want?
ties of the situation when he said, after the Quebec election of Novem-
ber 15, 1976, that the real question was, "Can francophones of Quebec
consider Canada as their country, or must they feel at home only in
Quebec?"
Surprisingly, the idea of a national homeland for French-speaking
Quebecers does not seem to worry the English-speaking experts who
comment on Quebec. The language problems and the economic prob-
lems seem more pressing, and they make the headlines and are
described in detail. But nationalist feelings, which are really the root
of the matter, are neglected altogether. People will say: "What Quebec
really wants is more control over all things cultural; what Quebec
wants is a series of specific concessions; what Quebec really wants is
this, or that." No one mentions the fundamental desire: a homeland
for a nation. In my view, as a conclusion drawn from years of reading
and interviewing, it is on this idea of a "true" homeland for French-
speaking Quebecers that Parti Quebecois leaders will try to unite
Quebec. The other objectives, language and economics, coincide with
this third objective, but this one alone necessarily leads to the demand
for sovereignty.
Territorial Symbols
Those who hold the view that French Canadians can feel at home
only in Quebec have succeeded in changing the label by which
Quebec French Canadians identify themselves. Fifteen years ago,
nobody in Quebec would have used the term "Quebecois" to designate
an inhabitant of the Province of Quebec: this label was applied only
to the inhabitants of Quebec City. The French-speaking inhabitants of
the province of Quebec were called French Canadians, just like "Fran-
cophones" in the other provinces of Canada. Only the French-speak-
ing inhabitants of the maritime provinces, who were descendants of
the French settlers who came to "Acadia" (now New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia) in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, had a
separate name: Acadians. In the St. Lawrence Valley, the French
settlers of the same period had taken the name of "Canadiens",
because their territory, New France, was locally known as Canada.
Indeed, for more than 150 years after the British conquest of New
France in 1759-1760, the French-speaking inhabitants of Canada
described themselves as "les Canadiens" and labelled the English-
speaking newcomers "les Anglais". After Confederation, the expression
The Idea of a Homeland 73
"French Canadian" progressively displaced the former appellation.
And now, in the 1970s, a large proportion of French-speaking Quebec-
ers call themselves "les Quebecois" (and they include under this term
any inhabitant of the province of Quebec who considers Quebec his
homeland).
During the 1960s, several surveys included Questions about the
ethnic loyalties of French-speaking Canadians, but normally these
surveys made no reference to the term "Quebecois", because that term
was not yet in general use in Quebec. In these surveys of the 1960s,
respondents were asked whether they considered themselves French
Canadians or simply Canadians. These surveys showed that 20 to 25
per cent identified themselves as "French Canadians only", and 40 to
60 per cent as "French Canadians first", with the remainder (between
20 and 35 per cent, depending on the survey) saying they were
"Canadians first". The first known survey of the whole Quebec popu-
lation to use the word "Queb6cois" was conducted in 1970, a few
years after the new name had begun to become popular. This survey,
conducted by sociologist Maurice Pinard, revealed that, of a sample of
4,889 French-speaking Quebec adults, 21 per cent considered them-
selves "Quebecois", 44 per cent "French Canadians", 34 per cent
"Canadians", and one per cent something else. According to Parti
Quebecois sources, private surveys completed between 1973 and 1976
indicate that a majority of French-speaking Quebecers now call them-
selves "Quebecois".
This increasing popularity of the term "Quebecois" shows how
important the territorial symbol of Quebec is in the social thinking of
contemporary French-speaking Quebecers. In a way, those who label
themselves "Quebecois" express their political loyalty to the society
bounded by Quebec frontiers, Quebec values and Quebec institutions.
But a political loyalty is rarely exclusive. People who express a loyalty
to their country generally feel related to both larger and smaller
territorial symbols as well: North America, the Western World, a
province, a region, a city. However, one of these loyalties is generally
dominant. A "true" Canadian is a Canadian first, then a Manitoban,
Albertan or whatever. In Quebec, currently, fewer than one third of
French-speaking adults consider themselves "Canadians first". When
asked which government they favor, Ottawa or Quebec, four French-
speaking Quebecers out of ten say Quebec, one says Ottawa, two say
both, two say neither, and one starts to argue. Outside Quebec, six
English-speaking Canadians out of ten favor Ottawa, and only one
74 What Does Quebec Want?
favors his provincial government (two others say both, and one nei-
ther), or roughly so.
8
 According to the survey data used on the CBC
radio program Sunday Morning on April 3, 1977, when asked which
government they think of when asked "which government is yours",
50.7 per cent of the Quebec respondents of both languages said
Quebec and 32.7 per cent said Ottawa.
ENOUGH, MR. LEVESQUE!
You are about to pass legislation which will
be seen as regressive and discriminatory. And
we know why. You're trying to scare us out. Why
else would anyone propose a language policy
like yours?
Well, Mr. Levesque, your tactic almost
worked. But consider this: We have stopped
running.
We are staying in Canada. What's more, as
long as this remains a democratic society, we
demand that our rights, including all rights of
language use, be protected. We demand it for
ourselves, our children and for the conduct of
business.
Pursue your dream, Mr. Levesque, and we will
pursue ours- a Quebec based on respect for
human rights. West Quebec, Canada.
The eleventh province.
Note to all Quebecers: THE PREPARATORY
We need your time and IAAAI COMMITTEE FOR
your money, your hands Q£yN«g AN 11th PROVINCE
and your hearts. ^ s^j&a &.
Please direct your (iflx^f^AiJ P.O. Box 998,
enquiries, and send ^jJUjSer Station H, Montreal,
your contributions to: H3G 2M9.
Source: The Montreal Star, April 30, 1977, page A-13.
The Idea of a Homeland 75
In Quebec, contrary to the norm in the rest of Canada, the domi-
nant loyalty of the largest number is addressed to the symbols of the
province, and not to those of Canada. This loyalty, however, is
restrained by conflicting views related to other rallying symbols. Thus,
according to a small survey conducted in 1968 by political scientist H.
D. Forbes among Quebec youth, 77 per cent of the 699 young people
who answered the question said that they considered the whole of
Canada as their country and only 20 per cent said that their country
was restricted to Quebec alone. The survey also showed that individu-
als were ready to accept several designations in order to identify
themselves: 80 per cent of this sample of Quebec youth accepted the
term "Quebecois" as fitting them (a percentage which far exceeds
anything that has been obtained for a sample of the whole popula-
tion). But, at the same time, 78 per cent of the these respondents
accepted the term "Canadien francais"; 65 per cent accepted the term
"Canadien"; 30 per cent the expression "Americain du Nord", and 15
per cent the word "Francais". The loyalty to Quebec exists, but it is
(or was) a loyalty tempered by other loyalties. It is clear that many
Quebecers see Quebec as their homeland, just as many Canadians see
Canada as their homeland. But the idea of Canada, as a territorial
symbol, conflicts with the idea many Quebecers have of their home-
land. The territory of Canada includes Quebec.
If a break-up of the Canadian federation were to occur, the terri-
torial symbols would undoubtedly lead to fierce arguing about bound-
aries, because many Quebecers, notably the leading publicists of the
independence movement, consider that their part of Canadian territory
should be roughly proportional to the percentage traditionally consti-
tuted by Quebec in the Canadian population, that is 30 per cent.
9
 At
present, Quebec territory covers 523,860 square miles, or 15.4 per cent
of Canada's 3,560,238 square miles of land. The part of the Quebec
continental peninsula known as Labrador, which is now Newfound-
land territory, covers 101,881 square miles (3.0 per cent of the total
(Canadian surface). The islands located east of the 79° 30' longitude,
north of the Quebec peninsula, account for another 4.6 per cent of
Canada. Parti Quebecois members who talk about Quebec territory
usually consider that in the event of a break-up of Canada, a sover-
eign Quebec should cover the territory of the province, plus the
federal territory east of the 79° 30' longitude, and the islands in the St.
Lawrence, plus possibly Labrador. Labrador was awarded to the then
Dominion of Newfoundland in 1927 by the British Privy Council, in
settlement of claims made at the time by Newfoundland and the then
76 What Does Quebec Want?
separate Dominion of Canada (Newfoundland joined the Canadian
federation in 1949). Quebec was the part of Canada which was "trun-
cated" as a consequence of the British Privy Council decision, and the
population of Quebec, by and large, has maintained the view that
Labrador is "rightly" part of Quebec. In any case, if the Canadian
federation were to break up, the territorial vision of Quebec which
prevails among "les Quebecois" would lead to a lot of aggressive
arguing. If the Parti Quebecois gains the support of a majority of the
Quebec electorate (which constitutes 28 per cent of the Canadian
population) in favor of a sovereign state, it will probably insist on at
least 20 to 22 per cent of Canadian territory for that state.
It is clear that territorial symbols play a large part in the definition
of a "homeland". They even play a part in the expression of loyalties
in the daily behavior of many citizens of Canada. Hence the standing
joke in Canada of telling people who go into or out of Quebec not to
forget their passports. When a Quebecer says he is "a Canadian first",
there can be no doubt that he considers the whole territory of Canada
his country. This is a psychological response, for he has been told that
this part of the world belongs to Canadians, that a Canadian is at
home everywhere within the borders of this vast area. He loves the
picture of beautiful Lake Louise in the Canadian Rockies, or of
charming Nova Scotian coves, and even if he has never been out of
Quebec, he cherishes such scenes as his private property—just as
English-speaking Canadians hold to the landscape of the Gaspe coast
or picturesque Quebec City. Territorial symbols carry deep significance
for many people. The idea that a territory can be a "property"
dominates the whole world: indeed the whole world has been divided
into pieces, and it is a life objective for millions of individuals to
acquire a small piece of land that would be "private property". Natu-
rally, territorial symbols, and eagerness to own land, lead to conflicts
over the most desirable resource on earth: a place in the sun.
Quebecers who want to bring about Quebec's accession to sover-
eignty thus want to establish their "shared property claims" over the
territory which they consider the homeland of the Quebecois. These
Quebecers do not identify themselves with English-speaking Canadians
living outside Quebec, but they feel themselves to be members of a
"new and developing" Quebec society. They consider Lake Louise and
Peggy's Cove foreign beauty spots, just as Switzerland, Rome or
Washington, D.C. are nice places to be in, but places which do not
"belong" to Quebecers: what belongs to Quebecers is Quebec.
The Idea of a Homeland 77
Area and Power
Property rights over a piece of land imply a definite control by the
owner over his territory. The whole idea of private ownership of land
is to endow individuals with unquestioned authority over an area: the
principle of private ownership, on which most people agree, enables
individuals to "reign" supreme over an area of known dimensions,
without having to resort to force or violence in order to establish their
sovereignty.
Many Quebecers feel that they are "outsiders" when they go out of
Quebec to other Canadian provinces. At the same time, they feel that
"outsiders" (that is, Canadians from other provinces) have a lot of say
about what goes on in Quebec. Many Quebecers, moreover, have the
feeling that they have no say in Canadian affairs, and can influence
no government other than that of Quebec.
10
 According to a survey
conducted in 1968 by political scientist John Meisel, 58 per cent of the
632 French-speaking respondents of the Quebec sample felt that they
had no say in Canadian politics; only 34 per cent of the 927 Ontario
respondents had such a feeling. Statistics on the relative interest shown
in federal and provincial elections illustrate similar attitudes. Voter
turnout in the last few Quebec provincial elections has hovered
between 80 and 85 per cent, while it stands in the 60-to-75-percent
range in provincial elections held in other parts of Canada. Con-
versely, while voting turnout in federal elections reaches 80 per cent in
English-speaking Canada, it stays around 70 per cent in French-
speaking Quebec. For many Quebec voters, the government of Quebec
is theirs, while the federal government of Canada is the government of
English-speaking Canadians.
Quebecers who feel that way naturally wish for more powers over
their own area for the government which they consider their own.
Such attitudes reflect the sense of belonging to that particular society
defined by the French language, the territorial symbols of Quebec,
and Quebec-based institutions. However these attitudes are not held
with the same degree of intensity by all Quebecers: loyalties are
divided, and a majority of Quebec voters are confused or ambiguous
on the question of identifying their government, their territory, and
their reference group.
In spite of this ambiguity, when asked to express their position on
the debate between the Parti Quebecois and the federal government, a
majority of French-speaking Quebecers say they favor the concession
78 What Does Quebec Want?
of more powers to the Quebec government. In a 1973 survey con-
ducted by a McGill University research team led by Richard Hamilton
and Maurice Pinard, among 861 French-speaking respondents 13 per
cent said they were in favor of Quebec independence, and another 39
per cent said they wished that more powers would be transferred from
Ottawa to Quebec; only three per cent of this sample wished that
Quebec could transfer powers to Ottawa, while 21 per cent were in
favor of maintaining the existing division of powers between the two
governments (23 per cent had no opinion). The CBC Sunday Morning
survey (April 3, 1977) revealed that 35.5 per cent of the people
interviewed in a representative sample of French and English Quebec-
ers were in favor of maintaining the existing division of powers. On
the other hand 38.6 per cent favored an extension of Quebec's powers,
12.4 per cent favored an extension of Ottawa's powers, and 13.5 per
cent abstained.
It is safe to hypothesize that the fundamental motivation behind
Quebecers' opinions in favor of Quebec independence or increased
autonomy is related to the sense of identity felt in relation to the
French-speaking society of Quebec. Indeed, another survey conducted
by Maurice Pinard in 1970 revealed that, among 795 respondents who
said that they favored Quebec's secession from Canada, 52 per cent
said that they were motivated by "nationalistic" economic reasons;
these economic reasons were of the following type: "We would
become stronger; our savings would stay home; we would administer
our resources ourselves; our taxes would be reduced...." The other
respondents favoring Quebec secession did not mention a motivation
related to economics, but were motivated by sentiments such as cul-
tural independence, improved collective status, reduction of ethnic
tensions and so on.
Conversely, the fear of possible Quebec secession depends little on
nationalist attitudes but rather almost entirely on economic insecurity.
Both before and after independence, a secessionist country usually
finds some of its outside markets cut off for various reasons. During
the transition period leading to secession, clashes between extremist
groups for and against separation cause chaos and violence and lead
to economic stagnation. In the case of Quebec, leading entrepreneurs
and managers could exile themselves and leave Quebec without eco-
nomic leadership, the prey of leftists. Economic fears are held by the
leading opponents of the Parti Quebecois, and the fight against inde-
pendence is essentially based on the fear of economic losses.
11
The Idea of a Homeland 79
Surprisingly, however, few people ever argue for or against Quebec
independence from an institutional viewpoint. Institutional arguments
and references to particular aspects of the federal set-up or to ques-
tions related to federal-provincial relations rarely show up in the
answers obtained to open questions about Quebec independence asked
by sociologists or political scientists who conduct surveys in Quebec or
Canada as a whole.
Quebec and Canadian Federalism
The average Canadian does not seem to understand that the immedi-
ate issue involved in Quebec independence is the federal government's
own presence in Quebec. The average Canadian does not even know
the correct answers to questions related to the division of powers
between the federal and the provincial governments. A Canada-wide
survey conducted in 1968 by the Institute for Behavioural Research of
Toronto revealed, for instance, that 52 per cent of the respondents did
not know that unemployment insurance was a federal responsibility,
38 per cent did not know that foreign affairs were a federal responsi-
bility, and 40 per cent were not aware of the fact that education was a
provincial responsibility. Governmental institutions and division of
powers are matters which, in the view of a majority of Canadians, do
not warrant much attention and do not need to be known with any
degree of precision. Indeed, a survey conducted for the Montreal
French daily La Presse after the 1974 federal election showed that a
majority of the voters in the Montreal area went to the polling booths
without knowing the name of any local candidate except the Liberal,
and with a very scant idea of the problems which had been discussed
during the campaign.
12
The general ignorance of the workings of governmental institutions
probably explains the fact that, for a majority of the people, Quebec
independence is not naturally related to what it is meant to achieve: a
reorganization of governmental institutions operating in Quebec. What
the Parti Qu6becois is for is a peaceful reorganization of the federal
system, in terms of the federal presence in Quebec and federal power
over Quebec. What is at stake is the federal presence in Quebec.
Although this does not show up in surveys, the federal government
is the institution most immediately and directly concerned by the
secessionist option of many Quebecers. Indeed, if a break-up of the
Canadian federation were to occur, its most perceptible effect would
80 What Does Quebec Want?
be a reorganization of federal departments, offices and crown corpora-
tions. It has been estimated that between 15 and 20 per cent of federal
employees would stop working under the authority of the federal
government and start working under the authority of the Quebec
government. Most of the federal employees likely to be involved are
already residents of Quebec and work in offices located either in
Quebec or in the federal capital. It has been estimated that about two
thirds of the personnel involved would not even need to move to
another office building; among the rest, however, there are several
thousand who would have to move from Ottawa to Montreal or
Quebec City. The moving of several thousand households subsequent
to a governmental reorganization is the minimum to be expected as a
consequence of Quebec's accession to sovereignty.
This governmental reorganization, in the view of Parti Quebecois
leaders, is the only means available to French-speaking Quebecers
who want to apply in Quebec policies which differ from those which
are applied in the rest of Canada. On many questions which are now
the responsibility of the federal government, French-speaking Quebec-
ers hold views which differ from those of English-speaking Canadians:
this is the case in matters of language, culture, scientific development,
communications, agriculture, trade, and so on. French Canadians are
poorly represented in the associations which lobby in Ottawa, and they
are a minority in every federal committee or council. When the
demands from Quebec differ from those of Ontario, the latter are
likely to prevail, and the French-Canadian representatives cannot eas-
ily obtain "special treatment" for Quebec.
With a declining proportion of the total Canadian population,
French-speaking Quebecers (now between 20 and 23 per cent of
Canada) cannot hope to dominate the government side of the Cana-
dian House of Commons any more.* However, French-speaking mem-
bers of Parliament have constituted between 40 and 55 per cent of the
government benches since 1896, except for the periods of Conservative
rule: 1911-1921, 1930-1935 and 1957-1963, or 21 of the last 81 years.
* The 1971 census found 3,668,000 inhabitants of Quebec who stated
that they spoke French only; 713,000 others had French as their
mother tongue but were able to speak both French and English; and
522,000 more, who spoke both French and English, did not have
French as their mother tongue. Out of 21,568,000 inhabitants of
Canada (1971), unilingual French-speaking Quebecers account for 17
per cent of the population of the country. Quebecers who speak
French, whatever their mother tongue, account for 23 per cent of the
total Canadian population.
The Idea of a Homeland 81
Such a feat was achieved because Quebec sent a solid bloc of Liberal
representatives to the House of Commons, while English-speaking
Canadians were more or less evenly divided between Liberals and
Conservatives. In federal elections, Quebec helped the Liberal party
and kept it in power. But, even with its overrepresentation on the
government side of Parliament, Quebec never obtained more than one
third of the Cabinet posts, and the Quebec ministers in Ottawa were
not able to introduce even such timid measures as French words on
the federal cheques issued to Quebec residents until the 1960s, when
bombs began to explode in Quebec and showed how exasperated
some Quebecers had become.
In spite of the leadership of Prime Minister Trudeau after 1968, a
number of Quebec interests have been frustrated by federal policies.
The priority of the Trudeau Cabinet has been "Canadian unity" and
measures which would have upheld Quebec's autonomist positions
have generally been brushed aside. The Quebec government position
on a constitutional amendment formula for Canada has been perhaps
the most significant case; another case has been the Quebec govern-
ment position on social affairs; a third one, the Quebec government
position concerning communications. Among less publicized questions
which have raised problems in the area of "national unity", one can
mention the negotiations on the James Bay hydro project, the debate
on container terminals, production quotas and subsidies in agriculture,
tariff negotiations, immigration, Quebec's international relations, the
Quebec Pension Plan, Quebec housing policies, and many others.
When the Quebec government states a position which runs against
the federal position, it usually does so for reasons related to Quebec's
particular circumstances: its demographic structure, its industrial struc-
ture, its foreign markets and types of exports, its language, and other
distinctive characteristics.
Although they could not detail what powers should be held by
Quebec, a majority of French-speaking Quebecers are aware of the
situation in which French-speaking Quebecers find themselves when
dealing with the federal government. A large part of the news related
to the Canadian government in the Quebec media consists of conflict-
ing statements uttered by Quebec and Ottawa ministers on some
aspect or other of their continuing quarrel. And it is not surprising
that a majority of French-speaking Quebecers consider the division of
powers a source of waste which could be eliminated by giving one
single government complete authority over the areas where conflicting
interests lead Ottawa and Quebec to confront each other.
82 What Does Quebec Want?
Quebec's Case Against the Federal Government
The Quebec provincial government has been the upholder of the
interests of French Canadians since 1867. And in the view of Quebec
nationalists these interests have regularly been at odds with those of
the rest of the Canadian population. The federal government has, for
instance, undertaken the building of railways and canals which have
served the interests of the English-speaking population of the country
and of Montreal, but it has neglected the areas of Quebec inhabited
by French Canadians. The federal government, between 1914 and
1918 and between 1939 and 1945, greatly developed the industrial
capacity of Canada, but did so to the benefit primarily of southern
Ontario and, to a lesser extent, of English-speaking Montreal. By and
large, the federal government of Canada, since 1867, has been the
government of English-speaking Canadians and the government of
Quebec has been the government of French Canadians.
The Quebec case against the federal government is not a case
against federalism; it is a case against a system prejudicial to French
Canadians. Federalism is based on the idea that the areas of govern-
mental action where conflicts are likely to develop along territorial
lines should fall under the authority of territorial governments, while
the areas of governmental action where various territories can find a
common interest should be administered by a common, central, fed-
eral government. The Canadian federation developed a division of
powers between the provincial governments, on one side, and the
central government, on the other side, which was an application of the
federal principle to the particular circumstances of the British North
American colonies in 1867. Matters of local interest, which could not
fit into any single Canadian standard, were left to the provinces. These
provincial concerns included education, a particularly delicate question
in a country where two language groups and various religious denomi-
nations coexisted. Provincial powers also included the administration
of natural resources and agriculture (the latter falling also under
federal jurisdiction in its more general aspects). In addition, the pro-
vincial jurisdiction covered local government as well as public services
and regulations established for local purposes or private objectives.
The authority of the provincial governments was delineated in a
restrictive manner in four sections of the constitutional statute which
created the Dominion of Canada in 1867 (sections 92, 93, 94 and 95 of
the British North America Act, 1867). The authority of the central
The Idea of a Homeland 83
government, on the other hand, was stated in very broad terms in one
section of the statute (section 91) and reiterated in the sections relating
to the provinces so as to restrict the extension of provincial powers.
Paragraph 10 of section 92 stated that the Canadian Parliament had
control over interprovincial communications and over public works
which it considered of general Canadian interest. Section 93 gave the
Canadian government the authority to interfere in educational matters
if the rights of denominational schools established before 1867 were
being threatened by provincial legislation. Section 95 stated that both
the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures could make laws
relating to agriculture and immigration but that the federal laws would
have precedence.
In its division of legislative powers, the British North America Act
of 1867 put the central government in a dominant position. The new
Canadian government had authority over practically every area of
governmental action except those which related to municipalities, edu-
cation and local matters. In the area of tax revenue, the central
government found itself with 60 per cent of all taxation receipts in
Canada, the provinces and municipalities being left with the greatly
unpopular direct taxation (which, in any case, the central government
could also use). Moreover, the federal government was given the
power to disallow provincial legislation which ran counter to federal
interests (this federal power over provincial legislation was described
in sections 55, 56, 57 and 90 of the Act).
Administrative powers in the provinces were to be held by a federal
nominee, the Lieutenant-Governor (sections 58 and 59 of the Act). In
1878 and again in 1891, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec used his
authority and tried to curb provincial initiatives, in spite of constitu-
tional practice which had already restricted the powers of the Lieuten-
ant-Governor in other provinces. This federal control over Quebec,
through the Lieutenant-Governor, led to two serious crises, one in
1878, the other in 1891-1892. Canadian Senators are also nominated
by the federal government and they are in no way representatives of
"provincial interests".
In the view of the Fathers of Confederation, the areas of govern-
mental action which were left to the provincial governments were
indeed very limited. But the history of the Canadian federation has
proved that the Fathers of Confederation underestimated the conflicts
which could arise in the areas of responsibility awarded to the federal
government. Federal policies in several areas benefited some provinces
84 What Does Quebec Want?
at the expense of others, and as early as 1870 provincial governments
began to fight to protect aggrieved regional interests. Nova Scotia felt
so underprivileged during the first 30 years of Confederation that its
provincial government came to take serious autonomist stands. So did
Quebec, especially after 1886. Later, it would be Alberta and British
Columbia. The pressure put on the federal government to let the
provincial governments take initiatives gradually led to a reassessment
of the division of powers in the Canadian federation. New areas of
government action were opened and left to the provinces (roads for
automobiles, electricity, natural resource development, etc.), while oth-
ers were taken by the central government (radio, foreign affairs, unem-
ployment insurance, family allowances, pensions, etc.).
While Canadian federalism was evolving according to the circum-
stances, reflecting the interplay of political forces and regional inter-
ests, Quebec became more and more dissatisfied and its government
took autonomist positions more and more frequently. It introduced
new taxes in 1882 (corporation taxes) and in 1892 (succession duties),
and was among the first to resort to corporate income taxes (1932),
personal income taxes (1939) and sales taxes (1940). It showed its
opposition to federal involvement in such matters as prohibition (nota-
bly on the occasion of a 1898 plebiscite on the subject), agriculture
(notably between 1911 and 1920), welfare payments, including pen-
sions and unemployment insurance (notably during the 1930s).
13
Quebec rejected federal proposals related to taxation from 1945 to
1957 and obtained the establishment of a federal program of equaliza-
tion payments. In the 1960s, an op ting-out formula to be applied to
federal grants to provincial governments was established at Quebec's
insistence, and the Quebec government was the only one to take
advantage of the formula: instead of benefiting from federal grants,
Quebec gained access to tax rebates.
For more than 40 years now the Quebec government has generally
provided the main institutional opposition to governmental centraliza-
tion or policy standardization in Canada. It was often the only govern-
ment to oppose federal initiatives. It is the only provincial government
that maintains services in many areas in which the federal government
has the monopoly of action outside Quebec. In Quebec, there is a full-
fledged Department of Revenue, which reaches into the pocket of
every individual and corporate taxpayer in Quebec. No other province
has such an organization. The Quebec government has a disguised
department of foreign affairs, with delegations in a dozen foreign
The Idea of a Homeland 85
cities, intergovernmental agreements in several areas, regular exchange
programs, and so on. No other province in Canada has anything
approaching this, not even Ontario. The Quebec government has a
Department of Immigration, as does Ontario: Quebec has a Depart-
ment of Communications, with a provincial radio and television corpo-
ration (Radio-Quebec). In the field of agriculture, Quebec maintains
the most extensive provincial services in Canada. In the field of
labor, Quebec maintains manpower centres, the only provincial man-
power centres in Canada. Quebec also maintains a provincial police, a
provincial pension plan, a provincial housing corporation, a provincial
film board, and dozens of other provincial offices, commissions and
services which one rarely finds in other provinces.
There are very few areas of governmental activity in which the
Quebec government has not established its own services which com-
pete, on Quebec territory, with federal services in the same areas. This
competition is visible not only to Quebec civil servants but to thou-
sands of Quebecers and is resented as sheer insanity, not only because
it wastes millions of dollars but also because the provincial programs
are generally considered better suited to Quebec needs, while lacking
the budgets necessary in order to be effective.
Parti Quebecois activists object to the federal government's moves
toward centralization, because they believe that decisions taken in
Ottawa are taken either by English-speaking senior bureaucrats or by
committees where English-speaking civil servants or ministers are a
majority. In the view of Quebec nationalists, Ottawa decisions made
by French Canadians are extremely rare, and decisions which favor
Quebec or Quebec interests generally reflect the impact of crises such
as the Quebec terrorism of the 1960s or the growth of Parti Quebecois
support in the 1970s. When a decision is taken in Ottawa, it is
generally the result of pressures put on the decision-makers by interest
groups in which French Canadians are a silent minority. English-
speaking civil servants are linked to all kinds of interests and they
usually try to defend those interests, just as French-speaking civil
servants do—but, at the decision-making levels, for every French-
speaking civil servant one finds four or five English-speaking civil
servants. When Ottawa launches a new program, such as the 1971
Opportunities for Youth project or the 1972 Local Initiatives Program,
applications for jobs, subsidies and information coming from English-
speaking Canadians flow in for several weeks before such applications
start to come in from French-speaking Quebecers in any number. This
86 What Does Quebec Want?
is probably explained by the "grapevine effect": more English-speak-
ing applicants hear about the program first.
Among examples of federal decisions considered detrimental to
French Canadians, those which come up most often are immigration,
certain welfare programs, federal actions in the cultural sector, and the
auto pact. But other examples abound: the Borden line for oil imports,
freight rates, and so on. Nationalists like to quote immigration statis-
tics*: between 1901 and 1964, out of 8,089,823 immigrants to Canada,
only 112,740 were French, that is 1.5 per cent of the total. Among the
immigrants of other than British or French origin who opted to live in
Quebec, three out of four chose English as their "official" language.**
When European governments started their welfare programs in the
1920s, pressure mounted in Toronto and other large cities of Canada
for old-age pensions and similar transfer payments. At the time, older
citizens accounted for eight per cent of Ontario's population but they
accounted for less than four per cent of Quebec's French-speaking
population. By having Ottawa pay for old-age pensions, the English-
speaking pressure groups angered Quebec civil servants who saw no
need for such pensions in Quebec and considered that their province
had more pressing needs than old-age pensions, even though they
were seen as a generous idea. The federal law was enacted in 1927,
and Quebec, in 1936, was the last province to sign the agreement.
In the 1950s, English-speaking Canadians became aware of the
cultural impact on Canada of the United States, and pressure groups
started a campaign for federal action on the cultural sector. French-
speaking Quebecers, at the time, felt no threat from the United States
culture industry; on the contrary, they were of the opinion that "cul-
* See Rosaire Morin, L'immigration au Canada (Montreal: Les Editions
de 1'Action nationale, 1966). Morin quotes Pierre Laporte (page 144)
who, as a minister of the Quebec government, declared on February
10, 1965, "It is clear that immigration as organized by the government
of Canada has not been organized in the cultural interests of French
Canada." (Journal des Debats, 1965, p. 464, translation).
** In 1961, according to census data, in the Montreal metropolitan area,
97 per cent of the 1,353,480 people of French origin had French as
their mother tongue; 5.6 per cent of the 377,625 people of British
origin had French as their mother tongue (93.92 per cent had English)
and 23.72 per cent of the 135,731 people of other origins had chosen
French as their "official" language, while 76.32 per cent had chosen
English.
The Idea of a Homeland 87
ture" was the main reason for the existence of a provincial govern-
ment and were in favor of provincial action in this sector. Quebec
fought against the federal decision to finance cultural programs.
Quebec lost. Millions of dollars were spent by the federal government
in various programs which primarily benefited English-speaking indi-
viduals and their institutions. Between 1960 and 1975, according to
available statistics, French-speaking Quebecers and their institutions
got less than 15 per cent of the hundreds of millions of dollars which
were spent in federal scientific and cultural grants, subsidies and
research contracts.
In the 1960s, Ontario and the federal government became concerned
about the huge deficits registered in the Canadian trade in automo-
biles, trucks and auto parts. An agreement was negotiated with the
United States and with the leading American car-makers. The Quebec
government at the same time was trying to attract European and
Japanese car-makers in order to start a small-car industry in Quebec.
Quebec's interests were at odds with those of Ontario. According to
Quebec spokesmen, the European car-makers received no help from
the federal government. The Canada-United States auto pact led to a
substantial increase in industrial activity in Ontario, which had an
inflationary effect that was not compensated for by counter-measures
in regions suffering from economic stagnation. Quebec was unable to
develop an auto industry of any size and it suffered from Ontario-
induced inflation; Quebec's economic structure came out of the adven-
ture still more underprivileged.
Immigration policies, welfare programs, cultural and scientific devel-
opment programs, and the Canada-United States auto pact are only
four of a dozen examples Quebec nationalist leaders cite to show how
the federal government protects interests which run counter to those of
French-speaking Quebecers.* Even though many federal decisions
taken since the mid-1960s have had a pro-Quebec bias, the history of
Canadian federalism confirms the general feeling held by a majority
of French-speaking Quebecers that they would be better served if the
Quebec government had a larger share of tax revenues and a monop-
oly over the numerous areas of government action where French-
speaking Quebecers have interests which conflict with those of Eng-
lish-speaking Canadians.
* A periodical such as L'Action nationale provides a good survey of
these examples.
88 What Does Quebec Want?
Theoretical Advantages of Federalism
The belief that the federal government serves the interests of English-
speaking Canadians and has a detrimental effect on French-speaking
Quebecers has a great impact in Quebec. Moreover, many French-
speaking Quebecers fail to see the relevance for the Quebec popula-
tion of the theoretical advantages of federalism.
The most important theoretical advantage of federalism is the equi-
librium that it maintains between two different sets of political institu-
tions, federal and provincial. The institutional balance created by
federalism limits the tendency of governments to centralize, to control
and to standardize everything. The persistence of regional or provin-
cial governments is a guarantee of some limits to standardization and
a minimum degree of territorial dispersion of public expenditures. In a
federation, the central government has to face contending power struc-
tures which impede its dominating tendencies. In a federation, citizens
can turn to another government when they fight against a bureauc-
racy. In a federation, decisions which serve the interests of the whole
country are easily made and obeyed because there is one central
authority empowered to reach them; at the same time, territorial
governments can safeguard local interests and regional particularisms.
This great theoretical advantage of federalism is often quoted by those
who take issue with the Parti Quebecois.
14
 However most nationalists
have a fundamental objection to the argument. They approve of the
idea of an institutional balance in a federation, but in their view there
can be no effective balance if the regional communities are different
in size and in culture.
Nevertheless, the idea of making several cultural communities coex-
ist within a large territory and under one set of economic regulations
is seen as another great advantage of federalism. Federalism enables
different cultural communities to benefit from a common market and
from economic structures which permit a better use of productive
resources and lead to higher standards of living. Industries which
could not develop in any of the individual communities if they were
not federated can become profitable and prosper. Such economic
benefits can sustain each of the cultural communities and its particular
culture. Those who uphold the federal principle in Quebec usually say
that Canada, Yugoslavia, Switzerland and India are good examples of
coexistence between different and sometimes antagonistic linguistic
The Idea of a Homeland 89
communities.
15
 These four federations, and other federations which
have similar features, show the world an example.
From this viewpoint, Canadian federalism can be seen as a great
success. Canadians rank among the wealthiest peoples on earth, and
the French-speaking minority has succeeded in maintaining its culture
and its identity, while benefiting from the general economic prosperity
of Canada. The French- and English-speaking communities of Canada
have worked together through the federal institutions in relative peace
for more than a hundred years. The presence of a French community
in Quebec has offered other Canadians the opportunity to know, close
to them, a different, great, worldwide culture. However, French-speak-
ing Quebecers who feel threatened by the attractive power of English-
speaking North America, notably the leaders of the Parti Quebecois,
generally believe that the cultural safeguards offered by Canadian
federalism are insufficient. They would feel more secure if they could
control all the governmental institutions which operate in their terri-
tory, while maintaining the economic co-operation that exists among
the various regions of Canada.
In some sense, while they may be badly informed on the workings
of federal institutions, French-speaking Quebecers often seem very
pragmatic when they talk about federalism. They are not impressed by
its theoretical advantages. They want to protect the cultural identity of
their society and assure it a secure and promising future. They wish
that English-speaking Canadians could understand this objective of
leaving the Quebec government free to expand its services so as to
better safeguard the interests of French-speaking Quebecers (the inter-
ests of English-speaking Quebecers being considered as already safe-
guarded by Quebec's location in North America).
Many politically active French-speaking Quebecers, including Liber-
als, Conservatives and Pequistes, take great pains to explain that
Quebec's French-speaking majority is not anti-English; this majority is
only concerned with the survival of the French-speaking "nation" and
the economic prosperity of Quebec. These Quebecers believe that
nobody but themselves can realize these goals and, as a consequence,
only the government controlled by French-speaking Canadians should
exert power in Quebec* But they are aware of the economic con-
* The Parti Quebecois ministers, now, and the Union Nationale premier,
Daniel Johnson, in 1966, have been the best-known exponents of such
views.
90 What Does Quebec Want?
straints on the ideal of maximum political autonomy for Quebec. In a
word, these Quebecers want Quebec to have the greatest amount of
political autonomy consistent with the maintenance of beneficial eco-
nomic relations with the rest of Canada.
Federalism is infinitely varied in its practice. If the European Eco-
nomic Community is federalism, the "sovereignty-association" scheme
put forward by Parti Quebecois leaders is also federalism. Federalism
in the Canada of the 1970s is very different from the federalism of the
1870s. Canadian federalism differs from West German federalism,
which in turn differs from Australian federalism, and so on. Federal-
ism is evolving and adaptable. The flexibility of federalism offers
Canadian political leaders the possibility of compromises between
English Canada and French Quebec which could satisfy a majority of
those who hold to a territorial perception of what their country should
be, and who have only a rudimentary knowledge of governmental
institutions.
What Quebec Wants
Those French-speaking Quebecers who say that they are "Quebecois"
and that their homeland is Quebec usually call for a maximization of
the Quebec government's power over Quebec territory. These pro-
Quebec French Canadians are clearly a majority in Quebec. A major-
ity of French-speaking Quebecers has already supported the Parti
Quebecois in the November 1976 provincial election. Surveys have
shown that between 60 and 75 per cent of French-speaking Quebecers
favor an extension of the Quebec government's powers. Approximately
70 per cent of them identify themselves as "Quebecois" or as "French
Canadians first". The strength of this pro-Quebec feeling, although
relatively recent, has been steadily growing for the last two decades.
Surveys of the 1950s and early 1960s conducted by the Canadian
Institute of Public Opinion and by Montreal's Groupe de Recherche
Sociale showed that, at that time, concern for Quebec provincial
autonomy was highly correlated with educational levels. In other
words, only the elite was aware of the possibilities of government
action in cultural matters. By the mid-1960s, this elite concern with
government action and provincial autonomy had gained ground in the
French-speaking urban population. In the 1970s, as we have seen,
surveys revealed that the trend was being maintained: concern for the
future of the French language and the French-speaking population of
The Idea of a Homeland 91
Quebec seems to be shared by quite a large proportion of Quebec's
population. If this interpretation of available survey data corresponds
to reality, there are reasons to believe that nationalist feelings could
eventually overcome the economic fears which stand in the way of the
Parti Quebecois quest for Quebec political independence.
Recent survey data show that a majority of French-speaking Que-
becers now agree on a series of fundamental objectives, the first of
which relates to the status of the French language in Quebec. Accord-
ing to a study by FInstitut Quebecois d'Opinion Publique, published in
three Quebec dailies on May 24, 1974, 67 per cent of the French-
speaking people surveyed were in favor of making French the only
official language of Quebec (19 per cent) or, at least, the priority
language (48 per cent). According to the same report, 59 per cent of
the French-speaking Quebecers interviewed favored a law making it
compulsory for immigrants and immigrants' children to enrol in the
French school system. Most English-speaking Quebecers (between 65
and 80 per cent of those who were interviewed, percentages varying
according to ethnic origin) favored official bilingualism in Quebec and
English schools for Quebec immigrants. The viewpoints of the English-
speaking minority of Quebec were (and still are) sharply contrasted
with the French Quebec perspective in the matter of language. In spite
of the objections raised by the English-speaking minority of Quebec,
in spite of the tendency of two French-speaking Quebecers out of ten
to agree with these objections, and in spite of some disapproval of the
1977 Charter of the French Language,* it is clear that the majority in
Quebec is united behind the objective of preserving and extending the
use of the French language in Quebec. This objective is related, in the
view of French-speaking political leaders, to the paramount objective
of national survival.
Another objective pursued by French-speaking Quebecers relates to
regional economic development. The inhabitants of Quebec are partic-
ularly dissatisfied with the state of their economy. They perceive
themselves as being exploited by English-speaking managers, and they
see the federal government as ignoring Quebec's economic interests.
Although linguistic discrimination cannot explain much of Quebec's
* As revealed by the Goldfarb survey published September 26, 1977, in
the Southam dailies. See The Gazette, Montreal, September 26, 1977,
page 1. The data published by the Southam papers were somewhat
contradicted by a survey commissioned by the Reader's Digest, Octo-
ber 1977.
92 What Does Quebec Want?
Some 15 years before the American Revolution, the French
colony of Quebec was conquered by British troops. That con-
quest deprived our society of a great many of its elite, who went
back to France, and it turned over our political and economic
life to foreign leadership.
The small Quebecois community immediately became a very
delicate plant, tenuously rooted in an alien and not always
hospitable environment. Every effort had to be made to ensure
its protection and even its survival. So the Quebec people instinc-
tively retreated into their shells. And then it would take some 12
generations to bring us to the threshold of national maturity.
Of all the European groups who settled in America in the 17th
century—French, Spanish, Portuguese and British—only the
French have not yet attained full political autonomy.
But now, at long last, Quebec is a fully developed society. It
has over six million people, 82 per cent of whom are French by
descent, language and cultural heritage. Montreal, our metropo-
lis, is the second largest French city in the world.
Our gross national product would make us 23rd among the
nations of the world, and 11th on a per capita basis. And as for
our territory, its store of resources is even more ample than its
quite sufficient size.
Independence for Quebec, therefore, now appears as normal, I
might say almost as inevitable, as it was for the American states
of 200 years ago.
Rene Levesque, speaking in New York, January 25, 1977.
Source: The Gazette, Montreal, January 26, 1977, p. 7.
economic lag behind New York State or Ontario, French-speaking
Quebecers tend to put a great deal of emphasis on this factor. On the
whole, French-speaking Quebecers would like to see the Quebec gov-
ernment foster the industrial development of Quebec, especially out-
side Montreal, to the benefit of French-speaking entrepreneurs, man-
agers and workers.
A third objective on which one finds a large degree of agreement
concerns the control that French-speaking Quebecers should exert over
the political institutions which operate in Quebec. Many Quebecers
tend to consider Quebec their homeland and they feel a loyalty to the
The Idea of a Homeland 93
Quebec government and to the territorial symbols of Quebec. This
loyalty outweighs the loyalty felt toward the federal government and
the territorial symbols of Canada. In spite of their dual loyalties and
all the ambiguities such divided loyalties can nourish, most French-
speaking Quebecers favor an extension of the powers of the Quebec
government—in other words, some kind of "devolution" from the
federal government to the government of Quebec.
Survey data published in April 1977 showed that 33 per cent of the
French-speaking Quebecers were already willing to go along with the
Parti Quebecois as far as "souverainete-association". Another survey,
published by the Reader's Digest in October 1977, showed that the
proportion of those who support "souverainete-association" has grown
substantially, reaching the 38 per cent mark in the whole of Quebec
and 44 per cent as far as Francophones alone are concerned.*
In sum, these objectives, which would result in increased autonomy,
perhaps going as far as "souverainete-association", are what a majority
of Quebec voters want. Quebec is trying to become as French as the
rest of Canada is English, in order to safeguard the French-speaking
community, in order to insure the survival of French. Quebec is trying
to give its government all the powers required to develop Quebec
industry and foster economic progress for the French-speaking popula-
tion. There is indeed a majority united behind these objectives, but
this majority is not consolidated under a single political leadership.
Most of it supports the Parti Quebecois, while parts of it are scattered
among the other parties.
The answers to the question relating to "souverainete-association"
were, for the whole of Quebec, 38 per cent for, 44 per cent against, 18
per cent undecided; and, for Francophones alone, 44 per cent for, 37
per cent against, 19 per cent undecided. The Reader's Digest based its
survey on a 823-person sample. This study is recommended reading.
See Reader's Digest, October 1977, pages 55ff.
Notes to Part I
1. Bernard Smith, La Loi 22 (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1975),
pages 58, 77, 79-86.
2. Claude Ryan, "Le Devoir et les minorites d'ici," Le Devoir, April
30, 1977, page 4.
3. Raymond Barbeau, Le Quebec est-il une colonie? (Montreal: Les
editions de l'homme, 1962), page 144 (my translation).
4. See Andre d'Allemagne, Le colonialisme au Quebec (Montreal:
Editions R-B, 1966) or Raymond Barbeau, Le Quebec est-il une
colonie? (Montreal: Les editions de l'homme, 1962).
5. Comite Canada, Le separatisme? Non! 100 fois non! (Montreal:
Les presses libres, 1970).
6. Jacques Henripin, "From Acceptance of Nature to Control: The
Demography of the French Canadians since the Seventeenth
Century," in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, French-Canadian
Society (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), vol. 1, page
210.
7. See Comptes economiques du Quebec (Quebec: Ministry of Indus-
try and Commerce, April 1, 1977).
8. These figures are shown by the surveys in the following texts:
Mildred A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory—The Sociology of
Regional Persistence in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Uni-
versity Press, 1971), pages 104, 125; Vincent Lemieux, Marcel
Gilbert and Andre Blais, Une election de realignement—L'election
generate du 29 avril 1970 au Quebec (Montreal: Editions du Jour,
1970), pages 90-93; Jane Jenson and Peter Regenstreif, "Some
Dimensions of Partisan Choice in Quebec, 1969," Canadian Jour-
94
Notes to Part I 95
nal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, vol.
III, no. 2 (June 1970), pages 308-317.
9. For example, see Raymond Barbeau, J'ai choisi l'independance
(Montreal: Les editions de l'homme, 1961), pages 34-35.
10. This has been documented in David J. Elkins and Richard
Simeon, "Regional Political Culture in Canada," Canadian Jour-
nal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, vol.
VII, no. 3 (September 1974), page 406.
11. A good example of this is Quebec, le cout de l'independance, a
study by the Chamber of Commerce of the Province of Quebec
(Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1969).
12. La Presse, July 13, 1974, page A-5.
13. A chronology of the autonomist idea in Quebec is available in
Robert Rumilly, L'autonomie provinciate (Montreal: Editions de
l'arbre, 1948).
14. One particularly articulate description of the advantages of feder-
alism can be found in Gilles Lalande, Pourquoi le federalisme?:
Contribution d'un Quebecois a Vintelligence du federalisme cana-
dien (Montreal: Hurtubise/HMH, 1972).
15. Ibid., pages 21, 27, 169.
PART II:
HOW?
Introduction
Even though a majority in Quebec agrees on the long-term general
objectives of French language survival, increased economic well-being
and preservation of the Quebec homeland, they are still divided on
the how—the appropriate means to realize these objectives.
In the 1976 Quebec election campaign, the six major Quebec politi-
cal parties were in favor of at least some extension of the French
language in Quebec. The smallest of these six parties, the Democratic
Alliance, led by Nick Auf der Maur, stated the minimum position:
"French should be promoted in the business and cultural life of
Quebec through encouragement, consultation and incentives, not
through fear and coercion." The Alliance had 13 candidates in consti-
tuencies with large English-speaking populations, and it polled 17,444
votes (4.8 per cent of the votes in these 13 constituencies and fewer
than half of one per cent of the 3,360,785 votes cast in the election).
A still smaller party, the Quebec New Democratic Party (which
polled 3,101 votes with 21 candidates (fewer than 0.3 per cent of the
votes polled in the 21 districts) held the following position:
Schools in Quebec should be French: schools should speak the
language of more than 80 per cent of the population. French is
the general rule.
After a transition period during which no student already
enrolled will be obliged to change schools, the linguistic minorities
in Quebec will attend the common schools. Where the need and
the desire are felt, courses in minority languages will be available,
but without ever calling into question the quality and the integrity
of the instruction in French.
99
100 What Does Quebec Want?
We commit ourselves to defending the recognition of French as
the language of work and the sole official language of Quebec.
1
 The positions of the Democratic Alliance (10 of whose 13 candidates
had English as their mother tongue) and of the Quebec New Demo-
cratic Party (five of whose 21 candidates had English as their mother
tongue) are interesting primarily because of the high proportion of
English-speaking candidates and party workers in their organizations.
These two were the only parties in which English-speaking candidates
and party workers were overrepresented in comparison with the 18 per
cent that English-speaking Quebecers constitute in Quebec's popula-
tion. In each of the other parties, English-speaking Quebecers made
up less than 15 per cent of the candidates and party workers. On the
language issue, all these parties (Liberals, Creditistes, Parti Quebecois,
Union Nationale, Parti National Populaire, and smaller parties) took
positions that were, in general, as strong as that of the Quebec New
Democratic Party.
In four parties, which polled a total of 65 per cent of the votes,
references to the idea of a "nation" were commonplace in speeches
and texts devoted to the language question and to constitutional
problems. The Union Nationale is clearly identified with this idea, the
very term "Union Nationale" having been, from the start in 1935, a
reference to the French-Canadian nation. The Parti National Populaire
has also chosen to refer to the idea of a "nation" in its name. The
leader of the Quebec Creditistes (Social Credit), Camil Samson, spoke
of the "nation canadienne-francaise" on numerous occasions. As for
the Parti Quebecois, its nationalist stand is well known.
The other parties, including the Quebec Liberal party, made very
few references to the idea of a "nation". Such expressions as "nation
canadienne", "nation canadienne-francaise", "nation quebecoise", and
the qualification "national" were rarely used and, indeed, these formu-
las have been taken out of Liberal party literature. Nevertheless, the
Liberal leader, Robert Bourassa, often resorted to formulas such as
"societe quebecoise", "les Quebecois" and "tous les Quebecois".
The first objective, the survival of the French language, or, in the
view of a majority, the survival of a French-speaking "nation" or
"society" is supported by every political party represented in the
Quebec National Assembly (and one can note that the Quebec legisla-
ture is known as a National Assembly).
The second major objective, economic development, is also of para-
Introduction to Part II 101
mount importance in the platform of every political party in Quebec.
However, in the economic sector, there seem to be four distinct views
on how this economic development should be achieved. The first and
least significant of these views is held by the small parties of the left,
none of which polled more than half of one per cent of the votes in
the 1976 election.* These small parties favor a socialist solution to the
economic problems of Quebec, but a very mild one compared with the
solutions put forward by their counterparts in European countries. The
members of these small parties of the left talk a lot about "class
conflict", "bourgeoisie", "proletariat", "capitalism", "exploitation of
the working class", and "imperialism". Their programs include propos-
als to nationalize the Bell Telephone Company and some corporations
where labor problems have been acute.
A different view on economic development is held by the Parti
Quebecois. That party, in spite of its reliance on government interven-
tion for economic development, does not talk of nationalization
(except in the case of asbestos). On the contrary, Parti Quebecois
leaders have always advocated an increase in government aid to
improve the productivity of Quebec's small and medium-sized enter-
prises and co-operatives, which together employ half the work force.
The Parti Quebecois does not challenge the maintenance of the eco-
nomic system based as it is on private enterprise and the market, but
it emphasizes the role of the government which it sees as a promoter
of economic development and not solely as a caretaker of the econ-
omy. Moreover, the Parti Quebecois believes strongly in small and
medium-sized enterprises and co-operatives, which it sees as a source
of ideas, goodwill, and progress.
The economic platform of the Parti Quebecois differs considerably
from the programs of the left-wing parties and is far from being
"socialist" (in the Marxist meaning of the term). This economic plat-
form, however, is "socially-minded" and it shows a bias in favor of
* The Democratic Alliance, led by Nick Auf der Maur, could be classi-
fied as one of the small parties of the left. However its program
cannot be termed socialist: it is progressive. The Democratic Alliance
opposes French unilingualism and Quebec sovereignty and, in Novem-
ber 1976, it stood against the Parti Quebecois on these grounds. The
Democratic Alliance also condemns spending extravaganzas, low polit-
ical morality, and regressive government action, and, in 1976, it
offered an "alternative" to the English-speaking voters with this plat-
form.
102 What Does Quebec Want?
enterprise controlled by French-speaking Quebec. Finally, by empha-
sizing government action (tax incentives, government purchasing poli-
cies, regionalization of government operations, and so on), the Parti
Quebecois of necessity supports greater economic powers for the
Quebec government.
The third view of how Quebec economic development should be
achieved is held by the Quebec Liberal party. The Liberals put their
emphasis on larger companies and on giant projects which they see as
the greatest levers of economic progress. They also favor increased
activity in Montreal and in Quebec City, because they believe the
development of these centres will induce the development of their
periphery and hinterland much better than any sprinkling of govern-
ment grants and subsidies to remote areas could do. The Quebec
Liberal party welcomes foreign investment. It does not favor massive
government intervention, especially at the provincial level where eco-
nomic powers are limited. Such views are compatible with the objec-
tives of the Montreal business community and with the views held by
many "liberal" economists such as Andre Raynauld. The views of the
Quebec Liberal party on the economic development of Quebec do not
challenge the interests of the larger corporations and they do not
require any constitutional change in order to be implemented.
The fourth view on the means to achieve the economic development
of Quebec is held by the three political parties based in the rural and
semi-rural areas of Quebec: the Union Nationale, led by Rodrigue
Biron in the Quebec election of 1976, the Ralliement Creditiste, led by
Camil Samson, and the Parti National Populaire, represented by
Fabien Roy in the Quebec National Assembly after the 1976 election.
These three small parties, which accounted for 24 per cent of the votes
cast in 1976, favor small and medium-sized enterprises, and they favor
some government action in the areas of agriculture, mines, forests,
fisheries and tourism. They would like to see more processing of
Quebec's natural resources done in Quebec. These planks are similar
to those of the Parti Quebecois on the same questions. The three
"rural" parties, however, condemn the "excessive" reliance placed by
the Parti Quebecois on government intervention. At the same time,
they do not agree with the Quebec Liberal party on such matters as
Montreal-based economic development.
Although such a concise presentation of the economic platforms of
the political parties that competed in the Quebec 1976 election cannot
fully reflect the variety of the proposals put forward, it summarizes the
Introduction to Part II 103
Table 5—Main Views of Quebec Political Parties on Economic
Development
Parties
Left-Wing
Parties*
Parti
Quebecois
Quebec
Liberal
Party
Union
Nationale,
Ralliement
Crediste,
Parti
National
Populaire
Degree of
Government
Intervention
Medium to
extreme
Large
Medium
Small
Territorial
Emphasis
None
Quebec
regions
Quebec
industrial
centers
Quebec
regions
Preferred
Economic
Agent
Public
enterprise
Public
enterprise
small and
medium-sized
enterprises
co-operatives
Large
corporations
Small and
medium-sized
enterprises
Constitutional
Changes
Required in
the Economic
Sector
Varying
Large
Little or
None
Some
Percentage
of Vote
in 1976
1? (total)
AW,
34
r
i?
247
(
 (total)
essentials. In a capsule, the four main views held by the political
parties of Quebec on its economic development are set out in table 5.
In spite of the very significant differences in the economic programs
of the Quebec political parties, all parties agree that Quebec economic
development is a fundamental objective. Quebec is no different from
* These left-wing parties were those which had at least one known
candidate in the 1976 election Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire,
Ligue Sociahste Ouvnere, Ligue Communiste, Parti Commuinste, Parti
Ouvner, Parti des Travailleurs, Coalition des Militant Syndicaux et
Nouveau Parti Democratique The Democratic Alliance platform does
not fit the above classification, and its stands on the various issues
would call for a separate category altogether
104 What Does Quebec Want?
other areas of Canada or the rest of the western world in this regard.
What is different in Quebec is the view held by many that this
economic objective cannot be achieved without constitutional change.
Whether they believe that constitutional amendments are required
or not, the spokesmen for the five political parties represented in the
Quebec National Assembly in 1976 (both before and after the Novem-
ber election) all agreed on the idea of giving the Quebec government
substantially increased powers, at least in the socio-cultural domain.
The differences among the parties regarding the third basic objective
of making Quebec the homeland of French-speaking Canadians relate
to the degree or importance of the transfers from Ottawa to Quebec
that are required; they do not relate to the idea itself. It is the idea of
a homeland for the French-speaking Quebecers that necessitates con-
stitutional adjustments. And constitutional adjustments appear to be
the stumbling block against which Quebec comes to grief.
4
Political Sovereignty
The most far-reaching constitutional change proposed by a Quebec
political party represented in the Quebec National Assembly is "sover-
eignty-association", that is a transfer to the Quebec government of all
constitutional powers currently held by the federal government, fol-
lowed or accompanied by the establishment of decision-making mech-
anisms in the economic sector controlled jointly by the governments of
Quebec and Canada. As it is explained by Parti QuebScois spokesmen,
"sovereignty-association" would free Quebec from the traditional cen-
tury-old federalism under which Canada has lived since 1867 and
introduce into Canada the kind of federalism which is gradually being
installed in Europe.
In 1970, the program of the Parti Quebecois was titled La Solution,
and after 15 years of debate within Quebec about the "ideal" constitu-
tional arrangement, the "sovereignty-association" proposal seemed as
if it really might be the solution. It could rally those Quebec national-
ists who had argued for all-out Quebec independence as well as those
who had called for increased Quebec autonomy. It had, by 1970,
already gone a long way toward healing the historic division of nation-
alist forces in Quebec and had the support of most nationalist organi-
zations. It was consistent with the basic objectives shared by a large
proportion of French-speaking Quebecers: survival of the French lan-
guage and of a French "nation" in Quebec, along with economic
development for the benefit of the Quebec population. And it seemed
to offer "national dignity" through control by the Quebec population
of political institutions operating in Quebec.
The leaders of the Parti Quebecois continue to believe that their
solution will rally a near-unanimity of French-speaking Quebecers and
even a substantial proportion of bilingual Quebecers of British origin
105
106 What Does Quebec Want?
whose roots in Quebec go back several generations. They hold the
conviction that Quebec would fare far better in every aspect of its
cultural, social and economic life, if the Quebec government controlled
all the taxes levied in Quebec and was solely responsible for public
administration. The main argument of Parti Quebecois leaders such as
Jacques Parizeau is just that:
Quebecers have full control over the Quebec government and the
Quebec government is the only government over which Quebecers
have full control, and if it were the only government to operate in
Quebec, Quebecers could have policies appropriate to their needs
and a guarantee of efficiency and dynamism in public administra-
tion.
Some Parti Quebecois leaders even argue that their solution will
rally a large proportion of English-speaking Canadians living outside
Quebec* They cite several factors favoring this development. First,
many English-speaking Canadians would be relieved to see that poli-
cies suited to their own needs could henceforth be defined without
reference to the different needs of Quebec and without being eroded
by compromises. Second, the Parti Quebecois solution would save
millions of dollars now spent in translation, debating, negotiation and
conflicts caused by the presence of the federal government in
Quebec.** Third, the Parti Quebecois solution would bring about the
end of federal equalization payments to Quebec, which amount to
more than one billion dollars annually and are seen as a sop to
Quebec although, according to Claude Morin, they are paid for by
Quebec taxpayers.
2
 Finally, many Parti Quebecois leaders think that
English-speaking Canadians, freed from the "Quebec problem", would
get a chance to progress in their own way, building their nation.
* Gallup poll data published by the weekly supplement The Canadian
(circulation 2,500,000) , on April 9, 1977, revealed that 44.8 per cent of
English-speaking respondents answered "yes" to the following ques-
tion: "If separation occurs, should Canada enter into an economic
union with Quebec?", while 39.0 per cent said "no" and 15.9 per cent
did not state an opinion. The representative sample was made up of
1,043 adult Canadians.
** In 1975, there were 1,400 translators in the federal government trans-
lation bureau. The costs expected in 1980 were $60 million (1975
dollars). See Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Official
Languages (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976), p. 150.
Political Sovereignty 107
We therefore propose a new type of association with the rest
of Canada, a set of new ties so that both nations, the English and
the French, may live in harmony, side by side, without hurting
each other. That we stand ready to discuss at any time, with our
minds open to pooling or "joint-venturing" whatever should be if
both Quebec and Canada are to profit from and with one
another.
This new partnership could take the form, essentially, of a
common market based on a customs union, permitting free pas-
sage of persons, goods and capital, as in the countries of Western
Europe.
Additionally, if the desire is mutual, we are ready to go
further, as far as monetary union, which obviously would allow
for political change to be implemented with a real minimum of
uncertainty in economic affairs ...
And as for labeling our program, if it's necessary, we can call
it "social democratic". Social democratic parties have been, or
are presently in power in several western countries of some
importance, like Sweden, Great Britain, West Germany, and also
in certain Canadian provinces ...
Our model, so to speak, for social and economic development
is based on respect for the individual and on keeping people well
informed about and involved in all major decisions that concern
them. We want fully responsible citizens.
Rene Levesque, speaking in New York, January 25, 1977.
Source: The Gazette, Montreal, January 26, 1977, p. 7.
Independence
The solution put forward by the Parti Quebecois has been described in
a series of documents, among which the best known have been Option
Quebec, a book written by Rene Levesque which appeared in January
1968; La Solution, the 1970 booklet summarizing the party program;
and Un Gouvernement du Parti Quebecois s'engage, the 1973 summary
of the program.
The last document published before the 1976 election was entitled:
Le programme, l'actio n politique, les statuts et reglements, Edition 1975,
Parti Quebecois. This document states the various objectives set by the
108 What Does Quebec Want?
party's fifth national convention in November 1974; it outlines how a
Parti Quebecois government would bring about Quebec independence,
describes how an independent Quebec would run its foreign relations
and states the party's objectives in the domestic sector. In spite of its
importance, this document has not been issued for general distribu-
tion, although it was made available to every Parti Quebecois member
and to any person who asked for it. Some 200,000 copies had been put
into circulation by the end of 1976. During the 1976 election campaign
the Parti Quebecois published small booklets and pamphlets which
were consistent with this program, instead of a summary of the pro-
gram itself.
The solution proposed by the Parti Quebecois, sovereignty for
Quebec and economic association between Quebec and Canada, has
not been modified substantially since 1968. The main change in the
party's platform was made in 1974 when the party convention adopted
a resolution on the procedure to be used to ascertain the existence of a
majority of Quebec voters in support of the Parti Quebecois solution.
Instead of considering a Parti Quebecois election victory as sufficient
proof of support for Quebec independence, the 1974 convention
decided to distinguish between an election for seats in the National
Assembly and a referendum on Quebec independence. People could
thus vote for Parti Quebecois candidates in a general election without
necessarily voting for independence. As Parti Quebecois propagandists
had already stated during the 1973 election campaign: "First things
first. Today I vote to form a government. Later, by referendum, I will
decide on Quebec's future."
This recourse to a referendum was justified from the point of view
of democracy as well as that of pure partisanship. With Quebec's
single-member constituency system, it could—and eventually did—
happen that the Parti Quebecois would get a majority of seats in the
National Assembly with fewer than 50 per cent of the votes. The
leaders of the Parti Quebecois considered that Quebec independence
was too serious a project to undertake without the democratic support
of an absolute majority of Quebec voters. Consequently, they felt that
the policy of "accession to independence by steps" had to be intro-
duced. But to distinguish between the election of a government and a
referendum on Quebec independence was also good strategy. It could
and did help defuse the propaganda of opposing parties, which were
likely to equate a vote for the Parti Quebecois with a vote for eco-
nomic chaos, labelled "separatism".
Political Sovereignty 109
During the 1976 election campaign, Parti Quebecois spokesmen
made skilful use of their promise to hold a referendum on Quebec
independence. When asked about their party's independence proposal,
Rene Levesque and other Parti Quebecois candidates systematically
replied that there would be plenty of time for a debate on independ-
ence, because a referendum was to be held in due time. If pressed for
more details, Levesque and his colleagues would add: "Read the
program; it is available upon request at the party office."
The program included the following plank: "A Parti Quebecois
Government is pledged to put into effect Quebec political sovereignty
through democratic processes and to propose to Canada a mutually
beneficial economic association."
3
 The reference to the proposed refer-
endum reads as follows:
The right of peoples to self-determination, that is their right to
choose their own political regime, is inscribed in the Charter of
the United Nations, to which Canada itself has adhered, along
with more than 130 other countries. International law and custom
provide the mechanisms by which peoples can accede to political
sovereignty. Besides, since Quebecers, like their Canadian and
American neighbors, live under a democratic regime, it is the
people, in this type of regime, who hold the power to decide by
means of the vote. It is thus by this democratic process accepted
by all that Quebec, after an election, will realize its political
sovereignty, while maintaining with its neighbors and with other
countries friendly relations based on respect for international law.
Therefore, a Parti Qu6b6cois government pledges:
1. To set in motion, immediately, the process of accession to
sovereignty by proposing to the National Assembly, soon after
its election, a law authorizing it:
a) to demand from Ottawa the repatriation to Quebec of all
powers except those which the two governments want to
entrust to common organizations for the purpose of economic
association;
b)to undertake, with the view of attaining this objective, techni-
cal discussions with Ottawa on the arranged transfer of pow-
ers;
c)to work out with Canada agreements touching especially on
the division of assets and liabilities as well as of public
110 What Does Quebec Want?
property, in conformity with the usual rules of international
law.
2. If it should become necessary to proceed unilaterally, to assume
methodically the exercise of all the powers of a sovereign state,
having ensured beforehand that it has the support of the
Quebec people by means of a referendum.
4
Rene Levesque and his ministers have talked so much about the
proposed referendum that Quebec voters have no reason to fear a
unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the Parti Quebe-
cois government without such a referendum having been held and
won by the pro-independence forces.
Would the Parti Quebecois Settle for Less?
Has the Parti Quebecois any chance to win a referendum proposing
Quebec political sovereignty in an economic association with Canada?
If it lost the referendum, would the Parti Quebecois settle for a
compromise such as special status for Quebec? And if there were a
compromise, what would be the reaction of the die-hard "independan-
tistes"? These are some of the questions which concern federal minis-
ters and civil servants as well as other Canadians. The answers to such
questions can only be obtained with time; however, intentions can be
studied, and they provide some indications about the future.
Every statement uttered by Parti Quebecois leaders reveals that they
are determined to achieve their aim: Quebec political sovereignty.
They have already studied and rejected many other proposals, notably
those put forward by the Union Nationale in 1966 and by the promot-
ers of special status. They have been fighting for Quebec political
sovereignty for 10 long years. Many members of the Parti Quebecois
were "independantistes" as early as 1960 and some of them have put
in long hours over a period of years working for independence parties.
These people know— and it is more than faith—they know that Quebec,
one day, will be a sovereign, separate country, which they hope will be
linked to Canada through some kind of confederal arrangement, be it
a monetary union or a free-trade association.
Parti Quebecois leaders know there will be a majority of Quebec
voters in favor of their solution, in the 1980s at the latest. This
conviction is based on demographic trends in the Quebec electorate.
The independence idea was first propagated by Quebec teachers,
Political Sovereignty 111
artists, poets, novelists, singers, journalists and other "intellectual
workers" who, by 1966, were either converted to the idea or at least
not actively opposed to it. The support given by the intellectual
avant-garde to independence was illustrated by a survey published in
a weekend newspaper on November 13, 1976: more than 100 Quebec
television and radio artists (including Monique Leyrac, Jean Duceppe
and George Dor) stated, by name, that they supported the Parti
Quebecois. Among the 147 artists who said how they would vote, 142
were in favor of the Parti Quebecois.
5
The intellectual "avant-garde" was joined in the mid-1960s by the
students at Quebec's colleges and universities. In 1966, these two
groups constituted the bulk of the independence forces. By 1970 they
had been joined by older nationalists (such as Rene Levesque and
other former Quebec Liberals) and by members of the trade unions
(particularly some of their advisers such as Robert Burns and Charles
Tremblay). In 1970, the Parti Quebecois had a majority in the 18-24
age group; in 1973, it had a majority in the 18-30 age group; in 1976,
it had a majority in the 18-35 age group. In 1980, if the trend is
maintained, it will have a majority in the 18-40 age group, and
probably also in the 40-45 age group, with a good showing (40 per
cent) in the 45-55 category: this will make for a solid and absolute
majority of the whole Quebec electorate.
On November 15, 1976, the Parti Quebecois won the votes of some
50 per cent of French-speaking Quebec voters. Among French-speak-
ing voters who have 12 or more years of schooling, 70 per cent
supported the Parti Quebecois. And, according to both polls and Parti
Queb6cois surveys, more than 20 per cent of bilingual English Quebec
voters supported the Parti Quebecois. But the Parti Quebecois got
nothing from unilingual English Quebec voters and very little from
older voters, in spite of a lot of campaigning among older voters in
east-end Montreal.
Surveys have shown that the Parti Quebecois generally retains the
support of those who have voted for its candidates once. A Gallup
poll published in the Montreal daily La Presse on May 2, 1976,
estimated that 81 per cent of those who had voted for the Parti
Qu6b6cois in 1973 were still supporting it three years later. This
conclusion was supported by the study carried out by sociologists
Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton in November 1976. But sup-
port for the Parti Quebecois does not necessarily imply approval for its
sovereignty proposal. In the November 1976 study, Pinard and Hamil-
112 What Does Quebec Want?
ton showed that only half of those who voted for the Parti Quebecois
were also in favor of "Quebec becoming an independent (separate)
country."*
Commentators often state that the proportion of Quebec voters who
support the idea of an independent Quebec hovers around 15 per cent
and is stationary. The fact is that between 1962 and 1967, surveys
which included a question on Quebec independence registered on the
average nine per cent in favor, 75 per cent against, and 14 per cent
abstaining. Support for the independence parties in the 1966 election
was very close to the nine per cent figure. Surveys done between 1967
and 1972 showed that the average support for Quebec independence
had climbed to 11 per cent (or 13 per cent if only French-speaking
voters were considered). In the period 1972-1977, the average support
reached 17 per cent (or 22 per cent if only French-speaking voters are
considered). Members of the Parti Quebecois who have studied both
published and unpublished data contend that, if a referendum were
held in 1978, the support for "Quebec political sovereignty in an
economic association with Canada" would reach at least 40 per cent of
the votes cast (that is 30 per cent of Quebec voters would vote yes, 45
per cent would vote no, and 25 per cent would abstain). The propor-
tion of those who approve of Quebec independence certainly does not
stand at 15 per cent of Quebec voters: it has been increasing gradually
and it is probably closer to the Parti Quebecois figures than to the
1965 statistics which are so often quoted.**
Support for Quebec independence has gradually increased with
time, and, in my view, it is likely to increase further, because of the
demographic trends which favor the Parti Quebecois and because of
the greater propaganda effort that can be put behind the idea now
that the Parti Quebecois is the Quebec government.
In other words, the Parti Quebecois does have a chance of winning
a referendum held in 1980 or after on the question of "Quebec
political sovereignty in an economic association with Canada."
* Reference to this study has been made above.
** The CBC Sunday Morning survey of April 3, 1977, showed that 32
per cent of the respondents approved of "souverainete-association,"
but only 16 per cent approved of "souverainete" without "association".
The survey data published in October 1977 by the Reader's Digest and
based on a sample of 823 Quebecers, showed that the proportion had
climbed to 40 per cent in the case of those who approved of "souver-
ainete-association," while 19 per cent approved of "independence"
(without association).
Political Sovereignty 113
However, if the referendum were forced upon the Parti Queb6cois
earlier than its strategists consider desirable, it could well be that a
majority would say no to independence. Would the Parti Quebecois
then settle for a compromise?
As far as I can judge from personal acquaintance with some mem-
bers of the Parti Quebecois, from interviews with party activists and
from available public statements, the Parti Quebecois sees political
sovereignty as the prerequisite for achieving the fundamental objec-
tives of the French-speaking population of Quebec (survival as a
"nation", economic development, and so on). Full political sovereignty
implies the following transfers of powers from Ottawa to Quebec:
taxation, foreign affairs and defence, agriculture, communications,
energy, mines, resources, justice, labor, corporate affairs, citizenship,
immigration—indeed, every area of government jurisdiction except
those specifically related to economic union.
However, the degree of association, in the view of many, could be
pushed as far as a full economic union. Economic union is a "federal"
arrangement in which the participating units maintain their sover-
eignty while agreeing to harmonize their taxation and social policies,
to use one common currency, to use one common tariff and to
practise free trade within their common boundaries. The "central"
institutions in an economic union normally include a central bank, an
economic council, a tariff commission, and a series of joint commit-
tees, some of them with large secretariats, research staffs and statistical
services.
If the compromise offered to Quebec by Canada were to take the
form of an economic union (which is more than a monetary union,
much more than a common market, and very much more than a
free-trade association), it is safe to predict that it would be accepted. If
the proposed compromise were to exclude full political sovereignty for
Quebec, it is safe to predict that it would be rejected by the Parti
Quebecois which would instead wait another few years until the time
was ripe for its own referendum.
At this point, it is too early for any political leader to dare say that
Canadians could come up with a compromise making Quebec politi-
cally sovereign within a Quebec-Canada economic union. This makes
it hard to predict whether such a compromise is possible. The reaction
of die-hard Quebec "independantistes" to this compromise is also very
difficult to predict, although many believe that it would be accepted.
In addition, many events affect the path of history, and it could well
be that the Quebec independence movement will falter as a result of
114 What Does Quebec Want?
such unexpected contingencies as the death of a leader, a leadership
crisis, a change in political personnel, a severe economic setback, a
sudden oil discovery, pressures from outside or other events beyond its
control.
Arguments for Quebec Political Sovereignty:
The International Aspect
Although the Parti Quebecois has made French the official language
of Quebec and the compulsory language of instruction for immigrants
and immigrants' children, many party members believe that this is not
sufficient. What is needed, in their view, is a clear understanding that
Quebec is a sovereign country, distinct from Canada although asso-
ciated with it in economic matters. Only if they know that Quebec is a
sovereign country will immigrants join Quebec's French-speaking
society. If they consider Quebec a "province" in an English-speak-
ing country, immigrants settling in Montreal will continue to behave as
they have in the past. They will integrate or try to integrate into the
economically dominant English-speaking community. In the long run,
in spite of the Charter of the French Language, immigrants settling in
Quebec and their children will become English-speaking Quebecers.
Many members of the Parti Quebecois believe that the government of
Canada has long been trying to submerge French-speaking Quebecers
under a flood of immigrants, just as the colonial administrations did
between 1840 and 1867.
In this view, French-speaking Quebecers, who have now entered the
industrial age, can no longer count on high fertility rates and rural
isolation in their fight for national or cultural survival. They require
full control over immigration policies so that their society will not be
overrun by English-speaking immigrants. From this point of view,
legislative powers over immigration and citizenship must be trans-
ferred to Quebec. Advocates of this argument still favor immigra-
tion if it serves to strengthen Quebec's French-speaking society. In
order to get would-be immigrants from other countries to come to
Quebec knowing that Quebec is a French-speaking country, the
Quebec government needs the power to open embassies in foreign
capitals. These embassies would make Quebec known abroad and
would cater to the needs of potential immigrants to Quebec. In order
to have embassies abroad, Quebec needs recognition as a politically
sovereign country, with full control over foreign affairs and an interna-
tional status.
Political Sovereignty 115
The argument for full control over foreign affairs is based on other
needs as well. In order to foster its economic and cultural develop-
ment, Quebec needs the capacity to enter into exchanges with other
countries, especially those which have things in common with Quebec
in terms of either language or cultural heritage. People who speak
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian or Greek, as well as French-speaking
people, are most often mentioned in this context.
Some of these international exchanges favored by Parti Quebecois
members are of an altruistic nature. Quebecers who are internation-
ally-minded are particularly numerous in the Parti Quebecois and they
believe that Quebec could have useful ties with the French-speaking
African countries and some of the Spanish-speaking nations, not to set
the stage for a new North American economic imperialism but to help
them overcome their economic and political dependency.
Parti Quebecois leaders would also like to see more international
exchanges in the cultural domain. In 1974, Quebec held a "Super-
franco-fete" to which delegations from a dozen African countries were
invited. This event was an eye-opener for many Quebecers, who
became convinced of the benefits which accrue from such interna-
tional ventures. In the same vein, Quebec and France have had
exchanges of students, artists, teachers and technicians, among others,
since 1967. The benefits are not measured in dollars but in life
experiences, and they are viewed as being well worth the money.
Quebecers want to expand these international exchanges, and it would
be easier to do so if Quebec had control over foreign affairs.
But the international exchanges which Parti Quebecois members
favor most strongly fall in the economic sector. Quebec needs to sell
its products abroad; it needs new markets. In its trade, Canada has
traditionally favored English-speaking countries, and particularly the
United Kingdom and the United States.* Less than one per cent of
Canada's foreign trade, for instance, is with France, which is a market
of 50 million people. Quebecers who favor political sovereignty think
that if only one quarter of the Canadian external affairs budget had
been managed by Quebec, Quebec would be far better off today.
These arguments, and many others which have to do with deeper
nationalist feelings, have led the Parti Quebecois to include the follow-
ing statement in the Programme:
* About 69 to 72 per cent of Canada's international trade is with the
United States, and between four and six per cent of Canada's exports
go to the United Kingdom. Japan accounts for six to seven per cent
of Canada's trade.
116 What Does Quebec Want?
A Parti Quebecois government pledges:
.. . to seek Quebec's admission to the United Nations and to
obtain recognition from other countries
... to respect, among the treaties binding Canada, those which
are favorable to Quebec, and to follow international law in the
renunciation of other treaties
.. . to pursue a foreign policy of peaceful co-operation.
6
These preliminary statements are elaborated in a long section of the
program devoted to Quebec foreign policy and defence. The preamble
to this section states that Quebecers in the 1970s want to participate
fully in the world outside. They conceive of their foreign policy as
being the implementation of two main principles: 1) the safeguarding
of the interests of the Quebec people, peace, security and the necessity
of interdependence and economic and socio-cultural ties with other
states; and 2) the solidarity of the Quebec people with developing
peoples.
The whole section is worth quoting at length:
A Parti Quebecois government pledges:
1. To promote the liberty of peoples and respect for their
national character along with international co-operation based on
justice, progress and peace; to reject all forms of neo-colonialism
in international relations, notably by supervising the investments
and the behavior of Quebec companies in foreign countries; to
avoid co-operation with any regime that does not respect the
Human Rights Charter of the United Nations.
2. To respect the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of another state.
3. To establish ties of co-operation and goodwill with the inter-
national community, while considering as priorities:
a) the replacement of preferential ties with the Commonwealth
by close relations with French-speaking countries;
b) the establishment of relations with the countries of the Third
World, especially those of Latin America;
c) the close ties that link us with Canada and the United States
of America.
4. To open up a number, limited at first, of diplomatic missions
and consulates, the heads of which could be accredited to several
countries or international bodies.
5. To practise a pacifist foreign policy based on the rejection of
Political Sovereignty 117
the recourse to war as a solution to international differences,
disarmament, the banning of the testing and use of nuclear and
bacteriological weapons, and withdrawal from military alliances
such as NORAD and NATO. [This last phrase was removed
during the Parti Quebecois convention May 29, 1977.]
6. To reduce military expenditures substantially by substituting
for traditional armed forces territorial defence units which could
be available for non-military purposes and could collaborate with
the United Nations in its peacekeeping missions.
7. To create a research and supervision unit, responsible to the
National Assembly, which would aim to eliminate political inter-
vention by multinational corporations in the State of Quebec*
In the area of economic relations with other countries, the Parti
Quebecois program states that:
A Parti Quebecois government pledges:
... to respect the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which anticipates a freeze or reduction of tariffs by a
large number of countries and a renunciation of tariff increases.
... to respect international law in the formulation of our inter-
national economic policy.
7
The options outlined in this section accurately reflect the opinions
held by a majority of French-speaking Quebecers in the field of
external affairs, as revealed by public opinion polls published since the
end of World War II, and as shown by the behavior of Quebec voters
in 1942 when Canada was asked, in a plebiscite, whether it favored
military conscription for service abroad. According to many students
of Canadian external affairs, until the 1970s the viewpoints of French
Canada were systematically discarded by Canada's policy-makers
* Le programme... Edition 1975, pages 9 and 10, translation. The
change in the earlier proposal to withdraw an independent Quebec
from NORAD and NATO has developed since the Parti Quebecois
gained control of the Quebec government. The leaders of the Parti
Quebecois have made it clear that the proposed defence policy of the
future sovereign Quebec is under study and that it is not now foreseen
that Quebec should withdraw from NORAD and NATO. The state-
ments uttered by the Parti Quebecois leaders since November 15,
1976, are to the effect that Quebec is part of North America and that
it shares responsibility in matters of defence.
118 What Does Quebec Want?
In a referendum, the precise wording of the question is of
relatively little significance.
Si vous voulez eviter la conscription,
voici ou vous ferex votre croix au plebiscite
du 27 wilt
Contentez-vous a libirer
Ie Gouvernement dc tout*
obligation resultant
d'engagements anterieurs
restreignant les methodes
dc mobilisation pour l«
service militaire ?
OUI
NONX
The question put to the people of Canada on April 27, 1942 was
ambiguous, but the opinion leaders made it clear enough by
resorting to propaganda devices such as this damaged copy of a
1942 handbill, which was distributed all over Quebec. French-
speaking Quebec stood four-square against conscription, and the
No vote received an overwhelming majority in that province.
Source: The Montreal Star, April 30, 1977, page A-13.
when there were differences of opinion between French- and English-
speaking Canadians in the area of foreign policy.
The Parti Quebecois leaders favor free trade and increased eco-
nomic exchanges with the eastern United States, Europe, Africa and
South America. The leading economists of the Parti Quebecois are
known to have been supporters of free trade long before they joined
the party. Rodrigue Tremblay, now Minister of Industry and Com-
merce, wrote a pamphlet in 1970 proposing a Quebec-United States
common market.
8
The Economic Aspect
According to a Parti Quebecois election pamphlet entitled Enough is
Political Sovereignty 119
Enough—The English and the '76 Election, one of Quebec's problems is
that the federal government does not protect Quebec industries:
Look at the case of textiles. This is a gradually declining industry
in Quebec and more and more workers are being laid off. Why?
Because the Federal government insists on importing textiles from
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in order to protect the sale of
western Canadian wheat.
Furthermore the government has failed to protect Quebec's
dairy farmers from federal policies which reduced their incomes.
These policies resulted in Quebec earning only 9% of Canadian
agricultural revenues from some 27% of Canada's farming popula-
tion.
9
Such examples were used in 1976 by the Parti Quebecois publicists
to convey the idea that federal policies have been detrimental to
Quebec economic development. Similar arguments were used in 1973
when, in a booklet entitled Le coup du federalisme, Parti Quebecois
publicists strongly criticized federal policies in agriculture, labor, natu-
ral resources, scientific research and transport.
In the labor sector, the federal government has established policies
which are implemented by a Department of Labor, a Department of
Employment and Immigration, a Public Service Commission, an
Unemployment Insurance Commission, and several other federal insti-
tutions. The main Parti Quebecois criticism of these policies, as
expressed in Le coup du federalisme, is that they account for several
thousands of jobs being offered in Ontario (particularly in Ottawa)
when they should be distributed over Canadian territory. In 1970,
according to Le coup du federalisme, 18,000 of these jobs should have
been located in Quebec, and the fact that they were not accounted for
a $200-million loss every year for Quebec taxpayers and the Quebec
economy.*
The other basic criticism is that these policies were built up to suit
the expansionist thrust of the federal civil service and were not
directed toward Quebec problems: they were band-aids on a broken
leg. According to Le coup du federalisme, federal mismanagement of
taxpayers' money spent in the labor sector accounted for a significant
portion of Quebec's excessively high unemployment rate. If only one
* Since 1968, the federal government's expansion on the Quebec side of
the federal capital region has indeed located 18,000 more jobs in
Quebec.
120 What Does Quebec Want?
fifth of the money spent by the federal government in its labor
programs had been spent by a Quebec government concerned about
real Quebec problems, more than one billion dollars a year could have
been pumped into the Quebec economy.
10
 Therefore, the argument
goes, Quebec needs full control over labor, employment, unemploy-
ment, and manpower policies and services.
In the field of natural resources, the federal government is accused
of systematic unfairness to Quebec. In Le coup du federalisme, statistics
were quoted showing that Quebec, with 28 per cent of Canada's
population, received only 14 per cent of federal expenditures in the
agricultural sector, eight per cent of federal expenditures in the sector
of mines, forests and fisheries, five per cent under Canada's water
programs, and two per cent under Canada's energy programs, for the
years 1963-1968.
11
 The conclusion was obvious: Quebec had to assume
total jurisdiction in these areas.
The booklet was also very critical of the federal government's scien-
tific research policies. It showed that in 1969-1970, to take one exam-
ple, Ottawa spent $260 million on research in federal laboratories and
research centres: of this, $13 million was spent in Quebec and $200
million in Ontario. Outside contracts to universities in 1970-1971
amounted to $132 million, but Quebec universities received only $23
million of this and Quebec French-speaking universities, $14 million
(that is ten per cent of the total, when French-speaking Quebecers
account for 23 per cent of the total Canadian population). The same
proportions held true for grants and subsidies awarded to individuals.
The conclusion, again, was obvious: Quebec had to get full control
over government-funded scientific research.
The fourth domain on which Le coup du federalisme touched was
transportation policies. It showed how federal investments in Quebec
were insufficient and usually served the interests of other parts of
Canada: three examples were railways (11 per cent of Canada's rail
mileage is located in Quebec), seaports (those of Quebec have been
neglected to the benefit of eastern ports and inland facilities on the
Great Lakes), and aviation (the latest airport, Mirabel, having been
conceived to serve Ottawa and Montreal, rather than Montreal and
Quebec City.) Again the argument concluded that Quebec had no
choice but to gain sovereignty in the domain of transportation.
The federal policies which stir the loudest criticism in Quebec,
however, are policies over which the province could legislate under the
British North America Act of 1867, if judicial interpretations were
Political Sovereignty 121
favorable. The provinces have jurisdiction over "public works",
"municipalities", "hospitals", "education", "property and civil rights",
"public lands and forests" and "local or private matters." But the
Canadian Parliament has jurisdiction over every matter that does not
fall under exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
Moreover, while the provinces can raise revenue by resorting to
direct taxation in order to finance the implementation of provincial
policies, the central government can raise revenue by any mode or
system of taxation. Judicial interpretation has been that the federal
government can resort to direct taxation, even though "direct taxation
for provincial purposes" is a provincial jurisdiction. And the courts
agree that the federal government can spend its money without any
restriction on the object of its expenditure, because the only restric-
tions on spending in the British North America Act apply to the
provinces, not to the central government.
Until 1976 when the Parti Quebecois gained power, the interpreta-
tion of the British North America Act had always been the key issue.
The provinces, for instance, have jurisdiction over hospitals (section
92, paragraph 7), except navy hospitals. Can the federal Parliament
legislate in matters of health, a domain which is not mentioned in the
British North America Act? The provinces have exclusive jurisdiction
over municipal institutions (section 92, paragraph 8). Can the federal
Parliament legislate on housing and on similar subjects which have
traditionally been the concern of municipal institutions?
The answer to each of these questions and to all others concerning
governmental jursidictions has generally been yes—the federal govern-
ment can enter sectors on which the British North America Act is
unclear, either by means of legislation or by means of administrative
and budgetary action. If an activity were neither foreseen nor allocated
to any government in the British North America Act, the federal
government obtains full legislative powers. If it is interpreted as an
activity which falls under exclusive provincial jurisdiction in the British
North America Act, the federal government cannot legislate, but it can
spend money on it.
Judicial interpretation of the key sections of the British North Amer-
ica Act of 1867 favored the evolution of Canadian federalism toward
centralization from 1867 to 1896 (approximately) and from 1930 to
1970 (approximately). Very few questions of judicial interpretation
remain unsettled and the accumulated judicial interpretation of the
division of powers described in the British North America Act is now
122 What Does Quebec Want?
more significant than the Act itself. Parti Quebecois leaders cannot
accept the actual present-day division of powers arising from the
interpretation of the British North America Act.
Moreover, the Parti Quebecois leaders consider that the federal
government is torn between two or more conflicting regional interests
almost every time it faces a policy problem in the economic sector. It
has to satisfy Alberta oil interests, Montreal refineries, the southern
Ontario chemical industry, the automobile industry, and the average
Canadian consumer. It has to balance the St. Lawrence harbor inter-
ests against the Great Lakes maritime interests and the Atlantic port
interests. In the view of several Parti Quebecois leaders, the prevailing
interests win their point, and Quebec interests, if in conflict, register a
loss.
According to the Parti Quebecois program, Quebec political sover-
eignty would offer a variety of economic benefits to French-speaking
Quebecers. Decisions which concern Quebec, instead of being made in
Ottawa, would henceforth be made in Quebec by Quebecers and in a
Quebec perspective. Savings would be made in taxation services, by a
reorganization under one single Quebec authority of the Quebec Reve-
nue Department and the Quebec branches of the federal Revenue
Department. Corporate income tax, henceforth fully controlled by
Quebec, would be used to promote Quebec industry and foster
Quebec economic development. Individual income tax rates, also fully
controlled by Quebec, would be modified so as to achieve greater
justice and equity, being integrated with a guaranteed minimum
income plan.
Excise taxes and production sales taxes, which are now the basic
federal indirect taxes, would be integrated with the existing Quebec
retail sales tax under a plan similar to the value-added tax common in
Europe, with continued exemptions for food, pharmaceuticals, hous-
ing, and other essentials, and with higher rates for luxury products.
Quebec economic development would benefit from greater co-ordina-
tion in the public sector, because one single government, Quebec,
would be in charge of the whole sector, with a central planning board.
In the fields of agriculture, forests, fisheries, mines and other
resources, the Quebec government would be able to achieve greater
productivity, a larger degree of industrial processing of primary prod-
ucts, better access to foreign markets, and so on, because it would
have authority over the whole sector and because Quebec interests
would be its primary objective.
Political Sovereignty 123
The changes advocated by the Parti Quebecois in the area of trans-
port are a good example of its plans:
A Parti Quebecois government pledges:
... to reorganize the transport field
a) by merging the railway systems in Quebec into a single
system operated by a corporation that would be majority publicly-
owned;
b) by unifying the domestic airlines and extending them to
serve foreign destinations, as a single system also operated by a
corporation that would be majority publicly-owned;
c) by administering navigation within Quebec's territorial lim-
its, by favoring the creation of a merchant fleet through a realign-
ment of companies and by maintaining the year-round navigabil-
ity of the St. Lawrence River.
12
The Socio-Cultural Aspect
In the social sector, the Parti Quebecois believes that, because Quebec
society is limited by the constraints of Canadian federalism, it cannot
define priorities for its own social development. The federal institu-
tional arrangement in Canada deprives Quebecers of the means
required for public choices reflecting the characteristics of Quebec and
enabling Quebec society to develop itself according to its own particu-
lar priorities. A politically sovereign Quebec would be able to offer
better social services to its population, and it could do so at a lower
cost than today, by eliminating fraud, administrative delay and pro-
gram deficiencies, which now result from lack of co-ordination and
excessive rivalry between federal and Quebec civil servants.
The elimination of Quebec-Ottawa rivalry is seen as a powerful
argument by Parti Quebecois propagandists. In the 1975 program, this
paragraph follows a statement of health policy objectives:
The cost of drugs here is the highest in the world and allows the
pharmaceutical industry to exploit commercially such a vital sec-
tor, with the tacit complicity of the federal government which
contents itself with band-aids Here as elsewhere, we will have
to get rid of federal-provincial political struggles to widen the
application of the health insurance program, to put an end to the
exploitation of citizens in the area of drugs and to authorize an
124 What Does Quebec Want?
exceptional effort to improve the health of the population, nota-
bly through prevention and research.
13
The section of the 1975 program devoted to work conditions states
that "when it is relieved of the endless federal-provincial wrangling in
the employment sector, Quebec will be in a position to guarantee
genuine job security " As we have seen, the work situation differs
somewhat from that in Ontario, as a result of greater territorial disper-
sal of the population, lower participation rate in the labor force,
higher unemployment rates, crisis conditions in several manufacturing
sub-sectors, and so on. Undoubtedly, the Parti Quebecois has substan-
tial arguments in calling for Quebec political sovereignty in these
matters.
Another sector in which it holds a strong position is urban affairs.
Urban planning and housing are unquestionably local matters. Never-
theless it is an area where the federal government has set a firm foot.
According to the Parti Quebecois, housing and urban planning consti-
tute another area where federal policies and Quebec policies have
always been different, if not contradictory.
14
Quebec's housing situation is unique in that the percentage of
families renting their housing is higher in Montreal (especially among
French-speaking Montrealers) than anywhere else in Canada: overall,
53 per cent of Quebec dwellings are rented, while in no other province
does the proportion of rented dwellings exceed 29 per cent.
The Parti Quebecois position on the media is also probably sup-
ported by a large proportion of Quebec voters. In a politically sover-
eign Quebec, French would be the language of the publicly-owned
radio and television networks, and the number of privately-owned
English-language radio and television stations would be proportional
to the English-speaking population of Quebec.
15
 Privately-owned radio
and television stations, in a sovereign Quebec governed by Parti Quebe-
cois leaders, could not be under non-resident control. Morever, co-
operatives and community associations would obtain greater access to
cable-television programming. In general, the Parti Quebecois position
is that Quebec should have the power to safeguard freedom of speech
and opinion and to satisfy the desire of the Quebec people for means
of cultural expression. Quebec political sovereignty and Parti Quebe-
cois policies would put Quebecers in control of the media and would
curb the tendency toward private monopoly in the mass media.
Political Sovereignty 125
Is Quebec Political Sovereignty a Solution that Canada
Could Accept?
The arguments put forward in favor of Quebec political sovereignty by
Parti Quebecois leaders can be summarized under three main head-
ings:
1) Quebec is different and most Canadian federal policies do not
suit Quebec interests;
2) Federalism, as it is operating in Canada, is costly and ineffi-
cient;
3) The survival of a French-speaking society in North America
cannot be guaranteed unless Quebec becomes a sovereign state.
These arguments are used in the Quebec constitutional debate along
with the data which have been quoted above. Each argument and
each set of data could be challenged. One can dispute the points
relating to Quebec's share of federal revenue and its share of federal
expenditures, because perspectives differ widely.
One can show that there is no such thing as a "Quebec national
interest", but a variety of conflicting interests within Quebec, some of
these being satisfied with Canadian federal policies while others are
not. One can assert that the federal government is highly efficient, or
that it is more efficient than the Quebec government. One can main-
tain that the costs of federalism are outweighed by benefits accruing
from federalism. One can state his faith in the survival of French
Quebec within the Canadian federation. There is indeed cause for
dispute in the arguments used by Parti Quebecois leaders, and the
opposing contentions could be well documented. (The Quebec Liberal
party thesis will be described at length in chapter 5.)
One can discard demographic projections, opinion surveys, or eco-
nomic statistics on the grounds that the whole debate deals with
sentiments, feelings, perceptions, moral values, and the like. Many of
those who take part in the Quebec constitutional debate do not want
to be confused with facts or figures. Moreover, they make a mountain
out of the mole hill seen in their neighborhood: the facts and figures
that count are personal experiences.
Both in Quebec and elsewhere, there have been many reactions to
the election of the Parti Quebecois. These reactions have ranged from
126 What Does Quebec Want?
desperation to incredulity, from excessive concern to the utmost indif-
ference, even among Canadian political scientists and members of the
Canadian Parliament. But outside Quebec, if one can judge by editori-
als and letters to the editor in the newspapers, by comments on radio
hotlines, and by the statements of political leaders, those who have
shown the greatest concern over the election are also those who seem
the most worried by the prospect of Quebec's accession to political
sovereignty. These same people are also those who are most inclined
to want to crush "these separatists who want to break up Canada".
Indeed, the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, has been
quoted as saying: "Quebec separatists have the choice between separa-
tion and association, but they can't have both."
16
Others want to appease French Canadians. The leader of the Oppo-
sition, Joe Clark, told a Quebec audience on March 23, 1977, that he
was wining to concede a lot more powers to the provinces in such
areas as industrial development, culture, communications, immigration,
urban affairs and mineral resources.
17
 The day before, Claude Forget,
who was Quebec's Minister of Social Affairs in the Bourassa govern-
ment, had said that Ottawa should leave social affairs to the prov-
inces.
18
Many Canadians believe Quebec secession would be disastrous for
the rest of Canada. A Gallup poll published March 23, 1977, revealed
that 46 per cent of the Canadian sample thought that it would be very
serious, 27 per cent quite serious, and 22 per cent not very serious.
But, according to another Gallup poll, published in the weekly The
Canadian on April 9, 1977, 54.2 per cent of the English-speaking
respondents said "no" to the following question: "Should the govern-
ment of Canada negotiate special political and economic agreements
with Quebec to try to prevent separation?" Among the French-speak-
ing respondents, 66.9 per cent said "yes".
5
The Federalist Solution
Many members of the Quebec Liberal party, as well as many English-
speaking Canadians outside Quebec, believe that if Quebec were to
become a sovereign, separate country it would be dropping the sub-
stance for the shadow.
According to this point of view, the survival of the French language
and of a French-speaking Quebec society can only be guaranteed by
economic prosperity, and economic prosperity cannot be achieved in a
separate Quebec. Consequently, in order to assure the survival of a
French-speaking society in North America, Quebec must remain a
province in the Canadian federation, albeit a province with more
powers than before and, if necessary, more powers than other prov-
inces.
This line of reasoning is a rebuttal of the Parti Quebecois' argument
that the survival of a French-speaking society in North America can-
not be guaranteed unless Quebec becomes a sovereign state. This
viewpoint is usually voiced in conjunction with other rebuttals of Parti
Quebecois arguments. According to many Quebec Liberals, Quebec is
not significantly different from the rest of Canada, and if French
Quebecers participated actively in the federal government, they would
obtain federal policies suited to Quebec interests. In any case, add
Quebec Liberals, federalism is less costly and more efficient than the
"balkanization" proposed by the Parti Quebecois.
Cultural Survival and Economic Prosperity
The leading postulate in the chain of anti-separatist reasoning is that
cultural survival depends on economic prosperity. To support this idea,
the drain of the French Quebec population between 1870 and 1930 is
127
128 What Does Quebec Want?
usually cited. During this 60-year period, economic hardship in rural
Quebec led several hundred thousand French Canadians to exile
themselves to the United States. Is there anything worse than emigra-
tion to endanger the survival of a society?
The best-known case of language disappearance following an eco-
nomic depression is provided by the Gaelic-speaking community of
Ireland, which was destroyed by famine and migration during the
second half of the nineteenth century. In 1850, Gaelic was spoken by
half the population of Ireland. By 1900, it had become the language of
a small minority. Examples such as these are numerous enough in
America as well: Indian tribes have disappeared altogether after being
reduced to poverty by Spanish conquerors or northern European set-
tlers.
An economic disaster in Quebec, in the view of some Liberals, could
be fatal to Quebec's French-speaking society. But the survival of a
language and the culture associated with it does not depend solely on
economic prosperity. It depends on a variety of other conditions as
well: numbers, levels of education, cultural productivity, control of the
media, exchanges, political factors. Quebec Liberals say that Quebec
has or can easily obtain control over immigration and demographic
policies (to maintain the "numbers"), over education, over cultural
policies, over the media. And they are afraid of the economic disaster
which, in their view, Quebec's political sovereignty would constitute.
Economic Consequences of Political Independence
According to the chain of reasoning developed by many Quebec
Liberals, Quebec's accession to political independence would spell
economic disaster, resulting from the loss of markets in Ontario and
western Canada, a severe capital drain, the emigration of Quebec's
economic elite, the loss of equalization payments, the loss of oil
subsidies, and the budgetary deficits necessitated by the reorganization
of the government and the moving of thousands of civil servants from
Ottawa to Quebec.
In the view of leading Quebec Liberals, Quebec's accession to
sovereignty would result in the loss of the Ontario and western
markets now available to Quebec manufactured products protected by
Canadian tariffs. These Quebec Liberals think that Quebec will never
be able to negotiate "sovereignty and association", because English-
speaking Canadians will jump at the opportunity to abolish the com-
The Federalist Solution 129
mon tariffs which, at present, protect Quebec manufactured products.
These protected Quebec products cost more than similar products
manufactured in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Italy or Spain,
but they still retain a share of the Canadian market because competing
imported products are subject to tariffs and import quotas. If Quebec
products lost their tariff protection in the rest of Canada, they would
lose between 10 and 50 per cent of their market, depending on the
product. These goods are already seriously endangered by foreign
competition and vulnerable to tariff reductions and increased import
quotas. The loss of the Ontario and western markets is bound to occur
eventually, but it will constitute a serious setback if it occurs suddenly.
If Quebec becomes independent, and the rest of Canada does not
agree to a common market, this sudden setback would account for a
decline in the Quebec Gross National Product of two to six per cent.
If Quebec sovereignty were achieved without a Quebec-Canada
economic association, the Quebec textile, clothing, leather and elec-
tronics industries, to name a few, would be compelled to reorganize.
The economic break-up of Canada would be felt mainly by the same
industries which are already threatened by the possibility of Canadian
tariff reductions and by foreign competition.
Quebec's accession to political sovereignty, with or without a
Quebec-Canada economic association, would probably involve some
capital drain. Some Liberals believe that this capital drain would be
severe. Others say that most of the expected capital flight has occurred
already. In any case, it is to be expected that a number of individuals
who feel particularly insecure or who strongly disagree with the idea
of a sovereign Quebec will as a first reaction stash their money abroad
and, as a second reaction, exile themselves to Florida, California,
Mexico or the Bahamas. These reactions to Quebec's accession to
sovereignty could lead to some enterprises winding up, and some
employees finding themselves without jobs.
More serious would be the emigration of Quebec economic elite:
managers, accountants, engineers, entrepreneurs, chemists, and so on.
This would probably occur among English-speaking Quebecers more
than French-speaking Quebecers, but, no doubt, many French-speak-
ing doctors, engineers and managers would be tempted to leave
Quebec in fear of the future. If the person who leaves is not replaced,
and if whole services move out of Quebec, then the loss can be felt by
many people: secretaries and technicians can find themselves unem-
ployed, office space and dwellings can be unoccupied for long periods,
130 What Does Quebec Want?
construction projects can lag. As a matter of fact, the brain drain has
already started. As an example, according to calculations by Statistics
Canada, between 1969 and 1973 several hundred thousand Quebecers
left Quebec to go elsewhere, and the net emigration was 90,700. The
greatest emigration occurred in the troubled years of 1970 and 1971,
when 64,900 people left Quebec. In 1974 and 1975 more people came
to Quebec than left: during these two years, there was a net immigra-
tion of 18,300 people. Since November 15, 1976, according to real-
estate agents, the number of those leaving has been larger than the
number of arrivals.
The threat of independence has been sufficient for many corpora-
tions to move personnel out of Quebec. In December 1976 the Royal
Bank of Canada announced its decision to move some 100 people in
its money market, investment and corporate marketing divisions from
Montreal to Toronto. The Bank of Montreal moved about 25 people
in its marketing department from Montreal to Toronto. Such moves
have been a common occurrence in Montreal since the mid-1960s,
when "separatism" began to gain momentum. These moves were par-
ticularly frequent in 1969 and 1970, at a time when uncertainty
reached a high level, and they appear to be occurring at an even
higher rate since the 1976 election. In any case, such moves always
echo loudly in the news media. The effects of the flight from Quebec
cannot be measured with certainty. Nevertheless they are significant
and have been felt for a dozen years now.
Another aspect of the economic disaster predicted by some Quebec
Liberals is the loss of equalization payments, oil subsidies, and other
benefits accruing from "profitable federalism". As we have seen in
recent years federal payments, expenditures and transfers to Quebec
institutions and inhabitants have exceeded the amount of federal reve-
nues collected in Quebec. While the statement of federal revenue and
expenditure in Quebec cannot be considered a very serious argument
either for or against Quebec sovereignty, it cannot be denied that, in
the short run, the "reorganization of the public sector" following
Quebec's accession to independence would be felt seriously.
One of the costs of Quebec's accession to sovereignty would involve
moving public servants and their families from Ottawa to a location in
Quebec. The Parti Queb6cois has pledged that no civil servant will
lose his job or have his salary reduced following Quebec's accession to
sovereignty. The cost of moving several thousand public servants and
their families, households and offices from Ottawa to a location in
The Federalist Solution 131
Quebec, and the low productivity that such a reorganization would
involve for a period of several months can be estimated at $30,000 per
public servant. If 15,000 public servants have to move—and the costs
would be borne by the taxpayers—the price tag is a little over half a
billion dollars. There can be no doubt that in the short run, for two or
three years, Quebec's accession to sovereignty could cause major tran-
sition costs; according to Quebec Liberals, these would amount to
"economic disaster".
Cultural Survival and the Canadian Federation
Quebec Liberals would rather play it safe. They are aware of the
benefits which accrue from the maintenance of Quebec's federal links
with the rest of Canada, and they are afraid of the economic conse-
quences of Quebec's accession to sovereignty. To play it safe is to opt
for the maintenance of federalism.
Actually, Quebec Liberals put the emphasis on economic develop-
ment, not on "survival of a French-speaking Quebec society". In 1970,
Robert Bourassa wrote: "Our great priority, first and foremost, has to
be economic development. We must, by all the means at the disposal
of the state, get our economy moving again. Without economic pros-
perity, we will never be able to attain the cultural and social objectives
that we are all seeking."
19
The survival of a French-speaking Quebec society depends on eco-
nomic prosperity, and economic prosperity depends on Quebec's stay-
ing in the Canadian federation. On October 19, 1969, Bourassa was
already saying: "The federal formula is without doubt the form of
government which will assure Quebecers of the highest level of well-
being, of their cultural development, of their active presence in the
community of peoples and particularly of French-speaking peoples."
20
From 1970 to 1973, as Premier of Quebec and leader of the Quebec
Liberal party, Robert Bourassa undertook two major rounds of nego-
tiations with the federal government. His first objective was to obtain
a larger share of federal expenditures for Quebec, and he met with
success, gaining significant increases in the area of equalization pay-
ments and regional economic development. The second objective was
related to constitutional review: Quebec called for greater powers in the
sectors of immigration, health, manpower, urban affairs, culture, edu-
cation and youth. Unable to gain what it had requested, the Bourassa
government vetoed the 1971 constitutional amendment formula, the
Victoria Charter.
132 What Does Quebec Want?
These constitutional objectives were reiterated in the Quebec Liberal
party platform of 1973.
21
 They were repeated anew in 1974 by the
eighteenth convention of the party and again in 1976 by the nine-
teenth convention.
The 1976 convention recommended that the Quebec government
approve a new federal-provincial division of legislative powers when
and only when three fundamental guarantees had been included in the
constitution: (a) provincial priority in the areas of communications and
immigration; (b) the enlargement of provincial taxation powers and
the restriction of federal spending powers; and (c) veto power over
any proposed constitutional amendment for provinces with 20 per cent
or more of the Canadian population. This position, adopted on April
25, 1976, constitutes the latest stand of the Quebec Liberal party on
the "federal question". Resolutions at Liberal party conventions have
rarely concerned the division of powers in Canada. Before 1960 the
emphasis was put on autonomy, and a resolution on this subject was
adopted at each convention. The platform of 1956 included the follow-
ing text:
The question of autonomy is not limited to taxes. It implies the
right and the duty of each province to have and to implement a
precise policy in all the areas allotted to it by the Canadian
constitution: natural resources, education, agriculture, labor rela-
tions, health and welfare, etc.
The absence of constructive and progressive provincial policies
in these domains puts provincial autonomy in grave danger. The
Liberal party has, on each of these points, a precise policy which
is set out in this program and which will contribute to assuring
the autonomy of Quebec on all fronts: economic, educational,
social, etc.
During the 1960s, the emphasis shifted to specific questions, mostly
related to the social affairs sector. The Quebec government succeeded
in obtaining from Ottawa the power to "opt out" of joint federal-
provincial programs in the sector of social affairs which, if exercised,
meant gaining control over their operations and a fiscal compensation.
When negotiations came to a standstill on the question of family
allowances in 1966, the Quebec Liberals included the following sen-
tence in their program: "As a means to allow the orderly implementa-
tion in Quebec of a social policy centred on the family and based on
real needs, the government of Quebec will insist on the transfer from
the federal government of family allowances."
The Federalist Solution 133
In 1970, attention was focussed on three points: tax sharing between
the federal and provincial governments, provincial control over radio
and television, and immigration. On the taxation question, the 1970
Liberal program stated that a Liberal government would negotiate
with Ottawa an increase in equalization and similar payments which
would benefit Quebec. In addition, it would negotiate Quebec's partici-
pation in the policy-making process concerning tariffs on Quebec's
manufactured products. In the communications sector, the 1970 plat-
form stated that a Liberal government would negotiate with Ottawa
Quebec's participation in policy-making related to radio and television.
Finally, in the immigration sector, the 1970 platform called for fed-
eral-provincial co-operation in order to satisfy Quebec's objectives.
On the whole, the Quebec Liberals hold that Canada needs a
flexible form of federalism, and that Quebec needs "cultural sover-
eignty" and "fiscal decentralization".
The underlying position is that Quebec is not really different from
the remainder of Canada, except from the viewpoint of language and
culture. Consequently, Quebec does not need special status in non-
cultural areas. The extent of the cultural sector remains to be defined.
However, as a minimum, it covers radio and television, education, arts
and humanities, and most social programs, including immigration. The
meaning of the slogan "cultural sovereignty" is that the Quebec gov-
ernment should have the last word in policy-making on the various
questions pertaining to culture.
In another area, the Quebec Liberals consider that the Quebec
government should raise the revenue it needs to match its expendi-
tures. There should be a greater fiscal decentralization in Canada, an
"economic federalism".
Benefits of Federalism
The Quebec Liberals have talked a lot about "profitable federalism".
In using this term, they are saying two things. The first point is that
one of the functions of the central government is to "equalize" public
revenues among the different regions of the country. Quebec, with a
10 to 15 per cent lag behind the Canadian average per capita income,
has benefited (or will benefit) from remaining a province within the
Canadian federation. The second point is that a federation enables its
member states to save a lot of money by sharing public services which
would have to be duplicated if the federation did not exist. If Quebec
were a separate country, it would have to maintain embassies abroad,
134 What Does Quebec Want?
a central bank, full-fledged statistical services, armed forces, and so on.
The per capita costs of these services would be higher than their per
capita cost in present-day Canada, because they cannot be one-fifth
services. A Bank of Quebec would be at least one third the size of the
present-day Bank of Canada. Federalism is profitable because it
means savings on services which need not be duplicated and which are
not local or regional by nature.
These are the Liberals' chief counter-arguments to the Parti Quebe-
cois's position in favor of sovereignty. They add that the federal setup
can and will be improved, and that their policy is directed precisely
toward avoiding costly duplication and making federalism profitable.
In the view of Quebec Liberal party leaders, the federal system which
links together the various regions of Canada has many other advan-
tages, related to foreign affairs and international trade as well as to
domestic questions. The "balkanization" of Canada would constitute a
loss for the whole country.
In the area of defence, the theoretical advantages of federalism are
considerable. The Canadian armed forces are considerably more effi-
cient than would be two separate, barely co-ordinated Canadian and
Quebec military organizations. Indeed, to achieve the degree of effi-
ciency and defensive capability maintained by the Canadian armed
forces today the total budget required for two separate military organ-
izations would be, as a rough estimate, 25 per cent higher. But, of
course, a separate Quebec could try to operate without rescue patrols,
without coast guards, without northern outposts, without emergency
services, without radars, without any participation in the United
Nations peacekeeping operations!
Similar arguments are advanced concerning the advantages of feder-
alism in foreign affairs and international trade. Quebec Liberals and
most English-speaking Canadians consider that great advantages accrue
from the maintenance of one common department of external affairs,
one common network of trade agencies and immigration offices, one
common foreign aid agency, and so forth. If the Canadian territory
were balkanized, and if each separate region were to maintain embas-
sies, consulates, trade offices, immigration offices, and so on, the total
costs to taxpayers would be a lot higher than today.
Quebec Liberals add that, in spite of acknowledged difficulties,
Quebec benefits from the weight carried by Canada in the world.
French-speaking Canadians travelling abroad have their embassy.
Quebec enterprises which want to export can benefit from the exten-
The Federalist Solution 135
sive network of Canadian trade agencies. Canada projects a favorable
image in every country of the world and this is to the advantage of
French-speaking Quebecers. Indeed, indirect benefits such as these,
according to some Quebec Liberals, outweigh the inadequacies of
Canadian foreign policy that are so often cited by the Parti Quebecois.
Quebec Liberals also stress the advantages accruing from the main-
tenance of a consumer market of 22 million people in Canada. If
Canadian territory were divided into two or more separate markets,
Quebec would find itself confined to its own market of six million. In
addition, there are the benefits of standardization: monetary standard-
ization, fiscal standardization, manufacturing standardization, weights
and measures, postal and telephone services, and so forth. Another
theoretical benefit of federalism, as compared with "balkanization", is
found in the launching of vast long-term projects in the common
interest: building transcontinental railways, laying transcontinental
pipelines, developing networks of airports, digging canals and seaways.
Robert Bourassa, who was a friend of Rene Levesque's and worked
closely with him before Levesque left the Liberal party in 1967, was
well aware of the objections of Parti Quebecois members to Liberal
arguments in favor of federalism. But he used to say that the objec-
tions raised always referred to the past, and often the facts and figures
quoted referred to the nineteenth century. The statistics on railways
and canals, for instance, concerned federal projects which were practi-
cally completed by 1900. Moreover, although only small portions of
the railway and canal networks are located in Quebec, there is no
question that they helped make Montreal the commercial, financial
and industrial centre of Canada, at least up to the 1960s. During his
six-year term as Quebec Premier, Bourassa kept saying that it was time
to forget about the past and start looking to the future.
It might be true that, all in all, federalism has not been as beneficial
to French-speaking Quebecers as it could have been but, say the
Liberals, the situation has changed. Quebec has become a developed,
urbanized society. Quebecers have acquired the necessary technical
know-how and they can now play their part in the Canadian adven-
ture. The theoretical advantages of federalism can henceforth be fully
felt by French-speaking Quebecers. Quebec already benefits from the
twenty-year-old equalization program, from the ten-year-old regional
economic expansion program, from the five-year-old Quebec-Ottawa
agreement in the social sector, from the three-year-old oil subsidy. By
gaining full control over cultural matters, Quebec could have the best
136 What Does Quebec Want?
of two worlds: the advantages of cultural sovereignty and the benefits
of economic federalism. Is that not far simpler and easier than "sover-
eignty-association"? According to Quebec Liberals, federalism offers
all the benefits and none of the risks.
6
Third Options
Between the Parti Qu6becois's "sovereignty-association" proposal and
the Quebec Liberal party's "profitable federalism", there is ample
ground for third options.
The Union Nationale, led by Rodrigue Biron, comes close to what
could be termed a third option, midway between the Parti Quebecois's
constitutional proposals and the Quebec Liberal party's "flexible feder-
alism". The smaller political parties do not have elaborate constitu-
tional programs: some of them stand for Canadian federalism as it is
today, while others call for a socialist Canada and reject the constitu-
tional question altogether.
The Constitutional Stand of the Union Nationale
The Union Nationale has a long tradition as a defender of provincial
autonomy and decentralization. Between 1936 and 1959, under the
leadership of Maurice Duplessis, the party systematically opposed
federal centralization, even refusing federal grants and denying
Quebec the benefits offered by Ottawa to the provinces surrendering
to its fiscal proposals. Between 1966 and 1968, under the leadership of
Daniel Johnson, the Union Nationale posed an ultimatum to Ottawa:
equality or independence. Premier Johnson stood firmly in favor of an
arrangement midway between traditional Canadian federalism and
Quebec independence, but he was talking seriously when he said that
Quebec would rather declare its independence unilaterally than agree
to the type of federalism which was being perpetuated in Canada.
Gabriel Loubier, who led the Union Nationale from 1971 to 1974,
defined Canada as the union of two nations. This thesis of two nations
led to constitutional proposals similar to those which Daniel Johnson
137
138 What Does Quebec Want?
had presented to the federal government as Premier between 1966 and
1968.
Other leaders of the Union Nationale (Premier Paul Sauve, 1959;
Premier Antonio Barette, 1960; Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand, 1968
to 1970; and Maurice Bellemare, 1974 to 1976) did not modify its
fundamental constitutional stand. And when he became leader of the
Union Nationale in May 1976, Rodrigue Biron inherited the autono-
mist thesis of his party. This autonomist thesis was confirmed by the
party convention held during the first week of October 1976, 15 days
before the launching of the election campaign which led to the Union
Nationale's gaining 11 seats in the National Assembly.
The Union Nationale stands for a highly decentralized form of
federalism. This proposed new federalism would give the "reserve
power" to the provinces and would confirm the full and complete
sovereignty of the provincial governments over education, health,
social security, communications, cultural affairs, and the matters which
already fall under provincial jurisdiction according to existing judicial
interpretation of the British North America Act of 1867.
Moreover, under the new federalism defined by Union Nationale
literature, the provincial governments would have exclusive responsi-
bility over policy-making and administration, within provincial terri-
tory, in matters related to immigration, regional economic develop-
ment, housing and urban planning and land management. In addition,
provincial governments would have the power to negotiate, sign and
administer international agreements in the various sectors falling under
their jurisdiction. Finally, the powers of the federal government would
be drastically curbed, not only through the transfers implied in the
enlargement of exclusive provincial jurisdictions, but also through
severe restrictions put on the federal government's spending power
and taxation capabilities. And, in order to avoid the pitfalls of central-
izing judicial interpretation, the new federalism of the Union Nation-
ale would be safeguarded by a constitutional court on which would sit
judges chosen and appointed by the provincial governments.
During the 1976 election campaign, Union Nationale spokesmen
were careful not to publicize their program and they simply told their
audiences that they stood "four-square" for Quebec's remaining in
Canada, that they favored a renewed federalism, and that they were
the federalist alternative to the Liberals. On October 29, 1976, Premier
Robert Bourassa told English-speaking Liberal supporters on Ile Perrot
Third Options 139
near Montreal that the Union Nationale was "not a federalist party".
He said the Union Nationale "proposes associate-state status for
Quebec in relation to the rest of Canada. If you look at their program
you'll see that they don't really believe in the federal system." He
added that the Quebec Liberal party "is the only federalist party".
22
Bourassa's opinion was echoed by candidate Bryce Mackasey, former
federal minister, campaigning in Notre-Dame-de-Grace riding in the
English-speaking west end of Montreal. Rodrigue Biron reacted by
saying that he was a federalist and that he stood for a regenerated
federalism.
Nevertheless, a study of the Union Nationale's 1976 program, as
well as its programs of 1973 and 1966, leads to the following conclu-
sion: the Union Nationale stands for a constitutional solution midway
between sovereignty-association and traditional federalism. One can
remember Union Nationale Premier Daniel Johnson declaring to other
premiers at a meeting in Ottawa, September 14 and 15, 1966:
In preparation for the new constitution, it is also important that we
proceed without delay with a rearrangement of revenues and
functions between the federal and Quebec governments. By virtue
of this rearrangement, the Quebec government would gradually
become solely responsible within its territory for all public
expenditures relating to education in all its forms, old-age secu-
rity, family allowances, manpower placement and training,
regional development and especially aid to municipalities,
research, fine arts, culture and, in general, all other services of a
socio-cultural nature which are our responsibility by virtue of the
present constitution
Quebec believes that the best way to rearrange revenues
between itself and the federal government is to reserve to Quebec
the full use of 100 per cent of the sources of fiscal revenue to
which it has a right constitutionally, that is personal and corporate
income taxes and succession duties.
23
Johnson's proposals were consonant with the text of the British
North America Act of 1867. They were not "separatist". Nevertheless,
they were labelled "crypto-separatist" and the Union Nationale was
said to be supporting a "two-nation thesis". The reactions to the
Union Nationale's constitutional proposals of 1976 are similar to those
which met Premier Daniel Johnson's proposals ten years before. But
140 What Does Quebec Want?
those reactions did not stop the federal government from introducing
changes in its policies which satisfied several of Johnson's demands.
Compromises were negotiated. Quebec eventually obtained half the
personal income tax levied in Quebec and it gained control over
several social programs. Quebec got a separate pension plan, participa-
tion in family allowances, control of its health programs and so on.
The Parti National Populaire and the Ralliement Creditiste
Apart from the Union Nationale, which won 18 per cent of the votes
cast and 11 of the 110 seats in the Quebec National Assembly in
November 1976, each of two other small parties succeeded in having
one candidate elected. The Ralliement Creditiste polled four per cent
of the vote and its leader, Camil Samson, was elected in the consti-
tuency of Rouyn-Noranda in northwestern Quebec. The Parti
National Populaire, created by dissident former Liberal minister Jer-
ome Choquette and a former Creditiste, Fabien Roy, less than a year
before the election, received one per cent of the total vote and saw
Roy elected in the constituency of Beauce-Sud, in the southeastern
part of the province. These two smaller parties profess to support
federalism and their leaders have stated repeatedly that they want
Quebec to stay within Canada.
Delegates to the first convention of the Parti National Populaire,
held a few days after the opening of the 1976 election campaign,
opted for a restoration of the power of the provinces but did not adopt
any specific constitutional proposal. They focussed their attention on
matters falling in well-established provincial jurisdiction. Only four
proposals made reference to the federal government or to federal
programs or policies. One of these concerned immigration and said
that "immigration policy had to be consonant with Quebec language
policy". Another was related to family allowances and called for a
graduated scale geared to fostering increased birthrates. A third one
supported predominant jurisdiction for the Quebec government in all
matters related to the manufacturing sector. The last of these proposals
was a rebuttal to federal policies aimed at Quebec credit unions and
co-operatives. Perhaps as a result of these stands, the party's election
pamphlet made no mention of the word "federalism".
The leader of the Parti National Populaire, Jerome Choquette, made
several pleas in support of a reinforced Canadian federalism. He said
Third Options 141
that "the basis of the Canadian union should not be put in question".
On October 14, 1976, his views were expressed in these words:
The Canadian union is the guarantee of Quebec's prosperity.
Separation will bring about extreme economic hardship resulting
principally from lack of investment and loss of markets. Canada
will retaliate by erecting tariff walls to the detriment of Quebec.
Federalism is not only a paying proposition, it is indispensable.
Quitting Canada, Quebec will become a member of the poor
nations' club of this earth We refuse to let Quebec become an
obscure Balkan state lost in Anglo-Saxon North America.
In contrast to their Parti National Populaire opponents, Ralliement
Creditiste candidates entered the 1976 election campaign with a well-
established platform. In constitutional matters, the Ralliement Credi-
tiste platform was squarely "anti-separatist". But in spite of its federal-
ist stand, the Ralliement Creditiste supported a kind of special status
for Quebec. It was in favor of Quebec's using all available powers over
trade and immigration. It supported the idea that the Quebec govern-
ment should take full advantage of section 92, paragraph 2, of the
British North America Act, which gives provincial legislatures the
power to levy revenues for provincial purposes by means of direct
taxation. In the view of Creditiste spokesmen, the federal government
should be ejected from the income-tax field. The Ralliement Creditiste
considered that "credit" should be controlled by provincial govern-
ments. Communications (the mass media) and territorial development
were also said to belong to the provinces.
The 1976 election pamphlets of the Ralliement Creditiste were in
the tradition of the constitutional stand taken by the leaders of the
party in April 1971, when a fifteen-page text was signed by the then
twelve Creditiste members of the Quebec National Assembly and the
five members of the party executive committee. This constitutional
manifesto was published in the May 1971 issue of the party monthly,
L'ordre nouveau. It called for the abolition of the monarchy in Canada
and of the whole British North America Act of 1867 (page 8 of the
manifesto). It supported the right of each province to determine its
own constitutional future. On the whole, these constitutional options
were in line with statements set forth by the leaders of the movement
since 1963, and they were thought to reflect the dominant opinion of
142 What Does Quebec Want?
the rank-and-file, however sketchy they might appear when compared
with the Parti Quebecois program.
The Left-Wing Parties
A dozen political parties have no parliamentary representation. Alto-
gether, their candidates polled fewer than one per cent of the votes
cast in the 1976 election. These very small parties constitute the left
wing of the Quebec political spectrum. One, the Democratic Alliance,
describes itself as a "progressive reform movement". Another poses as
a "workers' movement". A third one calls itself the Quebec Workers'
Party. And there is the traditional Quebec Communist Party. And the
Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire (three candidates). And the League
for Socialist Action (one candidate). And the North American Labour
Party (one candidate). And the Parti Communiste du Quebec (Marx-
iste-Leniniste), the Canadian Communist League (Marxist-Leninist),
and the Maoist promoters of a future Canadian Proletarian Party
(Marxist-Leninist), who publish In Struggle and Proletarian Unity.
Two of these parties favor federalism: this is the case with the
Democratic Alliance led by Nick Auf der Maur (13 candidates, 17,444
votes, in 1976) and with the coalition formed by the Quebec New
Democratic Party and a moderate Trotskyist organization known as
the Regroupement des Militants Syndicaux, with the support of
another Trotskyist organization called the Groupe Socialiste des Tra-
vailleurs du Quebec. Among the 21 candidates of the coalition, three
or four distinct constitutional stands could be identified. Some candi-
dates were heard saying that they favored a complete overhaul of the
Canadian constitution, while others stated a marked preference for the
current arrangement. The 14 candidates of the Quebec Communist
Party tried to stay away from the constitutional debate, and the 1,770
voters who supported them were apparently concerned with other
problems.
All in all, even if they favored federalism, the leaders of these three
small parties (which were the largest in the left wing) agreed with the
right of Quebec to decide its own future and with the idea of amend-
ing the century-old division of power between the central Parliament
and the provincial legislatures. Others among the small parties favored
Quebec's accession to political sovereignty and supported the idea of a
socialist Quebec. This was the case with the Quebec Workers' Party
(12 candidates, 1,248 votes), the League for Socialist Action (one
Third Options 143
candidate, 88 votes), and the Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire (three
candidates, 122 votes). The remaining groups altogether accounted for
only three candidates and 207 votes and their dominant characteristic
was concern with theory, not with Quebec realities.
Is There a Third Option?
If there is a third option, it does not come from any of the left-wing
parties. The socialist parties cannot win a single constituency and they
are too divided for an electoral union to be a serious possibility.
Although united behind the objective of advancing the class struggle,
their members fight against each other in labor unions and citizens
committees. Nor is anything to be expected from the Ralliement
Creditiste or the Parti National Populaire. Their constitutional stands
need further explanation. In any case, constitutional problems are not
the priority of these parties, which are more concerned with the social
policies of the Quebec government.
The third option is found in the Union Nationale platform. It goes
further in the way of provincial autonomy than the Quebec Liberals
dare venture, but it remains a federalist option.
Is a third option representative of a large proportion of Quebec
public option? As an answer one can quote opinion polls taken since
1970. The least that can be said is that any midway option gains more
support than the "sovereignty" proposal, and more support than
options which stand for no change. But opinions shift. As we know,
Parti Quebecois leaders anticipate a majority in support of Quebec
independence by 1980 or 1982.
The third constitutional option proposed by the Union Nationale,
even though it has the support of much of the population, cannot be
considered by Union Nationale leaders as a road to electoral victory.
The Union Nationale organization is made up of three main categories
of party workers, only two of which support the constitutional stand of
the party.
One category consists of English-speaking conservatives who would
rather stand with the Quebec Liberal party on constitutional matters
although they disapprove of the Liberals' economic and social policies.
The second category approves of the Union Nationale's stand on
constitutional matters but is closer to the Parti Quebecois in economic
matters and closer to the Quebec Liberal party in social matters; this
category is made up of French-speaking Union Nationale supporters
144 What Does Quebec Want?
of the younger generation. The third category is made up of the older
Union Nationale faithful: they approve of the nationalist stand of
their party, favor economic policies directed toward small and
medium-sized enterprises (like the younger generation and like the
dominant wing of the Parti Quebecois) and are opposed to the Parti
Quebecois's pro-labor stand and the Quebec Liberal party's social
policies, notably in education and welfare.
The Union Nationale is a coalition of groups, which have one thing
in common: they all stand in favor of private initiative and small and
medium-sized enterprises, and are all dissatisfied with the political
action of labor unions in Quebec. It would be hard to enlarge this
coalition because what it stands for can satisfy sympathizers of neither
the Parti Quebecois nor the Liberal party.
In an election, moreover, the choices made by voters reflect a
variety of motivations and influences. As an example, in the 1976
election, only seven per cent of the voters surveyed by sociologists
Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton put "independence" as the
most important issue of the campaign, while eight per cent put it as
the second most important issue. Another two per cent put "constitu-
tion" first, and seven per cent held it as the second most important
issue. High above these issues, according to the survey data, the voters
ranked "the economy", "public morality", and "right to strike". The
language question was seen as a more important issue than independ-
ence (and the other issues) by six per cent of the respondents. In other
words, even in 1976, the constitutional stand of a party was not of
overwhelming importance for its campaign strategy or for its electoral
success. As a matter of fact, the Union Nationale tried to play down
its constitutional option during the campaign. In its English-language
advertising, the Union Nationale did not even mention its proposal for
a new federalism, although it did it in its French-language advertising.
The electoral gains obtained by the Union Nationale were concen-
trated in two areas of the province. The first area was the English-
speaking western part of Montreal and the English-speaking southern
rural constituencies bordering the United States. The other area con-
tained traditional Union Nationale strongholds: the rural and semi-
rural constituencies located south of the St. Lawrence, between the
Richelieu and Chaudiere rivers. These areas are those where the ideas
upheld by the Union Nationale are strongest.
Third Options 145
Table 6—The Most Important Issues in the November 1976 Campaign
Ranked Ranked
first second
by by
The economy
The honesty of the
government
The right to strike
in the public sector
Independence
Bill 22 - and enrolment
in English schools
Canadianization of
the constitution
All issues equally
important/no answer/
don't know
Number of answers
41%
7%
(1,095) (1,091)
Source: A survey directed by sociologists Richard Hamilton and Maurice
Pinard, in Le Devoir, The Gazette and The Toronto Star, November 10, 1976.
A Third Option and the Referendum
In a referendum, just as in an election, the choices made by the voters
reflect a variety of motivations and perceptions, but instead of half a
dozen options, the ballot offers only two: black or white, yes or no.
Past experience, in countries such as France and Switzerland where
referendums have been held recently, shows that the party in power
normally has the support of its sympathizers and that smaller parties
usually carry considerable weight.
Four of the five recent French referendums worked out to the
advantage of the ruling Gaullist party. In September 1958, the Gaul-
lists got 80 per cent of the voters to approve their proposed constitu-
1A6 What Does Quebec Want?
tion. The referendums of January 1961 and April 1962, concerning the
status of Algeria, were also won by the Gaullists and put an end to the
Algerian independence conflict: the GauUists got 75 per cent of the
votes cast in the first referendum and 90 per cent in the second. The
October 1962 referendum, providing for the election of the French
president by direct universal popular suffrage for a seven-year term,
was another Gaullist victory: in spite of the opposition of all the other
parties, the Gaullists got 60 per cent of the popular vote. The only
referendum which "failed" in modern France was the April 1969
referendum proposing a substantial governmental decentralization,
labelled "regionalization". The idea was opposed by traditional elites,
who benefited from the status quo, by the left-wing parties, who
opposed anything that looked Gaullist, and by some people such as
Valery Giscard d'Estaing who normally supported de Gaulle. The
result was 47 per cent for de Gaulle, 53 per cent against, and it forced
the General's resignation.
A study of voting behavior and party strategies in referendums held
in France, Switzerland and other countries provides useful ideas on
the politics of constitutional referendums. The first point worth noting
is that, just as in an election, the decision on how to vote in a
referendum is the result of numerous influences, one of which, and
not necessarily the strongest, is the precise wording of the question.
Among the factors taken into account, one of the most important is
related to "perspective": is the proposed text the result of a negotia-
tion, or a compromise proposal aimed at a settlement, or a starting
position in a renewed conflict? Does the proposed text focus on
language, or on economic growth, or on representative and efficient
government?
The alliance which is formed in support of the proposed text is
another very important factor. Party strategy and the interests of
various pressure groups usually determine the nature of such an alli-
ance. Perhaps the most interesting questions concern the possible
strategy of the Union Nationale. The third option which has been
advanced by the Union Nationale cannot take it to power in an
election, unless the party is able to gain support from some former
Liberals, some former Parti Quebecois sympathizers and some former
Creditistes. But to achieve this, it must find interests that all these
people share with Union Nationale supporters.
In 1973, Union Nationale leader Gabriel Loubier tried to stand for
every option that seemed to have the support of a majority: a middle-
Third Options 141
of-the-road constitutional option, a moderately progressive social
stand, and so on. He met with failure because the voters could not
reconcile the conflicting elements in Loubier's platform as easily as he
could. Those who were pleased with the social stand of the party were
not satisfied with its tradition, while those who used to support the
Union Nationale were not happy with its new social policy. Loubier
and his candidates got 146,206 votes in the October 1973 election, a
loss of more than 400,000 from the 564,544 the voters had given to the
Union Nationale three years before.
In a referendum, the support given by the Union Nationale to one
or the other option would largely depend on its future electoral
strategy. If the potential clientele of the Union Nationale in a future
election is to come from the ranks of the Quebec Liberal party, its
interest would be in defeating the Liberals first in the referendum. In
such an eventuality, Parti Quebecois leaders could come up with a
question that appeared to be a compromise between its own constitu-
tional stand and the Union Nationale's constitutional option. The hope
of displacing the Liberals as the official opposition—and eventually,
the Parti Quebecois as the majority party—would be decisive for the
Union Nationale. A coalition of the Union Nationale and the Parti
Quebecois on the referendum question might appear a strange alli-
ance, but it is not an impossible one.
If the potential clientele of the Union Nationale was thought to
come from the ranks of the Parti Quebecois, its strategy would be
different. The Union Nationale leaders would then water down their
constitutional option and side with the Quebec Liberals. A coalition of
the Union Nationale and the Quebec Liberal party on the referendum
question would constitute such a tough opposition that the Parti Quebe-
cois would have to muster for full-time service every one of its 120,000
members in order to gain the required majority. But then, if the Parti
Quebecois won, that would probably kill the hopes of the opposition
leaders of ever gaining power in Quebec.
Any discussion of a third option for Quebec should take into
account electoral trends registered in Quebec since the 1950s (as
shown in table 7). It should be remembered that, even though the
choices offered to voters in a referendum are restricted to yes-or-no or
black-or-white alternatives, the influences at play remain numerous,
conflicting, and powerful. The alignment of the political parties,
finally, can be the most significant factor.
Table 7 - Distribution of Valid Ballots, as a Proportion of Voters on
the Electoral Lists (not as a proportion of total valid ballots) and
Distribution of Seats Among the Major Political Parties, Quebec
Assembly, 1935-1976 (in percentages)
Election
(year)
Voters
on lists
(number)
Valid
ballots
(number)
Number Liberal Party Union Nationale Parti Quebecois Other parties
of seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1935
1936
1939
1944
1948
1952
1956
1960
1962
1966
1970
1973
1976
726,551
734,025
753,310
1,864,692
2,036,576
2,246,889
2,393,350
2,608,439
2,721,933
3,222,302
3,478,891
3,762,709
4,025,118
536,361
569,325
563,297
1,345,518
1,513,825
1,679,272
1,845,729
2,096,597
2,136,966
2,324,829
2,872,970
2,970,709
3,361,963
90
90
86
91
92
92
93
95
95
108
108
110
110
37.0
32.4
40.5
28.5
28.5
34.4
34.3
41.2
44.3
34.0
37.5
43.2
28.2
53.3
15.6
81.4
40.3
8.7
25.0
21.5
53.7
64.1
46.3
66.6
92.7
25.5
36.0
44.6
29.3
25.8
37.9
38.5
40.1
37.5
33.0
29.5
16.2
3.9
15.2
46.7
84.4
17.4
52.8
89.1
73.8
77.4
45.2
32.6
51.9
15.5
0.0
10.0
—
_
—
_
—
-
_
_
_
_
19.0
23.8
34.6
_
_
—
_
_
—
_
_
_
6.5
5.5
62.7
0.8
0.5
4.9
17.8
7.9
1.9
3.5
1.7
1.2
8.6
9.8
8.0
2.8
0.0
0.0
1.2
6.9
2.2
1.2
1. 1
1. 1
3.3
1.8
11.4
1.8
1.8
Third Options 149
If the alignment of political parties depended on nothing but the
constitutional preferences of their most active members, chances are
that the Quebec Liberal party would find itself isolated. As Robert
Bourassa said repeatedly during the 1976 election campaign, the
Quebec Liberal party is the only genuine federalist party in Quebec,
and even at that it calls for Quebec control over immigration and
culture, including the media.
The most politically active citizens in Quebec are much more
nationalist in outlook than the whole of the population. This phenom-
enon is easily explained by the fact that the most active citizens come
from the ranks of those who are better educated and better paid, who
have more leisure or can afford more time, and who, generally, are
leaders in their community. Now these citizens are precisely those who
hold the strongest nationalist feelings and who are the most concerned
about the future of their society. As a result, all political parties are
run by people who favor greater constitutional changes than do the
party's sympathizers. The active membership of the Union Nationale
is definitely strongly nationalist and autonomist. But the most active
members do not decide everything.
The Quebec electorate is crisscrossed by lines of cleavage which
make it difficult for any party to gain a large majority in elections to
the National Assembly. The Quebec Liberal party, in 1970 and 1973,
was able to unite conflicting categories by focussing on the "independ-
ence question": it rallied the whole of the English-speaking electorate
as well as many well-to-do, traditionalist French-speaking voters on its
stand against separatism. At the same time, in 1970 and 1973, it got
the votes of French-speaking voters who favored the Liberals' advo-
cacy of large job creating government projects such as the James Bay
hydro complex and the Montreal Olympic games, and who supported
Liberal policies in the social sector.
In 1976, warnings against the separatist threat did not bring the
Liberals the expected results, partly because the Parti Quebecois soft-
pedalled the issue and partly because many voters were not prepared
to take the threat seriously a third time in a row. The great govern-
ment projects had proved very costly while the number of jobs created
was not that large. These projects had been an opportunity for pilfer-
ing public coffers, and suspicion of corruption in government had
mounted to a very high level. Finally, the social policies of the Liberal
government had been revealed as somewhat deceptive: language legis-
lation had antagonized significant segments of the electorate, and the
150 What Does Quebec Want?
government's handling of labor disputes, especially in the public sec-
tor, had raised considerable opposition.
In Quebec today the electorate is divided on economic policies. It is
divided on labor policies, it is divided on educational standards and
education management, and it is divided on the constitutional formula.
These cleavages are worsened by the division between French-speak-
ing Quebecers and English-speaking Quebecers, and by the differences
in interests and perspective between Montreal voters and the rest of
the electorate.
There is a broad consensus in the French-speaking Quebec elector-
ate, however, on the great objectives of national survival, economic
development, and Quebec government supremacy, the last objective
reflecting a desire to make Quebec the homeland of French-speaking
Canadians. The Parti Quebecois holds an advantage over its rivals
from this point of view because it is the party which has taken the
clearest stand in support of these three fundamental objectives,
although they are also upheld, with lesser emphasis, by every other
party. The Parti Quebecois also holds another advantage in that it is
unchallenged in Montreal's French-speaking constituencies, while it
can gain many new votes outside Montreal by maintaining and adver-
tising its economic platform, which favors the interests of the prov-
ince's regions.
The compromise favored by some members of the Parti Quebecois,
full economic union between a federal Canada and a politically sover-
eign Quebec, could turn out to constitute the much-sought third
option.* In any case, if a third option is to prevail in the next few
years, it can only do so with the support of the Parti Quebecois
membership.
Two members of the Parti Quebecois parliamentary representation
have been quoted on this point, Claude Morin, minister of intergov-
ernmental affairs, and Gerald Godin, member for the district of
Mercier.
Notes to Part II
1. New Democratic Party of Quebec, Platform, page 10, translation.
2. Claude Morin, Le pouvoir quebecois... en negotiation (Montreal:
Les Editions de Boreal-Express, 1972), pages 64-66.
3. Le programme, l'action politique, les statuts et reglements, edition
1975 (Montreal: Parti Queb6cois, 1975), page 5, translation.
4. Ibid.
5. Le Supplement du Samedi, Le Journal de Montreal, November
13, 1976.
6. Le programme, page 5, translation.
7. Ibid., page 18. The same text also appears in Un gouvernement
du Parti Quebecois s'engage (Montreal: Parti Quebecois, 1973),
page 72.
8. Rodrigue Tremblay, Independance et marche commun Quebec-
Etats-Unis (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1970).
9. Enough is Enough—The English and the '76 Election (Montreal:
Parti Quebecois, 1976), page 8.
10. Le coup du federalisme (Montreal: Parti Quebecois, 1973), page 7.
11. Ibid., page 11.
12. Le programme, page 13, translation.
13. Ibid., page 20.
14. Ibid., page 23.
15. Ibid., page 25.
16. See the Financial Post, April 30, 1977, pages 1, 4.
17. Le Devoir, March 24, 1977, page 1.
18. Le Devoir, March 23, 1977, page 2.
151
152 What Does Quebec Want?
19. Robert Bourassa, Bourassa Quebec! (Montreal: Les Editions de
l'Homme, 1970), page 11, translation.
20. Ibid., page 26.
21. Un nouveau programme d'action 1973 (Montreal: Parti Liberal du
Quebec, 1973), pages 75-77.
22. The Gazette, Montreal, October 30, 1976, page 40.
23. Reproduced in Le gouvernement du Quebec et la constitution
(Quebec: Office of Information and Publicity, 1968), pages 7-8,
translation.
CONCLUSION
Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau insists that the Quebec national-
ists will be unable to stand by their convictions when faced with the
economic consequences of their nationalism. An opinion survey spon-
sored by the CBC French network a few days after the November 15,
1976 election tends to support the views of Prime Minister Trudeau.
This survey was conducted by sociologists Maurice Pinard and
Richard Hamilton, who used the same methods and the same sample
as they had two weeks earlier when they were able to measure
accurately the relative strength of the parties competing in the election.
The survey showed that the new "fact" constituted by the election
results coincided with a dramatic drop in support for the "independ-
ence option". The survey taken during the first week of November
had shown that 18 per cent of the 1,097 respondents were in favor of
Quebec's becoming an independent country, 58 per cent were against,
and 24 per cent abstained on the question. Two weeks later, 11 per
cent of the 1,088 respondents were in favor, 68 per cent were opposed,
and 26 per cent were abstaining—a drop of seven percentage points in
15 days!
If it is true that Quebec nationalists will be unable to sustain their
convictions in the face of the economic consequences of their national-
ism, they might give a majority to the sovereignty-association formula
in a public opinion poll and, in a referendum, defeat such an option.
This possibility reassures many people who would otherwise be more
concerned about the survey data which show that the long-term trend
favors the sovereignty option. Yet in spite of occasional drops such as
the one revealed by Pinard and Hamilton, the long-term trend is a one
percentage point growth per year in the support given to the inde-
pendence option in Quebec.
153
154 What Does Quebec Want?
If it is true that Quebec nationalists are afraid of the economic
consequences of their nationalism, it may be possible to negotiate even
with a Quebec government pledged to achieve Quebec independence.
A comparison of the "starting positions" held by Quebec premiers in
federal-provincial conferences since 1945 with their "final stands" after
months of frustrating negotiations makes it clear that, so far, Quebec
nationalist leaders have always compromised. Many people expect the
same of the Parti Quebecois. They believe that the whole affair is
nothing but a background for negotiation, and state peremptorily that
Quebec will never separate.*
Politicians such as federal Finance Minister Jean Chretien, on the
other hand, argue that the very vocal, well-educated, "separatist"
minority will never surrender to any compromise. People must learn to
live with "separatism" but not to fear "separatism" or "separation",
because "separation" will never happen. In the same line of thought,
others argue that the presence of the English-speaking minority in
Quebec is a guarantee that there will never be a majority behind the
sovereignty-association formula. English-speaking Quebecers are
thought to be solidly opposed to such a formula, and, totaling 20 per
cent of the Quebec electorate, they are able to stop up to 65 per cent
of the French-speaking Quebecers from having their say.
This may be reassuring for many Canadians, but will this English-
speaking bloc ultimately be an obstacle to sovereignty-association?
How many "federalist voters" will have already left Quebec by the
time the referendum is held? How many bilingual English-speaking
Quebecers will join the Parti Quebecois forces? How many Quebec
voters will find sovereignty less costly than an indefinite continuation
of the uncertainty that has already caused so many problems?
If a satisfactory compromise is not reached in the near future, the
long-term trend toward pro-independence sentiment is likely to be
maintained. And if it is maintained, the disruptive trends will con-
tinue. Some commentators link Quebec economic problems to the
action of the pro-independence movement.** In their view, "separa-
* Quotations to that effect are found every week in most newspapers.
For easy reference, see the Reader's Digest article on the future of
Canada in the October, 1977, issue of this widely read monthly.
** One example is provided by the April 1977 decision of Warnock
Hersey International Ltd. to move the 16 employees of its head office
out of Quebec. Its treasurer, C. G. Penney, "told The Montreal Star:
Conclusion 155
tism" has done more harm to the Quebec economy than factors such
as demography, geography and industrial structure. According to these
commentators, "separatist agitation" in Quebec has scared away small
and medium-sized investors as well as some larger manufacturing
firms. They have preferred to invest their capital in safer places. This
movement of investment capital out of Quebec, which was already
occurring as a result of the general westward trend of North American
economy, has been hastened by the separatist threat. Indeed, say some
people, the costs of Quebec's future independence are already being
paid every day.
Parti Quebecois members reply by saying that this tax on the future
will cease to apply when Quebec becomes independent. What Quebec
pays now is the price of fear: fear of the future, fear of change.
According to Parti Quebecois members, this price is the cost of a lack
of maturity on the part of too many voters; in a sense, these Parti
Quebecois members fully agree with Prime Minister Trudeau: if
French-speaking Quebecers give in to their fears, they will be unable
to hold to their nationalist convictions. As long as there is only
"separatist agitation", the price of fear will continue to be paid. The
Parti Quebecois members want to convince Quebecers to overcome
their fear and become "independent". Until now, they say, the federal
arrangement has been detrimental to French-speaking Quebecers, and
in the future it will be worse still—so let's change this and opt for a
better future. The Parti Quebecois leaders are trying to prove that the
economic consequences of Quebec's future independence will be bene-
ficial to French-speaking Quebecers. They think that most French-
speaking Quebecers will stand by their nationalist leanings when the
benefits of the Quebec nationalist stand become clear.
The debate on independence thus revolves around the discussion of
the costs and benefits of Quebec sovereignty. Members of the Parti
Quebecois tend to consider the costs as minor compared to the bene-
fits which could accrue to French-speaking Quebecers. Quebec sover-
eignty, in the view of the Parti Quebecois, would put an end to the
"If it had not been for the political factor I suppose we would not
have been moving out of Montreal." The Montreal Star, April 5 ,1977,
page H-l. For further comments, see Amy Booth's article, "Business
priorities play their part in that flight from Quebec", The Financial
Post, February 26, 1977, page 32. Also, Don Braid and Sheila Arno-
poulos, "Fear drives companies out", The Montreal Star, May 4, 1977,
pages A-l and A-10.
156 What Does Quebec Want?
costly duplication of public services. In the view of their opponents, it
would impose overhead costs which would offset any benefits, and it
would put an end to equalization payments. Parti Quebecois spokes-
men respond that in the long run equalization payments are paid for
by Quebec taxpayers. Opponents of the Parti Quebecois add that
sovereignty would scare away investment. Parti Quebecois members
reply that the nervousness of small investors is caused by a state of
uncertainty, which sovereignty would resolve.
The final argument of the Parti Quebecois is that, in a sovereign
Quebec, all governmental decisions applying to Quebec would be
made by Quebecers. The question then arises of the immediate costs
involved in moving part of the federal bureaucracy from Ottawa to
various locations in Quebec. How will the federal government's assets
and liabilities be divided and what will happen in the Canadian
North? According to Parti Quebecois leaders, the problem is not that
complicated. Quebec's share of federal assets and the federal debt will
be approximately 25 per cent. The costs of moving French-speaking
Ottawa civil servants who want to come to a location in Quebec will
be less than three per cent of one year's budget for the government of
an independent Quebec.
Parti Quebecois leaders have a reply to every major question. They
are seeking Quebec's sovereignty in order to satisfy what they perceive
to be the needs of French-speaking Quebecers. In their view, French-
speaking Quebecers run no risk of being the losers, because they are
not the owners. Owning very little, they have very little to lose—and
much to gain.
In a sense, the struggle which is developing in Quebec is primarily
one between the new social classes, who really do have much to gain,
and the traditional elites, both French and English. On one side, are
unionized workers and college graduates. On the other side, are the
business community and its professional associates. In another sense,
this struggle is between "integrists" and "pluralists". The "integrists"
include many Parti Quebecois activists, while the "pluralists" are typi-
fied by Prime Minister Trudeau. The "integrists" are trying to build a
new nation-state, Quebec; the "pluralists" are fighting on two fronts,
against Quebec nationalists and against English-speaking Canadian
"integrists".
Yet, in my view, a compromise can be reached, if only because of
the equilibrium between the opposing forces. The Quebec electorate is
divided by conflicting concerns: language, social class, age, regional
Conclusion 157
Economics of Split are Complicated
If the separatists win the referendum we would have to deter-
mine how the assets and liabilities of the Canadian federation
would be split up. Those who still cannot face such a possibility
would, I suppose, answer that whatever assets are physically in
Quebec will stay there, and the hell with any further discussions
about the rest!
It is not that simple, as even the most rabid colonialists or
colonized in so many countries have found out over the past 30
years.
Quebec has a share in all federal assets, whether located within
its boundaries or not, because it has paid for it. But it also must
share in the federal public debt because part of it was issued for
the benefit of its citizens. We must, therefore, come to some sort
of an agreement on a percentage to split assets as well as
liabilities.
To simplify somewhat, two percentages are of particular signif-
icance. The first has to do with population. Quebec has close to
28% of the present Canadian population. It is an important
figure in the sense that several public services are distributed
roughly according to population. The second significant percen-
tage has to do with personal income, which is the real basis for
so many taxes. Quebec's share comes out to something like 25%.
I respectfully suggest that after a couple months discussions, we
will probably compromise on a highly technical coefficient of
Should such a coefficient be confirmed, it will be applied to
both assets and debts.
Quebec Finance Minister Jacques Parizeau speaking to the Ontario
Economic Council.
Source: The Financial Post, April 30, 1977, page 21.
loyalty and others. A new balance could develop, and the crisis, now
15 years old, could be settled. However, it is hard to see the solution
in simply re-polishing the British North America Act, because such a
mild compromise would never satisfy the well-organized minority of
those who call for Quebec's independence.
If the clamour of Quebec's pro-independence minority is not qui-
158 What Does Quebec Want?
eted, the problems will continue. This pro-independence minority
seems wining to compromise, but only as far as "souverainete-associa-
tion": its activism can be calmed only through a fundamentally differ-
ent arrangement between Quebec and the rest of Canada.
Suggested Reading
Ares, Richard. Nos grandes options politiques et constitutionelles. Mon-
treal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1972.
Bergeron, Gerard. L'independance: oui, mais... Montreal: Les Editions
Quinze, 1977.
Bernard, Andre. Quebec: elections 1976. Montreal: Hurtubise HMH,
1976.
Black, Edwin R. Divided Loyalties: Canadian Concepts of Federalism.
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975.
Brossard, Jacques. L'accession a la souverainete et le cas du Quebec:
conditions et modalites politico-juridiques. Montreal: Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1976.
Burns, R. M., ed. One Country or Two? Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1971.
Chodos, Robert and Nick Auf der Maur, ed. Quebec: A Chronicle
1968-1972. Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1972.
Dion, L6on. Nationalismes et politique au Quebec. Montreal: Hurtubise
HMH, 1975.
Johnson, Daniel. Egalite ou independance. Montreal: Les Editions Ren-
aissance, 1965.
Joy, Richard J. Languages in Conflict. Toronto: McClelland and Stew-
art, 1972.
Larocque, Andre. Defis au Parti Quebecois. Montreal: Les Editions du
Jour, 1971.
Legault, Albert and Alfred O. Hero, ed. Le nationalisme quebecois a la
croisee des chemins. Quebec: Centre quebecois des relations interna-
tionales, 1975.
Levesque, Rene. An Option for Quebec. Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1968.
159